"WASHINGTON,
June 25, 2.35.
"MAJOR GENERAL McCLELLAN:
"We
have no definite information as to the numbers or position
of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's
statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand
men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson at
Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg
and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia
was threatened, and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing
to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram
from Fremont contradicted this rumor. The last telegram from Banks
says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people
decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last
two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is
circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a
view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is
at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear
to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted
to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, an
the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was
designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked
Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone
to Richmond in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like
a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now
is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly
designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think,
therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be
a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you
any further information on this subject that may be
received here.
"EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of
War."
(a)
Jackson's command consisted of nine brigades at this time.
Whiting with two brigades and Lawton with one had joined him after
the engagements at Cross Keys and Port Republic, at which time he
had only six brigades, three in Ewell's division, and three in his
own.
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE ON HIS HORSE, "TRAVELLER," 1867.
(By permission of A. H. Plecker)
Page 75
This movement had been made with such dispatch
and secrecy, that the approach of Jackson towards
Washington was looked for by the authorities at that
city, until he was in position to fall on McClellan's rear
and left.
Having started on my return to the army, without
having any knowledge of the contemplated movement,
on my arrival at Lynchburg I found that the fighting
had already begun with brilliant results. I hastened
on to Richmond and arrived there late in the afternoon
of the 28th of June. Though hardly able to take the field
Page 76
and advised by the surgeon not to do so, immediately on
my arrival in Richmond I mounted my horse, and with
my personal staff rode to General Lee's headquarters
at Gaines' house, north of the Chickahominy, for the
purpose of seeking a command and participating in
the approaching battles which seemed inevitable. I
arrived at General Lee's headquarters about 11
o'clock on the night of the 28th, and found him in bed.
I did not disturb him that night but waited until next
morning before reporting to him. The battles of
Mechanicsville and Chickahominy* had been fought on
the 26th and 27th respectively, and that part of the
enemy's army which was north of the Chickahominy
had been driven across that stream to the south side.
The troops which had been engaged in this work
consisted of Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and A. P. Hill's
divisions, with a brigade of cavalry under Stuart, from
the army around Richmond, and Jackson's command,
consisting of his own, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions.
All of these commands were still north of the Chickahominy,
and Magruder's, Huger's, McLaw's, and D. R.
Jones' divisions had been left on the south side to defend
Richmond, there being about a division at Drewry's and
Chaffin's Bluffs under Generals Holmes and Wise.
Magruder's, McLaw's and Jones' divisions consisted
of two brigades each, and were all under the command
of General Magruder.
A reorganization of the divisions and brigades of
the army had been previously made, and my brigade,
composed of troops from two different States, had been
broken up, and my regiments had been assigned to other
brigadier generals. On reporting to General Lee on the
morning of the 29th (Sunday), I was informed by him
that all the commands were then disposed of, and no
* So called by General Lee, though designated by subordinate
commanders as the battle of Cold Harbor or Gaines' Mill, according
to the part of the ground on which their commands fought.
Page 77
new arrangement could take place in the presence of
the enemy; but he advised me to return to Richmond
and wait until a vacancy occurred, which he said would
doubtless be the case in a day or two.
I rode back to Richmond that day, and on the next
day, the 30th, called on the Secretary of War, General
Randolph, who gave me a letter to General Lee,
suggesting that I be assigned to the temporary command
of Elzey's brigade of Ewell's division, as General Elzey
had been severely wounded, and would not be able to
return to duty for some time. On the day before, our
troops on the north of Chickahominy had crossed to
the south side in pursuit of the enemy, and were marching
towards James River, and Magruder had had an
engagement with the rear of the retreating column at
Savage Station on the York River Railroad. On the
afternoon of the 30th, I rode to find General Lee again,
and, being guided by reports of the movement of our
troops and, as I got nearer, by the sound of artillery, I
reached the vicinity of the battlefield at Frazier's farm,
just about the close of the battle near dark. This battle
had taken place between Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's
divisions and a large body of the enemy's retreating
forces. There had been a failure of other portions of
the army to come up as General Lee expected them to
do, but the enemy had been driven from the field with a
loss of some artillery and a considerable number in
killed, wounded and prisoners on his part.
I gave General Lee the letter of the Secretary of
War, and next morning he gave me an order to report
to General Jackson for the purpose of being assigned
temporarily to Elzey's brigade. This was the 1st of
July, and I rode past the battlefield of the day before
with our advancing troops, until we reached the road
leading from across White Oak Swamp past Malvern
Hill to James River, where I found the head of General
Jackson's column. I rode forward and found the General
on the road towards Malvern Hill with a cavalry
Page 78
escort, awaiting a report from some scouts who had
been sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position.
On reporting to General Jackson, he directed his
adjutant general to write the order for me at once,
but while Major Dabney, the then adjutant general,
was preparing to do this, the enemy opened with some
of his guns from Malvern Hill, and several shells fell
near us. This rendered an immediate change of quarters
necessary, and the whole party mounted at once and
retired to the rear, followed by the enemy's shells in
great profusion, as the cloud of dust arising from the
movement of the cavalry enabled him to direct his fire
with tolerable precision. As soon as we got out of
immediate danger, Major Dabney wrote me the necessary
order, on his knee, in a hurried manner, and I thus
became attached to the command of the famous "Stonewall"
Jackson. I found General Ewell's division in
the rear of Jackson's column, and upon reporting to
him the command of Elzey's brigade was at once given
me, it being then about ten o'clock p.m.
The brigade was composed of the remnants of seven
regiments, to-wit: the 13th Virginia, the 25th Virginia,
the 31st Virginia, the 44th Virginia, the 52nd Virginia,
the 58th Virginia, and the 12th Georgia Regiments. The
whole force present numbered 1,052 officers and men,
and there was but one colonel present (Colonel J. A.
Walker of the 13th Virginia Regiment), and two lieutenant
colonels (of the 25th and 52nd Virginia Regiments
respectively), the rest of the regiments being
commanded by captains. General Jackson's command at
this time was composed of his own division, and those
of Ewell, D. H. Hill, and W. H. Whiting, besides a
number of batteries of artillery. Ewell's division was
composed of Trimble's brigade, Taylor's Louisiana
brigade, the brigade to which I had been assigned, and
a small body of Maryland troops under Colonel Bradley
T. Johnson.
After remaining for some time in the rear, we finally
Page 79
moved forward past Willis' Church, to where a line of
battle had been formed confronting the enemy's position
at Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill's division had been formed
on the right of the road leading towards the enemy, and
Whiting's on the left, with an interval between his
right and the road into which the Louisiana brigade
of Ewell's division was moved. My brigade was posted
in the woods in rear of the Louisiana brigade, and
Trimble's brigade was formed in rear of Whiting's left,
which constituted the extreme left of our line. Jackson's
division was held in reserve in rear of the whole.
The enemy soon commenced a heavy cannonade upon
the positions where our troops were posted, and kept it
up continuously during the rest of the day. From the
position which I occupied, the enemy could not be seen,
as a considerable body of woods intervened, but many
shells and solid shot passed over us, and one shell
passed through my line, killing two or three persons.
We remained in this position until about sunset, and,
in the meantime, D. H. Hill on our immediate right and
Magruder on his right had attacked the enemy and
become very hotly engaged. Just about sunset I was
ordered to move my brigade rapidly towards the right
to support General D. H. Hill. General Ewell accompanied
me, and we had to move through the woods in a
circle in rear of the position Hill had first assumed, as
the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery prevented our
moving in any other route. As we moved on through
intricate woods, which very much impeded our progress,
we were still within range of the shells from the enemy's
numerous batteries, and they were constantly bursting
in the tops of the trees over our heads, literally strewing
the ground with leaves.
After moving through the woods for some distance
we came to a small blind road leading into an open flat,
where there had once been a mill on a creek which ran
through swampy ground between our left and the enemy.
On reaching the edge of the open flat I was ordered to
Page 80
halt the head of my brigade, until General Ewell rode
forward with a guide, who had been sent to show us
the way, to ascertain the manner in which we were to
cross the creek. The musketry fire was now terrific,
and reverberated along the valley of the creek awfully.
General Ewell soon returned in a great hurry and
directed me to move as rapidly as possible. As soon as
the head of the brigade, led by Lieut. Colonel Skinner
of the 52nd Virginia Regiment, emerged into the open
ground, General Ewell turned to him and directed him
to go directly across the flat in the direction he pointed,
cross the creek, and then turn to the left through the
woods into the road beyond, ordering him at the same
time to move at a double quick. Before I could say
anything General Ewell turned to me and said, "We
will have to go this way," and he dashed off in a gallop
on a road leading to our right along the old dam across
the creek into another road leading in the direction of
the battlefield.
I had no option but to follow him, which I did as
rapidly as possible, but this required me to make a
considerable circuit to get to the point where I expected
to meet the head of my brigade. There were now
streams of our men pouring back from the battlefield,
and on getting into the road leading towards it I lost
sight of my brigade, as a woods intervened. I did not
find it coming into the road at the point where I
expected, and after some fruitless efforts to find it, in
which I was often deceived by seeing squads from the
battlefield come out of the woods in such manner as to
cause me to mistake them for the head of my brigade,
I rode back to find if it was crossing the flat.
I saw nothing of it then, and the fact was, as afterwards
ascertained, that, after crossing the creek, Colonel
Skinner had turned to the left too far, and moved
towards the battlefield in a different direction than that
indicated. His regiment had been followed by three
others, the 13th, 44th, and 58th Virginia Regiments,
Page 81
but the 12th Georgia and 25th and 31st Virginia Regiments,
being in the rear in the woods when the head of
the brigade moved at a double quick, were left behind,
and when they reached the flat, seeing nothing of the
rest of the brigade, they crossed the creek at the dam
and took the wrong end of the road. In the meantime,
while I was trying to find my brigade, General Ewell
had rallied a small part of Kershaw's brigade and
carried it back to the field. I saw now a large body of
men, which proved to be of Toombs' brigade, coming
from the field and I endeavored to rally them, but with
little success.
While I was so engaged, the 12th Georgia of my
own brigade came up, after having found that it had
taken the wrong direction, and with that regiment under
the command of Captain J. G. Rogers, I moved on,
followed by Colonel Benning of Toombs' brigade with
about thirty men of his own regiment. Lieutenant
Early, my aide, soon came up with the 25th and 31st
Virginia Regiments, which he had been sent to find.
On reaching the field, I found General Hill and General
Ewell endeavoring to form a line with that part of
Kershaw's brigade which had been rallied, while Ransom's
brigade, or a part of it, was moving to the front.
I was ordered to form my men in line with Kershaw's
men, and this was done in a clover field in view of the
flashes from the enemy's guns, the guns themselves and
his troops being concealed from our view by the darkness
which had supervened. General Hill's troops had
been compelled to retire from the field as had been the
greater part of Magruder's, after a very desperate
struggle against immense odds, and a vast amount of
heavy siege guns and field artillery. I was ordered to
hold the position where I was and not attempt an
advance.
The enemy still continued a tremendous fire of artillery
from his numerous guns, and his fire was in a circle
diverging from the main position at Malvern Hill so as
Page 82
to include our entire line from right to left. This fire
was kept up until after nine o'clock, and shells were
constantly bursting in front and over us, and crashing
into the woods in our rear. It was a magnificent
display of fireworks, but not very pleasant to those exposed
to it. After being gone some time the part of Ransom's
brigade which had advanced in front of us, retired to
the rear. Trimble's brigade had arrived from the extreme
left, and was posted in my rear. Generals Hill
and Ewell remained with us until after the firing had
ceased, and then retired after giving me orders to remain
where I was until morning and await further
orders. During the night General Trimble moved his
brigade back towards its former position, and General
Kershaw and Colonel Benning retired with their men
for the purpose of looking after the rest of their commands.
My three small regiments, numbering a little over
three hundred in all, were left the sole occupants of that
part of the field, save the dead and wounded in our immediate
front. My men lay on their arms in the open
field, but they had no sleep that night. The cries and
groans of the wounded in our front were truly heart-rending,
but we could afford them no relief. We observed
lights moving about the enemy's position during
the whole night, as if looking for the killed and wounded,
and the rumbling of wheels was distinctly heard as of
artillery moving to the rear, from which I inferred that
the enemy was retreating.
At light next morning I discovered a portion of the
enemy's troops still at his position of the day before,
but it was evidently only a small portion and it turned
out to be a heavy rear guard of infantry and cavalry
left to protect the retreating army. The position which
he had occupied and which our troops had attacked was
a strong and commanding one, while the whole country
around, over which our troops had been compelled to
advance, was entirely open several hundred yards and
Page 83
swept by his artillery massed on the crest of Malvern
Hill.
In my view were nearly the whole of our dead and
wounded that had not been able to leave the field, as
well as a great part of the enemy's dead, and the sight
was truly appalling. While watching the enemy's movements
I observed to our right of his position and close
up to it a small body of troops lying down with their
faces to the enemy, who looked to me very much like
Confederates. I moved a little further to my right for
the purpose of seeing better and discovered a cluster
of Confederates, not more than ten or twelve in number,
one of whom was also looking with field glasses at the
body which I took to be a part of our troops. On riding
up to this party, I found it to consist of General Armistead
of Huger's division with a few men of his brigade.
In answer to my question as to where his brigade was,
General Armistead replied, "Here are all that I know
anything about except those lying out there in front."
He had spent the night in a small cluster of trees around
some old graves about two hundred yards from my right.
After viewing them with the glasses, we were satisfied
that the troops lying so close up to the position
of the enemy were Confederates, and it turned out that
they consisted of Generals Mahone and Wright of
Huger's division with parts of their brigades. The
whole force with them only amounted to a few hundred,
and this body constituted the whole of our troops making
the assault who had not been compelled to retire.
They maintained the ground they had won, after mingling
their dead with those of the enemy at the very
mouths of his guns, and when the enemy finally retired
this small body under Mahone and Wright remained the
actual masters of the fight. Before the enemy did retire,
a messenger came from Generals Mahone and Wright,
with a request for the commander of the troops on the
part of the field where I was to advance, stating that
the enemy was retreating and that but a rear guard
Page 84
occupied the position. I was, however, too weak to
comply with the request, especially as I was informed
that their ammunition was exhausted.
Shortly after light, General Ewell came in a great
hurry to withdraw my command from the critical position
in which he supposed it to be, but I informed him
that the enemy had been retreating all night, and he sent
information of that fact to General Jackson.
Early in the morning a captain of Huger's division
reported to me that he had collected nearby about one
hundred and fifty men of that division, and he asked
me what he should do with them. I directed him to
hold them where they were and report to General
Armistead, who was on the field. About this time a
considerable body of the enemy's cavalry advanced
towards us on the road from his main position of the
day before, as I supposed for a charge upon us, and I
requested General Armistead to take command of the
detachment from Huger's division and aid me in
repulsing the charge, but, while I was making the necessary
preparations, a few shots from a small party of
infantry on the left of the road sent the cavalry back
again. By this time our ambulance details had commenced
to pass freely to the front for our dead and
wounded, and they began to mingle freely with those
of the enemy engaged in a similar work. For some
time a sort of tacit truce seemed to prevail while details
from both armies were engaged in this sad task, but
the enemy's rear guard finally retired slowly from our
view altogether, on the road toward Harrison's Landing.
It was not until this movement that I discovered
what had become of the rest of my brigade, and I then
ascertained that when the missing regiments had arrived
on the battlefield at a different point from that intended,
Colonel Walker had taken charge of them. It was dark
by that time, and they got in amongst some of the
enemy's regiments, when Colonel Walker quietly withdrew
them, as the force into which they had got was
Page 85
entirely too strong for him to attack. My brigade did
not draw trigger at all, but it sustained a loss of thirty-three
in killed and wounded from the artillery fire of
the enemy. During the 2nd it commenced raining, and
before night the rain was very heavy, continuing all
night. After being employed for some time in picking
up small arms from the battlefield, my command was
moved to a position near where we had been in line, the
day before, and there bivouacked with the rest of the
brigade, which had returned to that point the night
before.
At the battle of Malvern Hill, the whole army of
McClellan was concentrated at a very strong position,
with a limited front and both flanks effectively protected.
General Lee's entire army was likewise present,
and it was the first time during the seven days' fighting
around Richmond that these two armies had thus
confronted each other.
McClellan's army, however, was so situated that each
portion of it was in ready communication with, and in
easy supporting distance of, every other part, so that
the whole was available for defence or attack, while
such was the nature of the ground over which General
Lee's army had to move to get into position, and in
which it was drawn up after it got in position, that
communication between the several commands was very
difficult, and movements to the support of each other
still more difficult.
General Lee made the attack, and it was his purpose
to hurl the greater part of his army against the
enemy, but there had been much delay in getting some
of the commands into position, owing to the difficulties
of the ground and an unfortunate mistake as to roads.
When the attack was made, it was very late in the
afternoon, and then, from the want of concert produced
by the want of proper communication, only a portion
of our troops advanced to the attack of the enemy. The
troops which did so advance consisted alone of D. H.
Page 86
Hill's division of Jackson's command, Magruder's command
of three small divisions of two brigades each,
and three brigades of Huger's division, in all fourteen
brigades.
From some mistake in regard to the signal for the
advance, D. H. Hill, hearing what he supposed to be
that signal, and was probably intended as such,
advanced to the attack on the enemy's front with his five
brigades alone, and for some time confronted the whole
force at Malvern Hill, but after a desperate conflict
and a display of useless valor, was compelled to retire
with heavy loss. Magruder's command, including
Huger's three brigades, was then hurled upon the enemy
by brigades, one after the other, but those brigades
were likewise, compelled to retire after making in vain
the most heroic efforts to force the enemy from his
position.
In the meantime, Holmes' division of three brigades,
Jackson's division of four brigades, Ewell's division
of three brigades, and Whiting's division of two
brigades, were inactive, while Longstreet's and A. P.
Hill's divisions, of six brigades each, were held in
reserve some distance in the rear. It is true two
brigades of Ewell's division, and Jackson's whole
division, were ordered to the support of D. H. Hill after
his command had been compelled to retire, but it was
only to be thrown into confusion by the difficulties of
the way and the approaching darkness, and to be exposed
to a murderous fire of artillery, for it was then
too late to remedy the mischief that had been done.
In addition to all this, our troops had to advance over
open ground to the attack of the enemy's front, while
exposed to a most crushing fire of canister and shrapnel
from his numerous batteries of heavy guns and field
pieces massed on a commanding position, as well as to
a flank fire from his gunboats in James River, as it was
impossible from the nature of the ground and the position
of the flanks to turn and attack either of them.
Page 87
Moreover, such was the character of the ground occupied
by us that it was impossible to employ our artillery,
as in attempting to bring the guns into action on the
only ground where it was possible to use them, they
could be knocked to pieces before they could be used
with effect, and such was the result of the few experiments
made. Longstreet's and Hill's divisions were
held in reserve because they had been heavily engaged
at Frazier's farm the day before, but why the rest of
Jackson's command was not thrown into action I cannot
say, unless it be that the difficulty of communicating,
and the impossibility of seeing what was going on on
our right, prevented the advance from that quarter from
being known in time. Certain it is that I was not aware
of the fact that it was any other than an affair of artillery,
until ordered to General Hill's support, as the roar
of the artillery drowned the sound of the small arms.
General Hill states that his division numbered ten
thousand men at the commencement of the fighting
north of the Chickahominy, and he had sustained
considerable loss in that fighting. General Magruder says
his force of three divisions (six brigades) numbered
about thirteen thousand men when the movement to the
north of the Chickahominy began, and he had been
severely engaged at Savage Station. Huger's three
brigades numbered perhaps seven or eight thousand,
certainly not more. Our troops engaged could not, therefore,
have numbered over thirty thousand, and was
probably something under that figure, while McClellan
was able to bring into action, to meet their assault on
his strong position, his whole force, or very nearly the
whole of it.
The loss in the two armies was very probably about
equal, and we were left in possession of the battlefield,
and all the abandoned muskets and rifles of both armies,
besides those pieces of artillery abandoned on the
retreat, and some wagons and ambulances, but all this
did not compensate us for the loss of valuable lives
Page 88
sustained, which were worth more to us than the material
of war gained or any actual results of the battle
that accrued to our benefit.
Both sides claimed the victory, but I do not think
any advantage was gained by either army from the
battle, though McClellan made good the retreat of his
shattered army to the very strong position at Harrison's
Landing. If General Lee's plans for the battle had been
carried out, I have no doubt that it would have resulted
in a crushing defeat to the enemy.
On the 3rd of July the army was put in motion again,
and Jackson's, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions moved
around to the left and approached McClellan's new position
by the road leading from Long Bridge to Westover,
Ewell's division being in front. On the 4th we arrived in
front of the enemy, and advanced, with Ewell's division
in line of battle, and skirmished in front, until we
encountered the enemy's skirmishers, when our progress
was arrested by an order from General Longstreet, who
had come up. We remained in line skirmishing heavily
with the enemy for a day, when we were relieved by
Whiting's division. It was now judged prudent not to
attack the enemy in this position, as it was a strong one
with very difficult approaches, and on the 8th our army
retired, the greater part of it returning to the vicinity
of Richmond, thus leaving McClellan to enjoy the consolation
of having, after near twelve months of preparation
on the most gigantic scale and over three months
of arduous campaigning, accomplished the wonderful feat
of "a change of base."
McClellan in his report (Sheldon & Co.'s edition of
1864) shows that there was an aggregate present in his
army on the 20th of June, 1862, of 107,226, of which there
were present for duty 4,665 officers and 101,160 men,
making the aggregate present for duty 105,825. See
page 53. On page 239, he says: "The report of the
Chief of the 'Secret Service Corps,' herewith forwarded,
and dated 26th of June, shows the estimated strength
Page 89
of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown,
to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same
report puts his numbers on the 26th of June at about
180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding
their organization warrants the belief that this estimate
did not exceed his actual strength."
He seems to have been troubled all the time with
the spectre of "overwhelming numbers" opposed to him,
and that he should have believed so when he had "Professor
Lowe" with his balloons to make reports from
the clouds, and his "Chief of the Secret Service" and
"intelligent contrabands," to fool him with their inventions,
may be perhaps conceded by some charitable
persons, but that he should have written such nonsense
as the above in 1863, and published it in 1864, is perfectly
ridiculous. If the United States Government with
its gigantic resources and its population of 21,000,000
of whites could bring into the field for the advance on
Richmond only 105,000 men, and some fifty or sixty
thousand men for the defence of Washington, how was the
Confederate Government, with its limited means, its
blockaded ports, and its population of less than 6,000,000
of whites, to bring into the field, to oppose this one of
several large armies of invasion, 180,000 men, and if it
could get the men where were the arms to come from?
When I was at General Lee's headquarters, on the
night of the 28th of June, at Gaines' house, General
Longstreet, who occupied a part of the same house and
had accompanied General Lee from the commencement
of the operations on McClellan's flank and rear, informed
me that, when the movement commenced, we had
about 90,000 men in all, including Jackson's command,
60,000 being employed in the movement north of the
Chickahominy, and 30,000 being left on the south side
for the protection of Richmond. This latter number included
the troops at Drewry's Bluff and Chaffin's Bluff.
This statement was elicited in reply to a question by me,
in which I expressed some surprise at the boldness of the
Page 90
movement, and asked how it was possible for General
Lee to undertake it with his force. General Longstreet
had no reason to underestimate the force to me, and his
estimate was a sanguine one, and, I think, perhaps rather
too large, as it was based on the idea that General Jackson's
force was stronger than it really was.
The very active campaign and rapid marching of
that part of Jackson's command which had been employed
in the valley, had very much reduced its strength,
and the brigades and regiments were very weak. The
whole force was probably somewhere between eighty and
ninety thousand, and certainly did not exceed the latter
number. A very large portion of the army was armed
with smooth-bore muskets, and it was not until after
the battles around Richmond, and of second Manassas,
that we were able to exchange them for rifles and minie
muskets captured from the enemy.
The movement of General Lee against McClellan was
a strategic enterprise of the most brilliant character,
and at once demonstrated that he was a general of the
highest order of genius. Its results, independent of the
capture of artillery, small arms, and stores, were of the
most momentous consequences, as it relieved the capital
of the Confederacy of the dangers and inconveniences
of a regular siege for a long while, though it had not
resulted in the destruction of McClellan's army as General
Lee had desired, and the army and country fondly
hoped; but in a thickly wooded country, where armies
can move only along the regular roads, and move in
line of battle or compact columns along those roads,
there are facilities for the escape of a beaten army which
one accustomed to reading of European wars cannot well
understand. This was peculiarly the case in the country
through which McClellan retreated, where the impracticable
character of the swamps and woods enabled him
to conceal his movements and to protect his trains, rear,
and flanks by blocking up the roads and destroying
bridges.
Page 91
General McClellan, it must be confessed, displayed
considerable ability in conducting the retreat of his
army after it was out-manoeuvred and beaten,
notwithstanding the excessive caution he had shown on the
Potomac and at Yorktown, and I think there can be no
doubt he was the ablest commander the United States
had in Virginia during the war, by long odds. During
the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two
armies were more nearly equal in strength than they
ever were afterwards.
Page 92
CHAPTER IX.
BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN.
AFTER McClellan had been safely housed at his new
base on James River, Major General John Pope, of the
United States Army, made his appearance in Northern
Virginia, between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers,
at the head of an army called the "Army of Virginia,"
and composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and
Fremont, the latter being then under Sigel. General
Pope issued a vain-glorious address to his troops, in
which he declared that he had never seen anything of
the "rebels" but their backs; and he talked largely about
making his "headquarters in the saddle," and looking
out for the means of advancing, without giving thought
to the "lines of retreat," which were to be left to take
care of themselves. He certainly was producing great
commotion in the poultry yards of the worthy matrons,
whose sons and husbands were absent in the service of
their country, when General Lee sent "Stonewall"
Jackson to look after the redoubtable warrior.
After remaining in camp several days near Richmond,
Ewell's and Jackson's divisions were ordered to Gordonsville
under General Jackson, and, taking the lead,
Ewell's division arrived about the 15th of July. On
the next day after our arrival, a body of the enemy's
cavalry, having crossed the Rapidan, advanced through
Orange Court-House towards Gordonsville, and my
brigade and the Louisiana brigade were moved out with
a regiment of cavalry for the purpose of intercepting the
retreat of this body, but it made its escape across the
Rapidan by swimming that river, as the water was high.
Ewell's division went into camp near Liberty Mills on
the Rapidan, on the road from Gordonsville to Madison
Court-House, and I remained there, with occasional
movements when approaches of the enemy's cavalry
Page 93
were reported, until the 7th of August. In the mean
time, Jackson's force had been reinforced by the
division of A. P. Hill, and there had been skirmishing
and fighting between our cavalry and that of the enemy
in Madison County and at Orange Court-House.
General Jackson ordered a forward movement to be
made on the 7th of August, and on that day Ewell's
division crossed into Madison at Liberty Mills, and
moved down the Rapidan toward Barnett's Ford,
bivouacking for the night near that point. Early next
morning, we moved past Barnett's Ford, driving a small
detachment of the enemy's cavalry from the Ford, and
took the road for Culpeper Court-House. General
Beverly Robertson's cavalry now passed to the front and
had a skirmish and some artillery firing with the enemy's
cavalry at Robinson's River, where the latter retired.
We crossed Robinson's River and bivouacked north of it
at the mouth of Crooked Creek, Robertson's cavalry
going to the front some two or three miles.
On the morning of the 9th, I was ordered by General
Ewell to move forward in advance to the point occupied
by our cavalry some three or four miles ahead of us,
and to put out strong pickets on the road coming in from
the right and left. My brigade had now increased in
strength to something over 1,500 officers and men for
duty, by the return of absentees. As we moved forward,
the 44th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Scott, and six
companies of the 52nd Virginia were detached to picket
the side roads. Robertson's cavalry was found at a position
about eight or nine miles from Culpeper Court-House,
not far from Cedar Run, and in his front, in some
open fields, bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in view,
watching his movements. On our right was Cedar Run
or Slaughter's Mountain, and between it and Culpeper
road were the large open fields of several adjacent farms
in the valley of Cedar Run, while the country on the
left of the road was mostly wooded.
After General Ewell came up, my brigade was moved
Page 94
to the right towards the mountain, for the purpose of
reconnoitring, and a section of the battery attached
to it was advanced to the front under Lieutenant Terry
and opened on the cavalry in our view. This elicited a
reply from some of the enemy's guns concealed
from our view in rear of his cavalry, but no
infantry was visible. My brigade was then moved
back to the Culpeper road and along it about a mile, to
its intersection with a road coming in from Madison
Court-House, where it remained for some hours.
Shortly after noon, Captain Pendleton, of General
Jackson's staff, came with an order from the General,
for me to advance on the road towards Culpeper Court-House,
stating that General Ewell would advance on the
right, over the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain,
with the rest of the division, and that I would be supported
by Brigadier General Winder with three brigades
of Jackson's division, which would soon be up; but I
was ordered not to begin the movement until I received
information from General Winder that he was ready to
follow me.
