The Siege of
Savannah
in December, 1864, and the Confederate Operations in Georgia
and the Third Military
District of South Carolina during General
Sherman's March
from Atlanta to the Sea:
Electronic Edition.
Charles Colcock Jones, 1831-1893
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Congress/Ameritech National Digital Library
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Academic Affairs Library, UNC-CH
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1998.
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Library of Congress Subject Headings,
21st edition, 1998
LC Subject Headings:
Jones, Charles Colcock, 1831-1893.
Sherman's March to the Sea -- Personal narratives.
Savannah (Ga.) -- History -- Siege, 1864 -- Personal
narratives.
Georgia -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives.
South Carolina -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Campaigns.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Destruction and
pillage.
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865 -- Personal
narratives, Confederate.
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THE
SIEGE OF SAVANNAH
IN
DECEMBER, 1864,
AND THE
CONFEDERATE OPERATIONS IN GEORGIA
AND
THE THIRD MILITARY DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
DURING
GENERAL SHERMAN'S MARCH
FROM ATLANTA TO THE SEA.
BY
CHARLES C. JONES, JR.,
LATE LIEUT. COL. ARTILLERY, C. S. A., AND CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
DURING THE SIEGE.
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.
ALBANY, N. Y.:
JOEL MUNSELL.
1874.
Page verso
Entered according to Act of Congress,
in the year 1875,
by CHARLES C. JONES, Jr.,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress
at Washington, D. C.
To perpetuate the
Confederate memories connected
with the march of General Sherman from Atlanta to
Savannah is the design of the following pages. To be
guided in all that he relates by the genuine circumstances
of the action has been the author's care. This sad
chapter in the history of Georgia has been written only
by those who made light of her afflictions, laughed at her
calamities, gloated over her losses, and lauded her
spoilers. A predatory expedition, inaugurated with full
knowledge of her weakness, conceived in a spirit of
wanton destruction, conducted in violation of the rules of
civilized warfare, and compassed in the face of feeble
resistance, has been magnified into a grand military
achievement worthy of all admiration. The easy march
of a well appointed army of seventy thousand men
through the heart of a state abounding in every supply
save men and materials of war, and at the most delightful
season of the year, has been so talked of and written
about by those who either participated in the enterprise
or sympathized with its leaders, that multitudes have
come to regard this holiday excursion as a triumph of
consummate military skill and valor--as one of the most
wonderful exploits in the history of modern warfare.
Audi alteram partem.
CHAPTER I.
General Sherman's Intentions in Projecting his Expedition from
Atlanta to the Coast--Composition and Strength of the Federal
Army--Defenceless Condition of
Georgia--Inability of the
Confederate Leaders to Concentrate an Army of Opposition--The Federal
Advance--General Beauregard's Dispatches--A Levy en masse ordered by the
Legislature--Proclamation
of Governor Brown--Circular from Georgia Representatives
in Confederate Congress, to their Constituents--Supplemental
Proclamation of General A. R. Wright, . . . . .1
CHAPTER II.
Operations of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith in the Vicinity of
Atlanta--He Retires upon Griffin, and falls back to Macon--Movements of
the Confederate Cavalry under Maj. Gen.
Wheeler--Macon Defenses, their Armament and Garrison--Federal
Demonstration against Macon--Battle of Griswoldville--Report of Brig.
Gen. Phillips, . . . . .21
CHAPTER III.
The Federals occupy Milledgeville--Maj. Genl. Smith moves his
Command from Macon, by way of Thomasville, to Savannah--Ordered by Lieut.
Genl. Hardee at once to Grahamville, S. C.--Admirable Conduct of the
Georgia State Forces--Battle of
Honey-Hill--Signal Defeat of the Federal Expedition from Boyd's Neck,
under the Command of Brig. Genl. Hatch--Complimentary
Resolutions adopted by the Georgia Legislature, . . . . .32 Page viii
CHAPTER IV.
Adjutant General Wayne occupies Gordon--Retreats to Oconee
Bridge--Major Hartridge's Report of Confederate Operations at
that Point--Wayne's Command retires to Millen--Confederate Movements at
Number 4 1/2 and Number 2, Central
Rail Road--Col. Fizer disputes Osterhaus's Crossing at the
Cannouchee--Maj. Gen. Wheeler's Report of the Operations
of the Confederate Cavalry, . . . . . 44
CHAPTER V.
The Siege of Savannah--Concentration of Confederate Forces
for the Defense of the City--Investment by the United States
Forces--Federal Attempts to communicate with the Fleet--Confederate Line
at Monteith--Obstruction of Roads leading
into Savannah--Western Line for the Protection of the City,
its Location, Principal Batteries, and Armament--Enumeration
of Light Artillery Companies concentrated for its
Support--Inundation of the Low Grounds in Front of this
Western Line--the Western Line, how Subdivided, Commanded,
and Garrisoned--Supply of Ordnance, Quarter-Master, and
Commissary Stores--Statement of Rations issued, . . . . . 73
CHAPTER VI.
Confederate Forces in the 3d Military District of South Carolina,
under Maj. Genl. Sam Jones, guarding the Line of the Charleston
and Savannah Rail Road--Federal Advance from Gregory's Point,
and its Repulse near the Tullifinney Trestle--Original Confederate
Line conceived for the Protection of the Sea Coast of Georgia--Advanced
Line controlling the Water Approaches to Savannah--Line of Defense for
the Immediate Protection of the Eastern and
Southern Exposures of the City--Location and Armament of the
Savannah River Batteries, and of the Forts and Earth-works
erected to guard the Water Approaches to the City--Relative
Bearings and Distances of these Fortifications from Oglethorpe
Barracks--Genl. Beauregard's Instructions for the Defense
of Savannah, . . . . . 92 Page ix
CHAPTER VII.
Distribution of Confederate Forces along the Western Line--Federal
Timidity and Hesitation--Capture of the Dispatch Boat
Ida--Affair at Shaw's Dam--Repulse of the Assault upon Fort
Hardeman--The Tender Resolute captured by the Enemy--Federal Movement
against Fort McAllister--Assault upon and
Capture of that Work by Hazens's Division--Reports of Major
Anderson and of Brig. Genl. Hazen--Gallant Conduct of the
Garrison, . . . . . 111
CHAPTER VIII.
Federal communication established with the Fleet--Evacuation of
Savannah rendered Imperative--Line of
Retreat considered and determined upon--Location and
Construction of Pontoon Bridges across Savannah River--Progress of the
Siege--Heavy Skirmishing between Confederate
Cavalry and the Enemy on the Left Bank of the Savannah--Desertions from
Brooks's Foreign Battalion--Sherman's
Demand for the Surrender of Savannah, its Garrison, and
Dependent Forts--Lieut. Genl. Hardee's Refusal--Maj.
Genl. Sherman prepares to Bombard the City, . . . . . 131
CHAPTER IX.
Progress of the Siege--Maj. Genl. Wheeler's Cavalry Operations
on the Left Bank of the Savannah and in Rear of the Federal
Army--Confidential Circulars from Lieut. Genl. Hardee's
Head Quarters directing the Evacuation of Savannah--Evacuation of the
City--Order in which the Confederate
Forces were withdrawn--Good Conduct of the Troops--Movement successfully
concealed from the Enemy, until fully
Accomplished--Line of Retreat--Heavy Guns disabled,
Ammunition destroyed, and the Naval Vessels in the River
burnt and sunk--Reports of Coln. Anderson commanding
the River and Shore Batteries, and of Lieut. Coln. Jones,
Chief of Artillery--Genl. Beauregard's Orders for the
Disposition of the Confederate Forces after their Retreat from
Savannah--Formal Surrender of the City by the Mayor
on the Morning of the 21st of December, 1864--The Federals
occupy Savannah, . . . . . 145 Page x
CHAPTER X.
Extravagant and Unjustifiable Destruction of Property along the
Line of March--Comparison between the Conduct of Confederate
and Federal Invading Armies--Sherman's Violations of the Accepted
Rules of Civilized Warfare--Wanton Insults, Wholesale Plunder, and
Barbarous Treatment of Unarmed Citizens and Defenseless
Women, Children and Negroes, by Federal Soldiery--The
Conduct of the Royalist Prevost in 1779 outheroded in 1864 by that
of the Republican Sherman--The Campaign criticized as a
Military Movement--Its Success entirely attributable to the
Weakness of the Confederacy--Federal and Confederate Losses--Capture of
Savannah in 1778--The Evacuation of the City, under
the Circumstances, a Severe Reflection upon the Activity and Skill of
the Federal Commander, and a marked Achievement on the part of
the Confederates, . . . . . 164
ERRATA.
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. . . . . Heywards.
p. 64 13th line succeeded . . . . . should be
. . . . . exceeded.
p. 85 9th line mayor . . . . . should be . . .
. . major.
p. 91 9th line 1,1291 . . . . . should be . .
. . . 11,291.
p. 106 last line banks . . . . . should be .
. . . . ank.
p. 151 14th line points . . . . . should be .
. . . . point.
p. 155 7th line mariners . . . . . should be
. . . . . marines.
p. 159 27th line 300 . . . . . should be . .
. . . 500.
p. 163 20th line may orrequested . . . . .
should be . . . . . mayor requested.
General Sherman's Intentions in Projecting his Expedition from
Atlanta to the Coast--Composition and Strength of the Federal Army--
Defenceless Condition of Georgia--Inability of the Confederate
leaders to Concentrate an Army of Opposition--The Federal
Advance--General Beauregard's Dispatches--A Levy en masse
ordered by the Legislature--Proclamation of Governor Brown--
Circular from Georgia Representatives in Confederate Congress,
to their Constituents--Supplemental Proclamation of General A.
R. Wright.
"Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless
to occupy it: but the utter destruction of its roads,
houses and people will cripple, their military resources.
By attempting to hold the roads we will
lose a thousand men monthly, and will gain no
result. I can make the march and make Georgia
howl. * * * * * Hood may turn into Tennessee
and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to
follow me. Instead of being on the defensive I would
be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he
means, he would have to guess at my plans. The
difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I
can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of
the Chattahoochee. I prefer to march through
Georgia, smashing things to the sea."
So wrote Major General Sherman, from Atlanta, to
Lieutenant General Grant. That officer having
sanctioned the proposed movement, and indicated a
preference for Savannah as the objective point of the
campaign, General Sherman, about the middle of
November, 1864, put his columns in motion for their
march of spoliation and devastation through the heart of
Georgia. The "smashing" operation of this modern
Alaric was fairly inaugurated by the wanton and
merciless destruction of the cities of Atlanta and Rome.
For the purposes of the predatory incursion, the
Federal army was divided into two wings; the right--
commanded by Major General O. O. Howard--
comprising the Fifteenth Corps under Major General P.
I. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps under Major
General Frank P. Blair jr., and the left, under Major
General H. W. Slocum, consisting of the Fourteenth
Corps, brevet Major General J. C. Davis, and the
Twentieth Corps, Brigadier General A. S. Williams.
This infantry force of sixty thousand men was
accompanied by a cavalry division numbering fifty-five
hundred sabres, commanded by Brigadier General
Judson Kilpatrick. There was an allowance of about one
field piece to every thousand men, aggregating
between sixty-five and seventy guns, fully manned and
thoroughly equipped. A pontoon train was assigned to
each wing of the army, and an efficient pioneer battalion
organized for each corps. The entire command was
amply provided with good wagon trains, loaded with
ammunition, and carrying supplies approximating forty
days' rations of bread, sugar and coffee, a double
allowance of salt for the same period, and grain forage
for three days. Beef cattle, sufficient for forty days'
subsistence, attended the army. No equipment was
lacking which could in any wise enhance the comfort,
power, and efficiency of this formidable expedition.
