“I fell asleep on board the vessel where I worked, and, before I woke up, she set sail and carried me off.”

“Have n't I always treated you. well, Tony?”

To this question Burns made no answer.

“Have n't I always given you money when you needed?”

“You have always given me twelve and a half-cents once a year.”

Nothing further passed between the two, but in this brief colloquy Burns had already made admissions decisive of his fate. While it was going on, Brent stood gazing steadily in the prisoner's face, but exchanged no words, not even salutations with him. The object of the wily slaveholder had been accomplished, and with his friend he now took his departure. As he passed out, the Marshal put the inquiry, “Well, that's the man, is it?” to which Suttle responded, “Yes.”

No sooner had they gone, than the door was again strongly barred, and Burns was left to pass the night with the men by whom he had been arrested. Recalling his thoughts from Suttle, he now turned with indignant scorn upon Butman.

“I thought,” said he, “you arrested me for stealing.”

“I was afraid of a mob,” replied the dastard,“and that was the reason why I did n't arrest you when you left the store.” He added that he had been standing on the opposite side of the street, watching for Burns.

The speeches of both, on the present occasion, were so imperfectly reported that the public abroad had but a faint conception of their power and effect. Mr. Phillips was the first to speak.

“The city government is on our side,” began the orator; a storm of cheers greeted the announcement. “I am glad,” continued he, “to hear the applause of that sentiment. If the city police had been warned on the Sims case, as they are now, not to lift a finger in behalf of the kidnappers, under pain of instant dismissal, Thomas Sims would have been here in Boston to-day. To-morrow is to determine whether we are ready to do the duty they have left us to do. There is now no law in Massachusetts, and when law ceases, the people may act in their own sovereignty. I am against squatter sovereignty in Nebraska, and against kidnappers' sovereignty in Boston. See to it, that tomorrow, in the streets of Boston, you ratify the verdict of Faneuil Hall, that Anthony Burns has no master but his God.

“The question is to be settled to-morrow, whether we shall adhere to the case of Shadrach or the case of Sims. Will you adhere to the case of Sims, and see this man carried down State Street, between two hundred men? I have been talking seventeen years about slavery, and it seems to me I have talked to little purpose, for within three years, two slaves can be carried away from Boston. Nebraska, I call knocking a man down, and this is spitting in his face after he is down. When I heard of this case, and that Burns was locked up in that Court House, my heart sank within me.

“See to it, every one of you, as you love the honor of Boston, that you watch this case so closely that you can look into that man's eyes. When he comes up for trial, get a sight at him, and don't lose sight of him. There is nothing like the mute eloquence of a suffering man to urge to duty; be there, and I will trust the result. If Boston streets are to be so often desecrated by the sight of returning fugitives, let us be there, that we may tell our children we saw it done. There is now no use for Faneuil Hall. Faneuil Hall is the purlieus of the Court House to-morrow morning, where the children of Adams and Hancock may prove that they are not bastards. Let us prove that we are worthy of liberty.”

Theodore Parker followed his coadjutor. Addressing the assembly as “fellow subjects of Virginia,” he poured forth a torrent of the most bitter invective. At the close,11 See Appendix M. he proposed that when the meeting adjourned, it should be to meet in Court Square, the following morning, at nine o'clock. “To-night,” shouted a hundred voices in reply. The speaker stood silent, as one in doubt. At length he called on those who were in favor of proceeding that night to the Square, to raise their hands: half the assembly did so. But now the excitement burst through all bounds,—the vast Hall was filled with one wild roar of voices. “To the Court House,” was shouted in one quarter; “to the Revere House for the slave-catchers,” was answered back from another. In vain Mr. Parker attempted to allay the tumult,—his voice was submerged in the billows of sound, and he stood gesticulating like one in a dumb show. A potent master of the weapons that are fitted to goad the public mind even to madness, he lacked the sovereign power to control and subdue at will large masses of men. Amid the uproar, Wendell Phillips again ascended the platform. The different quality of the two men then appeared. Ere half a dozen sentences had fallen from his lips, the assembly had subsided into profound stillness.