While waiting for the message from General Winder,
General Robertson and myself reconnoitred the position
of the enemy's cavalry, and the country immediately in
my front, for the purpose of ascertaining how I would
advance so as to surprise the force immediately in front
of us. Just ahead of me, the Culpeper road crossed a
small branch, a tributary of Cedar Run, and then passed
for some distance through a thick woods, leaving a
narrow belt on the right of it. Between this belt and
the mountain the country was an undulating valley,
consisting of several adjoining fields.
All of the enemy's cavalry visible was in the field in
this valley, and the position where my command was
posted was hidden from its view by an intervening ridge,
which crossed the road diagonally from the woods into
the fields and fell off into the low grounds on the small
branch mentioned. No infantry had yet been discovered,
Page 95
and we were in doubt whether the enemy had any in the
vicinity. On the left of the road was a long, narrow
meadow on the branch, and as my brigade could not
march along the road except by flank, nor without great
difficulty through the woods if deployed in line, I determined
to form it in the meadow out of view of the
enemy, and then advance obliquely across the road,
against his cavalry, following it through the fields on a
route parallel to the road.
About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, a messenger came
from General Winder saying that he was ready to follow
me, and I commenced my movement. The brigade
was formed in line in the meadow, on the north of the
branch, with the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Walker,
thrown out as skirmishers to cover the front and flank
of the left of the brigade, which had to pass obliquely
through the corner of the woods. It then advanced to
the ridge behind which the enemy's cavalry was posted,
the right regiment (12th Georgia) moving by flank so as
to avoid observation, and forming in line as it reached
the ridge, when the whole moved over the crest and came
in view of the cavalry, which scampered off in a great
hurry, receiving as it went a slight volley at long range,
by which one or two saddles were emptied.
The brigade then swung around to the left and moved
forward in line for about three-fourths of a mile, until
we reached a farm road leading from Mrs. Crittenden's
house on our right across the Culpeper road, Colonel
Walker still continuing to cover the left, by moving with
his regiment extended as skirmishers into the woods
across the road, until we came to the farm road. At this
latter point the Culpeper road emerged from the woods
and ran along the left of a field in our front, by the side of
the woods to its termination, where it passed between
a cornfield on the right and a wheatfield on the left.
Colonel Walker immediately re-formed his regiment on
the left of the brigade and we advanced across the farm
road into the field beyond, to the crest of a ridge, where
Page 96
we discovered a considerable body of cavalry on the
opposite side of the wheatfield, on a high ridge over
which the Culpeper road ran, and three batteries of
artillery opened on us, from over the crest of the ridge
in front.
No infantry had yet been seen, but the boldness with
which the cavalry confronted us and the opening of the
batteries, satisfied me that we had come upon a heavy
force, concealed behind the ridge on which the cavalry
was drawn up, as the ground beyond was depressed. I
therefore halted the brigade, causing the men to cover
themselves as well as they could by moving back a little
and lying down, and then sent word for General Winder
to come up. The position which I now occupied was
in an open field on Mrs. Crittenden's farm. Immediately
to my right and a little advanced, was a clump of cedars,
and from that point the ground sloped off to our right
to a bottom on a prong of Cedar Run, the whole country
between us and Slaughter's Mountain consisting of open
fields. The northern end of the mountain was opposite
my right and about a mile distant. On my left was the
woods mentioned, which was very dense and extended for
a considerable distance to the left.
In front of this woods, about a hundred yards from
my left, was the wheat field, in a hollow, or small valley,
and immediately in my front was the cornfield, and a
small branch ran from the wheatfield through the cornfield,
to which the ground sloped. On the farther side of
the wheatfield was the high ridge on which the enemy's
cavalry was formed, and beyond which his batteries
were posted; and it extended across the road into the
fields on the right, but was wooded on the left of the
road. It was on and behind this ridge the enemy's batteries
were posted, and it was in the low ground beyond
that I supposed, and it subsequently turned out, his infantry
was masked.
Immediately after sending for General Winder, I sent
back for some artillery, but this request had been
Page 97
anticipated, and Captain Brown, with one piece, and Captain
Dement, with three pieces of their respective batteries
of Maryland artillery, soon came dashing up, and were
posted at the clump of cedars on my right. They immediately
opened on the enemy's cavalry and his batteries,
causing the former speedily to retire through the woods
over the ridge. Those guns continued to be served with
great efficiency during the action and rendered most
effectual service.
As there was a long interval between my right and
the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain, where General
Ewell was, I posted the 12th Georgia Regiment,
under Captain Wm. F. Brown, on that flank, to protect
the guns which were operated there. During all this
time the enemy poured an incessant fire of shells upon
us, and we were looking anxiously for the opening of
Ewell's guns from the mountain, and the arrival of
Winder. General Winder came up as rapidly as possible,
and, when he arrived, he took position on my left,
and at once had several pieces of artillery brought into
action with good effect. Ewell's guns had by this time
opened and a brisk cannonading ensued.
From the position I occupied, I had an excellent view
of the whole ground--except that beyond the ridge where
the enemy's infantry was kept concealed,--and seeing
that a force could be moved from our left around the
wheatfield, under cover, so as to take the enemy's batteries
in flank, I sent information of the fact to General
Winder; but, in a very short time afterwards, the glistening
bayonets of infantry were discovered moving stealthily
to our left, through the woods on the ridge beyond
the wheatfield, and I sent my aide, Lieutenant Early, to
warn General Winder of this fact, and caution him to
look out for his flank. Lieutenant Early arrived to find
General Winder just mortally wounded by a shell, while
superintending the posting of some batteries at an advanced
position, and the information was given to General
Jackson who had now arrived on the field.
Page 98
After the artillery fire had continued some two hours
from the time it was first opened on me, the enemy's
infantry was seen advancing through the cornfield in my
front, but it halted before getting within musket range
and lay down. His line overlapped my right and I sent
a request to General Jackson for a brigade to put on that
flank, which was promised.
Before it arrived, however, several pieces of the artillery
battalion attached to A. P. Hill's division, which
was just coming up, dashed in front of my brigade down
the slope to within musket range of the enemy in the
cornfield, and commenced unlimbering, when the enemy's
whole force rose up and moved forward. I saw at once
that these pieces would be captured or disabled unless
relieved immediately, and my brigade was ordered
forward at a double quick. On reaching the guns, the
brigade halted and opened fire on the enemy, checking
his advance and enabling the artillery to open on him
with canister. At the same time a heavy force of infantry
had moved through the wheatfield, and fire was
opened on it from the brigades of Jackson's division on
my left, which were posted in the edge of the woods
adjoining the field, and the fight became general, raging
with great fury. Brown's and Dement's guns opened
with canister, and the 12th Georgia was brought from
the right and posted on the crest of a small ridge, leading
out from the main one around in front of the clump
of cedars on my right, so as to have a flank fire on the
enemy immediately in front of the brigade.
Just as I had made this arrangement, Thomas'
brigade of Hill's division came up to my support as
promised, and I posted it on the right of the 12th Georgia,
behind the crest of the same ridge, which was so shaped
that Thomas' line had the general direction of the main
line, but was in advance of it. The arrival of this
brigade was very timely, as the enemy was advancing
with a line overlapping my right considerably. Thomas
confronted this part of the opposing force, and effectually
checked its progress, strewing the ground with the
Page 99
killed. While posting this brigade, the left of my own
brigade was concealed from my view, and as soon as I
had given Colonel Thomas his instructions, I rode to
see what was the condition of things on that part of the
line. On getting to where I could see, I discovered that
it had given way, and the men of several regiments were
retiring rapidly to the rear, while a portion of the enemy
had crossed the little stream in front of where my left
had been. The only thing now standing, as far as I
could see, was Thomas' brigade on my right, the 12th
Georgia, four companies of the 52nd Virginia, and part
of the 58th Virginia.
It was a most critical state of things, and I saw that
the day would probably be lost, unless I could hold the
position I still occupied. I could not, therefore, go to
rally my retreating men, but sent my Assistant Adjutant
General, Major Samuel Hale, to rally them and bring
them back, while I rode to the rest of my troops and
directed their commanders to hold on to their positions
at all hazards. On my giving the directions to Captain
Brown of the 12th Georgia, he replied: "General, my
ammunition is nearly out, don't you think we had better
charge them?" I could not admit the prudence of the
proposition at that time, but I fully appreciated its gallantry.
This brave old man was then 65 years old, and
had a son, an officer, in his company. The position was
held until other troops were brought up and the greater
part of the retreating men rallied, and the day was thus
prevented from being lost.
The enemy had penetrated into the woods on my
left, and the brigades of Jackson's division there posted
had been driven back, after a desperate conflict. The
left of the line had thus given way, and the enemy had
got possession of the woods, from which he had poured
a galling fire into the rear of my regiments on the flank,
which had been thrown into confusion, and compelled
to retire in some disorder. Colonel Walker of the 13th
Virginia had withdrawn his own regiment and part of
the 31st Virginia in good order, after they had been
Page 100
almost surrounded by the enemy. Only my own brigade,
Thomas' brigade, and the three brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged up to this time, but some
of the other brigades of Hill's division were now coming
on the field, and being at once ordered into action, the
temporary advantage gained by the enemy was soon
wrested from him, and he was forced back into the wheatfield,
and then across it over the ridge beyond.
Colonel Walker with the 13th Virginia, and part of the
31st, and Captain Robert D. Lilley with part of the 25th
Virginia, returned to the attack while the woods on our
left was being cleared of the enemy, and participated in
his final repulse. Finding himself being driven from the
field, after sunset, the enemy made a desperate effort
to retrieve the fortunes of the day by a charge with
cavalry. We had no regular line formed at this time,
and our men were much scattered in advancing, when a
considerable body of cavalry came charging along the
road from over the ridge, towards the position where
the left of my brigade and the right of Jackson's division
had rested during the action. Without being at all disconcerted
or attempting to make any formation against
cavalry, small regiments nearby, among which was the
13th Virginia, poured a volley into the head of the approaching
cavalry, when it had got within a few yards,
causing it to turn suddenly to its right up through the
wheatfield, followed by the whole body, which made its
escape after encountering a raking fire from our troops
further to the left, by which many saddles were emptied.
The attack on the enemy was thus resumed and he was
driven entirely from the field.
We were ordered to pursue on the road towards Culpeper
Court-House, and the division of General A. P.
Hill was placed in front, my brigade following it. Pursuit
was made for two miles, when the enemy's reinforcements,
coming to the aid of the beaten troops, were encountered,
and there was some skirmishing after dark
between Hill's leading brigade and the enemy, and an
affair between one of our batteries and some of the
Page 101
enemy's artillery, but night put an end to any further
operations. During the night, General Jackson ascertained
that Pope's whole army had concentrated in his
front, and he therefore determined not to attack him.
In moving forward in pursuit of the enemy from the
field, my brigade rejoined the rest of the division under
General Ewell, and, after operations for the night were
suspended, we bivouacked about where the enemy's infantry
had been masked when I first encountered his batteries.
The two brigades with General Ewell had not
been engaged, but his artillery had done good service,
and prevented any attempt to flank us on the right.
On the morning of the 10th (Sunday), after some
manoeuvring on our part, and a little shelling from the
enemy, we moved back and covered the battlefield with
our troops, while the wounded were being carried off,
and the small arms abandoned by the enemy were being
gathered. Later in the day we moved farther back and
took position in rear of the battlefield, Ewell's division
being posted on the end and side of Slaughter's Mountain,
and the other divisions crossing the Culpeper road
on our left. We remained in this position all night and
next day, but there was no fighting, as each army awaited
the advance of the other.
On Monday, the 11th, the enemy requested a truce
for the purpose of burying his dead, which was granted,
until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and subsequently extended,
at his request, to give him time to complete the
burial--the arrangements on our side being under the
superintendence of General Stuart, and on the side of
the enemy under that of Brigadier General Milroy.*
*Milroy, in his report, states that the truce was requested by us,
but General Jackson says it was applied for by the enemy, and no one
will doubt his word. I know that the extension was applied for by
Milroy or his staff officer, for I was on the ground in communication
with General Stuart at the time. This same Milroy was himself prevented
by me from riding to the rear of the ground on which the
enemy's dead lay, and he witnessed the taking from the field, under
my directions, of very large quantities of small arms, which had been
abandoned by Banks' men on the day of the battle.
Page 102
I went on the field under General Ewell's orders, to
superintend the burial of a portion of our dead, who had
not been buried by their proper commanders. I found
on the field, stacked up, a very large quantity of excellent
rifles, which the division, detailed to gather them up,
omitted to carry off. Some of the enemy's men were
taking these rifles, but I made them desist, and demanded
that a part already carried off, under direction of a staff
officer of General Sigel, should be brought back, which
was complied with. I then sent for a detail from my
brigade and had these arms carried off in wagons sent
to me from the rear, there being six full wagon loads.
While this work was going on, I heard a Federal soldier
say: "It is hard to see our nice rifles going that way,"
to which another replied: "Yes, but they are theirs,
they won them fairly."
The enemy had very large details on the field, and
several general officers rode on it, while the burial was
going on. This work was finally concluded a little before
dark, when the truce was concluded. The enemy buried
on this day over six hundred dead, a very large proportion
of which were taken from the cornfield in front of
the positions occupied by Thomas' and my brigade on
the day of the battle. My detail buried the bodies of
98 of our men, nearly the whole of which were taken
from the woods in which the brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged. From the want of sufficient
tools on our part and the hardness of the ground where
we buried our men, our work was not completed until
about the same time the enemy completed his.
On returning to my brigade, I found our troops preparing
to move back to our former position south of the
Rapidan, as the army of Pope concentrated in our front
was entirely too large for us to fight. Our movement to
the rear commenced immediately after dark, Hill's
division bringing up the rear of the infantry and our
cavalry that of the whole army. On the next day, the
12th, Ewell's division recrossed at Liberty Mills and
Page 103
returned to its old camps in that vicinity, the withdrawal
of our entire force having been effected without serious
molestation from the enemy. In this action, Banks
commanded the Federal troops immediately on the field, but
Pope came up at its close with a portion of McDowell's
Corps and the whole of Sigel's.
The loss in my brigade was 16 killed and 145 wounded,
and the loss in General Jackson's whole command was
223 killed, 1,060 wounded and 31 missing, making a
total loss of 1,314. The enemy's loss in killed and
wounded very greatly exceeded ours, and we captured
400 prisoners, including one Brigadier General (Prince),
besides securing one piece of artillery and more than
5,000 small arms.
Pope, or at least his soldiers, had now seen something
more of the "rebels" than their backs, and he was
soon to see other sights.
Shortly after our return from the battle, Lawton's
brigade was transferred from Jackson's division to
Ewell's, and Starke's Louisiana Brigade, newly created
out of regiments which had been attached to other
brigades during the battles around Richmond, and had
accompanied Hill's division, was attached to Jackson's
division. General Jackson's command, as now constituted,
was composed of fourteen brigades, to-wit: four
in his own and Ewell's divisions each; and six in Hill's
division, besides the artillery attached to the divisions
(about four batteries to each); and Robertson's cavalry
which was co-operating with us.
Page 104
CHAPTER X.
OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.
THE presence of General Jackson in the vicinity of
Gordonsville, again bewildered the minds and excited
anew the fears of the Washington authorities. The
spectre of "overwhelming numbers" at Richmond and
of a speedy advance on the Federal Capital now assumed
a fearful shape, and McClellan was ordered to remove
his army from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek as
rapidly as possible, for the purpose of uniting with Pope,
and interposing for the defence of Washington--Burnside,
with 13,000 men from the North Carolina coast on
his way to join McClellan on James River, having been
previously diverted from that point to Fredericksburg
on the Rappahannock.*
* The
following correspondence taken from McClellan's report is
interesting, as it exhibits the bewilderment of the Federal authorities
and the hallucination under which McClellan himself continued to
labor in regard to the strength of General Lee's
forces:
"WASHINGTON, July
30,
1862, 8 P.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B.
McCLELLAN:
"A dispatch just received from
General Pope, says that deserters
report that the enemy is moving south of James River, and that the
force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that he be pressed in that
direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case.
"H.
W. HALLECK, Major
General."
WASHINGTON, July 31, 1862,
10 A.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B.
McCLELLAN:
"General
Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be
evacuating Richmond, and falling back on Danville and
Lynchburg.
"H. W. HALLECK, Major
General."
"WASHINGTON,
August 6, 1862.
MAJOR GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN:
"You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and small batteries
of artillery to Burnside's command at Aquia Creek. It is reported
that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.
"H. W.
HALLECK, Major General."
The
following is an extract of letter from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, 1862, explaining the reason for the order for
the removal of the troops from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek.
"Allow
me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and
your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's force around
Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they
have and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. General
Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your
effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are about thirty
miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the
enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers
upon one or the other, as he may elect."
"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, BERKLEY,
August 14, 1862, 11 p.m.
"Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be
away to-morrow night. Everything done to carry out your orders. I
don't like Jackson's movements, he will suddenly appear where least
expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning.
"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General."
"MAJOR GENERAL
HALLECK, Washington, D. C."
Page 105
The execution of the order given to McClellan on
the 3rd of August for the evacuation of his base on James
River, was not completed until the 16th. In the meantime,
General Lee had ordered the divisions of Longstreet,
Hood (formerly Whiting's), D. R. Jones, and
Anderson (formerly Huger's), to Gordonsville for the
purpose of advancing against Pope, and the three first
named arrived about the 15th of August, Anderson's
following later. The greater part of Stuart's cavalry was
also ordered to the same vicinity.
On the 15th Jackson's command moved from its
camps and concentrated near Pisgah Church on the road
Page 106
from Orange Court-House to Somerville Ford on the
Rapidan, preparatory to the movement forward. While
here the 49th Virginia Regiment, Colonel William Smith,
joined my brigade. Pope's army, then reinforced by
the greater part of Burnside's Corps under Reno, was
in the County of Culpeper, north of the Rapidan; but
before we were ready to move it commenced to fall back
to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.
On the 20th, our whole army, now consisting of two
wings under Longstreet and Jackson respectively, and
Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Rapidan--Longstreet at
Raccoon Ford, and Jackson at Somerville Ford,--the
cavalry having preceded them early in the morning.
Jackson's wing, comprising the same force he had at
Cedar Run, camped at Stevensburg on the night of the
20th. On the 21st he moved past Brandy Station on
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the direction of
Beverly's Ford on the Rappahannock. Jackson's division
under Brigadier General Taliaferro was in front
and moved to the ford, where there ensued some
cannonading, and a fight between a portion of our cavalry
and the enemy on the northern bank. Ewell's division
bivouacked in the rear of Taliaferro near St. James'
Church.
On the morning of the 22nd the division moved up
to the vicinity of the ford, where the cannonading still
continued. It was then moved to the left, across Hazel
River at Wellford's Mill, towards Freeman's Ford,
Trimble's brigade being left at Hazel River to protect
our trains from a movement of the enemy from across
the Rappahannock. At Freeman's Ford, a portion of
Stuart's cavalry was found, and an artillery fight was
progressing with the enemy's batteries on the opposite
bank. The three remaining brigades passed to the left
from Freeman's Ford, and moved by a circuitous route
through the woods and fields towards the bridge at
Warrenton Springs. Late in the afternoon, Lawton's brigade
moved to the bridge at the Springs for the purpose of
MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER
Page 107
crossing, and my brigade, followed by Hays' (formerly
Taylor's) under Colonel Forno of the Louisiana Infantry,
was moved to the right, under the superintendence
of General Ewell, and crossed over about a mile
below the Springs, on an old dilapidated dam.
Hays' brigade was to have followed, but as it was
nearly dark when my brigade succeeded in getting over,
and the crossing was very difficult, that brigade was
left on the south bank until next morning. General
Ewell ordered me to occupy a pine woods or thicket in
front of the place at which I had crossed, and to establish
communications with General Lawton, the whole of
whose brigade it was expected would be crossed over
at the Springs. There had been a hard rain before I
was ordered to cross the river, and it was still raining
slightly. As soon as General Ewell left me, I moved
my brigade into the woods indicated, and established
my left near a road found leading from the Springs
towards the lower fords, throwing out pickets on the
front and flanks. By this time it had become intensely
dark, and we could see nothing except when the flashes of
lightning gave faint glimpses of things around.
As soon as the brigade was established in its position,
Major A. L. Pitzer, a volunteer aide, was sent to seek
General Lawton for the purpose of opening communications
with him. After he had been gone for some time, he
came back with a sergeant and six privates of Federal
cavalry as prisoners, with their horses, equipments and
arms complete. This party had passed up the road a
few minutes before I had taken position near it, and, on
getting near the Springs and finding that place occupied
by a portion of our troops, was deliberating as to what
should be done when the Major rode into it. He was at
once hailed and forced to surrender himself as prisoner,
and his captors started with him down the road leading
past my left. On getting near the point at which he
knew my brigade was posted, the Major told the party
having him in charge that they must reverse positions,
Page 108
and when he explained the condition of things and stated
that General Lawton was on the right, my brigade on
the left with pickets all around, he succeeded in inducing
the whole of it to surrender to him and come quietly into
my camp, to avoid being fired upon by the pickets. After
this attempt, as it was very dark and quite late, I did not
renew that night the effort to communicate with General
Lawton.
During the night there was a very heavy rain, and by
light on the morning of the 23rd, the Rappahannock, or
Hedgeman's River, as it is here called, was so much
swollen as to defy all attempts at crossing except by
swimming, as the bridge at the Springs had been burned
by the enemy.
A messenger sent to find General Lawton soon returned
with the information that only one regiment of
Lawton's brigade, the 13th Georgia under Colonel
Douglas, and Brown's and Dement's batteries of four
guns each, had crossed at the Springs, the morning
before. As soon as this condition of things was ascertained,
I sent a messenger, who was directed to swim
the river, with a note for General Ewell or Jackson,
whichever might be first met with, stating that if the
enemy advanced upon us in force, the whole of our
troops on the north of the river must be captured, and
suggesting the propriety of my attempting to extricate
them by moving up towards Waterloo bridge, several
miles above.
Before this note could be delivered, I received a
verbal message from General Jackson, which had been
given across the river at the Springs and was brought
to me by a sergeant of one of the batteries, directing me
to move my brigade up to where Colonel Douglas' was,
take command of the whole force, and prepare for defence,
stating, at the same time, that there was a creek
running a short distance from the Springs into the river
below me, which was past fording also, and that no enemy
was in the fork of the river and this creek; and also
Page 109
informing me that he was having the bridge repaired
as rapidly as possible. Very shortly after the reception
of this message, I received a note from General Jackson,
in reply to mine, containing the same instructions conveyed
by his message, and directing me in addition, in
the event of the enemy's appearance in too heavy force
for me to contend with, to move up towards Waterloo
bridge, keeping close to the river; and stating that he
would follow along the opposite bank with his whole
force, to cover my movement.
I at once moved towards the Springs and found
Colonel Douglas occupying a hill, a short distance below
the buildings, which extended across from the river to
Great Run (the creek alluded to by General Jackson).
Colonel Douglas, on crossing the morning before, had
captured a portion of a cavalry picket watching the ford,
and there was still a small body on the opposite banks
of Great Run with which he had had some skirmishing.
Colonel Walker with the 13th and 31st Virginia Regiments
had been posted across the road leading from
below, about three-fourths of a mile from Colonel Douglas'
position, and I now posted the remaining regiments
of my brigade and the 13th Georgia along the hill occupied
by the latter, so as to present the front to any force
that might come from the direction of Warrenton, across
Great Run above, resting my right on the Run and my
left on the river. The artillery was also posted on this
line, and the whole concealed as much as possible by the
woods. In this position, Colonel Walker guarded my
rear, and my right flank was the only one exposed, but
that was safe for the present, as the creek was very high
and Colonel Douglas had commenced the destruction of
the bridges across it, which was soon completed.
The body of the enemy's cavalry on the opposite side
of Great Run continued to hover about my right flank
all the morning, and some companies were posted on that
flank to watch the creek. Some time during the morning,
General Jackson sent over an officer familiar with the
Page 110
country, to pilot one of the staff officers over the route
to Waterloo bridge, which it might be necessary to pass
over in case of emergency, and Major Hale was sent with
him to ascertain the road.
In the meantime, the creek began to fall, and in the
afternoon it was in a condition to be crossed.
It now began to be evident that the enemy was moving
up from below in very heavy force, and that my
command was in a critical condition, as large trains
were seen moving on the road, east and north of us,
towards Warrenton. Late in the afternoon a heavy
column of infantry with artillery made its appearance
on the hills beyond my right, but it moved with great
caution, and the enemy was evidently of the impression
that my force, which was concealed from his view, was
much larger than it really was. I now changed my front
so as to present it towards the force in sight, but this
movement was so made as to be concealed from the
enemy's view by the intervening woods.
About this time, General Robertson, who had accompanied
Stuart on a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope's headquarters, arrived from the direction of
Warrenton with two regiments of cavalry and two pieces
of artillery. After consulting with me, General Robertson
posted his two pieces on a hill north of the Springs,
which commanded a view of the enemy's infantry and
opened on it. This fire was soon replied to by one of
the enemy's batteries, and I sent two Parrott guns from
Brown's battery to the aid of Robertson's guns, which
were of short range. A brisk cannonade ensued and was
kept up until near sunset, with no damage, however, to
my infantry or artillery, but one or two shells fell into
one of Robertson's regiments which was in rear of the
battery, on the low ground near the Springs, doing some
slight damage.
After the cessation of the artillery fire and very near
dark about a brigade of the enemy was seen approaching
the bank of the creek opposite where my brigade was
Page 111
posted, and in a few moments it delivered a volley into
the woods, which was followed by three cheers and a
tiger in regular style. Two of Dement's Napoleons were
immediately run out to the left of my line, and opened
with canister upon the enemy, who was scarcely visible
through the mist which had arisen. This fire was, however,
so well directed and so rapid that the enemy was
soon driven back in confusion, and his cheering was
exchanged for cries and groans, which were distinctly
audible to those in his front. The volley delivered by
the enemy was entirely harmless, and my men reserved
their fire with great coolness, until there should be
greater need for it. A very short time before this affair,
the 60th Georgia Regiment of Lawton's brigade, under
Major Berry, had crossed over on the bridge, which was
now in a condition for the passage of infantry, though
not for artillery or wagons, and had been placed in
position.
There was no further attack on me, but it was now
very certain, from the noise of moving trains and artillery
and the reports of scouts, that a very heavy force
was being massed around me, with a view of cutting me
off. I drew in Colonel Walker closer to my main force,
as he reported that the enemy had crossed the creek on
the road he was guarding and were massing in his front;
and I sent a messenger to General Jackson, after dark,
with information of the condition of things and the
suggestion that I be reinforced sufficiently to hold my
ground or be withdrawn. The remainder of Lawton's
brigade was crossed over on the temporary bridge, and
when General Lawton himself arrived, which was about
1 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, he informed me that he had
seen written instructions to General Ewell, directing to
cross over himself at daylight in the morning, and if it
was evident that the enemy was in heavy force, to recross
the troops, as it was not desired to have a general engagement
at that junction.
On receiving this information, I immediately
Page 112
dispatched a messenger to General Ewell, to inform him
that there could be no doubt that the enemy was in very
heavy force, and if I was to be withdrawn, it had better
be done that night without waiting for daylight, as by
moving to my left the enemy could post artillery, so as
to command the bridge and ford completely, and prevent
my being either withdrawn or reinforced, and that I was
satisfied that he was preparing for that very object. In
response to this, General Ewell came over himself a
little before three o'clock A.M., and, after consultation
with me, gave the order for recrossing, which was begun
at once, Lawton's brigade crossing first and carrying
over the artillery by hand, and my brigade following,
so as to complete the withdrawal a very little after dawn.
General Ewell had not been entirely satisfied that the
enemy was in such strong force as I represented, and
he was rather inclined to the opinion that movements I
had observed indicated a retreating army. To satisfy
him, we remained behind until the advancing skirmishers
of the enemy made it prudent for us to retire, and we
then rode across the bridge in rear of my brigade. Soon
Sigel's whole corps, supported by those of Banks and
Reno, moved to the position which I had occupied, and
a very heavy cannonading followed.
My command was thus rescued from inevitable destruction,
for it would have been impossible for General
Jackson to have crossed his troops in time to arrest its
fate, as his only means of crossing the river consisted
of one narrow, temporary bridge, unsuitable for the passage
of artillery, and which the enemy could have commanded
from several positions beyond the reach of our
artillery on the south bank. Pope's whole army was in
easy supporting distance of the force sent against me,
and I had in part confronted that army on the 23rd and
the following night.
The men of my command, including Douglas' regiment,
had had very little to eat since crossing the river,
and were without rations, as there had been little opportunity
Page 113
for cooking since leaving the Rapidan; and they
had lain on their arms during the night of the 22nd in a
drenching rain; yet they exhibited a determined resolution
to withstand the enemy's attack at all hazards,
should he come against us.
After recrossing the river, Lawton's brigade and mine
retired to the vicinity of Jefferson for the purpose of
resting and cooking rations.
Page 114
CHAPTER XI.
CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.
ON the same morning I had crossed the river, Stuart,
with a portion of his cavalry, after crossing the river
above, had made a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope's headquarters at Warrenton Junction, and among
other things had captured Pope's dispatch book.