Acquainted with the character of the country through
which his route lay, and aware of the fact that he would
meet with an abundance of provisions and forage
everywhere, General Sherman anticipated little difficulty
in subsisting his troops. At this season of the year
plantation barns were filled with the newly gathered
harvest. Corn, peas, fodder, sweet-potatoes, syrup, hogs,
cattle, mules and horses were to be expected without
stint. The recent movement of General Hood, ,ill-advised
and pregnant with naught save disaster, left the state of
Georgia fairly open to a Federal advance. She was
destitute of the means of offering any substantial
resistance. Few troops remained within her confines to
dispute Sherman's passage
to the coast. Such was the physical conformation of the
country, that there existed only occasional and partial
obstacles to a rapid and successful march; none which
could not be readily overcome by the pontoon trains and
pioneer corps with which the Federal army was supplied.
For his rear Sherman entertained no reasonable fears,
because the forces of General Thomas were an over-match
for General Hood's advancing columns. Under no
possible circumstances could Sherman have then been
overtaken by Hood, had the latter abandoned his plans
and started in pursuit. Nor was there any likelihood of his
encountering serious opposition from the Confederates in
his front. They were far too weak to do more than
skirmish in a desultory manner with this powerful army
of invasion. Enveloped by an ample guard of cavalry,
and presenting a front, varying from thirty to sixty miles
in extent, during their sweeping march toward the
Atlantic, the Federal general readily perceived that his
columns could speedily overcome any local interruptions
and partial hindrances which might be attempted by
newly organized and feeble bodies of citizen soldiery
hastily assembled for the defense of their immediate
homes. At best there were in the interior of the state
only old men and boys to shoulder their fowling pieces
and dispute the passage of swamps. General Lee, sore-pressed
in Virginia, could not spare from his depleted ranks a
single battle-scarred brigade for the emergency. A
reënforcement of seventy-five thousand men would not
have placed him in condition to have coped, man for
man, with the ever multiplying hosts marshalled under
the bloody banners of Grant. Such was the posture of
affairs at Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and
elsewhere, that no disposable troops could be found with
which to form even a tolerable army of observation.
General Hood, as we have already intimated, was now
so far removed from the scene of action that no change
in his plans would necessitate a postponement of the
purposed advance. The once puissant armies of the
Confederacy were sadly reduced by sickness, and
poverty and wounds and death. Tens of thousands of her
bravest sons had been gathered to their patriot graves,
and there were none to stand in their places. Her
treasures and supplies of every kind were well nigh
exhausted, and no helping hand was outstretched in the
hour of supreme need. Whole departments did not
comprise within their limits troops requisite for the
successful defense of a sub-district. Isolated in position
and cut off from all avenues of succor, each drop of
shed blood flowed from her single arm, every feather
which warmed and sheltered her Offspring was plucked
from her own breast.
Lieut. General E. Kirby Smith, commanding the
Trans-Mississippi Department, was capable of no
demonstrations which would compel the recall of the
formidable reënforcements which were hastening to the
support of General Thomas. Such was the scarcity of
troops in Alabama and Mississippi, that Lieut. General
Dick Taylor could detach but a handful in aid of Generals
Cobb and Smith, who, with the Georgia state forces, were
concentrated in the vicinity of Griffin. Lieut. General
Hardee could muster forces barely sufficient to constitute
respectable garrisons for the fixed batteries on the coasts
of Georgia and South Carolina. General Beauregard
looked in vain throughout the length and breadth of his
extensive military division of the west for the means of
effectual resistance, and was disappointed in the amount
of assistance which he hoped to realize from the Militia,
Home Guards, and Reserves of the respective states
embraced within the geographical limits of his command.
By carefully concealing his objective, and, with the
heavy masses at command by well conceived feints
cloaking his real design, General Sherman readily
conjectured that the small army of observation which the
Confederates might bring into the field would be so
divided in the effort to defend various and important
points, widely removed the one from the other, that unity
of action would
become quite difficult. For the same reason the chances
of his encountering anything like formidable resistance,
were well nigh dissipated.
At the outset, the cavalry corps of Major General
Joseph Wheeler, and the Georgia state forces, under the
command of Major Generals Howell Cobb and
Gustavus W. Smith, constituted almost the only
opposing forces on the Confederate side.
The season of the year selected for the movement
was most propitious; just the period of invigorating airs
and delightful autumnal suns, of clear skies and bracing
frosty mornings, of firm roads, and abounding health.
The stock upon the plantations, now in fine condition,
could be relied on to supply any lack of transportation.
As, more than three hundred years before, the
Spanish Adelantado in his quest of treasure compelled
the aid of the Red men of this region to bear the burdens
of his command while despoiling the homes and graves
of the sons of the forest, in like manner did it enter into
the calculation of these modern expeditionists to utilize
the negroes found on the plantations adjacent to the lines
of march by compelling them to accompany the columns
and assist in transporting the booty which was to be
ruthlessly collected on every side at the hands of
unprotected women, fatherless children, and decrepit old
men.
In all fairness, therefore, this vaunted undertaking of
General Sherman might well have been characterized, in
advance, as a holiday excursion, on a gigantic military
scale, and not as a martial enterprise involving
exposures, dangers, and uncertainties.
Having on the. 14th of November, 1864, completed his
preliminary arrangements, General Sherman put his right
wing, accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry, in motion in
the direction of Jonesboro and McDonough, with orders
to make a strong feint on Macon, cross the Ocmulgee
about Planter's Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood
of Gordon in seven days exclusive of the day of march.
The same day General Slocum moved with the
Twentieth Corps by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with
instructions to tear up the rail road from Social Circle to
Madison, burn the rail road bridge across the Oconee
east of Madison, and, turning south, reach Milledgeville
on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march.
General Sherman in person left Atlanta on the 16th in
company with the Fourteenth Corps, brevet Major
General Jeff C. Davis, moving by way of Lithonia,
Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville.
By the 23d General Slocum was occupying
Milledgeville and the bridge across the Oconee, and
Generals Howard and Kilpatrick had concentrated
in and around Gordon. The fact of Sherman's advance
was, by Major General Wheeler, promptly
communicated to General Beauregard then commanding
the military division of the west. His action in the
emergency is indicated by the following orders and
communications.
Reports of Genl.
Wheeler indicate that Sherman is about to
move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon. In
that event you will repair to points threatened with the
available forces you can spare from your department, and
assume command of all troops in Georgia operating against
Sherman. You will cut and block up all dirt roads in advance of
him, and remove or destroy supplies of all kinds in his front.
Wheeler's Cavalry will harass his flanks and rear. You will call
on Governors Brown and Bonham, and Genl. Hardee for
assistance. I will join you should it become necessary. When
you leave your department, turn over the command to Genl.
Wheeler. 1
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
1. Copies of this dispatch
were sent to Col. G. W. Raines, Augusta,
Ga., Gov. Jos. E. Brown, Milledgeville, Ga., Gov. M. L. Bonham,
Columbia, S. C., and Lt. Genl. W. J. Hardee, Charleston, S. C.
Tuscumbia, Ala., Nov. 16, 1864.
3 o'clock P. M.
Genl. S. Cooper,
A. & I. General, Richmond, Va.:
Reports of Genl. Wheeler indicate that Sherman is about to
move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon;
thence probably, to Charleston or Savannah, where a junction
may be formed with the enemy's fleet.
The threatened attack on Wilmington, in that event, must
be intended for Charleston.
I would advise that all available forces which can be spared
from North and South Carolina, be held ready to move to
defense of Augusta, or crossing of Savannah river, in
conjunction with forces in state of Georgia. Should Sherman
take Charleston, or reach Atlantic coast, he then might
reinforce Grant.
Genl. Taylor has been ordered to move with his
available forces into Georgia, and assume command of
all troops operating against Sherman, should he move
as reported.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
Cherokee, Ala., Nov. 17, 1864.
3:30 P. M.
Maj. Genl. Howell Cobb,
Macon or Griffin, Ga.:
Have ordered Genl. Taylor to send at once all troops he can
possibly spare, and Genl. Hood to send immediately one
brigade of Jackson's Cavalry Division, or the whole division if
it can possibly be spared at this juncture. A victory in
Tennessee will relieve Georgia.
Call on every available white man and slave to destroy and
block up roads in Sherman's front, flanks,
and rear.
G. T.
BEAUREGARD,
General.
[Confidential.]
Iuka, Miss., Nov. 17th, 1864,
6:30 P. M.
Genl. R. Taylor, Selma, Ala. " H. Cobb, Macon or Griffin, Ga. " G. W. Smith, Macon or Griffin, Ga.
Adopt Fabian system. Don't run risk of losing your active
forces and guns, available for the field, to hold any one place
or position, but harass at all points. Hannibal held the heart of
Italy for sixteen years, and then was defeated. Be cool and
confident, and all will yet be right. I will join you soon as
possible.
G. T.
BEAUREGARD.
H'd. Qrs. Mil. Div. of the West,
Tuscumbia, Nov. 17th, 1864.
Genl. J. B. Hood,
Commd'g, &c., General:
Genl. Beauregard directs me to say that he desires you will
take the offensive at the earliest practicable moment, and deal
the enemy rapid and vigorous blows; striking him whilst thus
dispersed, and by this means distract Sherman's advance into
Georgia. * * * * *
Corinth, Nov. 18, 1864.
Via Selma.
To the people of Georgia:
Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally
around your patriotic governor, and gallant soldiers.
Obstruct and destroy all roads in Sherman's front,
flank and rear, and his army will soon starve in your
midst. Be confident and resolute. Trust in our over-ruling
Providence, and success will crown your efforts.
I hasten to join you in defense of your homes and
firesides.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
West Point, Miss., Nov. 20th, 1864.
10 A. M.
Lt. Genl. Taylor, & Maj. Genl. J. Wheeler & Maj. Genl. H. Cobb:
Genl. Hardee will, for the present, give orders for the
defense of Georgia, East (South) Chattanooga. My
views are that positions should be defended only so
long as not to risk safety of troops and material required
for active operations in the field. Meanwhile,
remove to safe locality all government property on line
of enemy's march, and consume or destroy all supplies
within his reach.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
The Legislature of Georgia being in session at
Milledgeville, then the capital of the state, in prompt
acknowledgment of the danger, and in earnest effort to
provide to the utmost for the protection
of the Commonwealth, on the 18th November,
passed the following Act.
AN ACT to Authorize a levy en masse of the
population of
Georgia for the protection of its liberty and independence.
Whereas the Senate and House of Representatives of the
State of Georgia, in General Assembly convened, have learned
from a communication from his Excellency the Governor, that a
large hostile force of the foe, whose presence has so long
desecrated the soil of Georgia, has left Atlanta under the
leadership of a general whose past history is but a recital of
every violation of civilized warfare, and a repetition of every
outrage which links barbarism with the coarsest instincts of
brutal nature, with the apparent intention of penetrating the
heart of our noble old Commonwealth; and whereas in such an
emergency it becomes a people who are determined to die freemen
rather than to live slaves, to rise en masse and offer on the altar of a
common country all the resources in men and money which God in His
benevolence and wisdom has placed at their disposal for the
vindication of their rights, their liberties and their honor;
therefore, finding in the history of the past nothing to appall
us, but on the contrary every incentive to stimulate and press
us forward to the achievement of a glorious independence by
sundering the ties which once bound us to a near friendship to
our vindictive foe:
Section I. Be it enacted, That the Governor be, and he is
hereby authorized, during the emergency now arising out of
the present invasion of the interior of
our State by the armies of our barbaric foes, to summon to
arms in the field the entire white male population of the State
now residing or domiciled in the State, physically capable of
bearing arms, between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five: and
to compel their attendance for the protection of our soil and
the defense of our liberties.
Section II. Be it further enacted, That the Governor be
authorized to accept volunteers in such numbers, and such
organizations, and for such time as in his discretion he may
deem wise and prudent, during the
present emergency, conforming as closely as circumstances
will permit to the existing militia organization of the State.
Section III. * . . .* . . .*
Section IV. * . . .* . . .*
Section V. * . . .* . . .*
Section VI. And be it further enacted, That the powers
conferred upon his Excellency the Governor by this Act,
shall continue in force for the period of forty days and no
longer, from and after the forces are called out under it.
Section VII. Be it further enacted, That whereas the
Constitution has defined the coördinate branches of the
Government, to wit, the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative, and
the powers of each; and whereas one branch of the
Government should not be subject to the control of the others;
therefore it is provided that the enlistment of those engaged in
the Legislative and Judicial Departments of the Government
shall not be compulsory, but voluntary.
In order to call public attention at once to the scope
and effect of this extraordinary legislation, the Governor,
on the day following the passage of the Act, issued this
spirited proclamation.
State of Georgia, Executive Department,
Milledgeville, Nov. 19, 1864.
The whole people understand how imminent is the danger
that threatens the state. Our cities are being burned, our fields
laid waste, and our wives and children mercilessly driven from
their homes by a powerful enemy. We must strike like men for
freedom, or we must submit to subjugation.
Death is to be preferred to loss of liberty. All must rally to
the field for the present emergency, or the state is overrun.
I, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the
statute of this state, hereby order a levy en masse of the whole
free white male population residing or domiciled in this state
between sixteen (16) and fifty-five (55) years of age, except
such as are physically unable to bear arms, which physical
defect must be plain and indisputable, or they must be sent to
camp for examination, and except those engaged in the
legislative or judicial departments of the government, which
are by the recent act of the legislature declared exempt from
compulsory service.
All others are absolutely required, and members of the
legislature, and judges are invited to report immediately to
Major General G. W. Smith, at Macon, or
wherever else in Georgia his camp may be, for forty (40) days'
service, under arms, unless the emergency is sooner passed.
The statute declares that all persons hereby called out shall
be subject, after this call, to all the rules and articles of war of
the Confederate states, and on failure to report shall be subject
to the pains and penalties of the crime of desertion.
Volunteer organizations formed into companies, battalions,
regiments, brigades or divisions, will be accepted for forty
(40) days if they even approximate to the numbers in each
organization which is required by the militia laws of this state
which were in force prior to the late Act.
All police companies formed in counties for home defense
will report, leaving at home for the time only those over
fifty-five (55) years of age, and all persons having Confederate
details or exemptions who, by the late decision of the Supreme
Court of this state, are held to be liable to state militia service
and bound to obey the call of the governor.
All such, refusing to report, will be arrested by the police
force or by any aid de camp or other officer of this state, and
carried immediately to the front. The necessary employées of
rail-roads, now actively engaged, and the necessary agents of
the express company, and telegraph operators are, from the
necessity for their services in their present position, excused.
All ordained ministers of religion in charge of a church or
synagogue, are also excused.
All rail-road companies in this state will transport
all persons applying for transportation to the front, and in
case any one refuses, its president, superintendent, agents
and employées will be immediately sent to the front.
All aides de camp and other state officers are required to be
active and vigilant in the execution of the orders contained in
this proclamation, and all Confederate officers are respectfully
invited to aid state officers in their vicinity in sending forward
all persons hereby ordered to the front.
The enemy has penetrated almost to the center of your
state. If every Georgian able to bear arms would rally around
him, he could never escape.
JOSEPH E. BROWN,
Governor.
The same day the representatives from Georgia, in
Confederate congress assembled at Richmond,
addressed this circular to their constituents.
Richmond, Nov. 19, 1864.
To the People of Georgia.
We have had a special conference with President Davis and
the secretary of war, and are able to assure you that they have
done and are still doing all that can be done to meet the
emergency that presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms.
Remove your negroes, horses, cattle and provisions away from
Sherman's army, and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges,
and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invader in
front, flank, and rear. By day and by night let him have no rest.
JULIAN HARTRIDGE,
W. E. SMITH,
MARK BLANDFORD,
JOHN T. SHEWMAKE,
J. H. ECHOLS,
JAMES M. SMITH,
GEO. N. LESTER,
H. P. BELL.
Both Governor Brown and Major General G. W.
Smith having, by the rapid intervention of the enemy,
been cut off from direct communication with that portion
of the state lying east of the Oconee river, obedience to
the proclamation of the 19th of November, so far as the
eastern and southern portions of the state were
concerned, became physically impossible. In order to
dispel existing doubt, avoid delay, prevent confusion, and
assist in concentrating at the earliest moment the
manhood of the state, General A. R. Wright who, by
virtue of his office as president of the senate, became,
during the temporary territorial disability of the governor,
the de facto commander in chief
of that part of Georgia for the time being beyond the
influence of the executive, issued the following
supplemental proclamation.
Augusta, Georgia, Nov. 21st, 1864.
I. His Excellency Gov. Joseph E. Brown, governor and
commander in chief of the militia of the state, being cut off
from communication with that portion of the state east of the
Oconee river by the interposition of a hostile army, it becomes
my duty as president of the senate and ex officio governor
during the disability of the governor, to assume command of
all that part of the state thus left without the jurisdiction of the
governor; and, as the prompt and faithful execution of the
recent Act of the legislature providing for a levy en masse of
the arms bearing people of the state is of vital importance, I do
therefore issue this order revoking so much of the governor's
proclamation as provides for the reporting of all the troops
raised under it to Major General G. W. Smith, and do order that
the men in all the counties east of the Oconee river (except
such as may have already reported to Major General Wayne)
report immediately to me at this place, where arms and
equipments will be issued by the proper officers.
II. The aides de camp in the districts east of the Oconee
river will proceed at once to send on to this place all men
liable to service under the aforesaid act.
III. A medical board will be established at this place for the
examination of all men whose fitness for service may be
considered by the aides de camp as doubtful.
IV. The emergency is such, that a delay even of a single day
will in no case be permitted. All must be sent forward at once.
A. R. WRIGHT,
President of the Senate,
and ex officio Governor
during the disability of Governor Brown.
Operations of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith in the Vicinity of
Atlanta--He Retires upon Griffin, and falls back to Macon--
Movements of the Confederate Cavalry under Maj. Gen. Wheeler--
Macon Defenses, their Armament and Garrison--Federal
Demonstration against Macon--Battle of Griswoldville--Report
of Brig. Gen. Phillips.
In obedience to a telegram from General Hood,
received at Macon on the 12th of October, 1864, Major
General Gustavus W. Smith concentrated, as rapidly as
possible, all the available forces in that vicinity with a
view to an early demonstration against Atlanta, then in
possession of the Federals. In the execution of these
orders he, in a short time, assembled at Lovejoy's station
about twenty-eight hundred infantry, three batteries of
Confederate light artillery, and between two and three
hundred local reserve cavalry. This infantry belonged
principally to the First Division of Georgia militia. His
force being inadequate for a direct assault upon Atlanta,
as it was then garrisoned, General Hood suggested that
General Smith should cross the Chattahoochee and
destroy the line of railroad between that river and the
Etowah. Upon further consideration this movement
being deemed impracticable, General Smith located his
command, as a corps of observation, near Atlanta,
preventing the enemy from foraging, confining the
Federals within their lines, and acting as a support to
Brigadier General Iverson who, with two brigades of
cavalry, was in his immediate front. Major General
Wheeler reached General Smith's headquarters on the
night of the 12th of November, and soon after his
cavalry corps began to arrive from Alabama.
On the afternoon of the 15th the Confederate cavalry,
skirmishing heavily with the advancing columns of the
enemy, fell back from Jonesboro to Lovejoys. The same
day at dark General Smith commenced moving his
command to Griffin where were field fortifications
behind which he hoped to be able to check the Federal
advance. Ascertaining the next day that large bodies of
the enemy had passed through McDonough and were
moving along the direct road from Atlanta to Macon,
General Smith, at dark, began retiring his troops upon
Forsyth. This march of thirty-five miles was
accomplished in twenty-four hours. Information having
there reached him that the Federal army was crossing to
the east bank of the Ocmulgee river, General Smith
retreated upon Macon and there turned over his
command, with the exception of the Georgia militia and
two regiments of the Georgia state line, to Major General
Howell Cobb by whom he was assigned to the
command of a portion of the lines around Macon on the
west bank of the Ocmulgee river.
General Wheeler, commanding the Confederate
cavalry, interrupted, to the extent of his ability, the
advance of the enemy, and was present at Macon when
that city was threatened. The important services
rendered by his cavalry command during Sherman's
march through Georgia will be subsequently considered
when we have the pleasure of presenting his hitherto
unpublished Official Report.
Considerable expense had been incurred, and much
labor bestowed upon the construction of field-works for
the protection of Macon. These fortifications were
commenced by Captain M. B. Grant, but were
subsequently changed under the directions of Major
General M. L. Smith, chief engineer of Hood's army. On
the west bank of the river the defensive line was about
four miles in length; and, on the east side, about three
miles. It consisted of a system of detached works within
supporting distance of each other. The intention was to
connect them by means of a stockade; but, at the time
of Sherman's arrival, these works were incomplete, and
the stockade had been scarcely commenced. About
thirty guns were in position along the line, and were
served by four or five light
artillery companies from Hood's army who had lost their
horses, and by some local artillerists. The Confederate
force in Macon, when the Federals appeared before the
city, consisted of about four thousand infantry, including
the troops brought by General Smith from Lovejoys, the
reserves from Columbus and other points in the state, the
local troops, conscripts in camp, convalescents from the
hospital, and a small battalion of Confederate troops,
some two hundred strong, under the command of Lieut.
Col. Nisbet. To these should be added the artillerists
above mentioned, and General Wheeler's cavalry then
numbering between two and three thousand men.
The Federal demonstration against Macon was very
partial, and was easily repulsed. Sherman's army
crossed the Ocmulgee above Macon, and this
demonstration against the city was made by cavalry, and
against the Confederate lines on the east bank of the
river, where General Cobb had concentrated his forces
in anticipation of an attack. In fact, it was merely a feint,
while the Federal columns were moving upon
Milledgeville and other points to the south. The
casualties were inconsiderable. A few Federal prisoners
were captured.
Lieut. Genl. Hardee reached Macon while Sherman
was crossing the Ocmulgee above the mouth of the
Towaliga. Satisfied that the demonstration
against Macon was a feint, and that no further
attack would be made, he left for Savannah to
urge forward, as rapidly as possible, the defenses
of that city. General Dick Taylor arrived just after the
departure of General Hardee and, having remained only
a day in Macon, joined General Hardee in Savannah.