The captured correspondence showed that Pope was
being reinforced from the Kanawha Valley and also from
McClellan's army, and General Lee determined to send
General Jackson to the enemy's rear, to cut the railroad,
so as to destroy his communications and bring on
a general engagement before the whole of the approaching
reinforcements could arrive.
Jackson's wing of the army was put in motion early
on the morning of the 25th, with no wagons but the
ordnance and medical wagons, and with three days'
rations in haversacks, for a "cavalry raid with infantry."
Moving with Ewell's division in front, we
crossed the river at Hinson's Mill above Waterloo bridge,
and marched by a small place called Orleans to Salem,
near which place we bivouacked after a very long day's
march. On the morning of the 26th, we moved, with
Ewell's division still in front, past White Plains, through
Thoroughfare Gap in Bull Mountain to Gainesville on
the Warrenton Pike, and there turned off to the right
towards Bristow Station on the Orange & Alexandria
Railroad. At Haymarket, before reaching Gainesville,
we halted two or three hours to wait for Stuart to come
up with his cavalry, which had started that morning to
follow us, and did join us at Gainesville. Hays' brigade,
under General Forno, was in the advance of the division
on this day, and it arrived at Bristow Station a little
before sunset, just as several trains were approaching
from the direction of Warrenton Junction.
Page 115
There was but a small force of cavalry at Bristow,
which Colonel Forno soon dispersed, and he then arrested
and captured two trains of empty cars with their engines,
the first train which approached having made its escape
towards Manassas before the road could be sufficiently
obstructed, and other trains in the rear running back, on
hearing the alarm, towards Warrenton Junction. General
Trimble was sent, soon after dark, with two of his
regiments, to capture Manassas Junction, and in
conjunction with General Stuart succeeded in taking the
place and securing eight pieces of artillery, a considerable
number of prisoners and horses, a long train of
loaded cars, and a very large amount of stores of all
kinds. As soon as the remainder of Ewell's division
arrived at Bristow, it was placed in position to prevent
a surprise by the enemy during the night.
Very early on the morning of the 27th, Hays' brigade
and one regiment of Lawton's with a piece of artillery
were moved towards Kettle Run in the direction of
Warrenton Junction on a reconnaissance, and a train of cars
was seen re-embarking a regiment which had been sent
to drive off the "raiding party," but, on finding the
strength of our force, was about retiring. A shot from
one piece of artillery sent the train off in a hurry, and
one regiment of Hays' brigade was left on picket and
another regiment to tear up the railroad, with orders to
fall back skirmishing towards the main body, on the approach
of the enemy in force.
Trimble's other regiment, and the 12th Georgia,
which was now transferred from my brigade to his, were
sent to him at Manassas Junction this morning, and the
two other divisions of Jackson's command were ordered
to the same place. General Ewell had been ordered by
General Jackson to remain at Bristow with his three
remaining brigades to check any advance from Pope's
army along the railroad, but, if the enemy appeared in
heavy force, to retire upon the Junction, as he did not
desire a general engagement at this time. General Ewell
Page 116
accordingly disposed his command across the railroad
and facing towards Warrenton Junction as follows: my
brigade on the right, Lawton's on the left and Hays' in
the centre, the main body being posted on a slight ridge
covering the station. The 49th Virginia Regiment of my
brigade was moved to a ridge on my right, on the road
leading to and past Greenwich, and a regiment of Lawton's
brigade (the 60th Georgia), with one piece of
artillery, was advanced on the left of the railroad so
as to support Forno's two regiments which were in
front, while the batteries were posted so as to command
the approaches on our front and flanks.
In the afternoon indications were seen of the approach
of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton
Junction, and the wagons were ordered to Manassas. In
a short time the enemy advanced in force with infantry
and artillery, and the 6th and 8th Louisiana Regiments
which had been left in front fell back to a woods about
three hundred yards in front of the remainder of the
brigade. As soon as the enemy got within range, our
batteries opened on him from their various positions,
and the 6th and 8th Louisiana, and 60th Georgia Regiments
received him with well directed volleys, by which
two columns of not less than a brigade each were sent
back. The 5th Louisiana was sent to reinforce the 6th
and 8th, but by this time fresh columns of the enemy
were seen advancing, and it was apparent that his force
was larger than ours. As the position we occupied was
a weak one, and the enemy could very easily have turned
our flank by moving a force on the ridge to our right,
which he appeared to be doing, General Ewell determined
to retire in accordance with General Jackson's instructions.
The order for the withdrawal across Broad Run
was given, and I was directed to cover it with my brigade.
At this time the Louisiana regiments in front were
actively engaged, and a heavy column of the enemy was
moving against them. Lawton's brigade was first drawn
back across the ford at the railroad bridge over Broad
Page 117
Run, and took position on the northern bank. Hays'
brigade then followed, the regiments engaged in front
having retired in good order. My own brigade had been
withdrawn from a pine woods in which it was posted,
and covered the movements of the others by forming
successive lines of battle back to the ford, and was then
crossed over by regiments successively. All the artillery
was successfully withdrawn, a part crossing at Milford
several hundred yards above the bridge, at which point
the 49th Virginia also crossed.
In the meantime, the enemy had been advancing in
line of battle on both sides of the railroad, preceded by
skirmishers, and keeping up a constant artillery fire. The
13th Virginia had been deployed as skirmishers to keep
those of the enemy in check, and kept them from advancing
beyond the station until all the rest of our force
had crossed the Run, when it also retired. Lawton's
brigade had been formed in line on the north bank of
the Run, and some batteries put in position. Hays'
brigade was ordered to proceed to Manassas Junction
as soon as it crossed, and my brigade was moved back
about three-fourths of a mile and formed in line on a
hill commanding the road to the Junction, and in full
view of the enemy, who had halted on the ridges near
Bristow Station.
In a short time afterwards, General Ewell with
Lawton's brigade passed through my line, which was
across the road, and ordered me to remain in position
until further orders should be sent me. He left a battery
with me and directed that one or two regiments should
be so moved and manoeuvred as to present the appearance
of the arrival of reinforcements to my assistance.
This was done, and a small party of the enemy which had
crossed the Run, and was moving along the railroad, was
driven back by a few shots from the artillery, but the
enemy's main force, which consisted of the advance
division of Pope's army under Hooker, did not come
further than the station.
Page 118
Shortly after dark, under orders from General Ewell,
I retired to the Junction, where my men filled their haversacks
with rations of hard bread and salt meat from the
stores captured from the enemy, but this was all of the
plunder obtained at that place which they could get.
Our loss in this affair was comparatively slight and
was confined almost entirely to the 5th, 6th and 8th
Louisiana, and the 60th Georgia Regiments, which were
the only troops who drew trigger on our side, except the
13th Virginia when deployed as skirmishers to cover our
withdrawal. The enemy reported his loss at 300.
The two captured trains had been burned in the early
part of the day, and the railroad bridge across Broad
Run had been destroyed. A brigade of the enemy which
advanced towards Manassas, after having been landed
from a train coming from Alexandria, had been met by a
party of our troops moving out from the Junction and
routed, its commanding officer being killed.
As soon as Ewell's division had rested and broiled
a little meat, it moved from the Junction towards
Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run, and the brigades became
separated and bivouacked at different places, mine lying
down in the open field.
The other divisions had previously moved, and
Stuart proceeded to burn the trains, and such stores as
had not been carried off.
Page 119
CHAPTER XII.
THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON.
IT having become evident that Pope had found it
necessary to look after his "lines of retreat," and was
moving his whole army back for the purpose of falling
upon General Jackson's comparatively small force, the
latter determined to move to the left so as to be in a
position to unite with the right wing of General Lee's
army under Longstreet. Jackson's division, under
Brigadier General W. S. Taliaferro, had therefore been
moved on the night of the 27th to the vicinity of the
battlefield of the 21st of July, 1861, and A. P. Hill's to
Centreville, with orders to Ewell to move up, by the
northern bank of Bull Run, to the same locality with
Taliaferro early on the morning of the 28th. At dawn
on that morning, my brigade resumed the march, moving
across Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and then up the
north bank to Stone Bridge, followed by Trimble's
brigade. We crossed at a ford just below Stone Bridge,
and moved across the Warrenton Pike and through the
fields between the Carter house and the Stone Tavern,
where the battle of the 21st of July had begun, to the
Sudley road, near where Jackson's division was already
in position.
Lawton's and Hays' brigades had by mistake taken
the road to Centreville, but had now rejoined the rest
of the division, and the whole of the brigades were placed
under cover in the woods, north of the Warrenton Pike,
through which the Sudley road ran. Hill's division came
up from Centreville subsequently. In the meantime
Pope's whole army had been moving by various roads
upon Manassas Junction, with the expectation of finding
Jackson's force there, but in the afternoon the corps of
McDowell's en route for Manassas had been ordered to
move to Centreville, and a portion of it marched along
Page 120
the Warrenton Pike. Very late in the afternoon, Jackson's
division under Taliaferro was moved along parallel
to the pike, under cover of the woods, across the track
which had been graded for a railroad, until it passed the
small village of Groveton on our left. Ewell's division
followed Jackson's until the whole had crossed the railroad
track, and the two divisions were then halted and
formed in line facing the pike. General Ewell ordered
me to take command of my own brigade and Hays' and
form a double line in the edge of a piece of woods, with
my left resting on the railroad, and to await orders;
and he moved to the right with Lawton's and Trimble's
brigades.
My line was formed as directed, with my own brigade
in front and Hays' in rear of it, and as thus formed we
were on the left and rear of Starke's brigade of Jackson's
division, whose line was advanced farther towards
the pike. About sunset a column of the enemy commenced
moving past our position, and Jackson's division
and the two brigades with General Ewell moved forward
to attack him, when a fierce and sanguinary engagement
took place. While it was raging, and just before dark,
I received an order from General Jackson, through one
of his staff officers, to advance to the front, which I
complied with at once, my own brigade in line of battle being
followed by that of Hays.
While advancing, I received an order to send two
regiments to the right to General Jackson, and I detached
the 44th and 49th Virginia under Colonel Smith
for that purpose. On reaching the railroad cut in my
forward movement, I found it so deep that it was
impossible to cross it, and I had therefore to move to the
right by flank until I found a place where I could cross.
This proved to be a ravine with embankments on both
sides for a bridge or culvert, and I had here to pass
through by flank and form by file into line in front of a
marsh beyond. This brought me near the left of the
position to which Trimble's brigade had advanced, and I
Page 121
had passed a part of Starke's brigade on the railroad
track. While my brigade was forming in line it was
exposed to a galling fire of canister and shrapnel, and
before it was ready to advance the enemy had begun to
retreat and it had become so dark that it was impossible
to tell whether we should encounter friend or foe. I
therefore advanced no farther and Hays' brigade was
halted on the railroad; and in this position the two
brigades lay on their arms all night.
A short distance from me General Ewell was found
very severely wounded by a ball through the knee, which
he had received while leading one of the regiments on
foot, and I had him carried to the hospital, after having
great difficulty in persuading him to go, as he insisted
upon having his leg amputated before he left the ground.
Lawton's and Trimble's brigades lay on their arms
a short distance to my right, near the points where they
were at the close of the action, and both had suffered
heavily. The enemy had retired from our immediate
front, and we could hear the rumbling of his artillery
as he was moving off in the distance.
Page 122
CHAPTER XIII.
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.
THOUGH the force of the enemy, consisting of King's
division of McDowell's Corps moving on the left flank
of that corps, with which the engagement took place on
the afternoon of the 28th, had retreated in the direction
of Manassas, other troops had moved up to the vicinity,
and early next morning it was discovered that Pope was
moving his whole army against us from the direction
of Manassas and Centreville, to which point it had gone
in search of us.
It now became necessary to change our front to meet
the approaching columns, and Ewell's division, under the
command of Brigadier General Lawton as senior
brigadier, was formed in line facing Groveton, near
where it had lain on its arms the night before, on a ridge
running nearly at right angles to Warrenton Pike, with
its right, my brigade, resting on the pike. The other
divisions were retired behind the unfinished railroad on
our left, and the whole line faced towards the enemy. At
an early hour the enemy's batteries opened on us and
were replied to by ours. After this artillery firing had
continued for some time, the position of Ewell's division
was changed, and General Jackson in person ordered me
to move with Hays' brigade and my own, and Johnson's
battery of artillery, to a ridge north of the Warrenton
Pike and behind the railroad, so as to prevent the enemy
from turning our right flank, a movement from Manassas
indicating that purpose having been observed. Two of
my regiments, the 13th Virginia and 31st Virginia, under
Colonel Walker, were detached by General Jackson's
order and placed in position south of the pike, for the
purpose of watching the movements of the force that
was advancing from the direction of Manassas towards
our right.
Page 123
Hays' brigade and my own were formed in line on
the ridge indicated, in the edge of a piece of woods, and
skirmishers were advanced to the line of the railroad,
Johnson's battery being placed in position to command
my front. In the meantime our main line had been
established on the railroad a mile or more to my left,
and Lawton's and Trimble's brigades had been moved
so as to conform thereto. The artillery firing had continued
all the morning, on my left at our main position,
and there had been some infantry fighting. The two
regiments under Colonel Walker, by skirmishing, kept
the head of the force moving from Manassas on our
right in check, until the appearance of the leading
division (Hood's) of Longstreet's force on the Warrenton
Pike from the direction of Gainesville, which occurred
about ten or eleven o'clock A.M.
I remained in position until Longstreet's advance had
moved far enough to render it unnecessary for me to
remain longer, and, without awaiting orders, I recalled
Colonel Walker with his two regiments about one o'clock
P.M., and then moved the two brigades to the left, to
rejoin the rest of the division. I found General Lawton
with his own brigade in line in rear of the railroad, not
far from the position I had occupied, the previous morning,
before the fight, and Trimble's brigade was in line
on the railroad between Jackson's division and Hill's,
the former being on the right and the latter on the left.
Along this railroad Jackson's line was mainly formed,
facing to the southeast. The track of the road was
through fields and woods, and consisted of deep cuts
and heavy embankments, as the country was rolling.
The two brigades with me were formed in line in the
woods, in rear of Lawton's brigade, with Hays' on the
right of mine.
We remained in this position until about half-past
three P.M., and in the meantime the enemy was making
desperate attempts to drive our troops from the line of
the railroad, having advanced some heavy columns
Page 124
against Hill's brigades and been repulsed; and the battle
was raging fiercely in our front. Just about half-past
three, Colonel Forno, with Hays' brigade, was ordered
to advance to the assistance of one of Hill's brigades
which had been forced from his position, and he did so,
driving the enemy from the railroad and taking position
on it with his brigade. He was subsequently wounded
very seriously, while holding this position, by a sharpshooter,
and had to be removed from the field.
Some time after Forno's advance, a messenger came
from A. P. Hill, with the information that one of his
brigades, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, was
being very heavily pressed, and with the request that I
should advance to its support. I did so at once, without
waiting for orders, and moved directly ahead, as I was
informed the attack was immediately in my front; the
8th Louisiana Regiment under Major Lewis, which had
been sent to the wagons the day before to replenish its
ammunition and had just arrived, accompanying my
brigade. As I passed Lawton's brigade I found the
13th Georgia Regiment preparing to move forward under
the General's orders. I continued to advance until I
came to a small field near the railroad, when I discovered
that the enemy had possession of a deep cut in the railroad
with a part of his force in a strip of woods between
the field and the cut. General Gregg's and Colonel
Thomas' brigades, having very nearly exhausted their
ammunition, had fallen back a short distance, but were
presenting a determined front to the enemy.
My brigade, with the 8th Louisiana on its left, advanced
at once across the field, and drove the enemy
from the woods and the railroad cut, dashing across the
railroad, and pursuing the retreating force some two
or three hundred yards beyond, before I could arrest
its progress. The messenger from General Hill had
stated that it was not desired that I should go beyond
the railroad, but should content myself with driving the
enemy from it, as General Jackson's orders were not to
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advance but hold the line. I, therefore, drew my men
back to the railroad cut and took position behind it.
This charge was made with great dash and gallantry
by my brigade and the 8th Louisiana Regiment, and
very heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy with a
comparatively slight one to us, though two valuable officers,
Colonel William Smith of the 49th Virginia and Major
John C. Higginbotham of the 25th Virginia, were severely
wounded. At the time my brigade crossed the railroad,
the 13th Georgia advanced further to the right and
crossed over in pursuit.
This was the last of seven different assaults on General
Hill's line that day, all of which had now been
repulsed with great slaughter upon the enemy, and he
did not renew the attack, but contented himself with
furiously shelling the woods in which we were located.
Jackson's division had also repulsed an attack on his
front, and General Trimble was severely wounded during
the course of the day by an explosive ball from a
sharpshooter. General Jackson had accomplished his
purpose of resisting the enemy until General Lee with
Longstreet's force could effect a junction with him. The
latter force was now up and a part of it had been engaged
just about night with one of the enemy's columns.
Pope, in his report, claims that General Jackson was
retreating through Thoroughfare Gap, when his attack
arrested this retreat and compelled Jackson to take position
to defend himself, and that he drove our troops
several miles, but there was no thought of retreat, and
the various movements of our troops had been solely for
the purpose of defence against the enemy's threatened
attacks as he changed their direction.
Hill's brigades, to whose relief I had gone, went to
the rear to replenish their cartridge boxes and did not
return to relieve me after the close of the fight on the
29th. I had therefore to remain in position all night with
my men lying on their arms.
I had understood that some of Hill's brigades were
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to my left, but it turned out that they had also gone to
the rear to get ammunition and did not return; and very
early in the morning of the 30th, the enemy's sharpshooters
got on the railroad embankment on my left
and opened fire on that flank, killing a very valuable
young officer of the 13th Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant
Leroy. I thus discovered for the first time that my
flank was exposed, and the enemy's sharpshooters soon
began to cross the railroad on my left and advance
through a cornfield. I immediately sent word to General
Hill of this state of things, and, after some delay, some
brigades were sent to occupy positions on my left, who
drove the sharpshooters back. During the morning there
was very heavy skirmishing in my front, and the
skirmishers of my brigade, under Captain Lilley of the
25th Virginia, drove back a heavy force which was advancing
apparently for an attack on our position.
Subsequently our troops were arranged so as to place
Ewell's division in the centre, leaving Hill's division on
the left and Jackson's on the right, but when Lawton's
brigade was moved up, there was left space for only
three of my regiments, and leaving the 44th, 49th and
52nd Virginia Regiments on the line under General
Smith of the 49th, I retired about 150 yards to the rear
with the rest of the brigade. Hays' brigade, now under
Colonel Strong, had been sent to the wagons to get
ammunition and had not returned.
The fore part of the day was consumed by the main
body of the enemy and Longstreet's wing of the army in
manoeuvring and cannonading, but about four o'clock
P.M. the enemy brought up very heavy columns and
hurled them against Jackson's line, when the fighting
became very severe, but all of the attempts to force our
position were successfully resisted, and a very heavy
punishment was inflicted on the enemy. My three regiments
under Colonel Smith, participated in the repulse
of the enemy, and as he retired they dashed across the
railroad cut in pursuit, very unexpectedly to me, as I
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had given orders to Colonel William Smith not to advance
until the order to do so was given. His men, however,
had been incapable of restraint, but he soon returned
with them. In the meantime, I advanced the
other regiments to the front of the line that had been
vacated. Trimble's brigade, now under Captain Brown
of the 12th Georgia, and Lawton's brigade had participated
in this repulse of the enemy likewise.
The attack on the part of the line occupied by Jackson's
division had been very persistent, but Longstreet
now began to advance against the enemy from the right
and was soon sweeping him from our front. Some of
Hill's brigades also advanced and the enemy was driven
from the field with great slaughter. While this was taking
place, the other divisions of Jackson were ordered
to advance, and my brigade was soon put in motion in
the direction taken by Hill's brigades, advancing through
the woods in our front to a large field about a quarter
of a mile from the railroad. I halted at the edge of the
woods to enable the other brigades to come up, as I was
ahead of them, when General Jackson rode up and
ordered me to move by my left flank to intercept a body
of the enemy reported moving up Bull Run to our left.
I did so, moving along with skirmishers ahead of the
brigade until I came to the railroad, and then along that
until I came to a field.
It was now getting dark, and as my skirmishers
moved into the field they were fired upon from their left.
This fire came from a very unexpected quarter, and I
immediately sent to let General Jackson know the fact,
as it would have been folly to have advanced in the
direction I was going if it came from the enemy. A
message was soon received from General Jackson, stating
that the fire very probably came from some of Hill's
troops, and directing me to send and see. This had been
anticipated by sending a young soldier of the 44th Virginia,
who volunteered for the purpose, and he soon returned
with the information that the firing was from
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the skirmishers from Gregg's and Branch's brigades
of Hill's division who mistook us for the enemy. Fortunately
no damage was done, and I was moving on when
I received an order to advance to the front from where
I was, and in a few minutes afterwards another to move
back by the right flank, as the report of the movement
of the enemy around our left flank had proved untrue.
I found that the other brigades of the division had
bivouacked near where I had left them, and my own
did the same.
The enemy had been driven beyond Bull Run, and
was in retreat to Centreville, our pursuit having been
arrested by the approaching darkness.
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CHAPTER XIV.
AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY.
JACKSON'S command, after having rested on the
morning of the 31st, in the afternoon of that day was
put in motion for the purpose of turning the enemy's
position at Centreville. Crossing Bull Run at and near
Sudley's Ford, it moved to the left over a country road,
Jackson's division in front followed by Ewell's and Hill's
bringing up the rear, until the Little River Turnpike
was reached, when we turned towards Fairfax Court-House
and bivouacked late at night. Early on the morning
of September the 1st, the march was resumed, and
continued until we reached the farm of Chantilly in the
afternoon. The enemy was found in position, covering
the retreat of his army, near Ox Hill, not far from
Chantilly, and a short distance beyond which the Little
River Pike, and the pike from Centreville to Fairfax
Court-House, intersect.
General Jackson at once put his troops in position on
the ridge on the east of the Little River Pike, with his
own division on the left, Hill's on the right and Ewell's
in the centre; Hays' and Trimble's brigades only of
Ewell's division being on the front line, Lawton's and
mine being formed in the woods in their rear. As we
moved into position the enemy opened a heavy artillery
fire on us, and soon the action commenced with some of
Hill's brigades on the right, extending to Trimble's and
Hays' brigades. During this action a severe thunder
storm raged, and while it was progressing, General
Starke, then in command of Jackson's division, represented
to me that a heavy force was threatening his left,
between which and the pike there was a considerable
interval, and requested me to cover it with my brigade
to protect him from the apprehended danger.
After examining the position I reluctantly consented
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to yield to General Starke's entreaty, without awaiting
orders, as Hays' brigade was in my front and he represented
his situation as critical, and I proceeded to move
my brigade by the left flank to the point designated by
him. I had put myself on the leading flank, and while
moving I heard a considerable musketry fire, but as the
woods were very thick and it continued to rain I could
see only a short distance, and took it for granted that
the firing proceeded from the troops in front of where I
had been.
On reaching the position General Starke desired me
to occupy, which was but a short distance from the place
I had moved from, as his left was drawn back in a circle
towards the pike, I discovered that the 13th, 25th and
31st Virginia Regiments which were on my right had
not followed the rest of the brigade. I immediately sent
my aide, Lieutenant Early, back to see what had become
of the missing regiments, and he found them engaged
with a body of the enemy in their front. On ascertaining
this fact, I moved back at once and found that my
regiment had repulsed the force opposed to them and
inflicted considerable loss on it. Hays' brigade under
Colonel Strong had fallen back in considerable confusion
about the time I commenced my movement, and passed
through the three regiments on my right, followed by a
considerable force of the enemy. The commanding officers
had very properly detained those regiments, as the
affair was entirely concealed from my view, and they
had received the enemy's onset with great coolness,
driving him back out of the woods.
Colonel Strong had attempted to change front when
the enemy were advancing on him, and, being entirely
inexperienced in the management of a brigade, he had
got it into such confusion that it was compelled to retire.
The 8th Louisiana Regiment, under Major Lewis, had
been halted and formed into line immediately in rear
of my regiments, and the remaining regiments were soon
rallied and brought back by their respective commanders.
After quite a severe action, in which the enemy lost two
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general officers, Kearney and Stevens, he was repulsed
at all points, and continued his retreat during the night.
After the close of the action, Jackson's division was
withdrawn from the left to the rear, and Ewell's division
covered the point previously covered by General Starke,
and Hays' and Trimble's brigades, and the men lay
on their arms during the night. While Trimble's brigade
was engaged, the gallant old Captain Brown, of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, in command of the brigade, was
killed, and Colonel James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia
Regiment was subsequently assigned to the command of
the brigade, as it had no field officer present.
On the morning of the 2nd it was discovered that the
enemy had retired from our front, and during that day
Pope made good his escape into the fortifications around
Washington. He had now seen the "rebels" in various
aspects and found that his lines of retreat would not
take care of themselves; and very soon he was shipped
and sent to the northwest to look after the Indians in
that quarter.
This affair at Ox Hill closed the series of engagements
with the enemy under Pope, and it was again the
old story of the "rebels in overwhelming numbers,"
opposed to a small army of "Union soldiers." According
to Pope's account, his army was wearied out and
broken down by the fatigues of the campaign on the
Rappahannock, and the incessant marching and manoeuvring
to confront Lee's army, and was short of rations
and ammunition. It does not seem to have occurred to
him that the soldiers of the army which thus wearied his
own were at all susceptible of fatigue or hunger, or that
when his own rations were short, their chances of supplying
themselves were slim.
Pope's army had at the time of the battles of the
27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of August, been reinforced by
Burnside's corps under Reno, one brigade of Sturgis'
division from Alexandria, and the following troops
from McClellan's army: Heintzelman's corps, Porter's
corps, and the division of Pennsylvania reserves commanded
Page 132
by Reynolds. At the time of the affair at Ox
Hill he had been further reinforced by Franklin's and
Sumner's corps of McClellan's army, leaving but one
corps of that army (Keyes') which had not reached him.
His consolidated report of the 31st of July showed a
strength of 46,858 before he was joined by any of those
reinforcements and in the letter of Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, Pope's army is stated to be
about 40,000. In a telegram from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 12th of August, Burnside's force is stated to be
nearly 13,000.
General Lee's army at the time of these battles near
Manassas consisted of Jackson's wing of the army in
which there were three divisions of infantry containing
fourteen brigades, Longstreet's wing in which there were
four divisions of infantry containing fifteen brigades, and
two brigades of cavalry under Stuart. There was about
one battery of artillery of four guns for each brigade
attached to the divisions, and there was a reserve force
of artillery which may have numbered some eight or ten
batteries, but perhaps not so many.
Longstreet's command consisted of his own division,
seven brigades; Hood's division, two brigades; Jones'
division, three brigades; and Anderson's division, three
brigades. The whole of those brigades, as well as the
force of Jackson, had been in the battles around Richmond,
except Evans' brigade--attached to Longstreet's
division,--and Drayton's brigade, attached to Jones'
division. Those two brigades had probably been brought
from the South since those battles, or they may have
been organized out of regiments attached to other
brigades at that time; but I think they were brought
from North and South Carolina, and if such was the
fact, they were the only reinforcements which I ever
heard of reaching General Lee after the battles around
Richmond or before or during the campaign against Pope
or the campaign in Maryland. D. H. Hill's division of
five brigades; McLaw's division of four brigades, composed
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of his own and Magruder's consolidated; and the
force of Holmes and Wise--all of which had constituted
part of the army at Richmond during the battles,--had
been left for the protection of that city until the whole
of McClellan's force moved from James River.
When that event was fully ascertained, Hill's and
McLaw's division and two of Holmes' brigades, under
Walker, had been ordered to move North, but Hill and
McLaws got up on the 2nd, the day after the affair at
Ox Hill, and Walker later, so that Pope had only to
confront the 29 brigades before mentioned. My brigade
was fully an average one, and my effective force did
not exceed 1,500. Some idea therefore may be formed
of the force with which General Lee fought the second
battle of Manassas; I don't think it could have exceeded
50,000 effective men in all, including artillery and
cavalry, and it was probably considerably under that
number.
The loss in Ewell's division, beginning with the artillery
fighting on the Rappahannock and ending, with the
affair at Ox Hill, was in killed 366, wounded 1,169, and
missing 32, the loss in my own brigade being 27 killed
and 181 wounded.
The main battle, which occurred on the 29th and 30th
of August, has been called the second battle of Manassas,
but I think the little village or hamlet of Groveton is
entitled to the honor of giving its name to that great
battle, as the fighting began there on the 28th, and was
all around it on the 29th and 30th.
The first battle near the same spot, on ground which
was again fought over, had been properly named, as
Manassas Junction was then the headquarters and central
position of our army, and was the objective point
of the enemy during the battle. Such was not the case
with either army at the last battle, and the Junction,
several miles off, had no more relation to the battle than
Bristow, Gainesville or Centreville.
Page 134
CHAPTER XV.
MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND.
ON the 2nd of September our army rested, while the
movements of the enemy were being ascertained.