The enemy having abandoned any serious designs
which may have been entertained against the city of
Macon, and it being deemed not improbable that the city
of Augusta with its valuable powder mill, work shops,
foundry, arsenal, and government stores, would attract
the notice of Sherman, on the morning of the 21st of
November, General Hardee ordered the First brigade,
Georgia militia, to proceed with all dispatch along the line
of the Central rail road and, moving by rail or otherwise
as transportation could be secured, to rendezvous at
Augusta at the earliest practicable moment. On the
afternoon of the same day Major General Smith was
directed to follow with the Second, Third, and Fourth
brigades of Georgia militia, the two regiments of the
Georgia State line, and Anderson's Confederate Light
Battery. The Augusta and Athens battalions of local
troops, under Major Cook, were ordered to the same
point. Genl. Hardee left Macon for Savannah on the
evening of the 21st of November. In his absence,
and upon the arrival of Genl. Dick Taylor, the command
devolved upon him, as the ranking officer. In pursuance
of the foregoing orders Major General Smith, on the
morning of the 22d, put his command in motion in the
direction of Griswoldville, with instructions to halt there
and await further orders. While detained a few hours in
Macon in consummating necessary arrangements for the
transportation of supplies and ammunition for his
command, information was conveyed to General Smith
that large bodies of the enemy were still in the vicinity of
Macon and occupying positions along the proposed line
of his march. An order for the recall of the troops was
imperative, and received the sanction of Lieut. General
Taylor. That order did not reach them, however, until
they were on the eve of an engagement with what was
then supposed to be a small force of the enemy. In the
language of General Smith's report, "notwithstanding my
order to avoid an engagement at that time and place, a
collision occurred, we being the attacking party, and
though the officers and men behaved with great
gallantry, they failed to carry the works of the enemy,
but held a position within one hundred and fifty yards
of their line until after dark, when they were withdrawn
to Macon by my order." The First brigade was not
engaged; having, in execution of orders
given by General Hardee, passed Griswoldville prior to
the appearance of the Federals. The Athens and Augusta battalions
participated in the action. The Confederate loss was a
little over six hundred killed and wounded, being more
than one fourth of the effective muskets in action.
Several of the best field officers of the command were
killed or wounded. On this occasion the State and
Confederate forces were confronted by Wood's
Division of the 15th Army Corps,--General Walcott's
brigade with two pieces of artillery, and a regiment of
cavalry on either flank, being in advance. The Federals
were protected by barricades and temporary works.
Another corps of Sherman's army was marching from
Clinton in rear of the position occupied by the
Confederates, so that their situation was perilous in the
extreme. This engagement, while it reflects great credit
upon the gallantry of the Confederate and State forces
engaged, was unnecessary, unexpected, and utterly
unproductive of any good. The battle of Griswoldville will
be remembered as an unfortunate accident whose
occurrence might have been avoided by the exercise of
proper caution and circumspection. It in no wise crippled
the movements of the enemy, and entailed upon the
Confederates a loss which, under the circumstances,
could be illy sustained.
The following report of Brig. Genl. Phillips furnishes a
detailed account of the engagement.
Head Quarters 2d Brigade Georgia Militia,
December 8th, 1864. Col. Thos. Hardeman,
A. A. G. Colonel:
I have the honor to make the following report of the
operations of the four brigades under my command on the 22d
November last.
The command left East Macon at about 8 A. M. and arrived
without accident at 12 or 1, within about one mile of
Griswoldville, where I found the Athens and Augusta
battalions (under command of Maj. Cook) drawn up in line of
battle. I also met a number of cavalry at and near this point, all
of whom informed me that the enemy was in Griswoldville, and
had been engaged with some of our cavalry. He was
represented to be about 8 or 1200 strong. I formed a line of
battle with Genl. Anderson's brigade on the right, the Athens
and Augusta battalions on his immediate left, and Brig. Genl.
McCoy's brigade on the left of the line. The Second brigade,
under Col. Mann, was formed in the rear as a reserve. The
state line, under Lieut. Col. Evans, was deployed as skirmishers
and advanced on Griswoldville, where the enemy had just burnt
some buildings and retired before we arrived; of which facts I
informed the major general commanding at about 2 o'clock P. M.
Whilst in Griswoldville, Maj. Cook withdrew the Athens and
Augusta battalions from the line, informing
me that he was ordered by Lt. Genl. Hardee to proceed to
Augusta, and proceeded down the Central rail road. I soon
ordered the command to move down the C. R. R., until it
should clear the village, and halt to await further orders from
Maj. Genl. Smith. The rear of the column had not cleared the
village when firing of small arms was heard some half mile in
advance of our column, which was between the advance and
rear guards of Maj. Cook and the enemy. I ordered an advance
of the command, and on arriving, I met Maj. Cook who pointed
out to me the enemy posted on the opposite eminence in line
of battle, behind some temporary entrenchments and
fortifications. Maj. Cook's skirmishers were then engaged with
the enemy on his left. I disposed of the forces represented by
the accompanying diagram, viz: The Athens and Augusta
battalions on our right (owing to the positions they then held)
making rather an obtuse angle with the State line on their left,
and Genl. McCoy's brigade on the left of the State line; Genl.
M's left resting near and south of the rail road. Genl.
Anderson's brigade was formed on the north side of the rail
road, his left resting parallel with the rail road, and Capt.
Anderson's battery of four guns was posted at an eligible site
on the rail road on the north side. The Second brigade, under
Col. Mann, was drawn up in rear of the state line, and Genl.
McCoy's brigade in a secure place to act as reserves. In this
position an advance was ordered. Genl. Anderson with his
brigade was to attack the enemy on his right flank.
Major Cook with his command was to attack him on his left
flank,
whilst Capt. Anderson with his battery, the State line, and
Genl. McCoy's command should attack him in the front. The
State line and Genl. McCoy's brigade moved forward in fine
style, under a heavy and galling fire, until they reached within
some fifty yards of the enemy's works, which position they
maintained during the contest, and from which position they
delivered a telling fire. Col. Mann, deeming that his brigade
could be of more service near the lines, advanced it to near the
same position, where it participated in the general action. From
some misconception of orders, when the general advance was
being made, Genl. Anderson's brigade faced to the right and
swept across the rail road (save a small detachment on his
extreme left that was cutoff by a deep cut in the railroad) and
participated with the State line and Genl. McCoy's brigade in
the direct attack where they, both officers and men, sustained
themselves with decision and gallantry. After the action had
progressed for some hours, Genl. Anderson took the detachment
of his men that had been cut off, and went round to the enemy's
right flank, when a most spirited and desperate fight ensued,
lasting some hour and a half or more; but the enemy was too firmly
established, and the general's force too small to dislodge him.
The order to Major Cook (from some cause of which I am
not aware) to turn the enemy's left, was never carried out, yet
his command participated fully in the action, deported
themselves gallantly, and I regret to say, suffered much from
wounds and deaths. Captain Anderson with his battery did
good and valuable service,
soon silencing the enemy's battery, and forced upon
him many telling shots. He is a skilful, brave, and meritorious
officer. The officers and men deported themselves well during
the entire action, which lasted from 3 P. M., until dark, held
their positions, and retired in good order to Griswoldville
where I had intended to encamp, and bring off those of our
wounded and dead that had not been removed from the battle
field; but, on my reaching Griswoldville, I received an order
from the major general commanding ordering me to fall back
to the trenches at Macon, where I arrived about 2 o'clock A. M.
I can but believe if the flank movement had been carried out
with all the forces assigned to that duty, that it would have
resulted in dislodging and probably routing the enemy,
notwithstanding he was, I am satisfied, fully equal if not
superior to our forces. Whilst we have to regret the loss of
many gallant officers and men, yet we cannot but hope that
they died not in vain.
Accompanying please find a diagram of the field and
position of the forces, and the reports of all the officers that I
have been able to procure.
I am, with high regard,
Your obedient servant,
P. J. PHILLIPS,
Brig. Genl. Commanding Div. Ga. Militia.
The Federals occupy Milledgeville--Maj. Genl. Smith moves his
Command from Macon, by way of Thomasville, to
Savannah--Ordered by Lieut. Genl. Hardee at once to Grahamville,
S. C.--Admirable Conduct of the Georgia State Forces--Battle of
Honey-Hill--Signal Defeat of the Federal Expedition from Boyd's
Neck, under the Command of Brig. Genl. Hatch--Complimentary
Resolutions adopted by the Georgia Legislature.
The Federal columns having withdrawn from the
vicinity of Macon, and the line of the Central rail road
being in their possession, the destination of Genl. Smith's
command was changed from Augusta to Savannah. On
the 25th of November it was ordered to move by rail to
Albany, thence to march across the country to
Thomasville, and there take the cars of the Atlantic and
Gulf rail road to Savannah.
"We arrived," says Genl. Smith, "in Thomasville by
noon, Monday [the 28th], having marched from Albany,
a distance between fifty-five and sixty miles, in fifty-four
hours. At Thomasville, instead of finding five trains, the
number I had requested to be sent, there were but two,
and these could not be started until after dark, and did
not arrive here [Savannah] until two o'clock Wednesday
morning, occupying twice the time necessary between
Thomasville and Savannah, and leaving the 2d, 3d, and 4th
brigades at the former place." Upon his arrival in
Savannah, and before he had left the cars, General Smith
received a peremptory order from General Hardee
requiring him immediately to proceed with his command
to Grahamville, South Carolina, to repel an advance of
the Federals who, moving up from Broad river, were
seeking to cut the line of the Charleston and Savannah
rail road. It was absolutely necessary that this
communication should be preserved. Upon its security
depended the further occupation of Savannah. Over this
road must the garrison retreat in the event that it became
expedient to evacuate the city. By this route also, were
reënforcements expected. General Hardee had no troops
which could be detailed for this important service, except
two regular Confederate regiments from Charleston, and
it was feared that they would arrive too late. Not a
moment could be lost, and it was urged upon General
Smith that if he would move at once and hold the enemy
in check until two o'clock P. M. several thousand troops,
en route from North and South Carolina for the
reënforcement of the garrison at Savannah, would arrive
and ensure the effectual repulse of the Federals.
Although the statute organizing the State forces confined
their service and operations to the limits
of Georgia; although, strictly speaking, there rested
upon these troops no legal obligation to move
beyond the confines of their own state whose territory
they were instructed to defend; although General Smith had
a qualified authority from Governor Brown to withdraw
the Georgia State forces under his command from Confederate service
in case they were ordered beyond the limits of the
state, and although both commander and command
were "almost broken down by fatigue and want
of rest," realizing that the battle for the salvation
of the metropolis of Georgia was on the instant to
be fought on Carolina soil, and, after a full conference
with the lieutenant general becoming perfectly satisfied
that it was right and proper the movement
should be made, General Smith issued the requisite
orders and, about eight o'clock on Wednesday
morning, the 30th of November, arrived at Grahamville,
South Carolina, with his leading brigade. The conduct of
General Smith and the Georgia State troops in this trying
emergency will be always remembered with peculiar
pride and in especial honor.
On Tuesday, the 29th of November, a Federal force,
under the immediate command of Brigadier General
John P. Hatch, consisting of five thousand men of all
arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up
Broad river to Boyd's Neck,
where it landed with the intention of taking possession of
and occupying the Charleston and Savannah rail road at
Grahamville. This involved a march of only some seven
miles. This expedition was conceived in aid of General
Sherman who was known to be seeking the coast at
some convenient point. By thus severing the
communication between Savannah and Charleston, the
former city would be completely isolated and Sherman
enabled at pleasure, and without hazard, to cross the
Savannah river at almost any point below Augusta, and
establish communications with Port Royal, then the
principal Federal depot on the south Atlantic coast.
When General Hatch effected a landing at Boyd's
Neck the only Confederate force on duty at Grahamville
was a part of a squadron of the Third South Carolina
Cavalry. All available troops in the district had been sent
into the interior to oppose General Sherman's advance.
Colonel C. J. Colcock, the district commander, was fifty
miles away, superintending the erection of field works at
the principal crossings of the Savannah river. The
Federals having effected a landing at Boyd's Neck at
eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th of November, at
a remove of only seven miles from the rail road, and
there being at the time no Confederate forces in the
neighborhood to
dispute their advance, had they moved promptly upon
Grahamville, the Charleston and Savannah rail road
would have passed into their possession without a
struggle. During the whole of the 29th they were
engaged, however, in intrenching themselves at a point
distant half a mile from where they landed, and thus the
golden opportunity was suffered to pass unimproved.
Colonel Colcock arrived at Grahamville about seven
o'clock on the morning of the 30th, and an hour
afterwards Major General G. W. Smith, with his leading
brigade, was on the ground. Advices were received that
the Federal column, marching up the Honey-Hill road, had
passed Bolan's church and was then only five miles from
Grahamville. The line of breastworks, previously
constructed for the use of infantry and field-artillery,
being equidistant between Grahamville and the church, it
became all important that the advance of the enemy
should be retarded in order that the Confederates might
occupy those works. With this view Colonel Colcock
pushed rapidly forward with a 12 pounder Napoleon gun
of Kanapaux's Light Battery, under command of
Lieutenant Zealy, and company K, of the Third South
Carolina Cavalry, Captain Peeples. He encountered the
head of the Federal column on a causeway a mile and a
half in front of the breastworks. It was a most favorable
position for impeding the enemy's progress. On the
left was an impenetrable swamp, and on the right an
extensive old field intersected by numerous canals and
ditches. Lieut. Zealy's 12 pounder Napoleon was planted
so as to command the causeway, and Captain Peeples's
company was dismounted and deployed as skirmishers
across the old field. The first shell from the Napoleon
gun is said to have killed and wounded nine men of the
enemy. Upon its discharge the column halted, and, after
considerable delay, left the road, marching across the
field with a view to flanking the Confederate position. In
order to counteract this movement Colonel Colcock
ordered his men to set fire to the broom-sedge which
was dry, and covered the entire field. A strong wind at
the time prevailing and blowing in the direction of the
enemy, carried down upon them, with surprising rapidity,
a fierce line of flame and smoke before which they
precipitately retreated, in their flight abandoning blankets,
haversacks, and knapsacks. Reforming in the road, the
Federals advanced, Colonel Colcock retiring with his
little command and disputing their progress from time to
time as opportunity occurred.
Meanwhile General Smith had fully occupied the
breast works, and completed his dispositions. To Colonel
Colcock, the district commander, was
assigned the immediate executive command of the main
line.
The engagement commenced about ten o'clock in the
morning, and from that time until nearly dark the enemy
made continuous but fruitless efforts to carry the
Confederate position. The Confederates brought into
action five pieces of field artillery and about fourteen
hundred effective muskets. There were also three
companies and two detachments of the Third South
Carolina Regiment of Cavalry, under Major Jenkins. 1
The Confederate line of battle extended from the
Honey-Hill road, on which its right rested, in a
semicircular form, through an open pine barren, to the
Coosawhatchie road.
At a remove of some hundred and fifty yards, directly
in front of the Confederate line, and extending almost its
entire length, was a low, swampy ground, about twenty
yards wide. Upon its appearance about one hundred and
twenty yards in front of the field works occupied by the
Confederates, and in a curve in the Honey-Hill road, the
infantry and artillery immediately opened a murderous
fire upon the head of the Federal column, before which
it melted away. Thus commenced
1. The following organizations were present on this memorable
occasion, and constituted the little Confederate army charged
with driving back a Federal force more than three times as numerous.
INFANTRY.
The 1st Brigade Georgia Militia: Col. Willis.
The State Line Brigade. [Georgia] Col. Wilson.
The 17th Georgia, Confederate Regiment, Lt. Col. Edwards.
Companies B and E, and detachments from Company C and
the Rebel Troop, all belonging to the 3d Regiment South
Carolina Cavalry, under command of Major Jenkins.
ARTILLERY.
A section of the Beaufort Artillery, Capt. Stuart.
the engagement. The Federals were advancing in
apparent ignorance of this line of field works, and of the
serious opposition which they were destined to
encounter. Staggered by this unexpected and destructive
fire, the enemy recoiled; and some time elapsed before
they deployed in line of battle to the right and left of the
Honey-Hill road in front of the Confederate line and just
across the swampy ground to which allusion has already
been made. This low ground was wooded to an extent
sufficient to conceal the movements
of the enemy, but not to protect them from the heavy
fire of infantry and artillery which crashed through their
ranks, causing great destruction and demoralization. So
soon as the Federals had formed their line of battle,
efforts were made to force the centre of the
Confederate line and also to turn its flanks. These
attempts were renewed from time to time, but on each
occasion resulted in defeat and heavy loss. The
Confederate troops in position bravely held their ground,
and the gallant Thirty Second Georgia Regiment, which
constituted a movable reserve, rendered efficient service
in repulsing these attacks, appearing always at the
proper point at the most opportune time.
Wearied with and disheartened by these repeated
repulses, and perceiving their inability to force our
position, the Federals, about four o'clock in the afternoon,
slackened their fire, massed their artillery on their left
and in the Honey-Hill road to cover their retreat, and
commenced retiring. The Confederate left wing was
advanced, but his men being greatly exhausted and
having been for many hours without food, Genl. Smith
did not deem it best to pursue. The retreat of the enemy
was effected during the evening and night of the 30th,
and the next morning found the remnant of General
Hatch's army behind its breastworks near Boyd's
landing, covered by the protecting batteries of the
Federal gun boats.
The Confederate losses amounted only to four killed
and forty wounded. Those of the enemy are stated by
General Grant, in his official report, as seven hundred
and forty-six in killed, wounded and missing. The
Confederate artillery was admirably handled and did
great execution. In General Hatch's command were
several negro regiments. They suffered severely; and it
appeared, upon a subsequent inspection of the field, that
they were forced to occupy the most exposed positions.
Some Confederate officers, who examined many of
their dead bodies, noticed wounds in the back which
suggested the impression that some of them at least had
been forced into action at the point of the bayonet.
"I have never seen or known of a battle field," says
General Smith in his official report, "upon which there
was so little confusion, and where every order was so
cheerfully and promptly obeyed, and where a small
number of men for so long a time successfully resisted
the determined and oft repeated efforts of largely
superior attacking forces."
The enemy having been thoroughly beaten back on
the 30th, and Confederate forces having,
during the afternoon of that day and the morning
of the 1st of December, concentrated at Grahamville
in numbers sufficient to confirm the fruits of the
victory and repel any new attack, General Smith
regarded the necessity as no longer existing
for detaining the Georgia state troops "beyond
their legal jurisdiction." Accordingly, having
asked and obtained permission from Lieut. General
Hardee to lead his exhausted command back to
Georgia, General Smith arrived in Savannah with
his troops at ten o'clock on the night of the 1st of
December. From this time until the evacuation
of the city, this officer and the State forces were
posted on the right of the western lines of the city
of Savannah, where they rendered efficient service
and sustained an honorable part prior to and during
the progress of the siege.
This victory at Honey-Hill relieved the city of
Savannah from an impending danger which, had it not
been thus averted, would have necessitated its
immediate evacuation under the most perilous
circumstances, maintained the only line of
communication by which reënforcements were
expected for the relief of the commercial metropolis of
Georgia, and finally afforded an avenue of convenient
retreat when, three weeks afterwards, the garrison,
unable longer to cope with the enveloping legions of
Sherman, evacuated the city. In acknowledgment of the
gallantry, patriotism, and distinguished services of
General Smith and his
command in this brilliant affair, the Legislature of
Georgia on the 9th of March, 1865, passed the following
resolutions:
Resolved, by
the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Assembly met, That the thanks of the State
are due and are hereby tendered to Genl. G. W. Smith
and to the officers and men composing the
First Division of Georgia Militia, and to the officers and
men of the Georgia State Line, for their conspicuous
gallantry at Griswoldville in this State; and especially
for their unselfish patriotism in leaving their State and
meeting the enemy in the memorable and well fought
battle field at Honey-Hill in South Carolina.
The State with pride
records this gallant conduct of
her militia, and feels assured that when an emergency
again arises, State lines will be forgotten by her militia,
and a patriotism exhibited which knows nothing but our
whole
country.
Resolved, That
his Excellency the Governor be
requested to transmit a copy of these Resolutions to
General G. W. Smith, with a request that they be read
to all the troops under his command.
Adjutant General Wayne occupies Gordon--Retreats to Oconee
Bridge--Major Hartridge's Report of Confederate Operations at
that Point--Wayne's Command retires to Millen--Confederate
Movements at Number 4 1/2 and Number 2, Central Rail Road--
Col. Fizer disputes Osterhaus's Crossing at the Cannouchee--Maj.
Gen. Wheeler's Report of the Operations of the Confederate
Cavalry.
No resistance was offered to General Slocum when
he occupied Milledgeville on the 23d of November. The
Legislature hastily adjourned upon the approach of his
column. The supreme court also adjourned, and the
Governor left the capital. The capture of military stores
at Milledgeville were unimportant. The State Library
suffered severely, and the town was largely pillaged. On the
19th of November, Adjutant General Henry C. Wayne
with the corps of Cadets, Pruden's Battery of Light
Artillery, Talbott's company of Cavalry, Williams's Militia
company, the Factory and Penitentiary Guards and the
Roberts's Guards (convicts), aggregating about five
hundred men, and under the immediate command of Maj.
F. W. Capers, superintendent of the Georgia Military
Institute, evacuated Milledgeville and fell back upon
Gordon. On the afternoon of the next day
this force retreated along the line of the Central
rail road and took post at the Oconee bridge, "as
the most important point on the Central rail road to be
defended." Upon arrival, Adjutant General Wayne
found at the bridge a guard of 186 men,
consisting of Heyward's company of South Carolina
Cavalry, a section of Maxwell's Light Battery,
Lieutenant Huger, and a detail from the 27th Georgia
Battalion, all under the command of Major Alfred L.
Hartridge who had been ordered by Major General
Lafayette McLaws, commanding the district of
Georgia, to defend this crossing to the last extremity.
Major Hartridge thus details the services rendered in
obedience to these instructions.
Savannah, March 17, '67.
Col. C. C. Jones,
Dear Colonel:
On the night of the 18th November, '64, while at
Rosedew Battery, I received orders from Genl. McLaws,
then commanding the district of Georgia, to proceed
to the Central rail road bridge on the Oconee river,
and to hold said bridge against what was then supposed
to be a raiding party from Sherman's army. For this
purpose I was given a section of artillery (Lt. Huger, two
12 pounder Napoleons), a company of cavalry (the
Ashley Dragoons, Capt. Heyward), and 100 infantry
selected from the 27th Georgia Battalion.
I arrived at the rail road bridge with my command on
the evening of the 19th November, and immediately
proceeded to make what arrangements I could for its defense.
The river, at this point, has a large belt of swamp on both
sides; the bridge over the stream being approached by trestle
work on the Savannah side of 3/4 of a mile, and on the Macon
side of over a mile in length, so that I at once saw that I had a
difficult task to perform in defending not only the bridge
proper but the long line of trestle, against a superior force,
particularly as my artillery would be of little service from the
nature of the ground.
On the morning of the 20th, hearing that Gen. Wayne was at
Gordon with a force of State troops, I took an engine and paid
him a visit.
Arriving at Gordon about 2 o'clock P. M., I found him there
with about 450 men, a battery of 6 pieces of artillery, a
company of cavalry, several companies of Georgia militia, and
the Georgia State Cadets under Major Capers. Soon after my
arrival his pickets were driven in by the advance of the enemy
who were reported to be approaching in force. Gen. Wayne,
thinking Gordon a position of no value, decided to fall back to
the Oconee bridge without giving battle. Most of the guns and
baggage being already on the train, he moved off at 4 o'clock P. M.,
bringing off everything safely, and arrived at the bridge
the same afternoon.