Provisions were now very scarce, as the supply in the
wagons, with which we had started, was exhausted. The
rations obtained by Jackson's command from the enemy's
stores, at Manassas, which were confined to what could
be brought off in haversacks, were also exhausted, and
on this day boiled fresh beef, without salt or bread, was
issued to my brigade, which with an ear or two of green
corn roasted by a fire, constituted also my own supply
of food, at this time. Longstreet's wing of the army was
in a worse condition than Jackson's, as it had not participated
in the supply found at Manassas.
On the morning of the 3rd, Jackson's wing commenced
the march towards the Potomac, and moved to
the left over some country roads, crossing the Loudoun
& Hampshire Railroad at a station, above Vienna, until
we reached the turnpike from Georgetown to Leesburg
in Loudoun, and then along this road through Drainesville,
until we passed Leesburg on the afternoon of the
4th, and bivouacked near Big Springs, two or three miles
from the latter place, at night.
On the 5th we resumed the march and crossed the
Potomac at White's Ford, about seven miles above Leesburg,
into Maryland. This ford was an obscure one on
the road through the farm of Captain Elijah White, and
the banks of the river had to be dug down so that our
wagons and artillery might cross. On the Maryland side
of the river the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal runs along the
bank, and the canal had to be bridged over a lock to
enable our wagons to pass, as they could not get through
the culvert where the road ran. That night we bivouacked
near Three Springs in Maryland on the road leading
Page 135
towards Frederick City, and after my brigade had lain
down I received a message from General Jackson to let
my men get green corn for two days, but, I told the staff
officer bringing it, that they had already drawn their
rations in that article, which was all they had now to
eat. I will here say that green Indian corn and boiled
beef without salt are better than no food at all by a
good deal, but they constitute a very weakening diet for
troops on a long march, as they produce diarrhoea.
On the 6th we resumed the march and in the afternoon
occupied Frederick City and the Monocacy Junction
on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Jackson's division
took position near the city, and Hill's and Ewell's near
the Junction, which is about three miles from the city
in the direction of Washington. Ewell's division covered
the railroad and the approaches from the direction
of Baltimore, and Hill's those from the direction of
Washington. We were now able to get some flour and
salt, and our whole army was in a day or two concentrated
near the same points.
We remained in position until the 10th, and on that
day General Jackson's command moved through Frederick
westward, for the purpose of capturing Harper's
Ferry and Maryland Heights, where there was a considerable
force of the enemy. At the same time, McLaws,
with his own and Anderson's divisions, including three
brigades of Longstreet's attached to Anderson's division,
moved towards Maryland Heights, and Brigadier General
Walker with his two brigades moved towards
Loudoun Heights on the south of the Potomac, for the
purpose of surrounding Harper's Ferry and co-operating
with General Jackson in its capture.
On the night of the 10th, Ewell's division bivouacked
between Middletown and South Mountain. On the 11th,
we moved across the mountain at Boonsboro Gap, and
through Boonsboro to Williamsport, where we crossed
the Potomac; Hill's division moving from that place
directly for Martinsburg on the pike, and Ewell's and
Page 136
Jackson's divisions for North Mountain depot on the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, some miles west of Martinsburg,
near which they bivouacked. On the morning of
the 12th we moved for Martinsburg, and found that a
force of the enemy at that place under General White
had retired in the direction of Harper's Ferry on the
approach of Hill's division. We passed through the
town in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Ewell's
division bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.
On the morning of the 13th we resumed the march,
and reached the turnpike from Charlestown to Harper's
Ferry, one mile above Halltown, and bivouacked in
sight of the enemy's work on Bolivar Heights, covering
the town at the ferry, to wait until McLaws and Walker
should get in position on Maryland Heights and Loudon
Heights respectively, both of which overlooked and
commanded the enemy's position.
On the afternoon of the 14th, McLaws and Walker
having previously gotten in position and opened fire
with their artillery, General Jackson's force moved
forward to invest the enemy's works, Hill's division
moving on the right along the Shenandoah, Ewell's
division along the turnpike, and one brigade of Jackson's
division along the Potomac on the left, the rest of
the division moving in support. Ewell's division moved
along and on each side of the pike in three columns until
it passed Halltown, when it was formed in treble line of
battle with Trimble's and Hays' brigades on the front
line, and Lawton's and my brigade in their rear, Lawton's
forming the second line, and mine the third. In
this order we moved forward through some fields on
the right of the road until we reached a woods on a hill
called School House Hill, confronting the main works
on Bolivar Heights, and in easy range for artillery.
This was done without opposition, and Hays' brigade
was then moved to the left of the road and mine posted
in its rear, the right being occupied by Trimble's and
Lawton's brigades in the same order. It was now dark
Page 137
and the artillery firing from Maryland and Loudon
Heights, as well as that from the enemy's works, had
ceased. General Hill had had some skirmishing with the
enemy on our right, and had pushed some brigades close
to the enemy's left flank to favorable positions for
assaulting his works, and taking them on the flank and
rear, but night also closed his operations.
Early on the morning of the 15th, preparations were
made for the assault, and the batteries from Maryland
Heights, Loudon Heights, from a position across the
Shenandoah to which the guns belonging to Ewell's
division had been moved during the night, from Hill's
position, from each side of the pike in front of Ewell's
division, and from the left on the Potomac, opened on
the enemy. In front of the position occupied by Ewell's
division was a deep valley between School House Hill
and Bolivar Heights, the whole of which was cleared.
On the opposite side the ascent to the enemy's works
was steep and over thick brush that had been felled so
as to make a formidable abattis. It was over this ground
we would have had to move to the assault, and the prospect
was by no means comforting.
Very early in the morning, Lawton's brigade had
been moved to the right and then by flank to the upper
part of the valley in front of us, for the purpose of
supporting an attack to be made by Hill's division, and
the latter was moving to the assault, when the white flag
was hoisted on Bolivar Heights. This indication of the
enemy's surrender was received with very hearty and
sincere cheers all along the line, as we were thus saved
the necessity of an assault, which if stubbornly resisted
would have resulted in the loss of many lives to us.
Under the directions of General Jackson, General A.
P. Hill received the surrender of the enemy, then under
the command of Brigadier General White, Colonel Miles,
the commander of the forces at Harper's Ferry, having
been mortally wounded. About 11,000 prisoners were
surrendered and paroled, and we secured about 12,000
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small arms, 70 pieces of artillery, and a very large
amount of stores, provisions, wagons and horses.
The victory was really a bloodless one so far as General
Jackson's command was concerned, the only loss
being a very few killed and wounded in Hill's division,
but General McLaws had had heavy work in taking
Maryland Heights, and had been engaged severely with
the enemy coming up in his rear.
Page 139
CHAPTER XVI.
BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM.
LATE in the afternoon of the 15th, General Lawton
received an order from General Jackson to move the
division on the road to Boteler's Ford, on the Potomac
below Shepherdstown, and he at once put his own and
Trimble's brigade, which had gotten rations from
Harper's Ferry, in motion, and ordered me to follow
with my own and Hays' brigade as soon as they were
supplied likewise from the stores of the enemy. I was
detained until after night before the men of the two
brigades could be supplied, and I then followed General
Lawton, finding him just before morning bivouacked
about four miles from Boteler's Ford. Brigadier General
Hays, wounded at Port Republic while Colonel of
the 7th Louisiana, had returned to the brigade on the
15th after the surrender of Harper's Ferry and assumed
command of his brigade before we started on this march.
The division moved at dawn on the 16th, and, crossing
the Potomac, arrived in the vicinity of Sharpsburg
in the early part of the day, and stacked arms in a piece
of woods about a mile in rear of Sharpsburg, Jackson's
division having preceded it, and Hill's being left behind
to dispose of the prisoners and property captured at
Harper's Ferry.
After the different columns, which had been sent
against the latter place, had moved from the vicinity of
Frederick, the residue of General Lee's army had moved
across South Mountain in the direction of Hagerstown,
and the division of General D. H. Hill had been left to
defend Boonsboro Gap against the Federal Army, composed
of Pope's army and McClellan's army combined,
and heavy reinforcements which had arrived to their
assistance, now approaching under General McClellan.
General Hill had been attacked on the 14th, at Boonsboro
Page 140
Gap, by the main body of McClellan's army, and,
after a very obstinate resistance for many hours to the
vast forces brought against him, had, with the reinforcements
sent to his assistance in the latter part of the
day, retired late at night to Sharpsburg on the western
side of the Antietam.
A position had been taken on the morning of the 15th
by the force north of the Potomac, consisting of D. H.
Hill's division, five brigades; the three remaining
brigades of Longstreet's division; Hood's division, two
brigades; D. R. Jones' division, three brigades; and
Evans' brigade; fourteen brigades in all, covering
Sharpsburg on the north and east, with the right resting
on Antietam Creek, and the left extending to the
Hagerstown pike; and the enemy had gradually moved
his whole army up to the front of this position. This
was the condition of things when Jackson's two divisions
arrived on the 16th, and in the meantime there had been
some skirmishing and artillery firing.
After remaining in position in the rear for some
hours, General Lawton was ordered to move to the right
to cover a bridge over the Antietam, but after the movement
had commenced, it was countermanded and an
order received to follow Jackson's division to the left
through fields until we struck the turnpike from Sharpsburg
to Hagerstown, and proceeding along this we
reached a piece of woods on the west of the pike in which
there was a Dunkard or Quaker Church, and found, some
distance beyond the church, Jackson's division already
posted in a double line on the west of the pike, and
connecting on the right with the left of Hood's division.
General Jackson in person directed me to place my
brigade, which was at the head of the division, on the
left of his own so as to protect its flank, and to
communicate with Brigadier General J. R. Jones, then in
command of that division.
It was then getting near dark, and there was heavy
skirmishing between Hood's troops further to the right
Page 141
and the enemy, while shells were flying pretty thick. I
had some difficulty in finding General Jones or his left,
but after a while succeeded in doing so, and then posted
my brigade on the left of Starke's brigade, constituting,
as I was informed, Jones' left, which was formed on the
west of the pike extending into the woods.
My brigade was posted on a small road running
along the back of the woods past Starke's left, and
thrown back at right angles to his line. Lawton's and
Trimble's brigades had been halted near the church, but
General Hays, under orders from General Jackson, reported
to me with his brigade, and it was posted in rear
of mine. The artillery firing and the skirmishing except
occasional shots between the pickets was put to an end
by the darkness, and about ten or eleven o'clock Lawton's
and Trimble's brigades took the place, on the front line,
of Hood's two brigades, which were withdrawn to the
rear.
Very shortly after dawn on the morning of the 17th,
I was ordered by General Jackson in person to move
my brigade to the front and left, along a route pointed
out by him, for the purpose of supporting some pieces
of artillery which General Stuart had in position to
operate against the enemy's right, and Hays was ordered
to the support of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades.
Moving along the route designated by General Jackson,
I discovered a body of the enemy's skirmishers close
on my right pushing forward as if for the purpose of
getting around the left flank of our line, and I sent some
from my own brigade to hold them in check until I had
passed. I found General Stuart about a mile from the
position I had moved from, with several pieces of
artillery in position on a hill between the left of Jackson's
division and the Potomac which were engaging some of
the enemy's batteries. At his suggestion, I formed my
line in rear of this hill and remained there for about an
hour, when General Stuart discovered a body of the
enemy's infantry gradually making its way between us
Page 142
and the left of our main line, and determined to shift
his position to a hill further to the right and a little in
rear of the direction of our line.
This movement was executed by passing over a route
to the rear of the one I had taken in the morning, the
latter being in possession of the enemy, and, while I was
forming my brigade in a strip of woods running back in
an elbow from the northern extremity of the body of
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, General
Stuart informed me that General Lawton had been
wounded, and that General Jackson had sent for me to
return with my brigade and take command of the division.
Leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment, numbering less than
100 men, with General Stuart, I moved the rest of the
brigade across the angle made by the elbow with the
main body of the woods, through a field to the position
I had started from early in the morning.
The enemy had by this time pushed skirmishers into
the northern or further end of this woods, and was
moving up a very heavy force to turn our left flank.
When I got near my starting point, I found Colonel
Grigsby of the 27th Virginia Regiment, and Stafford
of the 9th Louisiana rallying some two or three hundred
men of Jackson's division at the point at which Starke's
brigade had been in position the night before. As I
came up I halted my brigade and formed line in rear of
Grigsby and Stafford, and they at once advanced against
the enemy's skirmishers, who had penetrated some
distance into the woods, driving them back.
My brigade was advanced in their rear until we came
up with Grigsby and Stafford, where I formed line on
the crest of a slight ridge running through the woods
and directed them to form on my left. Heavy bodies of
the enemy were now discovered in the field beyond the
woods moving up to it. I left my brigade under the
command of Colonel William Smith, of the 49th Virginia,
with directions to resist the enemy at all hazards, and
rode across the Hagerstown pike towards the right to
Page 143
find the brigades which had been engaged early in the
morning, but I found that they had been very badly cut
up and had gone to the rear, Hood having taken their
place with his two brigades. Jackson's division had
also been very badly used, and the whole of it, except
the few men rallied by Grigsby and Stafford, had retired
from the field.
The facts were, as I subsequently ascertained from
the brigade commanders, that, at light, after skirmishing
along the front of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades
in a piece of woods occupied by him, the enemy had
opened a very heavy enfilading fire from the batteries
on the opposite side of the Antietam, and then advanced
very heavy columns of infantry against them, at the
same time pouring a destructive fire of canister and
shells into their ranks from the front. Hays' brigade
had gone to the support of the others and this terrible
assault from the front with the flank fire from the
batteries across the Antietam, had been withstood for some
time with obstinacy, until General Lawton was severely
wounded; Colonel Douglas, commanding his brigade,
killed; Colonel Walker, commanding Trimble's brigade,
had had his horse killed under him, and himself been
disabled by a contusion from a piece of shell; all the
regimental commanders in the three brigades except two
had been killed or wounded; and Lawton's brigade had
sustained a loss of very nearly one-half, Hays' of more
than one-half, and Trimble's of more than a third. General
Hood then came to their relief and the shattered
remnants of these brigades, their ammunition being
exhausted, retired to the rear.
Jackson's division in the meantime had been very
heavily engaged, and had shared a like fate, all of it
that was left being what I found Grigsby and Stafford
rallying, after General Jones had retired from the field
stunned by the concussion of a shell bursting near him,
and General Starke, who had succeeded him, had been
killed.
Page 144
After having discovered that there was nothing of
the division left on the field for me to command except
my own brigade, and seeing that, what I supposed were
Hood's troops, were very hard pressed, and would probably
have to retire before overpowering numbers, I
sent Major J. P. Wilson, a volunteer aide who had been
serving with Generals Ewell and Lawton, to look after
the brigades which had gone to the rear, and I rode to
find General Jackson to inform him of the condition of
things in front, as well as to let him know that a very
heavy force was moving on the west of the pike against
our flank and rear, confronted by my brigade and the
small force under Grigsby and Stafford alone.
I found the General on a hill in rear of the Dunkard
Church, where some batteries were posted, and when I
informed him of the condition of things, he directed me
to return to my brigade and resist the enemy until he
could send me some reinforcements, which he promised
to do as soon as he could obtain them. I found my
brigade and Grigsby and Stafford's force at the point I
had left them, and the movement of the enemy in that
quarter was assuming very formidable proportions. The
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, ran
along the Hagerstown pike on the west side for about
a quarter of a mile until it came to a field on the same
side, about 150 or 200 yards wide. Then the woods fell
back to the left at right angles with the road, and then
ran parallel to it on the other side of the field for about
a quarter of a mile further, and then turned to the left
and ran some distance to the rear, making the elbow
before spoken of.
The field thus located between the pike and the woods
formed a plateau higher than the adjacent woods, and
the latter sloped towards a small road at the further
edge, which extended through the elbow, and was the
one on which I had been posted the night before, and
along which I had moved to the support of Stuart in
the early morning. The line formed by my brigade was
MAJOR SAMUEL HALE
Page 145
entirely in the woods, with its right flank opposite the
middle of the field or plateau, and its direction was a
right angle with the Hagerstown pike. In the woods
were limestone ledges which formed very good cover
for troops, and they extended back towards the church.
From my position the forces of both armies on my right,
or rather in my rear, as I now faced, were entirely
concealed from view, as the plateau on my right was
considerably higher than the ground on which my brigade
was formed.
After my return, the enemy continued to press up
towards the woods in which I was, in very heavy force,
and I sent Major Hale, my Assistant Adjutant General,
to let General Jackson know that the danger was imminent,
and he returned with the information that the
promised reinforcements would be sent immediately.
Just as Major Hale returned, a battery opened on the
Hagerstown pike where the field, or plateau, and woods
joined. This was in rear of my right flank and not more
than two hundred yards from it. I had been anxiously
looking to my front and left flank, not dreaming that
there was any immediate danger to my right, as I had
seen our troops on the eastern side of the pike, at an
advanced position, engaged with the enemy, and I took
it for granted that this was one of our batteries which
had opened on the enemy, but Major Hale's attention
was called to it by a soldier in our rear, who was standing
on the edge of the plateau, and informed him that it
was one of the enemy's batteries. Major Hale examined
it himself and immediately informed me of the fact, but
I doubted it until I rode to the edge of the woods and
saw for myself that it was really one of the enemy's
batteries, firing along the pike in the direction of the
Dunkard Church.
While I was looking at it for a minute to satisfy
myself, I saw a heavy column of infantry move up by its
side. This column consisted of Green's division of
Mansfield's corps. The fact was that Hood, after resisting
Page 146
with great obstinacy immensely superior numbers, had
fallen back to the vicinity of the Dunkard Church, and
the enemy had advanced to this position. My position
now was very critical, as there was nothing between Hood
and myself, thus leaving an interval of from a quarter to
a half mile between my command and the rest of the
army. Fortunately, however, my troops were concealed
from this body of the enemy, or their destruction would
have been inevitable, as it was nearly between them and
the rest of the army, and the body, moving up on the left
in my front, had now got into the woods. Hoping the
promised reinforcements would arrive in time, I quietly
threw back my right flank under cover of the woods to
prevent being taken in the rear.
The situation was most critical and the necessity
most pressing, as it was apparent that if the enemy
got possession of this woods, possession of the hills in
their rear would immediately follow, and then, across
to our rear on the road leading back to the Potomac,
would have been easy. In fact the possession of these
hills would have enabled him to take our whole line in
reverse, and a disastrous defeat must have followed. I
determined to hold on to the last moment, and I looked
anxiously to the rear to see the promised reinforcements
coming up, the column on my right and rear and that
coming up in front, with which my skirmishers were
already engaged, being watched with the most intense
interest.
While thus looking out, I saw the column on my
right and rear suddenly move into the woods in the
direction of the rear of the church. I could not now
remain still, and I at once put my brigade in motion by
the right flank on a line parallel to that of the enemy's
movements, directing Grigsby and Stafford to fall back
in line, skirmishing with the enemy coming up on the
left. The limestone ledges enabled my troops to keep
out of view of the enemy moving in the woods on my
right, and they moved rapidly so as to get up with them.
Page 147
On passing from behind one of these long ledges, we
discovered the enemy moving with flankers thrown out
on his right flank. I directed Colonel William Smith,
whose regiment, the 49th Virginia, was in the lead, to
open fire on the flankers, which was promptly done, and
they ran in on the main body, which was taken by surprise
by the fire from the unexpected quarter from which
it came.
I now saw two or three brigades moving in line to
our assistance, at the further end of the woods, and
my brigade was faced to the front as soon as the whole
of it had passed from behind the ledge, and opened fire
on the enemy, who commenced retiring towards the pike
in great confusion, after delivering one or two volleys.
I had not intended to move to the front in pursuit, as
I saw a brigade of the troops coming to our assistance
moving into the woods at its further end on my right so
as to come upon the flank of mine if it advanced, and I
was, therefore, afraid that both would be thrown into
confusion by the collision, and that mine would be
exposed to the fire of the other. Moreover the enemy's
other column was advancing on my left, held in check,
however, by Grigsby and Stafford with their men, aided
by the 31st Virginia Regiment, which was on that flank.
The brigade, however, without awaiting orders, dashed
after the retreating column, driving it entirely out of
the woods, and, notwithstanding my efforts to do so, I
did not succeed in stopping it until its flank and rear
had become exposed to the fire of the column on the left.
I then saw other troops of the enemy moving rapidly
across the plateau from the pike to the column, opposed
to Grigsby and Stafford, and I ordered my brigade to
retire a short distance, so as to change front and advance
against the enemy in that direction. Just as I was
reforming my line for that purpose, Semmes' brigade, and
two regiments of Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' division,
and Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones' division
came up, and the whole, including Grigsby's and Stafford's
Page 148
small command, advanced and swept the enemy
from the woods into the fields, and the enemy retreated in
great disorder to another body of woods beyond that
from which he had been thus driven. As soon as the
enemy had been thus repulsed, I recalled my regiments
and caused them to be re-formed, when they were again
posted in their former position on the small ridge before
mentioned. As soon as his infantry had retired the
enemy opened a tremendous fire with canister and shell
upon the woods occupied by us, which was continued for
some time.
The troops which had been opposed to us in this latter
affair consisted of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's
corps, which had not been previously engaged, supported
by Mansfield's corps, under Williams, and which moved
up for a fresh attack on our extreme left. During his
advance, the enemy's columns had received a galling fire
from the guns under General Stuart on a hill in the rear
of our left which contributed very materially to the repulse,
and General Stuart pursued the retreating force
on its flank for some distance, with his pieces of artillery
and the remnant of the 13th Virginia Regiment under
Captain Winston.*
*
McClellan says in reference to this affair on our left, his right:
"Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving the
enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry
and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill,
commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of
the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General
Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's
division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard was forced
the third time to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet
the column advancing on the left, but this line, now suffering from a
destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to
return, gave way towards the right and rear in considerable confusion,
and was soon followed by the first and second lines."
There was nothing in the shape of breastworks in the woods or
in its rear at that time, and the fight on our part was a stand up one
altogether. The slight works, made mostly of rails, which McClellan
saw after the battle, were made on the 18th when we were expecting
a renewal of the attack.
Page 149
My brigade at that time numbered less than 1,000
officers and men present, and Grigsby and Stafford had
between two and three hundred; yet with this small
force we confronted, for a long time, Sumner's formidable
column, and held it in check until reinforcements
arrived to our assistance. Had we retired from the fear
of being flanked or cut off, the enemy must have obtained
possession of the woods, where we were, and, as a necessary
consequence, of the hills in their rear, which would
have resulted in a decisive defeat to us, and a probable
destruction of our army.
While these operations on our extreme left were
going on, all of which transpired in the forenoon, two
other divisions of Sumner's corps, French's and
Richardson's, had been moving against our centre occupied
by General D. H. Hill, and were forcing it back after
a hard struggle, just about the time I was contending
with the two columns of the enemy in the woods. A
portion of this force moving against Hood near the
Dunkard Church, was met and repulsed by Kershaw's
and Cobb's brigades of McLaws' division, the portion of
Barksdale's brigade which had not come to my assistance,
and Ransom's brigade of Walker's division, at the
same time that the force opposed to me was repulsed.
Not long after my brigade had been re-formed and
placed in its former position, Colonel Hodges, in
command of Armistead's brigade of Anderson's division,
came up and took the place of my brigade, which latter
was then posted along the edge of the plateau on Hodges'
right, facing towards the Hagerstown pike. Subsequently
General McLaws posted Barksdale's brigade on
my right, and Kershaw's and Cobb's brigades on the
left of Hodges'. My line as established along the edge
of the woods and plateau after the repulse of the enemy,
extended beyond where the left of Jackson's division
rested at daylight, and embraced inside of it all of our
killed and wounded, and nearly the whole of that of the
enemy, in this last affair on our left.
Page 150
Major Wilson had by this time returned with the
information that he had been able to find only a part of
Hays' brigade, which was under General Hays, who was
with General Hood, and that it was in no condition to
render any service. He further stated that the remnants
of the other brigades had gone to the rear for the purpose
of re-forming and gathering up stragglers, but that
he had been unable to find them.
The enemy continued to shell the woods in which we
were for some time, doing, however, little or no damage,
as we were under cover, and his shot and shells went
over our heads. Some of our batteries, which had been
brought up to the hills in our rear, opened fire on the
woods where we were, on two occasions, under the
impression that they were occupied by the enemy, and I
had to send and have it stopped. Some pieces of our
artillery were moved into the angle of the plateau on
my right and opened on the enemy, but were soon compelled
to retire by the superior metal and number of
guns opposed to them.
We remained in position during the rest of the day,
as did the troops on my left, and those immediately
on my right. The enemy made no further attack on
us on this part of the line, but there were several
demonstrations as if for an attack, and from the top of a tree
on the edge of the woods a lookout reported three lines
of battle beyond the pike with a line of skirmishers
extending nearly up to the pike. There were, however,
some attempts against our line further to the right, and
late in the afternoon a fierce attack was made on our
extreme right by Burnside's corps, which drove some
of our troops from the bridge across the Antietam on
that flank, and was forcing back our right, when some of
A. P. Hill's brigades, which were just arriving from
Harper's Ferry, went to the assistance of the troops
engaged on that flank, and the enemy was driven back in
considerable confusion.
This affair, which terminated just before dark, closed
the fighting on the 16th, and after a most protracted and
Page 151
desperate struggle, our centre had been forced back to
some extent, but the positions on our flanks were maintained.
The attack on Jackson's command in the early morning
had been made by Hooker's and Mansfield's corps,
numbering, according to McClellan's statement, 24,982
men present and fit for duty, and this force had been
resisted by Jackson's division and the three brigades of
Ewell's, and subsequently by Hood's two brigades, aided
by those of D. H. Hill's brigades sent to the assistance
of Hood, until Sumner's corps, numbering 18,813 men,
came up about nine A.M. to the assistance of Hooker's
and Mansfield's. Hood was then compelled to retire to
the woods near the Dunkard Church, and Sumner, in
command now of the entire right wing of the enemy,
prepared for another attack with his corps supported
by Hooker's and Mansfield's. This attack was made
on our left by Sedgwick's division supported by Mansfield's
corps, and on the centre by French's and Richardson's
divisions supported by Hooker's corps, and was
repulsed as has been stated, Hill, however, losing ground
in the centre to some extent. Franklin's corps numbering
12,300 men was then carried to the support of Sumner,
arriving a little after twelve M., and a new attack
on the woods in which our left rested was projected, but
was arrested by General Sumner's orders.
Another attack, however, was made on Hill's position
in the centre, which met with some success by reason
of the removal of one of his brigades, by mistake, from
its position, but the enemy's progress was arrested by
Walker's brigades and a part of Anderson's division,
which had arrived to his support. The enemy had then
made the attack with Burnside's corps, numbering
13,819, on Longstreet's right, on the Antietam, held by
D. R. Jones' division, which was repulsed on the arrival
of Hill's brigades as stated. The above is a condensed
account of the main features of this battle taken from
the reports of both sides, and the figures in regard to the
strength of McClellan's corps are taken from his own
Page 152
report. Porter's corps of his army, numbering 12,930,
was held in reserve.*
Late in the afternoon, after it had become apparent
that no further attack on our left was to be made, I rode
to the rear in search of the missing brigades and found
about one hundred men of Lawton's brigade which had
been collected by Major Lowe, the ranking officer of the
brigade left, and I had them moved up to where my
own brigade was, and placed on its right. We lay on
our arms all night, and about light on the morning of
the 18th, General Hays brought up about ninety men of
his brigade, which were posted on my left. During the
morning Captain Feagins, the senior officer left of
Trimble's brigade, brought up about two hundred of that
brigade, and they were posted in my rear.
The enemy remained in our front during the whole
day without making any show of an attack on our left,
but there was some firing between the skirmish lines
farther to right. The enemy in my immediate front
showed a great anxiety to get possession of his dead
and wounded on that part of the ground, and several
flags of truce approached us, but, I believe, without
authority from the proper source. However, a sort of
informal truce prevailed for a time, and some of the
dead and very badly wounded of the enemy and of that
part of our army which had been engaged first on the
morning of the 17th, were exchanged even while the
skirmishers were firing at each other on the right. This
was finally stopped and the enemy informed that no flag
of truce could be recognized unless it came from the
headquarters of his army. We remained in position on
the 18th during the whole day, without any serious
demonstration by the enemy on any part of our line, and
after dark retired for the purpose of recrossing the
* Walker's division of two brigades (his own and Ransom's) had
reached the vicinity of the battlefield on the 16th and McLaws' division,
and Anderson's, including the three brigades of Longstreet's with
him, did not get up until after the battle had begun.
Page 153
Potomac. I held my position until my skirmishers in
front were relieved by a portion of Fitz. Lee's cavalry
and then retired in pursuance of orders previously
received from General Jackson, carrying with me Armistead's
brigade under Colonel Hodges, which had received
no orders from its division commander, and bringing
up, I believe, the rear of the infantry of our entire
army. We found a large number of wagons and troops
massed at Boteler's Ford, and the division now commanded
by me did not cross until after sunrise. After
getting over the river, the division was formed in line
of battle on the Virginia side, under direction of General
Longstreet, and remained in position several hours, until
the enemy appeared on the other bank and opened on us
with artillery.