He, as superior in rank, took command, but requested me to
keep command of the post, and, under his direction, to make
what disposition of the troops I thought best.
I knew that the enemy could flank us by crossing at
Milledgeville, so I had all the bridges on Buffalo creek
destroyed, and placed guards at each. The nearest crossing
below was Ball's ferry, 8 miles off. At this point I placed as
strong a force as I could spare, using the cavalry to picket
the river above and below, and Buffalo creek. I had rifle pits
dug on both sides of the bridge, and my two Napoleons were
placed in position at the nearest point of high ground. Scouts
were thrown across the river to watch the movements of the
enemy.
On Tuesday, the 22d November, the enemy appeared in our
front in large force. Gen. Wayne, in consultation with his
principal officer, determined to abandon the bridge, deeming
the force under his command inadequate for its defense; he
having telegraphed to Gen. McLaws for reënforcements and
receiving an answer that there were none to send. As my
orders from Gen. McLaws were positive to hold the bridge to
the last extremity, I refused to move my troops with those of
Gen. Wayne, stating to him that I was determined to hold the
position as long as possible. I at the same time telegraphed
Gen. McLaws the state of affairs; he replying that I must obey
his instructions to hold the bridge and not to consider myself
under Gen. Wayne's orders. Upon submitting this reply to
Gen. Wayne, he decided not to evacuate, but to stay and
share my fate.
On the 23d the enemy appeared at Ball's ferry, and driving
back my guard, took possession of the flat and boats, and
commenced crossing. Taking Heyward's and Talbott's
companies of cavalry, Huger's section
of artillery, and about 80 men of the 27th Battalion of Georgia
Volunteers, I proceeded immediately to the ferry with the
intention of driving the enemy back if possible. Hastening
ahead of my command with Heyward's cavalry, I arrived at the
high land (the swamp extending for about one mile from the
river at this point) nearest the ferry, at about 3 o'clock P. M., and
learned from a countryman living near that the enemy were
still crossing, and that from 4 to 500 were already on our side
and were bringing their horses over. I ordered Capt. Heyward
to advance dismounted, and feel their strength. At the same
time I sent back orders to my command to hasten up. After a
sharp skirmish Capt. Heyward was driven back, and reported
the enemy advancing.
The balance of my force having arrived, I placed my artillery
so as to command the road leading out of the swamp, and
dismounting the cavalry, I made the best breastwork I could
with fence rails, and awaited the approach of the enemy.
But they not making their appearance, and feeling satisfied
that if I remained inactive in my present position they would
cross a large force, I determined to make the attack. So,
throwing out Heyward's company (dismounted) as
skirmishers, and forming the infantry and Talbott's cavalry into
line of battle (leaving the artillery in my fortified position as a
reserve) I advanced on the ferry and, after a fight of about one
hour and a half, I forced the enemy to recross the river (except
a few on horseback who escaped into the swamp or were
captured). Their loss was 36 killed, and an unknown
number wounded. My loss was 2 killed and 7
wounded.
Leaving Capt. Talbott to hold the ferry, I hastened back to
the bridge and arrived there late that night. During that day
there had been some active skirmishing between our forces
and a brigade of Kilpatrick's mounted infantry. During the
night a courier arrived from Genl. Wheeler and stated that he
(Wheeler) was crossing at Blackshear's ferry a few miles
below Ball's. Later in the night we were joined by a regiment of
Wheeler's cavalry.
We learned from our prisoners that the troops I
encountered at Ball's ferry were an advance of the 15th Army
Corps, and that those in front of us were portions of
Kilpatrick's command, the main body of Sherman's army
being at Milledgeville.
All of the 24th was occupied in defending the rail road
bridge against vigorous attacks. With Hayward's company
dismounted and acting as riflemen, the 27th Battalion Ga.
Volunteers, and the hearty coöperation of Maj. Capers with
the State Cadets, and Capt. Pruden with a piece of artillery
mounted on a platform car, we managed to keep them at bay.
That night Col. Gaines, with 4 or 500 men, joined us from
Wheeler.
On the morning of the 25th Lt. Genl. Hardee arrived and
visited me at my position in front of the bridge. At that time
the enemy had succeeded in setting fire to the trestle very
near the bridge, but they dared not approach it as my sharp
shooters commanded it. They had also brought a piece of
artillery into play and were doing all they could to drive us
from our
position, but without effect. After ordering me to hold my
position, Genl. Hardee returned to No. 13, the enemy having
crossed at Milledgeville and moved in that direction. During
the afternoon the enemy withdrew from our front and, during
the night, we received orders from Genl. Hardee to fall back to
No. 13.
We were then ordered to fall back to the Ogeechee rail road
bridge; Huger with his two Napoleons, and Heyward
with his company, being ordered to report to Genl. Wheeler.
We arrived at No. 10 about 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the
26th, and the next day received orders to fall back to Millen
and fortify.
On the 29th I received orders from Genl. Hardee to proceed
to Savannah with the 27th Battalion, and arriving there on the
30th, was ordered to take command of the line at Monteith,
extending from the Charleston and Savannah rail road bridge
to Harrison's place.
Three important roads crossed my line, the Augusta road,
the Middle-ground, and the road through Harrison's place.
The swamp in front of my line had been reported impracticable
by the engineer in charge, Capt. Grant, but upon careful
examination I found I could ride through it in many places. I
reported this fact to Maj. Black of Genl. Hardee's staff next
day, and convinced him of the weakness of the position, as
the engineer had erected earth works only at the intersections
of the three roads mentioned. But, as I received orders to
hold the line as long as possible, I made the best of it. I had
about 800 troops under my
command consisting of the 27th Battalion Georgia
Volunteers 250 strong, a North Carolina battalion of about 350
men, Howard's local battalion of about 150 men, and Capt.
Abel's battery of 2 Napoleons and 2 howitzers. I placed the
27th battalion, with Abel's 2 Napoleons, to defend the
Augusta road, thinking it the most important, the North
Carolina battalion on the right, 4 miles off at Harrison's place,
and Howard's battalion in the center, each with a howitzer.
About this time Capt. Geo. S. Owens, and a Mr. McLeod,
rendered me much assistance, with a force of negroes, in
obstructing the roads and destroying the bridges in my front.
"On the 5th December, scouts reported the enemy
advancing on the Augusta road, and at the same time I
learned that Gen. Baker of North Carolina, commanding on my
left, was attacked. The next day my advanced guard on the
Augusta road was driven in, the enemy capturing the
lieutenant in command and five men.
The next day I was joined by Major Black, and at my
suggestion he agreed to take charge of my left, leaving me
with the right. About ten o'clock that morning the enemy's
skirmishers opened on my line, and soon afterwards they
commenced a rapid fire from a small Parrott gun. Capt. Abel
with his two Napoleons succeeded in silencing this piece
after an exchange of about 14 shots, but they kept up a
scattering fire of musketry until about 2 o'clock, when they
made a charge along my whole line. On the left, where Major
Black had charge, they forced back the North
Carolina battalion, and also caused Howard to fall back, as he
feared being flanked. Maj. Black continued to retreat until he
reached the rail road at Montieth Station and there formed
another line, the enemy having stopped at Genl. Harrison's
house. In the mean time I was pressed hard, but managed to
hold my position on the Augusta road.
About 4 o'clock I received orders from Genl. Hardee to fall
back to the Charleston and Savannah rail road bridge over the
Savannah river, where he would have boats to convey my
troops to the city. But as this necessitated the abandonment of
the section of artillery with me (which had by the gallant
conduct of its commander and men enabled me to hold my
position) I telegraphed the general asking permission to hold
my present position until after night fall, when I felt that I
could withdraw without serious loss. I would here remark that
during the time I was in front of the Federals in Georgia, and
afterwards in the two Carolinas, I never knew them to make an
attack, or inaugurate an offensive movement during the night
time.
My request being granted, I held my position until 8
o'clock, when I withdrew to the station, joining Maj. Black
with the balance of the command. Here I received orders to
hold the rail road until a train which was to convey Genl.
Beauregard to Charleston should pass. At 10 o'clock I was
instructed to fall back to the inner line of defenses 4 miles from
Savannah. The next day I was placed under Genl. Gustavus
Smith's command on the right of the line, where I remained for
several days.
The day after the fall of Fort McAllister Genl. Hardee
ordered me to take command of the line of the Little
Ogeechee, extending from the Rosedew Batteries to the
Atlantic and Gulf rail road bridge over the Little Ogeechee.
The troops under my command were the garrison at Rosedew
(two companies of Cobb Guards), three companies of the 1st
Georgia Regulars, under Capt. Twiggs, three sections of
Wheeler's horse artillery, and a company of Wheeler's
cavalry. The batteries at Rosedew consisted of three 10 inch
Columbiads, one rifled 18 pounder, one smooth bore 32
pounder, and one 10 inch mortar.
I placed Capt. Twiggs, with the regulars and a
section of horse artillery, at Coffee bluff, so that they could
defend the bluff and, in case of necessity, act as a reserve to
the batteries at Rosedew, or the points above the bluff. I
placed another section of artillery at Johnson's landing, and
the third at the rail road bridge, using the cavalry as pickets
along the line.
No decided demonstration was made on this line.
On the 17th, a faint attack was made on the bridge.
On the morning of the 19th, the enemy attacked
Beaulieu battery, just opposite, with one gun boat and
a mortar boat. To divert their attention I opened on
them with my mortar, they returning shot for shot,
but I cannot say much damage was done on either
side. That night I received information that Savannah
was to be evacuated on the night following, (20th
December), and, my orders were to move into the city by 8
o'clock P. M., of the 20th.
On the afternoon of the evacuation I destroyed all
my powder by throwing it into the river, cut up and damaged,
as far as I could, my gun carriages, spiked the guns, and did
everything I could to destroy the batteries, etc., without
making any noise or resorting to fire. At 5 o'clock P. M., I
withdrew from the line as ordered, and arrived in Savannah
between 8 and 9 o'clock.
Yours, very truly,
ALFRED L. HARTRIDGE.
On Saturday, the 26th of November, the forces
concentrated for the defense of the Oconee bridge were
withdrawn, and the same day reached number 13 on the
line of the Central rail road, where Huger's section of
Maxwell's Light Battery was turned over to Maj.
General Wheeler. General Wayne having received
orders from General Hardee to occupy the rail road
bridge across the Ogeechee, started at once with his
command for that point, which was reached at one
o'clock P. M. the same day.
The enemy having cut the Waynesboro road on the
morning of the 27th, General Wayne was directed to fall
back upon Millen and fortify that position. While at
Millen, in the execution of these orders, he was notified
that Kilpatrick's command, some four thousand strong,
was moving upon that point. He therefore fell back with
his
command to number 4 1/2, behind the Little Ogeechee rail
road bridge.
On the third of December, at day-break, he was
joined by the State line and the First Brigade of Georgia
Militia of General Smith's Division, under the command
of General Robert Toombs, at the time acting as
inspector general of the First Division. At eleven o'clock
the same day General Baker arrived with his brigade of
North Carolinians. Being advised that the 15th Army
Corps, on the other side of the Ogeechee, was moving
upon station number 2, Central rail road, and heavy
columns of the enemy being in front on the rail road and
on the right of the Confederate position, it was deemed
best by Genl. Wayne to return at once to number 2.
Upon arrival there he was met by Major Black of
General Hardee's staff, with instructions to return at
once to number 4 1/2 where he would be reënforced. This
order was promptly obeyed.
Early in the morning of December 4th, Anderson's
and Phillips's brigades of the Georgia militia reported for
duty at number 4 1/2. Line of battle was formed behind
the Little Ogeechee, with a force of four thousand
infantry and three pieces of artillery. General Baker was
assigned as executive officer in command of the line. At
1:35 P. M. the advance guard of the 17th Corps appeared
on the left, and skirmishing began there and in front of
the bridge on the rail road. At 4 P. M. Major General
McLaws arrived from Savannah with instructions from
General Hardee to assume the command. Having
reconnoitered the position and being convinced of the
utter inutility of offering resistance at this point, at half
past five o'clock General McLaws ordered a withdrawal
of the forces, which was done during the night, the
troops falling back quietly to number 1 1/2. At 7 P. M. the
enemy ceased skirmishing and began entrenching. The
next day the State forces and Baker's command
resumed their positions in the western lines for the
defense of Savannah.
The passage of the Cannouchee by General
Osterhaus's column had been vigorously but vainly
disputed by Colonel John C. Fizer and his command.
In advance of the Federal approach the prisoners at
Andersonville and Millen had been safely removed--
much to the chagrin of the invading forces. The
Confederate line at Monteith being found impracticable,
was evacuated, as has already been indicated in the
intelligent communication of Major Hartridge, the officer
in command.
As most of the fighting in retardation of Sherman's
advance was done by the Confederate cavalry, under
Major General Wheeler, we have purposely refrained
from alluding to the services
rendered by this arm of the service in order that we
might avail ourselves of the connected narrative
contained in the following report.
Head Quarters Cavalry Corps, near Savannah, Ga., Dec. 24th, 1864.
Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy, A. A. Genl.,
Hd. Qs. Dept., etc.
Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of
the operations of my command from Nov. 19th, 1864, the date
Genl. Hardee assumed command.
For several days previous to that date I had been resisting
the enemy's advance from Atlanta towards Macon, reporting
daily to Genls. Bragg, Hood, Hardee, and Taylor, and also to
Gov. Brown almost the exact movements and intentions of the
enemy. Anderson's brigade had been ordered to report to Maj.
Genl. Howell Cobb at Macon, in order that he might place him
in position to observe the enemy approaching Macon on the
east side of the Ocmulgee river. This brigade was placed in
position by General Cobb on the Clinton road.
On the 19th I sent Crews' Georgia brigade with orders also
to report to Genl. Cobb. This brigade Coln. Crews reports was
placed in position on the Milledgeville road with instructions
(as I afterwards learned), to follow and engage any raiding
party of the enemy which might move towards the rail road.
Towards evening on the 19th, I ascertained from my scouts
that the main forces of the enemy had crossed
the Ocmulgee river above the mouth of the Towaliga, which
induced me to move to Macon in person, directing all my
command, except Ferguson's and Breckinridge's brigades, to
follow me. On arriving at Macon about 11 P. M., I found Lt.
Genl. Hardee who had assumed command of the department.
He directed me to move at daylight with all my available force,
except Crews' brigade, out on the Clinton road and ascertain
the enemy's force and location. In obeying this order, and
before marching towards Clinton, both my flanks were
menaced by small parties of the enemy which I was obliged to
drive off, causing some delay. I then moved on rapidly with my
advanced guard to Clinton, and found Osterhaus' corps moving
through the town. This was not observed until very near the
column, owing to a dense fog. Six men dashed into the town
and captured Genl. Osterhaus' servant (an enlisted man),
within twenty feet of Genl. Osterbaus' Head Quarters. A
regiment of the enemy's cavalry charged us, making the
retreat of my small escort necessary. A squad of the enemy's
cavalry had pressed in upon my line of retreat, between my
position and the body of my command. These, however, were
soon cleared away by the approach of two of my regiments
which came up rapidly to my assistance. I immediately
charged the advancing column of the enemy and drove it back
upon their infantry. They then rallied and charged me again.
We met this charge, checked and returned it with success,
driving them back towards Clinton.
considerable force were pressing down the road towards
Griswoldville. I started promptly with a portion of my command
in that direction, and soon met a courier from Col. Crews with a
note from him stating that the enemy's cavalry had moved
towards the rail road, and that pursuant to Gen. Hardee's
orders he was going in pursuit. This left the Milledgeville road
open; and, fearing some difficulty, I moved rapidly to that
point. On arriving I found our artillery engaging the enemy's
advance, and our infantry in the redoubts ready to receive an
attack. The enemy had already charged up the road, and four
of them had attempted to capture a gun but had been driven
back leaving an officer (whose horse was killed) in the hands
of our infantry. Finding large unprotected intervals between
redoubts, I placed Harrison's and Hagan's brigades in line,
making the connection complete. After slight skirmishing the
enemy retreated a short distance. Pursuant to orders from
Genl. Hardee, I moved out during the night, and the next day
drove the enemy from Griswoldville, capturing a few prisoners.
The next morning I again attacked and drove the enemy for
some distance, capturing sixty prisoners, besides killing and
wounding a large number.
It now being evident that the enemy were not intending to
make any further demonstration upon Macon, I moved on
towards the Oconee, which river I reached on the 24th
November, and completed crossing the next day by swimming.
A brigade under Lt. Col. Gaines was immediately sent to hold
in check a portion of the enemy who were menacing the river
near Ball's ferry, and with the remainder of my command I
moved during the night to station No. 13, on the Central rail
road. Scouts and pickets were sent upon all roads by which the
enemy could reach the rail road, or march in an easterly
direction. The following day, pursuant to Genl. Hardee's orders,
I moved to Sandersville. The 14th and 20th corps of the enemy
had marched from Milledgeville, crossed Buffalo creek, and
were marching upon the town, preceded by cavalry which had
dispersed the local troops who had attempted to oppose them.
I moved out on the lower road and sent a force out on the
upper road. After moving three miles, we were charged by the
enemy whom we met and checked, and then in turn charged
and drove them back for a mile, capturing, killing, and wounding
about thirty of the enemy, besides capturing several
horses, mules, and one loaded wagon. I immediately sent word
to the citizens of Sandersville that the enemy would enter the
town the next morning; and I advised them to send off all
movable property of value. At dark we established our pickets
close to the enemy, and next morning were slowly driven back
towards, and finally through the town.
At evening I was informed by my pickets near Ogeechee
shoals that Genl. Kilpatrick, with a large force of cavalry, had
crossed the river on his way to Augusta. Leaving Genl.
Iverson to observe the enemy, I started immediately with my
command, overtaking him about midnight. I immediately
attacked and captured his picket, and pushed on to his camp
and drove him back from the main Augusta road and out of his
camps, capturing one stand of colors, some prisoners, some
fifty horses, clothing, blankets, camp equipage,
etc., in considerable quantities. The enemy immediately
started towards Augusta on the lower Augusta road. On
reaching the house where Genl. Kilpatrick had staid, I learned
that he and his officers had been overheard talking a great
deal in private about Augusta. It was the opinion of citizens
that this move was intended as a raid upon that place. Being
mindful of the great damage that could be done by the enemy's
burning the valuable mills and property which were
not protected by fortifications, including the factories in the
vicinity, the large portion of the city outside of the
fortifications, the arsenal and Sand Hills, I hoped
by pressing him hard he might be turned from his purpose. I
also learned that the night previous he had
sent a party of some five hundred (500) men to Waynesboro
to destroy the rail road bridge, which convinced me that
Augusta and not Waynesboro was Kilpatrick's destination, as
had the latter place been the point he designed striking, he
would not have sent a small party there on the preceding day.
Notwithstanding the jaded condition of my command, I
therefore pushed on rapidly, engaging and defeating his rear
guards whom I found fortified at every favorable point,
frequently separated by but two or three hundred yards.
Horses, arms, arid prisoners were captured in nearly every
engagement.
On reaching Brier creek swamp we pressed the enemy so
warmly that he turned off towards Waynesboro. During the
chase the enemy set fire to all corn
cribs, cotton gins, and large numbers of barns and houses.
We succeded in driving him off in nearly half the instances in
time to extinguish the flames, and frequently pressed him so
rapidly as to prevent his firing a number of houses, thus
saving a large amount of property.
I entered the town of Waynesboro' with my staff just after
dark, and just as the enemy were leaving it. The town was in
flames, but with the assistance of my staff and escort we
succeeded in staying the flames and in extinguishing the fire in
all but one dwelling which was so far burned that it was
impossible to save it. I immediately moved on and attacked the
enemy who were engaged in tearing up the rail road. The
attack had the effect to stop their work upon the rail road, and
to keep them in line of battle all night.
About 3 A. M., I sent Humes's division to gain the enemy's
rear by turning his left flank, and sent a regiment to gain his
rear by moving around his right. Unfortunately the commands
failed to get into position. At daylight the enemy withdrew for
a short distance, unobserved, in consequence of a dense fog.
As we advanced upon them they charged our line, which
charge we met and easily repulsed. I charged the enemy's flank
with Humes and Anderson's commands, and attacked the front
with the balance of my command, driving the enemy from his
fortified position, capturing a number of prisoners, arms and
horses, and killing a great many who refused to surrender, and
who were shot in the pursuit which ensued. The rout was
complete, and Genl. Kilpatrick was himself very nearly
captured. We continued the charge until reaching a
swamp where the enemy had so constructed barricades
as to make a very strong resistance. The enemy was
soon driven from this position by a flank movement,
after which I again charged and routed their entire
force, capturing, killing and wounding nearly two
hundred, and completely stampeding the whole force.
His destruction was only prevented by an intervening
swamp at Buckhead creek, which made it almost
impossible to approach, and by the failure of the 4th
Tenn. regiment to gain the enemy's rear, for which
purpose it had been detached some two hours previous.
The bridge over Buckhead creek had been carefully
prepared for burning by Kilpatrick's advance guard,
and, on our reaching it, the torch had been applied and
the bridge was in flames, while a terrific fire from the
enemy on the other side prevented me from immediately
extinguishing the flames. I dismounted the
advance brigade and advanced it through the creek
bottom to the bank, and finally drove the enemy
sufficiently far from the opposite bank to enable a few brave
men to work their way across and drive the enemy
beyond range. By great energy and hard labor on the
part of my men the fire was soon extinguished, and in
little more than an hour the bridge was reconstructed
and our troops passing over. The passage, however,
was very slow on account of the rude and frail
construction of the bridge. After advancing a mile,
I discovered the enemy's position, and ordered Genl. Dibrell
to turn their right flank by moving through a wood
which screened the movement. As night was fast
approaching it became important to strike the enemy
immediately, although only about twelve hundred (1200) of my
command had crossed the creek. I moved upon the enemy and
drove in his pickets. On discovering his line, I observed that
Genl. Dibrell in attempting to turn his flank (although he had
moved nearly a mile to our left), had nevertheless encountered
the enemy's line of battle which extended still beyond his
position. Having parts of Harrison's and Ashby's brigades
with me, the former being in advance, I placed the 3d Arkansas
Regiment in line, and the 8th and 11th Texas Regiments in
column, and charged the enemy's position. Nothing could
have succeeded the gallantry with which these troops
responded to the bugle's call, and hurled themselves upon the
enemy, driving his cavalry in confusion, and finally
encountering the breast works. This so terrified the enemy as
to cause him to fly in uncontrollable confusion. Unfortunately
the open ground did not continue, and we finally encountered
a line so positioned that it could not be approached by
cavalry. I ordered Ashby's brigade to turn the enemy's left
flank and take possession of the Louisville road upon which
the enemy was retreating. Owing to approaching dusk Col.