I was subsequently ordered to leave Lawton's brigade,
now increased to about four hundred men under Colonel
Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment (who had returned
after the battle of the 17th), at Boteler's Ford, under
the command of Brigadier General Pendleton, who was
entrusted with the defence of the crossing, and I was
ordered to move with the rest of the division towards
Martinsburg.
Our whole army with its trains had been safely
recrossed and this terminated the operations properly
connected with the battle of Sharpsburg.
In that battle, Ewell's division had lost in killed 119,
in wounded 1,115, and in missing 38, being an aggregate
loss of 1,352 out of less than 3,400 men and officers carried
into action. The loss in my own brigade was in killed 18,
and in wounded 156, and among the latter were Colonel
Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Gibson of the 49th Virginia
Regiment, both severely, and the former receiving
three distinct wounds before the close of the fight, in
which he was engaged. The loss in our whole army was
heavy, but not so great as the estimate put upon it by
the enemy.
There has been very great misapprehension, both on
Page 154
the part of the enemy and many Confederates, not
familiar with the facts, about the strength of General
Lee's army at this battle. The whole of the troops then
constituting that army had belonged to the army which
opposed McClellan in the battles around Richmond, except
Evans' and Drayton's brigades, and such absentees
as had returned, and there had been troops then belonging
to the army, which had not left Richmond, exceeding
the number in the said two brigades. There had been
heavy losses in the battles around Richmond; and the
subsequent losses at Cedar Run, on the Rappahannock,
at Manassas and in the vicinity, at Maryland Heights
and in Pleasant Valley--where McLaws had been
severely engaged,--and at South Mountain, had very
materially weakened the strength of the army. Besides
all this, since crossing the Rappahannock we had been
without regular supplies of food, and had literally been
living from hand to mouth. Our troops were badly
shod and many of them became barefooted, and they were
but indifferently clothed and without protection against
the weather. Many of them had become exhausted from
the fatigues of the campaign, and the long and rapid
marches which they had made while living on short
rations and a weakening diet--and many were foot-sore
from want of shoes; so that the straggling from these
causes, independent of that incident to all armies, had
been frightful before we crossed the Potomac, and had
continued up to the time of the battle.
Some idea of the diminution from these various
causes may be found from the following facts: That
Christian gentleman, and brave, accomplished soldier,
General D. H. Hill, states that his division, which
numbered ten thousand at the beginning of the battles around
Richmond, had been reduced to less than five thousand
which he had at the battle of South Mountain. Yet he
had reached the army after all the fighting about Manassas,
and he states that on the morning of the 17th of
September he had but three thousand infantry. Ewell's
Page 155
division, with Lawton's brigade, which was attached to
it after the battle of Cedar Run, must have numbered, at
the time they reached McClellan's right, north of the
Chickahominy, eight or ten thousand, as Lawton's
brigade was then a very large one, which had never been
in action. Yet that division numbered less than three
thousand four hundred on the morning of the 17th.
General Lee says in his report: "This great battle
was fought by less than forty thousand men on our
side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and
hardships in the field and on the march." This certainly
covered our entire force of all descriptions, and I am
satisfied that he might have safely stated it at less than
thirty thousand. There were forty brigades of infantry
in all in the army, one of which, Thomas' of A. P. Hill's
division, did not cross the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry, and the nine brigades of Ewell's and D. H. Hill's
divisions, numbering in the aggregate less than 6,400
officers and men, were fully average ones.
General D. R. Jones states that his command, consisting
of his division of three brigades and three of
Longstreet's, in all six brigades, numbering on the
morning of the 17th, 2,430; General J. R. Jones states that
Jackson's division of four brigades numbered less than
1,600; General McLaws states that he carried into action
in his four brigades, 2,893; General A. P. Hill states
that his three brigades actually numbered less than
2,000; D. H. Hill's five brigades numbered 3,000; and
Ewell's four brigades numbered less than 3,400; which
gives 15,323 in these twenty-six brigades, leaving thirteen
other brigades on the field whose strength is not stated,
to-wit: the six brigades of his own division and Longstreet's
brought up by General Anderson; A. P. Hill's
other two brigades; Hood's two brigades, both very
small; Walker's two brigades; and Evans' brigade.
General Anderson was wounded, and there is no report
from his division or any of his brigades, but General
D. H. Hill says that Anderson came to his support, which
Page 156
was before Anderson's division became engaged, with
some three or four hundred men, and that force consisted
of five brigades, Armistead's having gone to the
left. Averaging the thirteen brigades from which no
estimate was given with the others and it would give a
strength of 7,670, which would make our whole infantry
force on the field, from the beginning to the end of the
battle, twenty-three thousand at the outside. Our cavalry
was not engaged, as it had merely watched the flanks,
but six thousand would fully cover the whole of the
cavalry and artillery which we had on that side of the
river.
McClellan states his whole force in action at 87,164
men present and fit for duty, and he estimates General
Lee's at 97,445. As this estimate is a very remarkable
one and contains some very amusing features, it is given
here in his own language. He says:
"An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee,
made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by
the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., previous to the battle
of Antietam, is as follows:
- General T. J. Jackson's corps. . . . . 24,778 men.
- General James Longstreet's corps. . . . . 23,342 men.
- General D. H. Hill's 2nd division. . . . . 15,525 men.
- General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry. . . . . 6,400 men.
- General Ransom's and Jenkins' brigades. . . . . 3,000 men.
- Forty-six regiments not included in above. . . . . 18,400 men.
- Artillery, estimated at 400 guns. . . . . 6,000 men.
- Total. . . . . 97,445 men.
It is to be presumed that this estimate was made by
Banks when General Jackson was figuring around
Pope's rear, as he did not have a command in McClellan's
army, and it is well known that Banks always saw things
with very largely magnifying glasses when "Stonewall"
Jackson was about.
That some of the affrighted civilians who magnified
Page 157
one small company of cavalry at the first battle of Manassas,
called the Black Horse Cavalry, into 20,000, might
be misled by this estimate of McClellan's, or Banks',
might well be believed, but that the Major General
commanding the "Grand Army of the Potomac," should
have so estimated the strength of General Lee's army at
Sharpsburg, is perfectly amazing.
Who commanded the "forty-six regiments not included
in above," or where were the 400 guns to come
from?
This estimate of the relative strength of the two
armies gives rise to some very curious reflections:
It must be recollected that Bragg and Kirby Smith
were at this time in Kentucky, moving north, and if the
newly established Government at Richmond had been
able to put in the field and send into Maryland from
the comparatively small population of the Confederacy
an army of nearly 100,000 men with 400 pieces of artillery,
it showed a wonderful energy on the part of that
government; while, the fact that the powerful Government
at Washington, with its immense resources and its
very large population to draw from, after a call for
300,000 more men, and after taking everything in the way
of troops from the Ohio to the Atlantic, had been able
to bring into the field, for the defence of the National
Capital and to oppose the large invading army of
"rebels," only a force numbering less than 90,000 men,
displayed a weakness not at all flattering to the energy
of the head of the War Department at Washington, or
to the wisdom of the occupant of the White House, and
a want of "patriotism" by no means complimentary to
the people of the North.
McClellan had stated that the troops in and about
Washington and on the Maryland shore of the Potomac
above and below, including those in Maryland and
Delaware, amounted, on the 1st of March, 1862, to 193,142
present for duty and an aggregate present and absent
of 221,987. This did not include the 13,000 brought by
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Burnside from North Carolina, nor the troops brought
by Cox from the Kanawha Valley, nor, is it presumed,
the forces of Fremont under Sigel, a large part of which
were probably brought from Missouri; and there had
since been at least one call, if not more, for an additional
levy of 300,000 men. Now the question very naturally
arises, as to what had become of all that immense force,
with the reinforcements and recruits, which had dwindled
down to 87,164 men on the morning of the 17th of
September, 1862.
It will be seen from the account previously given
that on the 15th and in the early part of the day of the
16th, McClellan's large army was confronted by a very
small force under Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Jackson
with two divisions numbering less than 5,000 men, and
Walker, with his two brigades arrived on the 16th, and
it was upon the force consisting of these reinforcements
and D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's troops, including in
the latter Hood's two brigades, and Evans' brigade, that
McClellan's army had been hurled on the morning of the
17th. McLaws with his own and Anderson's brigades,
ten in all, did not arrive until the action had been
progressing for some hours. McLaws arrived at sunrise,
and A. P. Hill, with his five brigades, did not come
up until late in the afternoon.
The 24,982 men under Hooker and Mansfield had
attacked Jackson's division and Lawton's, Trimble's and
Hays' brigades of Ewell's division, numbering in all
4,000 men. When they were compelled to retire, Hood
with his two brigades supported by Ripley's, Colquit's
and Garland's and D. H. Hill's division had withstood
the enemy until Sumner arrived with his 18,813 men,
and then Hood was also compelled to retire to the Dunkard
Church. Sumner then with his corps and what was
left of the other two, attacked my brigade of less than
1,000 men, a remnant of about two or three hundred of
Jackson's division, and what was left of D. H. Hill's
and Hood's divisions, when McLaws and Walker with
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their six brigades came to our assistance immediately
after the arrival of McLaws upon the field. Sumner was
repulsed and then Franklin with his 12,300 arrived to
his support, and the attack was renewed on Hill in the
centre, when Anderson with three or four hundred men
and one brigade of Walker's came to his assistance.
This force of 56,095 men was brought against a force
which with all its reinforcements, from first to last,
amounted to less than 18,000 men. How it had been
served will appear from the following extract from
McClellan's report. He says: "One division of Sumner's
corps, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after
fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered
by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and
much scattered; so that they were for the time somewhat
demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the
return made by General Meade, commanding, there were
but 6,729 men present on the 18th, whereas, on the morning
of the 22nd, there were 13,093 present for duty in
the same corps, showing that previous to and during the
battle 6,364 men were separated from their command."
McClellan was not able to renew the attack on the
18th, and, according to his own showing, had to wait for
reinforcements before doing so; yet he claims a great
victory at Antietam, alleging that he had accomplished
the object of the campaign, to-wit: "to preserve the
National Capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania
from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland."
This was a singular claim on the part of the General who,
scarce three months before, had boastingly stated that
the advance of his army was within five miles of the
Confederate Capital.
The truth is that the substantial victory was with us,
and if our army had been in reach of reinforcements, it
would have been a decisive one; but we were more than
200 miles from the point from which supplies of ammunition
were to be obtained, and any reinforcements
which could have been spared to us were much further
Page 160
off, while large reinforcements were marching to
McClellan's aid. We had, therefore, to recross the Potomac.
The question had been mooted as to the propriety of
the campaign into Maryland, and in regard thereto I will
say: General Lee, on assuming command of the army
at Richmond, had found that city, the seat of the
Confederate Government, beleaguered by a vast army, while
all Northern Virginia, including the best part of the
beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, was held by the
enemy. With a herculean effort, he had broken through
the cordon surrounding his army, and with inferior
numbers fallen upon the beleaguering enemy, and sent it
cowering to the banks of the lower James. He had then
moved north, and, after a series of hard fought battles,
had hurled the shattered remains of the army that had
been marauding through Northern Virginia, with all the
reinforcements sent from the lately besieging army, into
the fortifications around Washington. With the diminished
columns of the army with which he accomplished
all this, he had crossed the Potomac, captured an important
stronghold defended by a strong force, securing a
large amount of artillery, small arms, and stores of all
kinds, and had fought a great battle with the newly
reorganized and heavily reinforced and recruited army
of the enemy, which later was so badly crippled that it
was not able to resume the offensive for near two months.
He now stood defiantly on the southern banks of the
Potomac, the extreme northern limit of the Confederacy,
and the result of all these operations, of which the march
into Maryland was an important part, had been that not
only the Confederate Capital had been relieved from the
presence of the besieging army, a danger to which it was
not subjected again for two years; but the enemy's
Capital had been threatened, his territory invaded, and
the base of operations for a new movement on Richmond
had been transferred to the north banks of the Potomac
at Harper's Ferry, from which there was an overland
route of more than two hundred miles. When that movement
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did take place, General Lee was in a position to
interpose his army, and inflict a new defeat on the enemy,
as was verified by subsequent events.
The following extracts from McClellan's report will
give some idea of the results obtained. Speaking, as of
the morning of the 18th, he says:
"At that moment--Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland
invaded--the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. Our
battle lost, and almost all would have been lost." And he subsequently
says:
"The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated
in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a
part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the
enemy's territory, and an attack on his capital, but was defensive in
its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be
technically called a 'defensive--offensive' campaign."
"It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced
severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital and
Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania, and to drive the enemy out of
Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by
the battle of Antietam, which brought the Army of the Potomac into
what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac."*
It was a great deal gained to force the enemy into a
"defensive--offensive" campaign in his own territory
and place the "Army of the Potomac" in that accidental
position, though we did fail in arousing Maryland, or
getting any reinforcements from that State.
* In a
telegram to Halleck, dated September 22nd (Part II,
Conduct of the War, p. 495), McClellan said: "When I was assigned
to the command of this army in Washington, it was suffering under
the disheartening influence of defeat. It had been greatly reduced
by casualties in General Pope's campaign, and its efficiency had been
much impaired. The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam
Creek had resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers and
many regimental and company officers, besides a large number of
enlisted men. The army corps had been badly cut up and scattered
by the overwhelming numbers brought against them in the battle of
the 17th instant, and the entire army had been greatly exhausted by
unavoidable overwork, and want of sleep and rest." (See also his
testimony same volume, pages 439, 440 and 441.)
Page 162
CHAPTER XVII.
PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG.
ON the afternoon of the 19th, after leaving Lawton's brigade
at Boteler's Ford, I marched with the three other brigades on the
road towards Martinsburg, about six miles from Shepherdstown,
and bivouacked.
During the night the enemy had succeeded in crossing the
Potomac and capturing four of General Pendleton's guns near
Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the 20th I was ordered to
move back to Boteler's Ford. On arriving near there, by order of
General Jackson, my three brigades were formed in line of battle
in rear of General A. P. Hill's division which had preceded me,
and were moving against the force of the enemy which had
crossed over to the south bank. My three brigades were posted
in pieces of woods on each side of the road leading towards the
ford, and remained there within range of the enemy's guns on the
opposite side until late in the afternoon. In the meantime Hill's
division advanced, under a heavy fire of artillery from across the
river, and drove the enemy's infantry on the southern bank pell-mell
into the river, inflicting upon him a very severe punishment
for his rashness in undertaking to pursue us and making him pay
very dearly for the guns he had taken. One officer in my
command, Captain Frazier of the 15th Alabama Regiment,--the
only regimental commander in Trimble's brigade who had not
been killed or wounded at Sharpsburg,--was severely wounded
by a shell, which was all the damage I sustained.
Late in the afternoon, I was ordered to move back, and that
night we marched to the vicinity of the Opequon not far above
its mouth. We remained at this position until the 24th, when we
moved across the Opequon to the Williamsport pike, and on the
next day to the vicinity of Martinsburg. On the 27th, General
Jackson's whole
Page 163
command was moved to Bunker Hill on the road from
Martinsburg to Winchester, and went into camp in that vicinity.
By this time our baggage wagons, which had been sent from
Manassas to the valley, when we moved into Maryland, had
reached us.
We were now able to obtain supplies of flour, by threshing
wheat, of which there was a good supply in the valley, and
having it ground. While our camps were located at Bunker Hill,
Jackson's command destroyed the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
from North Mountain to within five miles of Harper's Ferry,
which latter place had been re-occupied by the enemy. More
than twenty miles of the road was thus destroyed, and it was
done effectively. The Winchester & Potomac Railroad was also
destroyed to within a short distance of the Ferry. Previous to this
there was a slight engagement between the Stonewall brigade of
Jackson's division and a small force of the enemy on the railroad
near Kearneysville, but the enemy did not make a serious effort
to molest us, either while we were engaged in destroying the
railroad or subsequently.
The Army of Northern Virginia was now organized
into two regular corps of four divisions each, General
Longstreet being assigned to the command of the first
corps, and General Jackson to the command of the second
corps, both with the rank of Lieutenant General. D. H.
Hill's division was attached to the second corps, and
two divisions were formed out of Longstreet's, D. R.
Jones' and Hood's divisions, under the command of
Generals Pickett and Hood respectively, they having been
promoted. The first corps consisted of the divisions of McLaws,
Anderson, Pickett and Hood, and the second corps of the
divisions of Ewell, D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill, and Jackson (Ewell's
division being under my command and Jackson's under J. R.
Jones).
For some time the second corps remained camped near
Bunker Hill, and the first corps was camped in the vicinity of
Winchester.
McClellan in the meantime had concentrated the
Page 164
main body of his army on the north bank of the Potomac
near Harper's Ferry, and was engaged in preparing for
a new campaign into Virginia, while Maryland and
Bolivar Heights were very strongly fortified by him.
A short time after the middle of October, General
Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, made a successful
expedition through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the
rear of and around McClellan's army.
Towards the last of October McClellan began to move
across the Potomac on the east side of the Blue Ridge,
with a view to another approach to Richmond. His army
had been largely recruited, and superbly equipped. The
army of General Lee had been considerably increased by
the return of stragglers and convalescents, but it continued
to be indifferently supplied with clothing and
shoes, of which articles there was a great deficiency.
As soon as McClellan's movement was ascertained,
Jackson's corps was moved towards the Shenandoah,
occupying positions between Charlestown and Berryville,
and one division of Longstreet's corps was sent
across the Blue Ridge to watch the enemy. When the
enemy began to move eastwardly from the mountain, the
whole of Longstreet's corps moved across the ridge for
the purpose of intercepting his march. D. H. Hill's
division of Jackson's corps was subsequently moved
across the ridge to watch the enemy's movements. A. P.
Hill's division had been put in position near Berryville,
covering the Shenandoah, at Snicker's or Castleman's
Ferry, where it had an engagement with a body of the
enemy that had crossed the ridge as McClellan was moving
on. Ewell's division (under my command) was at
first posted on A. P. Hill's left, near a church, while
Jackson's division was on the Berryville and Charlestown
pike in my rear, but as the enemy's covered our
front I moved above, first to Millwood, and then to
Stone Bridge, near White Post, and Jackson's division
moved to the vicinity of the Occoquon between the positions
of the other divisions and Winchester.
Page 165
After the enemy had left the vicinity of the Blue
Ridge, D. H. Hill's division recrossed the ridge and
moved up on the east side of the Shenandoah to the
vicinity of Front Royal. While my camp was at Stone
Bridge, my division destroyed the Manassas Gap Railroad
from Front Royal to Piedmont on the east side of
the Blue Ridge, a distance of twenty miles, and D. H.
Hill's division destroyed it from Front Royal to Strasburg.
In the meantime McClellan's army had been concentrated
in the vicinity of Warrenton, and McClellan had been
succeeded in the command by Burnside. Longstreet
had previously taken position at or near Culpeper
Court-House.
About the 15th of November Burnside began the
movement of his army towards the lower Rappahannock
opposite Fredericksburg. When this movement was discovered
Longstreet's corps was moved towards Fredericksburg
to dispute the enemy's crossing, and orders
were sent to General Jackson to move his corps across
the Blue Ridge. This movement of the latter corps
began about the 20th of November, and we moved up
the valley to New Market and then across Massanutten
Mountain, the Shenandoah and the Blue Ridge to the
vicinity of Madison Court-House. The weather had now
become quite cool, and our daily marches were long and
rapid, and very trying to the men. On this march I saw
a number of our men without shoes, and with bleeding
feet wrapped with rags. We remained in the vicinity
of Madison Court-House for two or three days, and it
was here that General Jackson wore, for the first time,
a new regulation coat with the wreath, and a hat, and
his appearance in them caused no little remark and
amusement among the men. His dress hitherto had
been a rusty grey coat, intended for a colonel, and a little
dingy cloth cap which lay flat on his head, or rather
forehead.
From Madison Court-House we moved past Orange
Page 166
Court-House and along the plank road to the vicinity
of Fredericksburg, arriving there on the 1st of December.
Longstreet's corps was found guarding the Rappahannock
against Burnside's army which had concentrated
on the opposite bank. My division was moved to
the vicinity of Guiney's depot on the R., F. & P. Railroad,
as was Jackson's. After remaining here two or three
days, I was ordered to move towards Port Royal to
support D. H. Hill, whose division had been ordered to
the vicinity of that place, to watch some gun-boats there
and prevent a crossing. Port Royal is some eighteen or
twenty miles below Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock.
I first took position some six or eight miles from
Port Royal on the road from Guiney's depot, but subsequently
moved to the vicinity of Buckner's Neck on
the Rappahannock a few miles above Port Royal, for the
purpose of watching the river and acting in concert with
General Hill. The latter, by the use of one Whitworth
gun and some other artillery, had driven the enemy's
gunboats from Port Royal, and in revenge they fired
into the houses in the little village of Port Royal and
some others below as they passed down the river.
While I was watching the river at Buckner's Neck,
which is in a bend of the river, and commanded by high
ground on the opposite side, so as to afford a good position
for forcing a passage, the enemy hauled some
timbers to a place called the Hop Yard on the northern
bank, as if for the purpose of constructing a bridge at
that place, but this proved a feint. Jackson's division
had been left near Guiney's depot, and A. P. Hill's had
been camped in rear of Hamilton's Crossing for the purpose
of supporting Longstreet's right, which rested at
the latter place. The different divisions of Jackson's
corps were thus posted, immediately preceding the battle
of Fredericksburg.
Page 167
CHAPTER XVIII.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
FREDERICKSBURG is located on the southern bank of
the Rappahannock River at the head of tide water, and
the river is navigable to that point for steamboats and
small vessels. On the northern bank, opposite, above
and below Fredericksburg, are what are called the Stafford
Heights, which are close to the river, and completely
command the southern bank. Fredericksburg's exact
location is on a narrow strip of low land between the
river and a range of hills in the rear. These hills leaving
the river opposite the small village of Falmouth,
which is a short distance above Fredericksburg and on
the northern bank, diverge from it below, and gradually
declining, extend nearly to the Massaponix Creek, which
empties into the river four or five miles below the town.
The river flats or bottoms immediately below Fredericksburg
widen out considerably and continue to widen
until they are from one and a half to two miles in width
at the lower end of the range of hills, where they unite
with similar but not so wide flats on the Massaponix,
which extend back for some distance in rear of the range
of hills mentioned. Below the mouth of the Massaponix
there are other hills which approach near to the bank of
the river, and extend down it for a considerable distance.
Hazel Run, rising southeast of Fredericksburg, runs
through the range of hills along a narrow valley, or
ravine rather, and passing close on the east of the town,
empties into the river. Deep Run rises below in the
range of hills, and runs across the wide bottoms through
a deep channel likewise into the river, something over
a mile below the town. The hills just in rear of the town
were, at the time of which I am speaking, nearly denuded
of growing timber, but below, to the end of the range,
they were for the most part covered with woods. The
Page 168
bottoms were entirely cleared and in cultivation, furnishing
several extensive farms, and up Deep Run to its
sources is a valley making a large re-entering angle in
the line of hills, which valley was then also cleared and
in cultivation.
From the town a road, called the Telegraph Road,
runs south, crossing Hazel Run and then ascending the
hills passes towards Richmond by the way of Hanover
Junction. Another road called the Plank Road ascends
the hills above Hazel Run and runs westward by Chancellorsville
to Orange Court-House. A third road, called the River Road,
runs from the lower end of the town, crossing Hazel Run
and Deep Run, and, passing through the bottoms about
half way from the river to the foot of the hills, in a direction
very nearly parallel to the river, it crosses the Massaponix not
far above its mouth, where it forks, one fork going to Port
Royal below and the other by Bowling Green in the
direction of Richmond. This is a wide road, and where it
passes through the bottoms there were on both sides high,
thick, and firm embankments thrown up for fences or
enclosures to the adjacent fields.
The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad,
leaving the Potomac at the mouth of Aquia Creek,
crosses the river into Fredericksburg and then runs
through the bottoms below the town between the river
road and the hills, which latter it approaches closely at
their lower end, and then passes around at their foot
to take the direction to Richmond. Just at the rear of
the foot of the lower end of the hills, a country road
leading from the Telegraph Road and passing along the
east of the ridge crosses the railroad to get into the
River Road, and this is called "Hamilton's Crossing,"
from a gentleman of that name formerly residing near
the place. A canal runs from the river along the foot of
the hills above the town to the rear of it, for the purpose
of supplying water to several mills and factories in it,
Page 169
and this canal connects by a drain ditch with Hazel Run,
over which ditch the Plank Road crosses.
What is called Marye's Heights or Hill lies between
Hazel Run and the Plank Road, and at the foot of it is
a stone wall, behind which and next to the hill, the Telegraph
Road runs. Above Marye's Hill on the east of
the Plank Road are what are called, respectively,
Cemetery, Stansbury's and Taylor's Hills, all overlooking
the canal. In rear of these hills and overlooking
and commanding them are higher eminences. On the
east of Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road is quite a
high hill farther back than Marye's Hill and overlooking
it and nearly the whole ground, to which the name of
Lee's Hill has been given, because it was the position
generally occupied by General Lee during the battle.
Burnside's army had taken position on and in rear
of Stafford Heights, and the heights themselves, from
Falmouth to a point very nearly opposite the mouth of
the Massaponix, were covered with numerous batteries
of heavy guns, while the nature of the ground was such
as to afford easy access to the river by his troops. Longstreet's
corps occupied the hills in rear of Fredericksburg
to Hamilton's Crossing, and positions for some
distance above, while strong pickets were established in
the town and on the river bank above and below to watch
the enemy and impede a crossing.
It was impossible to resist successfully a crossing,
as the river is only between two and three hundred
yards wide, and the banks are so deep, and the river so
accessible, on the north bank by means of ravines running
into it, that our artillery, posted on the hills occupied
by our troops, could not play upon the bridges either
during the progress of the construction or afterwards,
while the enemy's batteries were able, by a concentrated
fire, to drive off the small bodies watching the river, or
to prevent any aid being sent to them over the wide
open plains formed by the bottoms. In addition to all
Page 170
this, the bottoms towards the lower end of our lines were
so wide that we had no guns which would do effective
firing across them, while the enemy's heavy guns from
the north bank of the river completely swept the whole
of our front, and reached over beyond our line.
On the morning of the 11th of December the enemy
commenced his movement, and by the use of his artillery
drove the regiments which were guarding the river from
its banks after an obstinate resistance, and succeeded in
laying down their pontoon bridges, one at the mouth of
Deep Creek, and the other two at Fredericksburg. The
first was laid early in the afternoon, but the latter two
not until near night, and during night and the next day
the enemy crossed in heavy force.
On the afternoon of the 12th I received an order from
General Jackson to move at once to the vicinity of
Hamilton's Crossing, which I did by marching nearly
all night, and a short time before day I bivouacked
some two miles in rear of the crossing where the division
had a little time to rest. At light on the morning of the
13th I moved up to the crossing, and found our army in
position confronting the enemy. Longstreet's line had
been constructed from the right, and General A. P. Hill's
division, which was much the largest in Jackson's corps,
now occupied the right of the line which rested near the
crossing. He was in the front skirts of the woods which
covered the hills, and on his left was Hood's division.
On the right of Hill's line was a small hill cleared
on the side next the enemy, on which were posted some
fourteen pieces of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel
Walker, which were supported by Field's brigade, under
Colonel Brockenborough, while Archer's brigade was on
the left of the guns. On Archer's left there was an
interval of several hundred yards in front of which was
a low flat marshy piece of woodland extending across
the railroad out into the bottom which was supposed to
be impracticable, and was therefore not covered by any
body of troops, but Gregg's brigade was posted in
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reserve in rear of this interval, without, however, being
in the line of battle. On the left of the interval were
the other three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Lane's
brigade being next to it, but in advance of the general
line a considerable number of pieces of artillery were
posted along the left of Hill's line, but they were on
low and unfavorable ground, as there were no good
positions for guns on that part of the line.
On my arrival, my division was posted on a second
line several hundred yards in rear of A. P. Hill's, with
Jackson's, now under Brigadier General Taliaferro, on
my left. My right rested on the railroad at the crossing,
and extended along the ridge road, which here crossed
the railroad, for a short distance and then into the woods
on my left. Hays' brigade was on my right, with
Trimble's brigade under Colonel R. F. Hoke immediately
in its rear, Lawton's brigade under Colonel N. N. Atkinson
in the centre, and my own brigade under Colonel J.
A. Walker on the left. In this position there was a thick
woods intervening between my division and the enemy,
and the consequence was that he was entirely excluded
from our view as we were from his. D. H. Hill's division,
which had followed mine from below, was posted in a
third line in the open ground in my rear beyond the
hills.
The weak point in our position was on our right, as
there was the wide open plain in front of it extending
to the river and perfectly covered and swept by the
enemy's heavy batteries on the opposite heights, and to
the right, extending around to our rear, were the open
flats of the Massaponix, here quite wide and incapable
of being covered by any position we could take. There
was very great danger of our right being turned by the
enemy's pushing a heavy column down the river across
the Massaponix. The plains on that flank were watched
by Stuart with two brigades of cavalry and his horse
artillery.
A heavy fog had concealed the two armies from each
Page 172
other during the early morning, but about nine o'clock it
began to rise, and then the artillery fire opened, which
was just as my division was moving into position. The
enemy's fire at first was not directed towards the place
where my division was posted, but after a short interval
the shells began to fall in our vicinity, and the division
remained exposed to a random but quite galling cannonading
for two or three hours.
Shortly after noon we heard in our front a very heavy
musketry fire, and soon a courier from General Archer
came to the rear in search of General A. P. Hill, stating
that General Archer was very heavily pressed and wanted
reinforcements. Just at that moment, a staff officer
rode up with an order to me from General Jackson, to
hold my division in readiness to move to the right
promptly, as the enemy was making a demonstration
in that direction. This caused me to hesitate about sending
a brigade to Archer's assistance, but to be prepared
to send it if necessary, I ordered Colonel Atkinson to
get his brigade ready to advance, and the order had been
hardly given, before the adjutant of Walker's battalion
of artillery came galloping to the rear with the information
that the interval on Archer's left (an awful gulf as
he designated it) had been penetrated by heavy columns
of the enemy, and that Archer's brigade and all our
batteries on the right would inevitably be captured unless
there was instant relief. This was so serious an emergency
that I determined to act upon it at once notwithstanding
the previous directions from General Jackson
to hold my division in readiness for another purpose,
and I accordingly ordered Atkinson to advance with his
brigade.
I was then entirely unacquainted with the ground in
front, having been able when I first got up to take only
a hasty glance at the country to our right, and I asked
Lieutenant Chamberlain, Walker's adjutant, to show the
brigade the direction to advance. In reply he stated that
the column of the enemy which had penetrated our line
Page 173
was immediately in front of the brigade I had ordered
forward, and that by going right ahead there could be
no mistake. The brigade, with the exception of one regiment,
the 13th Georgia, which did not hear the order,
accordingly moved off in handsome style through the
woods, but as it did so, Lieutenant Chamberlain informed
me that it would not be sufficient to cover the entire gap
in our line, and I ordered Colonel Walker to advance
immediately with my own brigade on the left of Atkinson.
The enemy's column in penetrating the interval
mentioned had turned Archer's left and Lane's right,
while they were attacked in front, causing Archer's left
and Lane's entire brigade to give way, and one column
had encountered Gregg's brigade, which, being taken
somewhat by surprise, was thrown into partial confusion,
resulting in the death of General Gregg, but the brigade
was rallied and maintained its ground. Lawton's brigade
advancing rapidly and gallantly under Colonel Atkinson,
encountered that column of the enemy which had turned
Archer's left, in the woods on the hill in rear of the line,
and by a brilliant charge drove it back down the hill,
across the railroad, and out into the open plains beyond,
advancing so far as to cause a portion of one of the
enemy's batteries to be abandoned. The brigade, however,
on getting out into the open plain came under
the fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and the approach of
a fresh and heavy column on its right rendered it
necessary that it should retire, which it did under orders
from Colonel Evans, who had succeeded to the command
by reason of Atkinson's being severely wounded.
Two of Brockenborough's regiments from the right
participated in the repulse of the enemy. Colonel
Walker advanced, at a double quick, further to the left,
encountering one of the columns which had penetrated
the interval, and by a gallant and resolute charge he
drove it back out of the woods across the railroad into
the open plains beyond, when, seeing another column of
the enemy crossing the railroad on his left, he fell back
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to the line of the road, and then deployed the 13th
Virginia Regiment to the left, and ordered it to advance
under cover of the timbers to attack the advancing
column on its flank. This attack was promptly made
and Thomas' brigade, attacking in front at the same
time, the enemy was driven back with heavy loss.
As soon as Atkinson and Walker had been ordered
forward, Hoke was ordered to move his brigade to the
left of Hays, but before he got into position, I received
a message stating that Archer's brigade was giving way
and I ordered Hoke to move forward at once to Archer's
support, obliquing to the right as he moved. Just as
Hoke started, I received an order from General Jackson,
by a member of his staff, to advance to the front with
the whole division, and Hays' brigade was at once
ordered forward in support of Hoke. The 13th Georgia
Regiment which had been left behind on the advance of
Lawton's brigade was ordered to follow Hoke's brigade
and unite with it.
Hoke found a body of the enemy in the woods in rear
of Archer's line on the left, where the regiments on that
flank, which had been attacked in rear, had given way,
but Archer still held the right with great resolution,
though his ammunition was exhausted. Upon a gallant
charge, by the brigade under Hoke, the enemy was driven
out of the woods upon his reserves posted on the railroad
in front, and then by another charge, in which General
Archer participated, the railroad was cleared and the
enemy was pursued to a fence some distance beyond,
leaving in our hands a number of prisoners, and a large
number of small arms on the field.
The movements of the three brigades engaged have
been described separately from the necessity of the case,
but they were all engaged at the same time, though they
went into action separately and in the order in which
they have been mentioned, and Lawton's brigade had
advanced further out into the plains than either of the
others.
Page 175
On riding to the front, I directed Lawton's brigade,
which was retiring, to be re-formed in the woods--Colonel
Atkinson had been left in front severely wounded and
he fell into the enemy's hands. Captain E. P. Lawton,
Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, a most gallant
and efficient officer, had also been left in front at
the extreme point to which the brigade advanced, mortally
wounded, and he likewise fell into the enemy's
hands.
I discovered that Hoke had got too far to the front
where he was exposed to the enemy's artillery, and also
to a flank movement on his right, and I sent an order
for him to retire to the original line, which he did,
anticipating the order by commencing to retire before it
reached him. Two of his regiments and a small
battalion were left to occupy the line of the railroad where
there was cover for them and his other two regiments,
along with the 13th Georgia, which had not been engaged,
were put in the slight trenches previously occupied
by Archer's brigade. Walker continued to hold the position
on the railroad which he had taken after repulsing
the enemy. Lawton's brigade was sent to the rear for
the purpose of resting and replenishing its ammunition.
Hays' brigade, which had advanced in rear of Hoke, had
not become engaged, but in advancing to the front it
had been exposed to a severe shelling which the enemy
began, as his attacking columns were retiring in confusion
before my advancing brigades. Hays was posted in rear
of Hoke for the purpose of strengthening the right in
the event of another advance. When I had discovered
Lawton's brigade retiring, I sent to General D. H. Hill
for reinforcements for fear that the enemy might again
pass through the unprotected interval, and he sent me
two brigades, but before they arrived Brigadier General
Paxton, who occupied the right of Taliaferro's line, had
covered the interval by promptly moving his brigade
into it.
The enemy was very severely punished for this attack,
Page 176
which was made by Franklin's grand division, and he
made no further attack on our right. During this
engagement and subsequently there were demonstrations
against A. P. Hill's left and Hood's right which were
repulsed without difficulty. Beginning in the forenoon
and continuing until nearly dark, there were repeated
and desperate assaults made by the enemy from
Fredericksburg against the positions at Marye's Hill and
the one to our right of it, but they were repulsed with
terrible slaughter, mainly by the infantry from Longstreet's
corps posted behind the stone wall at the foot
of Mayre's Hill, and the artillery on that, and on the
neighboring heights. The loss to the enemy here was
much heavier than that on our right, while our own loss
at the same point was comparatively slight.
My two brigades, Trimble's under Hoke, and my own
under Walker, and the 13th Georgia Regiment held their
positions on the front until night, while Hays retained
his position immediately in rear of Hoke, but there was
no further attack made on that part of the line, or on
any part of Hill's front, except the demonstrations on
his left which have been mentioned and which resulted
in some skirmishing and artillery firing.
When my division was first put in position on the
second line as described, having no use for my artillery,
I ordered Captain J. W. Latimer, my acting chief of
artillery, to report to Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery
for the Corps, with the six batteries attached to the
division, to-wit: Carrington's, Brown's, Garber's,
D'Aquin's, Dement's, and his own. Of these Brown's
and Latimer's were posted on Hill's left, under the
immediate charge of Captain Latimer, and did most effective
service, and D'Aquin's and Garber's were sent to Major
Pelham, Stuart's Chief of Artillery, on the right, where
they likewise did good service, Captain D'Aquin losing
his life while taking part in the artillery firing in that
quarter. Just before sunset of the day of the battle,
after having seen that all was quiet in my front, I rode
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a little to the rear and discovered General D. H. Hill's
division moving to the front through the woods.
On my inquiring the meaning of the movement, General
Colquitt, in command of the front brigade, informed
me that orders had been given for the advance of the
whole line and that Hill's division was ordered to
advance in support. General D. H. Hill himself rode up
in a few minutes, and confirmed the information. This
was the first intimation I had received of the order, as it
had not reached me. While General Hill and myself
were speaking of the matter, Lieutenant Morrison,
aide-de-camp to General Jackson, rode up and stated that the
General's orders were that I should hold my command in
readiness to advance; and immediately afterwards one
of my own staff officers came to me with the information
that General Jackson wished me to take command of
all the troops on the right and advance, regulating the
distance to which I should go, by the effect produced
on the enemy by our artillery which was to open.
I rode immediately to where Hoke's brigade was
posted and found General Jackson himself, who repeated
in person the orders to me, stating that I was to advance
in support of some artillery which he was about to send
forward. I informed him of the condition of my
command, the separation of Walker from the rest, the fact
of Lawton's brigade being in the rear, and that Hoke's
and Hays' brigades and the 13th Georgia were the only
troops immediately available. He told me to advance
with the latter and that he would give me abundant
support; I accordingly prepared to advance with Hoke's
brigade and the 13th Georgia in front, followed by Hays
brigade. The programme was that a number of pieces
of artillery should be run out in front, and open on the
enemy's infantry, when I was to advance and the artillery
to be again moved forward, followed by my infantry.
The movement with the artillery was commenced, and
as soon as it left the woods the enemy opened with
numerous batteries from the plains and from behind the
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embankments on tile river road. This fire was terrific
and many shells went crashing past us into the woods in
our rear, where D. H. Hill's division was massed. Our
own guns opened and continued to fire for a brief space,
and a part of Hoke's brigade advanced to the railroad,
but General Jackson soon became satisfied that the
advance must be attended with great difficulties and perhaps
disastrous results, and abandoned it. It was well
that he did. The enemy had very heavy forces massed
behind the embankments on the river road, the one nearest
us being pierced with embrasures for numerous
pieces of artillery. We would have had to advance nearly
a mile, over an entirely bare plain swept by all this
artillery, as well as cannonaded by the heavy guns on
Stafford Heights, and if we had been able to force back
the bodies of infantry and the artillery occupying positions
on the plain between us and the woods, still when
we reached the road itself we would have found a vastly
superior force behind a double line of very strong breastworks.
Nothing could have lived while passing over that
plain under such circumstances, and I feel well assured
that, while we were all ready to obey the orders of our
heroic commander, there was not a man in the force
ordered to advance, whether in the front or in support,
who did not breathe freer when he heard the orders
countermanding the movement.
I have subsequently examined this ground with great
care, and this examination has strengthened the position
first entertained. It may perhaps be asked why our troops
had not occupied the line of this road, to which I will
reply that the road and the embankments on each side of
it were perfectly commanded by the batteries of Stafford
Heights, which rendered the position untenable for
us, and the retreat from it most hazardous, while it
afforded safe protection to the enemy from our guns.
Shortly after the termination of this effort to advance,
I received a notification from General Jackson to move
Page 179
my troops to the rear for the purpose of resting and
getting provisions as soon as they should be relieved by
the troops of A. P. Hill's division which had at first
occupied the positions now held by me, but no troops
came to my relief, and I therefore, remained in position.
Orders were received during the night for Taliaferro
to relieve Hill's troops in the front line beginning from
the left, and for me to occupy the remainder of the line
on the right which Taliaferro could not fill out. In
accordance with these directions, before dawn on the 14th,
Paxton relieved Walker, Hays took the position which
Paxton vacated, Hoke remained stationary, Lawton's
brigade under Colonel Evans. was posted on Hoke's
right, and Walker was moved from the left and placed
in reserve behind Hoke. The evening before, Carrington's
battery had relieved Latimer's and Brown's on the left,
and still remained in position, and on the morning of the
14th, Dement's battery relieved one of the batteries on
the right which had been engaged the day before.
During the 14th the enemy remained in position on
the plains and at Fredericksburg, an occasional shot
being exchanged by the artillery and some firing from
the skirmishers taking place on portions of the line, but
none in my front.
Before light on the morning of the 15th, D. H. Hill's
division relieved Taliaferro's and mine on the front line,
and we moved to the rear in reserve, A. P. Hill's division
occupying the second line.
There was quiet on the 15th, the enemy still retaining
his position, but early on the morning of the 16th, as I
was moving into position on the second line in accordance
with previous orders, it was discovered that the enemy had
re-crossed the river during the night, taking up his bridges,
and I was ordered to move at once to the vicinity of Port
Royal to guard against the possible contingency of the
enemy's attempting to turn our right by crossing the
river near that place; and I commenced the march immediately.
Page 180
The loss in the division under my command in this battle was in
killed 89 and wounded 639, to-wit: in Hays' brigade, 5 killed
and 40 wounded; Trimble's brigade (Hoke's), 8 killed and
98 wounded; Lawton's brigade, 55 killed and 369 wounded; my
own brigade (Walker's), 17 killed and 114 wounded; and in
the artillery of the division 3 killed and 18 wounded. Among
the killed were Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, and Captain D'Aquin of the artillery,
and among the wounded were Colonel Atkinson of the
26th Georgia Regiment (in the hands of the enemy),
Captain E. P. Lawton, A. A. G. Lawton's brigade (Lawton
mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy)
and Colonel Lamar, 61st Georgia Regiment.
General Lee's entire loss in the battle was in killed
458, and wounded, 3,743, to-wit: in Longstreet's corps,
130 killed, 1,276 wounded; in Jackson's corps, 328 killed
and 2,454 wounded; and 13 wounded in Stuart's cavalry.
The enemy's loss was very much heavier, and over
900 prisoners, more than 9,000 stand of arms and a large
quantity of ammunition fell into our hands.
The failure of General Lee to attempt to destroy the
enemy's army after its repulse has been much criticised,
and many speculations about the probable result of an
attempt to drive the enemy into the river have been
indulged in by a number of writers. In the first place,
it must be recollected that no man was more anxious to
inflict a decisive blow on the enemy than General Lee
himself, and none understood better the exact condition
of things, and the likelihood of success in any attempt
to press the enemy after his defeat on the 13th. That
defeat was a repulse with very heavy loss it is true,
but it was not a rout of the enemy's army; and candid
persons ought to presume that General Lee knew what
he was about and had very good and sufficient reasons
for not sallying from his line of defence, upon the exposed
plains below, to make the attempt to convert the repulse
into a rout.
Page 181
If attention is given to the previous description of
the ground on which the two armies were operating, it
must be seen that an attempt to pass over the wide
plain intervening between our line and the enemy's
position below the town, while exposed to the fire of
150 heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, and the numerous
field pieces securely masked in the River road,
would inevitably have resulted in disaster, unless the
enemy's forces had become so paralyzed as to be
incapable of an effort at defence. Burnside's army was
composed of about 150,000 men in the grand division
under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, respectively.
In none of the assaults on our lines were the whole
of these grand divisions engaged, but when columns of
attack were sent forward, there were always very heavy
reserves for the attacking columns to fall back upon in
case of repulse; Sumner's and Franklin's grand divisions
had been mainly engaged and Hooker's scarcely at
all. General Lee's army was not half as large as Burnside's
and if he had at any time made an attempt to
advance, any force that he could have massed for that
purpose without abandoning his line of defence entirely
would in all likelihood have still encountered a superior
force of infantry behind a strong line of defence, in
addition to the artillery.
As I have stated, General Jackson made the attempt
to advance on the right late in the day on the 13th, but
he was compelled to desist, very fortunately, before any
disaster happened. Above the town, the same canal, at
the foot of the range of hills, which had furnished an
insurmountable obstacle to any attack by the enemy on
our extreme left, likewise furnished the same obstacle
to an advance on our part. The only other quarter from
which the advance could have been made was from the
hills immediately in rear of the town upon the enemy in
the town, and there the difficulties were greater even
than below. Any attacking columns from that quarter
must either have moved down the rugged face of the
Page 182
base hills, or by flank along the Telegraph and Plank
roads, and then they would have been so much scattered
by the artillery from the north bank, which would
then have had a more effective range than even on the
plains, that it would not have required the reserves,
posted behind the houses and defences in the town, to
complete the repulse and disaster.
As to a night attack, that is a very easy thing to talk
about but a most hazardous experiment to try, especially
on dark nights such as we then had. Such attacks
cannot be ventured on with safety unless with the most
thoroughly trained troops, and then not in large bodies,
for fear of confusion and firing into each other, the very
dread of which often paralyzes very brave troops.
It has been said that General Lee might have inflicted
tremendous damage upon the enemy by forcing
hot shot and shell into Fredericksburg while the enemy's
troops were massed there. The heroic and patriotic
people of that town, when it was threatened with a
bombardment by Sumner, had not appealed to the
commander of their country's army to cause the danger to
be removed from them by not resisting its occupation
by the enemy, but had exhibited most commendable
unselfishness by, in most cases, abandoning their homes
without a murmur, while there were some too poor to
move elsewhere, and others who chose to remain and
share all the dangers of the approaching struggle; it
was not in the heart of the noble commander of the Army
of Northern Virginia to doom, by his own act, the
remaining few of that devoted people and the homes of
the absent to destruction, for the sake of killing and
wounding a few thousand of the enemy, and causing
dismay among the remainder.
Is this forbearance one to be criticised with severity
as a grievous military blunder?
It is probable that if General Lee had known that
the enemy was evacuating the town, his artillery might
have inflicted considerable damage, but the enemy had
Page 183
given no indication of such a purpose, and he took
advantage of the darkness of the night and the prevalence
of a storm and wind to make good his retreat, when the
noise attending the movement could not be heard.
General Lee accomplished all that was possible with
the means under his control, except, indeed, the useless
destruction of what the enemy had left of the town of
Fredericksburg.
There was a ridiculous story about General Jackson,
to which currency was given by the newspapers, which
represented that, at a council of war called by General
Lee on the night after the battle, General Jackson fell
into a doze while the very grave question of what ought
to be done under the circumstances was being discussed,
and after all the rest had given their opinion, General
Lee turned to General Jackson and asked, "Well, General,
what is your opinion?" to which the latter, waking
out of his nap, replied, "Drive 'em in the river, drive
'em in the river." This story is by no means creditable
to General Jackson, yet it obtained a wide circulation,
and the narrators of it seemed to think it was very
characteristic.
General Jackson was a most able commander and
heroic soldier, and it was not at all likely that he would
have acted so much like a besotted member of a council
of war called by his chief. I presume after the facts that
I have before stated, it is not necessary to assert that
no such incident occurred.
Had Burnside moved down the river to the Massaponix,
after crossing, or had thrown other bridges
across at or near the mouth of that stream, and crossed
one of his grand divisions there, he would inevitably
have forced us to abandon our line of defence, and
fight him on other ground.
Page 184
CHAPTER XIX.
OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63.
ON the 16th of December, as soon as it was discovered
that the enemy had recrossed the river, in accordance
with the orders received, I moved to the vicinity
of Port Royal, arriving by nightfall.
The enemy was content with the experiment he had
made, and did not attempt any further movement at
that time. I proceeded the next day to picket the river
from a place called the Stop-Cock, near the Rappahannock
Academy, to the vicinity of Port Tobacco, below
Port Royal, the river having been watched on this line
previous to my arrival by some of Brigadier General
Wm. H. F. Lee's cavalry, which I relieved.
My division was encamped in the vicinity of Port
Royal, on the hills back from the river, and when it
was ascertained that the enemy was not preparing for
a new movement in any short time, the different brigades
built permanent winter quarters at suitable places.
After a careful examination of the country, I proceeded
to fortify the banks of the river at points likely to
afford facilities for crossing, and I established a line
of defence also along the main road running parallel
with the river, where high embankments with cedar
hedges on them afforded good cover for troops and
excellent breastworks. This line commenced at the
upper end of the Hazelwood estate, the former residence
of that distinguished Virginian, John Taylor of
Caroline, and with the defences on the river extending
to Camden, the residence of Mr. Pratt, some distance
below Port Royal, passing in rear of that town, which
was now nearly abandoned on account of the depredations
of the enemy's gunboats and the fear of their
repetition. New roads were constructed in rear of the
line of defence out of reach of artillery from the
Page 185
opposite bank, for the purpose of facilitating communication
between the different positions, and two Whitworth
guns under Captain W. W. Hardwick were placed on a
high hill in rear of Port Royal, for the purpose of
preventing the gunboats which were below from ascending
the river; and subsequently torpedoes were placed
in the bed of the river some two or three miles below
Port Royal under the superintendence of some one sent
from headquarters.
The enemy established a line of cavalry pickets on
the opposite bank of the river as far down as ours
reached, and the two were in sight of each other. The
river at Port Royal is between six and eight hundred
yards wide, and immediately opposite Port Royal is
the small village of Port Conway, which was occupied
by the enemy's pickets.
We were compelled to haul our supplies in wagons
from Guiney's depot on the railroad, and as the winter
was a severe one with much snow and rain, the country
roads, which we had to use, became almost impassable
from the mud, and we were compelled to employ the
men for a considerable time in corduroying them at the
worst places.
In the month of January, 1863, I was promoted to
the rank of Major General and was assigned to the
permanent command of Ewell's division, the name of
which was now changed. Colonel R. F. Hoke of the
21st North Carolina Regiment, who had commanded
Trimble's brigade since the termination of the Maryland
campaign, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier
General and assigned to the brigade he already
commanded, and the name of that also was changed. The
brigade had previously consisted of the 21st North
Carolina, the 12th and 21st Georgia, and the 15th
Alabama Regiments, and a North Carolina battalion of
two companies. The 12th and 21st Georgia were now
transferred to a Georgia brigade in D. H. Hill's division,
and the 15th Alabama to a brigade in Hood's division,
Page 186
the 6th, 54th, and 57th North Carolina Regiments from
Hood's division, taking the place in Hoke's brigade of
those transferred from it.
The 25th and 44th Virginia Regiments were transferred
from my own brigade to that of J. R. Jones, in
Jackson's division, and subsequently Colonel William
Smith of the 49th Virginia, who had been so severely
wounded at Sharpsburg and had not yet returned, was
appointed Brigadier General and assigned to my old
brigade as it remained after the transfer of the two
regiments. The organization of the artillery was now
changed, and in the place of the batteries which had
heretofore been attached to brigades, battalions were
organized, which were to be under the general control
of the Chief of Artillery for the Corps, and a battalion
to be assigned to a division on an active campaign, or
when required for defence. In consequence of this
arrangement, a number of promotions took place among
the artillery officers, and Captain J. W. Latimer, a
youthful but most gallant and efficient officer, was made
a Major of Artillery, a promotion which he had richly
earned, though he was scarcely twenty-one years old.
All the batteries heretofore attached to the division,
except Latimer's, were sent to the rear of Bowling
Green to winter, in order to be more convenient to forage.
Latimer's battery was retained to be used in case of
need, and it became Tanner's by virtue of the promotion
of the first lieutenant.
My assistant adjutant general, while I was a
brigadier general, Captain F. Gardner, had resigned
the previous summer, and my aide, Lieutenant S. H
Early,*
had resigned while we were in the valley after
the Maryland campaign, as he was over fifty years of
age, and the condition of his family required his presence
*
Lieutenant Early, at General Early's request (and accompanied
by his young son, John Cabell Early, aged fifteen years), rejoined the
army in 1863 during its northern invasion, and was severely wounded
at the battle of Gettysburg.
CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY
Page 187
at home. I had had no regular personal staff since
then. I found no assistant adjutant general with
Ewell's division when I succeeded to the command at
Sharpsburg, and Major Samuel Hale, who held the
commission of a commissary, had been acting in that
capacity for me while I commanded the brigade and,
continued to do so while I commanded the division. I found
with the division Major J. P. Wilson and Mr. Henry
Heaton, who had been acting as volunteer aides to
General Ewell and then to General Lawton, and they
continued with me in that capacity until after my
promotion.
After I was assigned to the division as major general,
Major Hale received the commission of adjutant
general with the rank of major, and A. L. Pitzer and
Wm. G. Callaway were commissioned as aides with the
rank of first lieutenants.
My division staff as then organized consisted of the
following officers, all of whom except those above
designated had been with General Ewell as members of
his staff:
- Lieutenant Colonel J. M. JONES, Inspector
General.
- Major SAMUEL HALE, Assistant Adjutant
General.
- Lieutenant A. L. PITZER, Aide.
- Lieutenant Wm. G. CALLAWAY, Aide.
- Major C. E. SNODGRASS, Quartermaster.
- Major BEN H. GREEN, Commissary.
- Captain WILLIAM THORNTON, Assistant
Commissary.
- Captain C. W. CHRISTIE, Ordnance
Officer.
- Captain HENRY RICHARDSON, Engineer Officer.
Subsequently, in the spring, Major John W. Daniel,
who had been commissioned at my instance, was also
assigned to me as an assistant adjutant general. Lieutenant
Robert D. Early, who had been acting as aide
In one of the brigades in D. H. Hill's division, also reported
to me during the winter, as acting aide, and continued
in that capacity until he was made an assistant
adjutant general to a brigade in Jackson's old division.
Page 188
A company of mounted men organized as scouts,
couriers and guides by General Ewell, had remained attached
to the division under the command of Captain
W. F. Randolph, but it was transferred in the spring
to General Jackson's headquarters. My division, as it
remained after the changes above mentioned, was
composed of four brigades, to-wit: Hays' Louisiana brigade,
Hoke's North Carolina brigade, Lawton's Georgia
brigade (commanded by Colonel Evans), and Smith's
Virginia brigade, organized as follows:
Hays' brigade: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana
Regiments.
Hoke's brigade: 6th, 21st, 54th, and 57th North
Carolina Regiments and Wharton's North Carolina
battalion.
Lawton's brigade: 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, and
61st Georgia Regiments.
Smith's brigade: 13th, 31st, 49th, 52nd, and 58th
Virginia Regiments.
In a few days after the battle, the other divisions
of Jackson's corps were moved to positions above me,
covering the river from the mouth of Massaponix to my
left, Jackson's old division being on my immediate left,
then A. P. Hill's division, and then D. H. Hill's. In
January General Trimble, who had been severely
wounded near Groveton on the 29th of August previous,
was made a Major General and assigned to Jackson's
division, which had always heretofore remained without
a regular division commander, even while General Jackson
was a Major General, as his command had included
other troops.
The enemy made no demonstration whatever on my
front, and we had nothing to disturb our quiet during
the winter, except a little incident by which two officers
were captured by the enemy in rather a singular manner.
There were a considerable number of ducks on the river,
and Major Wharton, commander of the battalion in
Hoke's brigade, and Captain Adams, the assistant
MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL
Page 189
adjutant general of the brigade, took it into their heads
to go shooting. There were several boats at Port Royal
which I had directed to be hauled up on the bank with
orders to the pickets to keep watch over them and not
permit them to be launched.
On the day the Major and the Captain took for their
sport, the picket at Port Royal happened to be from
their brigade, and they easily induced the sentinel on
duty to let them have the use of one of the boats, to row
into the mouth of a creek above, on our side, where the
ducks were most numerous. The day was a very windy
one with the wind blowing across towards the enemy.
By keeping near the bank they avoided the effect of
the wind until they got opposite the mouth of the creek,
when it struck their boat and forced it out into the
stream. Not being expert boatmen, and moreover being
excited by the danger, they lost control of the boat and
were driven helplessly to the northern bank into the
hands of the enemy's pickets, and of course were made
prisoners. The Major having an old newspaper with him,
pulled it out when he reached the shore and proposed an
exchange, a practice sometimes prevailing with the
pickets in spite of all orders, but the Federal on post
was rather too shrewd to have that game played on
him, insisting that it was not exactly a case for exchange
of such civilities. This was a caution to all persons
disposed to sporting and to interfere with the orders
to the pickets; and we had no more duck shooting in
boats.
Burnside made an abortive effort in January to advance
again by flanking us on the left, but he stuck in
the mud, and we were not put to any inconvenience by
the movement. About the last of the month he was
relieved of his command, and a new commander for the
Federal Army was selected, in the person of Major General
Joseph Hooker, called "Fighting Joe."
Though we passed the winter without the excitement
attending an advance of the enemy, still we were not
Page 190
without some excitements of our own, and I may as well
relate the following occurrence to show how men who
had passed through the stirring scenes of the previous
year, who had fought with Jackson in the valley, around
Richmond, at Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg,
could amuse themselves in winter quarters.
We had several severe snow storms during the winter,
and after one of them, when the snow lay deep on the
ground, Hoke's brigade challenged Lawton's for a battle
with snow balls, which challenge was accepted. The two
brigades were marshalled under their respective commanders
--Hoke on the one side, and Colonel Evans on
the other. Evans stood on the defensive in front of his
camp and Hoke advanced against him. Evans' force
was much the larger, but being Georgians who had been
brought from Savannah in the beginning of the previous
summer, his men were not accustomed to the fleecy
element. Hoke's men were more experienced, and when
they made a bold dash at the Georgians, pelting them
most unmercifully with their well pressed balls, and
giving the usual Confederate yell, there was no withstanding
the shock of the onset. Evans' men gave way
in utter confusion and rout, and Hoke's men got possession
of their camp.