Ashby, by accident, got on a road to the left of the one
indicated by my order, and notified me that he held possession
of the Louisville road. This error enabled the enemy to move off
by scattering through fields and wood without order or
organization.
During the night Kilpatrick sought the protection of his
infantry which he did not venture to forsake
again during the campaign, no doubt, being too much
demoralized to again meet our cavalry.
Fearing the enemy might make another attempt to raid or
march upon Augusta, I placed pickets at all the crossings of
Brier creek, and located my main force at Rocky Spring
church.
On the morning of December 2d, the 14th Army Corps and
Kilpatrick's cavalry marched upon Waynesboro, by the
Louisville road. I met and checked them at Rocky creek. After
a warm engagement they moved off to my left, and crossed a
short distance below on a temporarily constructed bridge,
and, by moving through the fields, turned off towards
Thomas's station. This necessitated my falling back. The
following day I moved down and attacked the enemy, driving
in their pickets and stopping their destruction of the rail road.
Perceiving, after night fall, that they had recommenced their
work, I again attacked them about midnight,
shelling their camp with good effect. At daylight the enemy in
strong force marched upon Waynesboro. Most of my command had
necessarily been sent some three miles after forage.
We quickly concentrated and hastily threw up barricades, while a
single regiment held the entire column in check. This rough
screen was hardly completed when a general charge was made
upon our lines, which was repulsed with considerable loss
to the enemy. A second, third and fourth charge were made by
the enemy, each of which was repulsed, or met and driven back
by counter charges. Finally their long lines of infantry advanced,
and, after warm fighting, their cavalry having turned
our flanks, we were compelled to fall back, which was done by
taking successive positions till we reached the town of
Waynesboro. Here we were so warmly pressed that it was
with difficulty we succeeded in withdrawing from our
position. The moment our lines left our works I directed the
8th Texas, Coln. Cook, and the 9th Tennessee, Capt. Brumley,
to charge the enemy, which was gallantly done, meeting and
driving back a charge of the enemy and so staggering him that
no further demonstration was made upon us until we were
prepared to receive the enemy at our new position north of the
town. During all the enemy's charges the loss of men and
horses must have been severe. According to his own account,
his loss in men numbered fifty (50) killed and one hundred and
forty-seven (147) wounded. The enemy remained in town
about three hours, and then moved down the Savannah road.
During all the engagements the enemy's cavalry were at least
double my own numbers, and were besides reënforced by one
or more divisions of infantry.
Having been notified by the Lieut. Genl. commanding that
the roads towards Savannah had been blockaded by his order,
and having sent Lewis's brigade (reëinforced by the 4th
Tennessee Regiment) to fall back before the enemy, I, with the
remainder of my command, remained to protect Augusta and
to strike his flanks and rear.
On the first day I attacked his rear several times,
driving him from his several positions, killing and
wounding a great number, and capturing about one
hundred (100) prisoners. During his movement towards
Savannah, so warmly was he pressed, that he
blockaded the roads in his rear, frequently building
fortifications two or three miles in length, and destroyed all
bridges on his line of march. He occasionally attacked us by
charging with his cavalry, which was invariably met by
counter charges and driven back in confusion, with heavy
loss. In every fight we captured horses, arms and prisoners.
On the night of Dec. 8th, we shelled the camp of the 14th
Corps with good effect, throwing the corps into confusion and
causing it to leave camp at midnight, abandoning clothing,
arms, etc. By breaking up the camp during the extreme
darkness, a great many negroes were left in our hands whom
we sent back to their owners. We also captured three wagons
and teams, and caused the enemy to burn several more
wagons. The whole number of negroes captured from the
enemy during the movement was nearly two thousand.
On the 8th we captured a dispatch--see appendix A--from
Genl. Slocum to Genl. Davis, giving the proposed location of
Sherman's army before Savannah; which afterwards proved to
be correct. This paper was forwarded to Genl. Hardee. On
reaching a point within ten miles of the city, and finding it
impossible to do any further harm to the enemy in that
position, I moved back and crossed the Savannah river,
leaving Genl. Iverson's command to watch the enemy should
he move in the direction of Augusta or Western Georgia.
and was placed by Lt. Genl. Hardee in command of the
defenses of New river and adjacent landings, and charged
with the duty of holding the line of communication from
Huger's landing to Hardeeville. This we succeeded in doing,
although the enemy held the South Carolina side of the river
with a division of infantry.
After the evacuation of the city, Dec. 20th, I
removed all the guns and ammunition from Tunbridge
and Mongin's landings, and New river bridge, also the heavy
guns, weighing 9000 pounds each, from Red Bluff, together
with the ammunition. I omitted to state that during the entire
movement of the enemy through Georgia I kept all my
superiors fully informed of the strength and of all the
movements of the enemy. At the same time I kept my cavalry
in his front, rear, and on both flanks, preventing his cavalry
from spreading over the country, retarding the enemy by
fighting him on all sides, and felling trees in his advance. This
duty was fully done, and I thank my officers and men for their
devotion, gallantry, and the self-sacrificing spirit they have
ever exhibited. Every engagement was a success, and the utter
defeat and discomfiture of the enemy's cavalry was most
signal and complete, notwithstanding his force of cavalry was
always superior to mine.
My force never exceeded thirty-five hundred (3500) men,
and was so distributed in front, rear and on both flanks that I
seldom had more than two thousand (2000) under my
immediate command, which two thousand frequently charged
and routed more than double their numbers. The enemy had
been falsely informed by
their officers that we took no prisoners, which caused him to
fight with desperation and to run very dangerous gauntlets to
escape capture, which frequently accounts for the large
proportion of killed.
In every rout of their cavalry, and in the many fights which
ensued, they continued to fly, refusing to surrender
notwithstanding the demands of my men in close pursuit.
Consequently, no alternative was left but to shoot or sabre
them to prevent escape.
During the trip, I had parties to move a day or more in
advance of the enemy, informing citizens where to run their
negroes and stock in order to ensure the safety of their
property, offering them every assistance in so doing. But
generally, the citizens were so frightened as to be perfectly
helpless. On the enemy's approach, pursuant to orders, I
drove off such horses and mules as were exposed to the
enemy's view, and have since taken every pains to restore
said stock to its owners, generally with success. My
command captured about five hundred horses, many of which
had been taken from citizens by the enemy, and have been
returned to their owners when it was possible to do so.
I desire to tender my thanks for the devoted gallantry of my
division and brigade commanders. Those whose conduct
came especially under my notice, were Generals Allen, Humes,
Anderson, and Dibrell, and Colonels Ashby, Hagan, Crews,
and Lt. Col. Anderson. Genl. Allen was slightly wounded and
had two horses shot under him at Waynesboro. Genls. Humes
and Dibrell also had their horses shot whilst gallantly
engaging the enemy. I also tender my thanks to Genl.
Robertson who, while acting as my chief of staff in the
temporary absence of his command, was severely wounded
while gallantly charging the enemy. Captain S. W. Steele and
Lieut. M. G. Hudson, A. D. C. of my staff, were highly
distinguished for gallantry and zeal. Lieuts. R. B. Ryan, J. M.
Stewart, and Henry Chapman, acting upon my staff, were
gallant and efficient.
In closing this report I will state that during the last five
months my command has been without wagons or cooking
utensils, with orders to subsist upon the country. Its food has
been limited to bread baked upon boards and stones, and meat
broiled upon sticks. It has not been paid in twelve months,
and has not had the regular issues of clothing which have
been made to the infantry. During this time it has averaged in
direct marching sixteen (16) miles a day; and, being without
wagons, has been obliged to pack all the forage and rations to
camp on horseback, which, together with scouting and other
duties, would make the average traveling of each soldier at
least twenty (20) miles each day. During these five months my
troops have been continuously in the immediate presence of
the enemy, fighting nearly every day, and with brilliant
success, except in a few instances when small detachments
sent off from my command met vastly superior forces. During
these five months my command has captured, killed and
wounded more than its own effective strength. It has captured
from the enemy in action and carried off the field four (4)
pieces of artillery, with caissons and battery wagons--twelve
hundred mules, over two hundred wagons, two thousand head
of beef cattle, three thousand cavalry horses with equipments,
and over four thousand stand of arms. It has also captured a
great number of the enemy's posts, with large amounts of
stores, and has destroyed more rail road used by the enemy--
stopping his communications for a longer time and with less
loss--than any other cavalry command, although expeditions
double its strength have been sent out on that duty. It has
also captured and destroyed over a dozen trains of cars,
generally loaded with supplies. As we were continually
fighting the enemy, our camps could not be designated before
night-fall. Details had then to be sent out to procure forage
and rations, frequently making it midnight before supper could
be prepared for my men, and then they were often compelled
to be in the saddle before daylight. No men in the Confederate
states have marched more, fought more, suffered more, or had
so little opportunities for discipline; yet they are to-day as
orderly and as well disciplined as any cavalry in the
Confederate service.
On our line of march officers and men were met who, in their
anxiety to increase their commands, used every exertion to
induce my men to desert, frequently offering them promotion
and furloughs as a reward for dishonor. Notwithstanding this,
my command is today stronger and more efficient than it was
at the beginning of a continuous campaign of eight
months' hard, constant, and successful fighting.
I must particularly commend my Tennessee and Kentucky
troops, whom, though they saw their homes
thrown open by the advance of General Hood's army, I
brought from the Coosa river to Savannah without a single
desertion. Afterwards I had the mortification to see a body
desert who had been informed they were to be punished
without trial for crimes they had never committed.
Respy. Col.,
Your Obt. Servt.
J. WHEELER,
Maj. Genl.
APPENDIX A.
Army of Georgia, Head Qrs., Left Wing, Springfield, Dec. 8, 1864, 7 A. M.
Genl.,
Genl. Sherman has information that the line of defense
around Savannah is about four miles from the city. He desires
to take the road extending from Cherokee hill through Silk
Hope to Litchfield, as our first position. Your corps should be
at or near Cherokee hill. The 20th will be to the left of Pooler,
17th on right of 20th, and 15th near Litchfield. The 20th Corps
will be at Monteith to night.
Yours very respectfully,
H. W. SLOCUM, M. G.
Official Copy.
H. C.
This dispatch was directed on the envelop to Genl.
Jeff. C. Davis.
The Siege of Savannah--Concentration of Confederate Forces for the
Defense of the City--Investment by the United States Forces--
Federal attempts to Communicate with the Fleet--Confederate Line at
Monteith--Obstruction of Roads leading into Savannah--Western
Line for the Protection of the City, its Location, Principal Batteries,
and Armament--Enumeration of Light Artillery Companies
Concentrated for its Support--Inundation of the Low Grounds in
front of this Western Line--the Western Line, how Subdivided,
Commanded, and Garrisoned--Supply of Ordnance,
Quarter-Master, and Commissary Stores--Statement of Rations
Issued.
Although every effort had been made to concentrate
a large force for the defense of Savannah, such was the
pressure upon the Confederacy and so great the paucity
of troops, that at the inception and during the progress of
the siege there were not more than ten thousand men fit
for duty within the Confederate lines around that city.
Nearly one half of these consisted of reserves and
militia, and considerable details were employed in
garrisoning the forts and fixed batteries in the Savannah
river and along the line of the water approaches. No
lack of patriotism existed on the part of the citizens, who
responded freely to the following spirited address of their
honored mayor.
Mayor's Office, Savannah, November 28th, 1864.
Fellow Citizens,
The time has come when every male who can
shoulder a musket can make himself useful in
defending our hearths and homes. Our city is well fortified, and
the old can fight in the trenches as well as the young; and a
determined and brave force can, behind entrenchments,
successfully repel the assaults of treble their number.