The Georgians seeing that their camp and all their
effects were in possession of the enemy, who seemed to
be inclined to act on the maxim that "to victors belong
the spoils," took courage, rallied, and came back with
such vim that Hoke's men in their turn were routed,
and retreated in utter dismay. No time was given for
them to rally, but they were pursued to their own camp,
their leader having been captured in the pursuit. Evans'
men did not deem it prudent to press their victory too
far, but retired, though in good order. They acted
magnanimously and released the leader of their opponents
on his parole of honor, not, however, without his having
been well wallowed in the snow.
There was no official report of this battle, but all the
Page 191
particulars were related at division headquarters by one
of the aides who happened to be present, and who was
himself captured under suspicious circumstances on
Hoke's retreat, but begged off on the ground that he was
a neutral and a mere spectator. He was much joked
by the other young men at headquarters, who charged
him with skulking on the occasion, and there was some
reason to suspect that he did not stand the storm of
snow balls as well as he did that of shot and shell on
many another occasion. Many, very many of the poor
fellows who shared in this pastime poured out their
life's blood on subsequent battlefields, and a small
remnant were surrendered at Appomattox Court-House with
arms in their hands, and tears rolling down their cheeks.
About the first of March my division was moved to
Hamilton's Crossing to take place of Hood's, which had
been sent with Longstreet south of James River, and
a body of cavalry took the place of my division on the
right. In my new position, it was my duty to picket
and watch the river from the mouth of Hazel Run at the
lower end of Fredericksburg to the mouth of Massaponix,
which was done with three regiments at a time, posted
at different positions on the bank. These pickets were
in full view of and in musket range of the enemy's
pickets on the opposite bank, and also under the fire of
the guns on Stafford Heights, but by a tacit arrangement
there was never any firing from either side on
ordinary occasions, but the picketing detachments on
both sides were moved into position and regularly
relieved without molestation.
In the month of April the 31st Virginia Regiment
of Smith's brigade, in company with the 25th Virginia
of Jones' brigade, Trimble's division, was sent to the
valley for the purpose of accompanying an expedition
into Northwestern Virginia under General Imboden, and
did not return until late in May.
The growing timber on the range of hills which had
constituted our line of defence at the battle of Fredericksburg
Page 192
had been almost entirely cut down during the
winter to construct tents, and furnish firewood for
Hood's division, and there were left only a few scattering
trees on the hills and a thin skirt in front. Shortly after
my removal, General Jackson, whose headquarters had
been below, near Moss Neck, removed also to the vicinity
of Hamilton's Crossing.
Brigadier General J. B. Gordon, who had been Colonel
of the 6th Alabama Regiment in Rodes' brigade, D. H.
Hill's division, and very severely wounded at Sharpsburg,
was assigned in April to the command of Lawton's
brigade, which took his name.
There was perfect quiet along the river front until
the night of the 28th of April, though Fitz. Lee's brigade
of Stuart's cavalry had a fight with the enemy at Kelley's
Ford in Culpeper in March, and there was another affair
with the cavalry in April.
Page 193
CHAPTER XX.
BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
BEFORE light on the morning of the 29th of April, the
enemy, having moved three corps of his army up during
the night, by taking advantage of a heavy fog that overhung
the river, threw a brigade across in boats, just
below the mouth of Deep Run, and the 54th North
Carolina Regiment on picket at that point, being unable
to cope with the force brought against it, was forced
to retire, which it did without loss. The movement had
been conducted with so much secrecy, the boats being
brought to the river by hand, that the first intimation
of it, to the regiment on picket, was the landing of the
force. Bridges were then rapidly laid down at the same
crossing used by Burnside at this point and a division
of infantry with some artillery was crossed over.
About a mile lower down below the house of Mr. Pratt,
a similar crossing was attempted, but that was discovered,
and resisted by the 13th Georgia Regiment under
Colonel Smith until after sunrise, when that regiment
was relieved by the 6th Louisiana under Colonel Monaghan
going on picket in its regular time. The latter
regiment continued to resist the crossing successfully
until the fog had risen, when the enemy's guns were
brought to bear, and by a concentrated fire that regiment
was compelled to retire, not, however, without sustaining
a considerable loss in killed and wounded as well as
prisoners, the latter being captured in rifle pits at points
below the crossing, which was effected by the enemy's
coming up in their rear before they had received notice
of his being across. The 13th Georgia had also sustained
some loss in killed and wounded, and prisoners captured
in the same way, who had not been relieved. The
resistance made at this point delayed the enemy so that
the bridges there were not laid until after 10 o'clock A.M.
Page 194
A little after light, information reached me of the
crossing at Deep Run, and I sent notice of it at once to
General Jackson. Without, however, waiting for orders,
I ordered my division to the front, and as soon as it was
possible put it in line along the railroad, with my right
resting near Hamilton's Crossing and my left extending
to Deep Run. Three regiments were sent to the front
and deployed along the River road as skirmishers. The
13th Virginia Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Terrill,
on picket between the mouths of Hazel and Deep
Runs, was drawn back to the line of the River road
above Deep Run, and remained there until relieved by
McLaws' division, when it was brought up.
As soon as the enemy had laid down his bridges at
the lower crossing, a division of infantry and some
artillery were crossed over at that point. When the
fog rose, the slopes of the opposite hills were
semi-covered with troops the whole distance from opposite
Fredericksburg to a point nearly opposite the mouth
of the Massaponix. The question was whether they
were ostentatiously displayed as a feint, or whether they
were massed for crossing. The troops which had crossed
were seen throwing up breastworks covering the bridges
and also epaulments for artillery; but it was impossible
to discover the strength of the force already across, as
below the deep banks of the river there was ample space
for massing a large body of troops out of our sight.
There appeared no attempt to make a crossing at
Fredericksburg, or to move up towards the town.
Some artillery was put in position on the hill near
Hamilton's Crossing on my right, and in rear of my
left. D. H. Hill's division, now under command of
Brigadier General Rodes, was soon brought up, and put
in position on my right, extending across the Massaponix,
one brigade being placed below that creek across
the River road, so as to guard the ford. A Whitworth
gun, of very long range, was also posted below the
Page 195
Massaponix out of range of the enemy's guns across
the river and in position to partially enfilade them.
The remaining divisions of Jackson's corps were
brought up during the day, and A. P. Hill's was put in
position in a second line in rear of mine. Trimble's
division under the command of Brigadier General
Colston arrived very late in the afternoon and was placed
in reserve in the rear. Barksdale's brigade already
occupied the town of Fredericksburg, and the remaining
brigades of McLaws' division were brought up and
placed in position on the left of my line, one of his
brigades connecting with my left, which was now drawn
back from the railroad, and a shorter line made across
to Deep Run, to connect it with McLaws' right. For
the greater part of the way the railroad track furnished
a very good protection, and it was strengthened by
throwing up embankments, the line being advanced a
little in front on the left of my centre where there was
a rise in the ground above the level of the road. In
order to occupy the whole of the line my brigades had
to be extended out, as the division was not strong enough
to man it fully.
During the day the enemy made no attempt to advance
against us in force with his infantry, and his
skirmishers were effectually kept from the River road
by mine, and on the right Rodes' skirmishers, which extended
from the right of mine around to the river above
the Massaponix, prevented any movement in that direction.
There was some artillery firing, and one Whitworth
gun from across the Massaponix played with very
considerable effect on the bottoms on the enemy's left.
Large bodies of the infantry on the opposite slopes
occasionally moved down towards the river, where they
were concealed from our view by the bank on the south
side, which is the highest.
I retained my position on the front line during the
night, which passed quietly. The next day there was
Page 196
very little change in the appearances in front. The
enemy had made strong tetes du pont covering his
bridges, and was constructing a line of entrenchments
connecting the two, passing in front of the Pratt and
Bernard houses, and extending below the lower bridge.
There was this day some apparent diminution of the
infantry in view on the opposite slopes, but there were
many heavy guns in battery on the heights and a very
large force of infantry still visible. There were some
demonstrations with the infantry on the north bank,
some skirmish firing, and some artillery firing also, but
the enemy on the south bank did not appear at all
enterprising, and rather contracted his lines on his left,
his skirmishers retiring before ours which were pushed
forward on that flank. The indications were that it was
a mere demonstration on our front, to cloak a more
serious move in some other quarter, and so it turned
out to be. When this was discovered, it is quite probable
that we might have destroyed the comparatively
small force on the south bank by a movement against it
from our line, but this would not have compensated us
for the loss we would, in all probability, have sustained
from the enemy's heavy guns.
General Lee had ascertained that by far the largest
portion of Hooker's army had crossed the Rappahannock
and Rapidan Rivers above their junction, and were moving
down on his left. He therefore determined to move
up with the greater part of his own army to meet that
force, which was watched by Anderson's division of
Longstreet's corps and a portion of Stuart's cavalry.
Accordingly late on the afternoon of the 30th I was
instructed by General Jackson to retain my position on
the line, and, with my division and some other troops to
be placed at my disposal, to watch the enemy confronting
me while the remainder of the army was absent. Barksdale's
brigade occupying Fredericksburg and the heights
in rear, was directed to retain his position, as was also
a portion of General Pendleton's reserve artillery, which
Page 197
occupied positions on Marye's and Lee's Hills, and the
whole was placed under my command. In addition,
Graham's battery of artillery of four guns, two twenty
pounders and two ten pounders, Parrots, posted on the
hill on my right, was left with me, and Lieutenant Colonel
Andrews was ordered to report to me with his battalion
of four batteries with twelve pieces, to-wit: six
Napoleons, four three-inch rifles, and two ten pounder
Parrots. A Whitworth gun under Lieutenant Tunis was
also left at my disposal and posted on the right across
the Massaponix. With the rest of the army near
Fredericksburg comprising the other three divisions of
Jackson's corps, and three brigades of McLaws' division,
General Lee moved on the night of the 30th and the
morning of the 1st of May towards Chancellorsville to
meet Hooker.
Before leaving, General Lee instructed me to watch
the enemy and try to hold him; to conceal the weakness
of my force, and if compelled to yield before overpowering
numbers, to fall back towards Guiney's depot
where our supplies were, protecting them and the railroad;
and I was further instructed to join the main body
of the army in the event that the enemy disappeared
from my front, or so diminished his force as to render
it prudent to do so, leaving at Fredericksburg only such
force as might be necessary to protect the town against
any force the enemy might leave behind.
The force which had made the demonstration on our
front consisted at first of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th corps of
Hooker's army, under the command of Major General
Sedgwick. The 3rd corps moved to join Hooker during
the 30th, but the 1st and 6th remained in my front still
demonstrating. In his testimony before the Congressional
Committee on the war, Hooker stated that the
6th corps, according to the returns of the 30th of April,
1863, numbered 26,233 present for duty. Sedgwick says
that the 6th corps numbered only 22,000 when it crossed
the river. Taking the medium between them, the
Page 198
effective strength may be put down at 24,000, which
General A. P. Howe, commanding one of the divisions,
says he was informed, at headquarters of the corps, it
was. The first corps must have numbered at least 16,000
and perhaps more, so that I must have been left confronting
at least 40,000 men in these two corps, besides
the stationary batteries on Stafford Heights and Gibbon's
division of the 2nd corps which was just above,
near Falmouth, and, according to Hooker's statement,
numbered over 6,000 for duty on the 30th.
My division by the last tri-monthly field return which
was made on the 20th of April, and is now before me, had
present for duty 548 officers and 7,331 enlisted men,
making a total of 7,879. It had increased none, and I
could not have carried into action 7,500 in all, officers and
men, and not more than 7,000 muskets, as in camp when
everything was quiet, a number of men reported for duty,
who were not actually able to take the field. I had already
lost about 150 men in the resistance which was made at
the lower crossing. Barksdale's brigade did not probably
exceed 1,500 men for duty, if it reached that number.
I had, therefore, not exceeding 9,000 infantry officers
and men in all, being very little over 8,000 muskets; and
in addition I had Anderson's battalion with twelve guns;
Graham's four guns; Tunis', Whitworths, and portions
of Watson's; Cabell's and Cutt's battalions under General
Pendleton, not numbering probably thirty guns. I
think 45 guns must have covered all my artillery, and
these were nothing to compare with the enemy's in weight
of metal.
The foregoing constituted the means I had for occupying
and holding a line of at least six miles in length,
against the enemy's heavy force of infantry, and his far
more numerous and heavier and better appointed artillery.
It was impossible to occupy the whole line, and
the interval between Deep Run and the foot of Lee's Hill
had to be left vacant, watched by skirmishers, protected
only by a cross fire of artillery. I could spare no infantry
Page 199
from the right, as that was much the weakest
point of the line, and the force which had crossed, and
which exceeded my whole strength, was below Deep Run,
and confronting my own division. Andrews' artillery
was placed in position on the morning of the 1st as follows:
four Napoleons and two rifles were placed under
Major Latimer, near the left of the line occupied by my
division, behind some epaulments that had been made on
that part of the line; two Parrots were placed with Graham's
guns on the hill on my right, and two Napoleons
and two rifles were posted to the right of Hamilton's
Crossing, near a grove of pines, the Whitworth gun
being posted on a height across the Massaponix so as
to have a flank fire on the enemy if he advanced, and it
was without support. Colonel Andrews had charge of
all of the artillery on this part of the line, that on
Marye's and Lee's Hills was under the immediate
superintendence of General Pendleton, and some of the
batteries were so posted as to have a cross fire on the upper
part of the valley of Deep Run.
The enemy remained quiet on the 1st, except in
demonstrating by manoeuvres of his troops, and there
was no firing on that day. His line of entrenchments,
covering the two bridges, had been completed, and he
still displayed a heavy force of infantry, consisting of
the two corps under Sedgwick. The ensuing night also
passed quietly, and during it a battery of four Napoleons
was sent by General Pendleton to report to Colonel
Andrews, and was posted with the four guns near the
pines on the right of the crossing.
The morning of the 2nd opened with appearances
pretty much the same as they had been the day before;
if anything there was more infantry in view on the north
bank than had appeared the previous day. Colonel
Andrews was ordered early in the day to feel the enemy
with his guns, and accordingly Latimer opened with his
two rifle guns on the enemy's position near Deep Run,
and Graham's and Brown's Parrots opened on the infantry
Page 200
and batteries below and near the Pratt house.
Latimer's fire was not returned, but Graham's and
Brown's was responded to by two of the batteries on
the north bank and some guns on the south side. Shortly
afterwards the infantry and artillery at the lower crossing
disappeared behind the bank of the river, and that
crossing was abandoned.
During the morning I rode to Lee's Hill for the purpose
of observing the enemy's movements from that
point, and I observed a considerable portion of his
infantry in motion up the opposite river bank. While I
was, in company with Generals Barksdale and Pendleton,
observing the enemy's manoeuvre and trying to ascertain
what it meant, at about 11 o'clock A.M., Colonel R.
H. Chilton, of General Lee's staff, came to me with a
verbal order to move up immediately towards
Chancellorsville with my whole force, except a brigade of infantry
and Pendleton's reserve artillery, and to leave at Fredericksburg
the brigade of infantry and a part of the
reserve artillery to be selected by General Pendleton,
with instructions to the commander of this force to watch
the enemy's movements, and keep him in check if possible,
but if he advanced with too heavy a force to retire
on the road to Spottsylvania Court-House--General
Pendleton being required to send the greater part of his
reserve artillery to the rear at once.
This order took me very much by surprise, and I
remarked to Colonel Chilton that I could not retire my
troops without their being seen by the enemy, whose
position on Stafford Heights not only overlooked ours,
but who had one or two balloons which he was constantly
sending up from the heights to make observations, and
stated that he would inevitably move over and take
possession of Fredericksburg and the surrounding
Heights. The Colonel said he presumed General Lee
understood all this, but that it was much more important
for him to have troops where he was, than at Fredericksburg,
and if he defeated the enemy there he could easily
Page 201
retake Fredericksburg; he called my attention to the
fact, which was apparent to us all, that there was a very
heavy force of infantry massed on the slopes near
Falmouth which had moved up from below, and stated that
he had no doubt the greater portion of the force on the
other side was in motion to reinforce Hooker. He repeated
his orders with great distinctness in the presence
of General Pendleton, and in reply to questions from us,
said that there could be no mistake in his orders.
This was very astounding to us, as we were satisfied
that we were then keeping away from the army, opposed
to General Lee, a much larger body of troops than my
force could engage or neutralize if united to the army
near Chancellorsville. It is true that there was the force
massed near Falmouth and the indications were that it
was moving above, but still there was a much larger force
of infantry stationed below, which evinced no disposition
to move. While we were conversing, information
was brought me that the enemy had abandoned his lower
crossing, and that our skirmishers had advanced to the
Pratt house, but he still, however, maintained his position
at the mouth of Deep Creek with a division of infantry
and a number of guns on our side of the river.
The orders as delivered to me left me no discretion,
and believing that General Lee understood his own
necessities better than I possibly could, I did not feel justified
in acting on my own judgment, and I therefore determined
to move as directed. It subsequently turned
out that Colonel Chilton had misunderstood General
Lee's orders, which were that I should make the
movement indicated if the enemy did not have a sufficient
force in my front to detain the whole of mine, and it
was to be left to me to judge of that, the orders, in fact,
being similar to those given me at first. It also turned
out that the troops seen massed near Falmouth were the
1st corps under Reynolds, moving up to reinforce Hooker,
and that the 6th corps, Sedgwick's own, remained behind.
When Colonel Chilton arrived, General Pendleton was
Page 202
making arrangements to move some artillery to the left
to open on the columns massed near Falmouth, but the
order brought rendered it necessary to desist from that
attempt in order to make preparations for the withdrawal.
My division occupied a line which was in full view
from the opposite hills except where it ran through the
small strip of woods projecting beyond the railroad,
and the withdrawal had to be made with the probability
of its being discovered by the enemy. I determined to
leave Hays' brigade to occupy the hills in rear of
Fredericksburg with one regiment deployed as skirmishers
on the River road confronting the force at the mouth
of Deep Run, and also to leave one of Barksdale's
regiments, which was already in Fredericksburg and along
the bank of the river, picketing from Falmouth to the
lower end of the town.
The orders were given at once and the withdrawal
commenced, but it had to be made with great caution so
as to attract as little attention as possible and therefore
required much time. General Pendleton was to remain
at Fredericksburg, according to the order's, and the
withdrawal of such of his artillery as was to be sent to the
rear was entrusted to him and executed under his directions.
The Whitworth gun was ordered to the rear
with the reserve artillery and Andrews' battalion and
Graham's battery were ordered to follow my column,
Richardson's battery, which was on the right, being
returned to General Pendleton's control. When the
withdrawal commenced, the enemy sent up a balloon and I
felt sure that he had discovered the movement, but it
turned out that he did not.* It was late in the afternoon
before my column was in readiness to move, and
Barksdale was ordered to bring up the rear with the three
regiments left after detaching the one on picket, as soon
* Professor Lowe's balloon reconnaissances so signally failed on
this occasion and in the operations at Chancellorsville, that they were
abandoned for the rest of the war.
Page 203
as he was relieved by Hays. As soon as the troops were
in readiness the three brigades of my division moved
along the Ridge road from Hamilton's Crossing to the
Telegraph road, and then along a cross-road leading into
the Plank road, Barksdale going out on the Telegraph
road to join the column. Upon getting near the Plank
road, a little before dark, I received a note from General
Lee which informed me that he did not expect me to
join him unless, in my judgment, the withdrawal of my
troops could be made with safety, and I think he used
the expression that if by remaining I could neutralize
and hold in check a large force of the enemy, I could do
as much or perhaps more service than by joining him.
I had proceeded so far that I determined to go on,
as the probability was that if the enemy had discovered
my movement, the mischief would be done before I could
get back, and that I would not be able to recover the
lost ground, but might deprive General Lee entirely of
the use of my troops. When the head of my column had
reached the Plank road and moved up it about a mile, a
courier came to me from General Barksdale, stating that
the enemy had advanced against Hays with a very large
force, and that the latter and General Pendleton had
sent word that all of the artillery would be captured
unless they had immediate relief. The courier also stated
that General Barksdale had started back with his own
regiments.
I determined to return at once to my former position,
and accordingly halted the column, faced it about and
moved back, sending my Adjutant General, Major Hale,
to inform General Lee of the fact. The fact turned out
to be that just before dark Sedgwick had crossed the
remainder of his corps and moved towards the River
road below, called also the Bowling Green road, forcing
from it the 7th Louisiana Regiment, under Colonel Penn,
which occupied that road and fell back to the line on
the railroad after skirmishing sharply with the enemy.
There had been no advance against Hays at Fredericksburg,
Page 204
and Sedgwick had halted with his whole force
and formed line on the river, occupying with his advance
force the road from which Colonel Penn had been driven.
We regained our former lines without trouble about
ten or eleven o'clock at night, throwing out skirmishers
towards the River road. Barksdale occupied his old
position and Hays' returned during the night to the
right of my line. The night passed quietly on the right
after my return except some picket firing on the front,
but, just before daybreak on the morning of the 3rd, I
was informed by General Barksdale that the enemy had
thrown a bridge across at Fredericksburg and was moving
into the town. The General had ridden to see me
in person to request reinforcements, and I ordered Hays'
brigade to return to the left as soon as possible, directing
General Barksdale to post the brigade where it was
needed, as he understood the ground thoroughly. In
reply to a question from me, he informed me that the
crossing had not been resisted by his regiment, which
had retired skirmishing on the approach of the enemy,
as the struggle was deemed useless, and it undoubtedly
would have been. This was a mistake about the bridge
being laid at that time, but it was a very natural one,
as Sedgwick moved a portion of his force up the river
into the town, while doubtless preparations were making
for laying down the bridge early in the morning.
Barksdale's brigade was then posted as follows:
the 21st Mississippi Regiment occupied the trenches on
Marye's Hill between Marye's house and the Plank
road; the 18th, the stone wall at the foot of the hill,
where it was subsequently reinforced by three companies
from the 21st; the 17th, the trenches on the front slope
of Lee's Hill; and the 13th, the trenches further to the
right. Squires' battery of the Washington Artillery was
posted in the works on Marye's Hill, and the rest of
Pendleton's guns on Lee's Hill on the front crest and
at positions further to the right, so as to cover the
interval between the hills and the upper part of Deep
Page 205
Run. There were no troops on the left of the Plank
road along the crest overlooking the canal. Very soon
after daylight, the head of Sedgwick's column, which
had moved up during the night from below, emerged from
the town and advanced against the defences at Marye's
Hill, but was repulsed by the fire of Barksdale's infantry
and the artillery posted there.
When it became sufficiently light to see, it was
discovered by us that the opposite bank of the river was
bare of troops and it was very apparent that the enemy's
whole force lately confronting us on that side was across
for the purpose of a serious move, and the question was
as to where it would be made. The heaviest force in
view was in front of the crossing below the mouth of
Deep Run, and there were at that point a number of
pieces of artillery. The enemy, however, was also
demonstrating against Marye's Hill with both infantry and
artillery, but the mass of his infantry there was
concealed from our view, and there were indications also
as if he might attempt to pass up the valley of Deep Run
on the left bank. The fact was that there was one
division covering the bridge, one between Deep Run and
Hazel Run, and one masked in Fredericksburg. The
skirmishers from my division succeeded in getting to the
River road on the right, but the position next Deep Run
was held by too strong a force to be dislodged.
Very shortly after light the enemy commenced
demonstrating at Deep Run as if to turn the left of my
division held by Hoke's brigade, and threw bodies of
troops up the ravine formed by the high banks of the
run, while there were demonstrations also on the
left bank of the run. Latimer opened with his guns on
the ravine and the advancing bodies of infantry where
they could be seen; but a considerable body succeeded
in getting up to that part of the railroad next to the run
and took position behind it, where they were protected
against the fire of our artillery. The enemy opened with
two or three batteries on Latimer's guns, and there ensued a
Page 206
brisk artillery duel. Andrews brought Graham's and
Brown's guns from the right to replace Latimer's
Napoleons, and also Carpenter's two rifles to take position
with Latimer's two, and the firing was continued
for some time, as well against the enemy's infantry as
against his artillery. Finally Smith's brigade, which was
on the right of Hoke's, moved out and dislodged the
infantry which had taken position behind the railroad
embankment, and as it retired the artillery played on
it. This ended the demonstrations at Deep Run, and
soon heavy bodies of infantry were seen passing up
towards Fredericksburg, upon which Andrews' batteries
opened.
I had remained on the right with my division, as I
knew that that was the weakest part of our line, and I
was very apprehensive that the enemy would attempt to
cut my force in two by moving up Deep Run, which
would have been the most dangerous move to us he could
have made. I, however, kept a lookout upon the
movements above and was in constant communication with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, from whom I received
several reports that they had repulsed all the attacks
upon their position, and thought they could hold it.
Shortly after sunrise, and after the repulse of the first
attack on Barksdale's position, Gibbon's division, of the
enemy's 2nd corps, was crossed over into Fredericksburg
on the bridge which had been laid there, and it was then
moved above the town for the purpose of turning the
position on that flank, but this effort was balked by the
canal, over which there was no bridge; it then attempted
to effect the movement by repairing a bridge over the
canal, the planking from which had been torn up, but
Hays' brigade had arrived by that time, and four of his
regiments filed into the trenches on the left of the Plank
road just in time to thwart this attempt, and another
made shortly afterwards to cross the canal at the upper
end of the same division.
Hays' brigade had had a long distance to march in
order to avoid the enemy, and when it arrived General
WALL (ON THE LEFT OF ROAD) AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND FREDERICKSBURG BATTLEFIELDS
Page 207
Barksdale placed one of the regiments, the 6th Louisiana,
Colonel Monaghan, on his right in the trenches near
what was known as the Howison house, and the other
four were sent to man the trenches along the crest of the
hills on the left of the Plank road, where they arrived just
in time to thwart the attempt to cross the canal as
before stated. The enemy's guns from the north side
of the river, as well as from positions on the south side
above and below the town, continued to fire upon the
positions occupied by Barksdale's men and our artillery,
but the latter generally reserved its fire for the infantry.
An attempt to turn the right of the position by the
right bank of Hazel Run was repulsed by Pendleton's
artillery and every effort to get possession of the heights
was baffled and repulsed until after 11 A.M., when two
large attacking columns of a division each were formed,
one of the divisions from below being brought up for
that purpose. One of these columns moved against
Marye's Hill and the other against Lee's Hill, both at
the same time, while Gibbon's division demonstrated
against the heights above with storming parties in front.
The column that moved against Marye's Hill, consisting
of Newton's division, made its attack on the famous stone
wall defended by a regiment and three companies, and
its storming parties were twice broken and driven back
in disorder by the gallant little band that held that
position, but constantly returning to the attack with
overwhelming numbers the enemy finally succeeded in
carrying the work, after having sustained terrible
slaughter.* Then passing around the foot of the hill a
* Sedgwick, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee
oil the War, says: " I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes'
time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."
General Barksdale informed me that just before this final attack
was made the enemy sent a flag of truce to Colonel Griffin, commanding
the force behind the stone wall, asking permission to take care of his
wounded lying in front under our fire, which permission was
imprudently granted by Colonel Griffin, without his knowledge, and that
the weakness of the force at that point was thus discovered, and
immediately afterwards the assaulting columns advanced.
Page 208
portion of the attacking column came up in the rear,
capturing Squires' guns (which had been fought to the
last minute), and along with them the Captain and his
company.
The column sent against Lee's Hill did not succeed in
carrying it by assault, but was kept at bay until Marye's
Hill had fallen, when the position being untenable, the
regiments defending it were withdrawn up the hill, and
the enemy was thus able to take possession of that also.
The artillery on both hills had done good service in aiding
to repel all the previous assaults and to resist this.
The companies of the 21st Mississippi in the trenches
on the left of Marye's Hill were compelled to retire to
prevent being surrounded and captured, as were also
Hays' regiments in the trenches further to the left, the
latter being compelled to cross the Plank road higher up,
as their retreat on the Telegraph road was cut off. The
enemy got on Hays' flank and rear before he was aware
the hill on his right was taken, and the consequence was
that he lost a few prisoners. He succeeded, however, in
making good his retreat.
General Barksdale partially rallied his regiments and
made obstinate resistance to the enemy's advance on the
Telegraph road, falling back gradually before the large
force opposing him. The greater portion of the guns
on Lee's Hill were carried off, but some were lost
because the horses belonging to them had been carried to
the rear to be out of reach of the enemy's shells, and
could not be got up in time to carry off the pieces. Ten
guns were lost in all, including those taken at Marye's
Hill, but two were subsequently recovered, making our
final loss in that respect eight pieces.
Wilcox's brigade was above at Banks' Ford, but not
under my command, and was about to move up to
Chancellorsville, but hearing that the enemy was
advancing up the river, General Wilcox hurried to the
vicinity of Taylor's house at the extreme left of the line
with two pieces of artillery and sixty men, and putting
his guns
Page 209
in position, opened with effect on a portion of Gibbon's
division when it was trying to effect a crossing of the
canal at the upper end. He then detained his brigade,
and subsequently started a regiment to Barksdale's
assistance at his request, but before it arrived Marye's
Hill had been taken and it therefore retired. General
Wilcox subsequently did good service in resisting the
enemy's advance up the Plank road.
While these events were transpiring above, I was
near the left of the line occupied by my division, and in a
position from which I could observe a good deal of the
movements, but could not see Marye's Hill very well.
After what was supposed to be the enemy's effort to
move up Deep Run and thus break our lines had been
thwarted, and when I saw the infantry moving up
towards Fredericksburg, I sent one of my aides,
Lieutenant Callaway, to Lee's Hill, to give notice to Generals
Barksdale and Pendleton and to ascertain how they were
getting on. After he had been gone some time, I became
uneasy and determined to ride up myself.
While I was on my way some one came galloping up
in my rear and stated that some person below had seen
the enemy's troops and flag go up on Marye's Hill. I
did not think this could be so, but rode on rapidly, hoping
that the statement was untrue. I soon met a courier from
General Pendleton with a note stating that they had so
far repulsed any attack and could hold their position.
This relieved me for an instant, but in a few minutes
Lieutenant Callaway came galloping with the information
that the enemy certainly had carried the heights,
and that he had seen his attacking column ascending them
at Marye's house, a very few minutes after parting with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, who were on Lee's
Hill and who had just stated to him that they thought
they could hold the position.
I at once sent an order to General Gordon, who occupied
my right, to move up as soon as possible with three
of his regiments over the road I was following, which was
Page 210
the nearest practicable one. I then galloped to the
Telegraph road, and soon met Pendleton's artillery going
rapidly to the rear, and ordered it to be halted. Going
on I found General Barksdale on the ridge immediately
in rear of Lee's Hill rallying his men and skirmishing
with the enemy who had ascended the hill, and before
whom they were retiring gradually but obstinately.
Barksdale's men were rather scattered, but the 6th
Louisiana had retired in good order and I directed it to
form a line, and Barksdale to halt and get his men in
line, which he did. I also ordered a battery of artillery
to be brought forward into action and soon one was by
my side and unlimbered but did not fire.
There was a line of the enemy in front a few hundred
yards on the crest of the hill, and I turned to the officer
commanding the battery and asked him why he did not
fire, to which he replied, "I have no ammunition, sir."
I ordered another to be brought forward, and a battery
of Howitzers, from Cabell's battalion, was brought up
and opened with canister. The enemy's advance had been
checked by the demonstration, but he soon brought up
some artillery and opened on us at short range with
shrapnel and canister, and I ordered the line to retire
a short distance, which it did in good order, taking up
another position. In this manner we continued to retire
along the Telegraph road from point to point, taking
advantage of favorable portions of the ground to make a
stand until the enemy ceased to pursue. I then ordered
General Barksdale to take position at Cox's house, about
two miles in rear of Lee's Hill, where the first cross-road
leaves the Telegraph road to get into the Plank road,
and to establish Hays (to whom I had sent a message
to come around to the Telegraph road) on the line,
as well as Gordon's regiments, when they arrived.
By obtaining possession of Lee's Hill, the enemy bad
obtained a position from which he could completely
enfilade my line on the right, and as soon as the
foregoing arrangements were made, I rode rapidly to the
Page 211
right and threw back the troops there into a second line
which had been previously prepared in the rear, and
which was not enfiladed; and Colonel Andrews was
ordered to take position with all of his guns on the
ridge at the head of the Deep Run valley, so as to protect
the left flank of my division and the right of Barksdale's
line.
All these movements were made without molestation
from the enemy. Of course I did not know what the
purposes of the enemy were, and took my measures to
provide as well as I could for any emergency that might
present itself. I had met Gordon with his three
regiments immediately after leaving Barksdale, and directed
him to join the latter. After making the dispositions on
the right, I rode back to Barksdale's position and found
his line established with Hays and Gordon in position.
It had been now ascertained that the enemy was
moving up the Plank road, and I rode out to a position
across Hazel Run, from which I could see the moving
columns and discovered that it was moving very slowly,
and that it finally halted. Lieutenant Pitzer, one of
my aides, had been at Lee's Hill when the heights were
carried, and knowing the importance of the affair to
General Lee, had gone at once to give him the information,
as he knew that it would be some time before I
could be informed so as to send a messenger myself, and
thus judiciously anticipated me in putting General Lee
on his guard.
While the events thus detailed were transpiring on
the line occupied by me, a great battle had been fought
between General Lee's forces and the main body of,
Hooker's army. Hooker had crossed the river above and
concentrated four corps at Chancellorsville in a strong
position, and Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps,
Longstreet himself being still absent with two of his
divisions, had watched the movement of the enemy and
resisted his advance column, taking position on the Plank
road at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division and the
Page 212
three divisions of Jackson's corps had moved up during
the night of the 30th of April and the morning of the
1st of May and united with Anderson. Our troops had
thus moved forward on the Plank road and the stone
turnpike, Anderson's and McLaws' divisions in front,
and Jackson's divisions following Anderson's on the
Plank road, and had driven an advanced line of the
enemy back to within a mile of Chancellorsville upon his
main force.
Early on the morning of the 2nd, Anderson's and
McLaws' divisions, with the exception of Wilcox's
brigade of Anderson's division, which had been sent back
to Banks' Ford, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws'
division which was at Fredericksburg, were left to confront
the enemy on the side next to Fredericksburg, and
Jackson moved with his three divisions, by a circuitous
route to the left, to gain the rear of the enemy's right.
Late in the afternoon, General Jackson reached the rear
of the enemy's right flank about three miles beyond
Chancellorsville, and with Rodes in front--followed by
Colston with Trimble's division, and A. P. Hill,--advanced
at once with great vigor, driving the enemy before
him, carrying position after position, routing entirely
one corps, and capturing a number of guns and prisoners,
until his advance was arrested by the abattis in front
of the central position near Chancellorsville. Night had
come on by this time, and General Jackson ordered A. P.
Hill's division, which was following in rear of the other
two, to the front to take the place of the latter. He
himself went to the front to reconnoitre for the purpose
of ordering another advance, and, having sent an order
to Hill to press on, while returning in the darkness was
shot and dangerously wounded * under an unfortunate
mistake, by a part of Hill's advancing troops. General
* Captain R. E. WELBOURNE:
Some conflicting accounts of the manner in which General Jackson
was shot have been published, and as you were with him, I will be
very much obliged, if you will give me all the details of the affair.
With pleasant recollections of your official connection with me,
Yrs. very truly
LYNCHBURG, Feb. 12, 1873. J. A.
EARLY.
General J. A.
EARLY:
I give you the facts relating to the wounding of General T. J.
Jackson. As the details of the battle are familiar to you, I will begin
with Jackson's movements after the battle was over, and all seemed
quiet, the enemy having disappeared from our immediate front, and
all firing consequently having ceased. Jackson took advantage of this
lull in the storm to relieve Rodes' troops (who had been fighting and
steadily advancing and making repeated charges from the time the
fight began), and had ordered General Hill to the front to relieve
Rodes with his fresh troops, directing the change to be made as
quickly as possible. We were within a half mile of the open fields
near Chancellorsville, where the enemy was supposed to be strongly
entrenched. While the change was being made Jackson manifested
great impatience to get Hill's troops into line and ready to move
promptly, and to accomplish this he sent the members of his staff
with orders to Hill and other general officers to hurry up the movement.
From the orders sent to General Stuart it was evident that
his intention was to storm the enemy's works at Chancellorsville as
soon as the lines were formed, and before the enemy recovered from
the shock and confusion of the previous fighting, and to place the left
of his army between Hooker and the river. While these orders were
being issued Jackson sat on his horse just in front of the line on the
pike. From this point he sent me with an order to General Hill. I
galloped back and met Hill, in about 50 yards, riding along the pike
towards General Jackson. I turned and rode with him to his lines, he
stopping within a few feet of their front. I then rode immediately
on to General Jackson, who was in sight, and only a few paces in
front of Hill, just in the position I had left him. As I reached him,
he sent off the only staff officer present, with orders to Hill to move
forward as soon as possible, and then started slowly along the pike
towards the enemy. I rode at his left side, two of my signal men
just behind us, followed by couriers, etc., in columns of twos. General
Jackson thought, while awaiting Hill's movements, that he would ride
to the front, as far as the skirmish line, or pickets, and ascertain what
could be seen or heard of the enemy and his movements,--supposing
there was certainly a line of skirmishers in front, as his orders were
always very imperative to keep a skirmish line in front of the line of
battle. When we had ridden only a few rods and reached a point
nearly opposite an old dismantled house in the woods (near the road
to our right) and while I was delivering to him General Hill's reply
to his order--given a few moments before,--to our great surprise our
little party was fired upon by about a battalion or probably less of
our troops, a little to our right and to the right of the pike, the balls
passing diagonally across the pike and apparently aimed at us. There
seemed to be one gun discharged, followed almost instantly by this
volley. The single gun may have been discharged accidentally, but
seemed to have been taken as a signal by the troops, to announce the
approach of the enemy. I hardly think the troops saw us, though
they could hear our horses' feet on the pike and probably fired at
random in the supposed direction of the enemy. However, the origin
of the firing is mere conjecture, but it came as above stated, and many
of the escorts and their horses were shot down. At the firing our
horses wheeled suddenly to the left and General Jackson, at whose
side I rode, galloped away--followed by the few who were not dismounted
by the first firing,--into the woods to get out of range of
the bullets, and approached our line a little obliquely, but had not gone
over 20 steps beyond the edge of the pike, into the thicket, ere the
brigade just to the left of the turnpike (on our right as we approached
from the direction of the enemy), drawn up within 30 yards of us,
fired a volley in their turn, kneeling on the right knee, as shown by the
flash of their guns, as though prepared to guard against cavalry. By
this fire General Jackson was wounded. These troops evidently
mistook us for the enemy's cavalry. We could distinctly hear General
Hill calling, at the top of his voice, to his troops to make them cease
firing. He knew that we had just passed in front of him, as did the
troops immediately on the pike, and I don't think these latter fired.
I was alongside of Jackson, and saw his arm fall at his side, loosing
the rein, when the volley came from the left. His horse wheeled
suddenly and ran through the bushes toward the enemy. The limb of a
tree took off his cap and threw him flat on the back on his horse. I
rode after him, passing under the same limb, which took off my hat
also, but Jackson soon regained his seat, caught the bridle in his right
hand, and turning his horse towards the pike and our men, somewhat
checked his speed. As he turned to the pike, it gave me the inside
track, and I caught his horse as he reached the pike, which he was
approaching at an acute angle. Just as I caught the reins, Captain
Wynn rode up on the opposite side of him and caught hold of the
reins on that side, almost simultaneously. By this time the confusion
was over and all was quiet, and looking up and down the pike in every
direction, no living creature could be seen save us three.
As soon as I could check Jackson's horse, I dismounted, and seeing
that he was faint, I asked him what I could do for him, or if he
felt able to ride as far as into our lines. He answered, "You had best
take me down," leaning, as he spoke, toward me and then falling,
partially fainting from loss of blood.
I was on the side of the broken arm, while his horse had his head
turned towards the enemy and about where we were when first fired
upon, and would not be kept still, as he was frightened and suffering
from his own wounds. As General Jackson fell over on me, I caught
him in my arms, and held him until Captain Wynn could get his feet
out of the stirrups, then we carried him in our arms some 10 or 15
steps north of the pike, where he was laid on the ground, resting his
head in my lap, while I proceeded to dress his wounds, cutting off his
coat sleeves, and binding a handkerchief tightly above and below his
wound and putting his arm in a sling. Wynn went for Dr. McGuire
and an ambulance, and I was left alone with him until General Hill
came up. Just before Hill reached us, Jackson revived a little and
asked me to have a skilful surgeon attend him. When I told him
what had been done he said "Very good."
The enemy evidently thought the firing had thrown our men into
confusion and resolved to take advantage of it by making a determined
attack at this time, so in a few minutes, it was announced by Lieutenant
Morrison, who had joined Jackson while he was lying on the
ground, and now ran up in a very excited manner, crying out, "The
enemy is within 50 yards and advancing. Let us take the General
away." Jackson was still lying with his head in my lap, I had finished
tying up his arm where it was broken, and asked him where his other
wound was, and what I should do for that, when he replied, "In my
right hand, but never mind that, it is a mere trifle." He said nothing
about the wound in his left wrist, and did not seem aware of it,
doubtless owing to the fact that the arm was broken above. Upon
hearing Morrison's warning, I sprang up, and said, "Let us take the
General in our arms, and carry him back," to which he replied, "No,
if you will help me up, I can walk." He had only gone a few steps, when
we met a litter and placed him on it. He was being borne off on foot,
supported by Captain Lee and one or two others, I walking between
them and the pike, and leading three horses, trying to keep the troops,
then moving down the pike, from seeing who it was, but found this
impossible, and we met some men with this litter before we had gone
ten steps. While placing Jackson on it, the enemy opened fire on us
at short range, from a battery planted on the pike and with infantry;
a terrific fire of grape, shell, minie balls, etc., and advancing at a
rapid rate. Everything seemed to be seized with a panic, and taken
by surprise, our line was thrown into confusion. It recoiled and for
awhile continued to give way, and the enemy pressed forward. Such
was the disorder that I thought that General Jackson and party would
certainly fall into the hands of the enemy. The horses jerked loose,
and ran in every direction, and before we proceeded far one of the
litter bearers was shot, having both of his arms broken, and General
Jackson fell to the ground. As he lay there he grew faint from loss
of blood, having fallen on his wounded side, and his arm began to
bleed afresh. I rode away to try to get some whiskey for the purpose
of reviving him, and at a short distance met Dr. McGuire and Colonel
Pendleton, to whom I told what had happened, as we rode towards
the place where I left Jackson. The ambulance came up; we hurried
it to the front, and, reaching Jackson, placed him in it. As soon as
the ambulance left, I was ordered by Colonel Pendleton, after consultation
with General Rodes, to go to General Lee as quickly as possible
and communicate the intelligence to him, explaining our position, what
had been accomplished, who had taken command; and ask him to
come to that place.
During the attack on our forces so many of our men had gone
past us that we seemed to be left with no troops between us and the
enemy, and I made up my mind to remain with the General to nurse
him, as it seemed we should soon be in their hands. However, the
gallant Pender--in command after the wounding of General Hill--
soon rallied his line and pressed forward, driving the enemy back to
his works, at which quiet was restored for the night, the fight having
ended as suddenly as it began.
Many people have thought it strange that Jackson should give an
order to troops to fire at everything, especially cavalry approaching
from the direction of the enemy, and then place himself in a situation
to have himself fired upon. I heard of no such order, and feel sure
that none such was given. If such had been the order it would have
been given to the skirmish line, and there could have been no necessity
for such an order to them, as they would do this anyway.
R. E. WELBOURN.
(Chief Signal Officer, 2nd Army Corps, 1863, Lieutenant General
Jackson, commanding.)
Page 213
A. P. Hill was soon after disabled and the advance was
thus arrested.
When Jackson's guns opened, our troops on the right
pressed the enemy's left heavily to prevent any troops
being sent from that flank against Jackson, but no attack
in front was made then and night put an end to the
operations in that quarter. Hooker had been joined
during the day by the 1st corps brought up from opposite
Page 214
Fredericksburg, but at the close of the fight his lines had
been very much contracted, and his troops on his right
greatly scattered; and early in the night he telegraphed
to Sedgwick to cross the river and move up to Chancellorsville
on the Plank road, which dispatch found
Sedgwick already across.
General Jackson had been entirely disabled by his
wound, and General A. P. Hill was so injured as to be
unable to command in the field. Brigadier General Rodes
Page 215
was the officer next in rank, but having a very natural
hesitation to assume the responsibility of so large and
important a command, Major General Stuart of the
cavalry, who was operating in connection with General
Jackson, was requested to assume command, which he
did. During the night the enemy strengthened his contracted
line with breastworks and abattis, and strongly
fortified other positions in his rear nearer the
Rappahannock.
Page 216
Early in the morning of the 3rd, Stuart renewed the
attack with Jackson's division on the left, while Anderson
pressed forward with his right resting on the Plank
road, and McLaws demonstrated on the right. The enemy
was forced back from numerous strongholds until Anderson's
left connected with Stuart's right, when the whole
line attacked with irresistible force, driving the enemy
from all his fortified positions around Chancellorsville
with very heavy loss, and forcing him to retreat to the
Page 217
new fortifications nearer the Rappahannock. By ten
o'clock A.M. General Lee was in full possession of Chancellorsville
and the field of battle. He then proceeded to
reorganize his troops for an advance against the enemy's
new position, to which the latter had been able to retreat
under shelter of the dense woods, which covered all the
ground, and also rendered an advance by our troops in
line of battle very difficult and hazardous.
General Lee had just completed his arrangements to
renew the attack, when he received the intelligence
of the capture of Marye's Hill by Sedgwick's force and the
Page 218
advance of his column; and he found it necessary to look
after the new opponent. Sedgwick had moved up the
Plank road held by Wilcox's brigade, which gradually
retired, and finally made a stand at Salem Church on the
Plank road, about five miles from Fredericksburg, when,
by a gallant resistance, the head of the column was held
at bay until the arrival of McLaws with four brigades,
and the further advance of the enemy was effectually
opposed.*
It will be thus seen of what importance to General
Lee's own movements were those below at Fredericksburg,
and how the capture of the heights in rear of the
two affected him. A force of at least 30,000 men had
been detained from Hooker's army by considerably less
than 10,000 on our side. It is true that Sedgwick had
finally broken through the force opposed to him and
commenced an advance up towards the rear of General
Lee's army, but he had not done so until the latter had
had time to gain a brilliant victory, and drive Hooker
to a position of defence from which he could not advance
except under great disadvantages.
Sedgwick's column had thus been detained by Wilcox
until a force was brought down to arrest its progress
entirely, and time was given to make arrangements to
fall upon Sedgwick while separated from the rest of
Hooker's army. Barksdale's brigade and the artillery
posted with it had resisted all assaults upon their
position for at least six hours, thus giving General Lee the
requisite time to gain his victory, and in being finally
*
In this condition of things, Lincoln telegraphed to General
Hooker's Chief of Staff, who was on the north bank near Falmouth,
as follows:
"WAR
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, May 3, 1863.
"MAJOR GENERAL BUTTERFIELD:
"Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? Where is
Stoneman?
A. LINCOLN.
"Sent
4.35 P.M." (See report Committee on the War.)
Page 219
compelled to succumb to overwhelming numbers that
brigade had lost no honor. It was impossible for me to
reinforce Barksdale with a larger force than I sent to
him, and I then weakened very much the defences on the
right. Had Sedgwick communicated his purposes to me
and informed me that he would assault Marye's and
Lee's Hills and those positions alone, then I would have
moved my whole force to those points and held them
against his entire force.
As it was, a division of Sedgwick's corps larger than
my own immediately confronted the position occupied
by the three brigades of my division left after Hays
had been sent to Barksdale, and if that position had been
abandoned and the brigades defending it moved to the
left, the division confronting it, and which was constantly
demonstrating towards it, would have moved up,
taken possession of the line, and then moved upon my
rear, compelling me to abandon the works on the left
practically without a struggle, or submit to a much
greater disaster than that which occurred. Sedgwick
would hardly have been so blind as to rush his troops
up against the strong positions at Marye's and Lee's
Hill's while defended by a force sufficiently large to hold
them, when there would have been an easy way open
to him for their capture and that of the whole force
defending them by simply moving a portion of troops
to the rear. Marye's Hill would have fallen much sooner
than it did, if it had been occupied by my whole force,
or if a force sufficiently strong to prevent the position
from being turned had not been retained on the right.
By holding the position on the right, therefore, the fall
of Marye's Hill and the consequent advance of Sedgwick's
column above were both very considerably retarded,
and when the catastrophe did happen there was
left a considerable force to threaten and fall upon
Sedgwick's rear. I think I may claim that the force entrusted
to my command had accomplished all that could reasonably
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have been expected of it under the circumstances
in which it was placed.
I will now return to my own position. Just as I
was returning from observing Sedgwick's column I
encountered, at Hazel Run, one of General McLaws' staff
officers, Major Costin, coming down under an escort of
cavalry, and he informed me that General McLaws had
moved down the Plank road to meet the enemy, and
that General Lee wished him and myself to attack Sedgwick
in conjunction and endeavor to overwhelm him, and
there was a note or message from General McLaws
requesting information as to my position and that of the
enemy, and asking what place I proposed, for attacking
the enemy.
I think there was a note received later from General
Lee communicating his wishes in regard to the proposed
attack, similar to information brought by Major Costin--
at any rate the information of his views and wishes was
brought by Lieutenant Pitzer on his return. It was about
an hour before sunset when Major Costin reached me, and
that part of my division on the right was more than three
miles from the position at Cox's, so that it was impossible
to accomplish anything that night. I immediately
sent a note to General McLaws informing him
that I would concentrate all my force that night and
move against the enemy very early next morning, drive
him from Lee's and Marye's Hills, and extend my left
while advancing so as to connect with his (McLaws')
right, and continue to move against the enemy above,
after his connection with Fredericksburg was severed;
and I asked General McLaws' co-operation in this plan.
During the night, I received a note from him assenting
to my plan and containing General Lee's approval of
it also.
As soon as the first communication had been received
from General McLaws, my troops from the right were
ordered up, but it was after night before they were all
concentrated. Andrews' artillery was brought up before
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night, one battery being left on the ridge so as to cover
my right flank on the line across the Telegraph road,
and a regiment of infantry being posted so as to guard
against a surprise on that flank, if the enemy should
move around Lee's Hill up the left of Deep Run. Just
before dark, we discovered a piece of artillery advancing
along the Telegraph road in our front, followed by a few
wagons. The men in charge of the piece of artillery
came on so deliberately, though in full view of our line,
that we took it for granted that it must be one of the
pieces supposed to be captured, with a forge or two, that
had been probably able to elude the vigilance of the
enemy by concealment in some of the ravines.
The approaching darkness rendered objects very indistinct,
and we therefore watched the approaching piece
until it got within a few hundred yards of us, when the
drivers suddenly discovered who we were, wheeled
rapidly and dashed to the rear, and we became then
aware that it was one of the enemy's pieces. Some of
Andrews' guns which were ready opened fire, but the
piece of artillery got off, though some of the mules to
a wagon and to a forge were killed, and we found and
secured the latter the next day with several fine mules.
The night passed quietly with us, and at light on the
morning of the 4th I prepared to advance. My plan
was to advance along the Telegraph road with Gordon's
brigade in line in front, followed by Andrews' battalion
of artillery and Graham's battery, with Smith's and
Barksdale's brigades following in the rear, forming a
second line, and to throw Hays' and Hoke's brigades
across Hazel Run opposite my present position so as to
move down the left bank, as the column moved along
the Telegraph road against the heights, both of which I
took it for granted the enemy held, as the affair just at
dusk the evening before must have given him notice of
my presence.
It was my purpose, as soon as the heights were taken
and the enemy's connection with Fredericksburg cut, to
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advance with Gordon's and Smith's brigades up the
Plank road and river, and for Hays and Hoke to advance
across towards the Plank road extending to the left
to connect with McLaws, while Barksdale's brigade and
some of Pendleton's artillery should be posted to hold
Marye's and Lee's Hills and protect my rear from the
direction of Fredericksburg. The ravine of Hazel Run is
so rugged that it was impossible to cross it except where
there were roads, and therefore it was necessary to pass
Hays' and Hoke's brigades over at the ford on my left.
Gordon's brigade was placed in line at light, and
Andrews' artillery immediately in its rear, while Smith
and Barksdale were ordered to take their positions and
be in readiness to follow. I then went with General Hays
and Hoke, whose brigades were put in motion, across
Hazel Run to point out to them the positions they were
to take and how they were to move. After doing this,
I rode back and found to my surprise that Gordon had
moved off under a misapprehension of my order, as he
was to have waited until all was ready, and I designed
accompanying him. Andrews had followed him and I
immediately put Smith and Barksdale in motion, the
former along the road by flank, and Barksdale in line of
battle on the right.
The line of hills composed of Marye's, Cemetery,
Stansbury's, and Taylor's Hills descends towards the
Marye's Hill, which is the lowest, Taylor's, bordering
on the river at the upper end of the canal, being much
the highest. Stansbury's, Cemetery, and Marye's Hills
are separated from a higher range on the southwest
by a very small stream which rises between Taylor's
Hill and the Plank road and runs across that road into
Hazel Run, some distance above the crossing of the
Telegraph road over that run. Cemetery and Marye's
Hills slope back gradually to the little stream, and from
the latter, on the southwest, rise steep hills terminating
in a high, wide ridge, along which the Plank road runs;
and the face of these hills fronting towards Cemetery
Page 223
and Marye's Hills is intersected by a number of deep
ravines, up one of which the Plank road ascends to get
on the main ridge. On the south side of the road and
a little distance from it the main ridge terminates in a
high hill which descends abruptly to Hazel Run, the face
towards the run being wooded. At the lower front of
the base of this hill is a mill called the Alum Spring
Mill. Just at the upper part of the base of the hill a
branch of Hazel Run comes in, uniting with the main
stream. This branch rises some distance above near
the Plank road, and runs nearly parallel to it, through
a deep valley to its junction with the main stream.
On the south of this valley is another long wide ridge
which extends for some distance parallel to that along
which the Plank road runs and also terminates with an
abrupt descent to Hazel Run. On the south of the Plank
road, and on the same ridge with it, is situated Mr.
Guest's house some two or three miles from Fredericksburg,
and nearly opposite to it on the other ridge is Mr.
Downman's house. On the extremities of the lesser
ridges, projecting out from that on which the Plank
road is located, was a line of small works and epaulments
for artillery, extending from the river at Taylor's Hill
to and across the Plank road, which had been previously
made by our troops, and this line completely commanded
the crests and rear slopes of Marye's, Cemetery and
Stansbury's Hills, being much higher.
The Plank road crosses the little stream, with a
high embankment extending for some distance on both
sides, the stream passing through a culvert. The Telegraph
road passes towards Fredericksburg from Cox's
house, where I was, along a ridge to Lee's Hill and
descends the hill on the side of the slope next to Hazel
Run.
Gordon, when he started, advanced rapidly along the
Telegraph road, and when he reached Lee's Hill, it was
found unoccupied, but a body of infantry was moving
along the Plank road from the town between Marye's
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Hill and the ridge above, which halted and took position
behind the embankment of the road. In the valley between
Guest's and Downman's houses, was observed a
considerable body of infantry, and at Downman's house a
battery of artillery. Gordon threw out his skirmishers
and made preparations to descend the hill and cross over
Hazel Run above Marye's Hill. Andrews placed Graham's
battery in position on the road and opened on the
infantry in the valley, which moved out of the way.
Two large bodies of infantry, supposed to be brigades,
each then moved over the ridge just beyond the Alum
Spring Mill, threatening Gordon's left, as he was advancing.
Graham turned his guns on them and soon
drove them off up the ridge. Gordon then made a dash
across the run and after a sharp engagement drove off
the infantry behind the road embankment, capturing
some prisoners and securing several baggage and
subsistence wagons, a battery wagon, and a forge--with
their teams,--which were passing up the road with the
infantry he encountered.
This gave us the possession of Marye's and Cemetery
Hills again, and cut the enemy's connection with
Fredericksburg. Arriving soon after with Smith's brigade I
threw it across Hazel Run to the support of Gordon,
the batteries from the Stafford Heights opening a heavy
fire on it as it descended Lee's Hill. Barksdale's brigade,
which had halted in the rear without orders, was then
sent for, to occupy the stone wall at the foot of Marye's
Hill, and General Barksdale was ordered to move rapidly
into the town if not held by too large a force, get possession
of the bridge, and secure a camp of wagons seen
at the lower part of the town. When Graham's guns
were operating upon the bodies of infantry in the valley
between Guest's and Downman's houses and those
threatening Gordon's flank, the enemy's battery--at
Downman's house,--opened fire on them, but as soon as the
infantry was disposed of, Graham turned his two 20
pounder Parrots on the enemy's guns, which returned
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across the valley and took position near Guest's house
where they were out of reach.
Seeing the enemy's wagons moving off from the
town and not hearing Barksdale's rifles, I sent a staff
officer to repeat the orders, and received a reply that he
was preparing to send forward his skirmishers; a second
messenger sent to him returned with the information that
his skirmishers reported a heavy force holding the town,
entrenched within rifle pits. The enemy's wagon trains
had thus made their escape, and I sent orders to Barksdale
to desist from the attack on the town and to dispose
of his brigade so as to resist any advance from that
direction. It turned out that the town was held by
Gibbon's division which had been left behind.
I had listened anxiously to hear the sound of McLaws'
guns or some
indication of his being engaged, but heard
nothing. The enemy had not expected us in this direction,
and he was therefore evidently taken by surprise,
but Gordon's advance, which was so handsomely made,
being sooner than I had intended, had given the