“Let us remember,” said he, “where we are and what we are going to do. You have said, to-night, you will vindicate the fair fame of Boston. Let me tell you, you won't do it by groaning at the slave-catchers at the Revere House—by attempting the impossible act of insulting a slave-catcher. If there is a man here who has an arm and a heart ready to sacrifice anything for the freedom of an oppressed man, let him do it to-morrow. If I thought it would be done to-night, I would go first. I don't profess courage, but I do profess this: when there is a possibility of saving a slave from the hands of those who are called officers of the law, I am ready to trample any statute or any man under my feet to do it, and am ready to help any one hundred men to do it. But wait until the daytime. The vaults of the banks in State street sympathize with us. The Whigs, who have been kicked once too often, sympathize with us. It is in your power so to block up every avenue, that the man cannot be carried off. Do not, then, balk the effort of to-morrow by foolish conduct to-night, giving the enemy the alarm. You that are ready to do the real work, be not carried away by indiscretion which may make shipwreck of our hopes. The zeal that won't keep till to-morrow will never free a slave.”

By this time the orator had his audience well in hand, when suddenly a man at the entrance of the Hall shouted: “Mr. Chairman, I am just informed that a mob of negroes is in Court Square attempting to rescue Burns. I move that we adjourn to Court Square.” A formal vote was not waited for, and the next instant the whole mass was pouring down the broad stairs and along the streets toward the new theatre of action.

It is necessary to return and follow the movements of the little band that had pledged themselves to the forcible rescue of Burns. A place of rendezvous had been appointed, but when the time for meeting arrived, only six of the seven appeared. The defection of their faint-hearted companion did not shake the purpose of the rest. Feeling, however, that their number was too small, they agreed to go forth, and, if possible, secure each man six coadjutors. This effort was so successful that in a short time the number of confederates was increased to nearly twenty-five. Their weapons of attack were various; some were armed with revolvers, some carried axes, and some butcher's cleavers that had just been purchased and were left in their paper coverings for better concealment. In a passage-way hard by, a large stick of timber had been secretly deposited to serve as a battering-ram. Soon after nine o'clock, everything was ready for the assault. It was at this juncture that the alarm had been given to the meeting in Faneuil Hall.

Scarcely had the crowd from the Hall begun to pour into the Square when the assault was commenced. The lamps that lighted the Square had already been extinguished, so that under cover of darkness the assailants might more easily escape detection. Strangely neglecting the eastern entrance, which was not secured at the time,11 Col. Suttle happened to be in the Court House at the time, and escaped by the east door after the attack commenced, leaving to Batchelder and others the business of defending his property at the risk and sacrifice of their lives. they passed round to the west side and commenced the attack in that quarter. The Court House on that side presented to the eye an unbroken facade of granite two hundred feet long and four stories high. In the lower part were three entrances, closed by massive two-leaved doors which were secured by heavy locks and bolts. Against the middle one of these doors, the beam which had been previously provided, was now brought to bear with all the force that ten or twelve men could muster. At the same moment, one or two others plied their axes against the panels. As the quick, heavy

On appearing, he was asked if he would undertake to serve the writ at such a time as the one mentioned. With some hesitation he agreed to do so, provided the sanction of the Governor, Attorney-General, and City Solicitor of Boston were first obtained. This answer was thought satisfactory and the conference ended. On the next day, the Coroner and Alderman Dunham sought an interview on the subject with City Solicitor Hillard. The Solicitor gave it as his opinion that no such interval of time as they contemplated would occur, and strongly advised them against proceeding with the writ.

While this was passing, two citizens of Boston, Samuel E. Sewall and Henry I. Bowditch, were moving in another direction and with a bolder purpose. Mr. Sewall was a lineal descendant of that ancient Chief Justice of Massachusetts who, having been betrayed by the spirit of the age into giving his judicial sanction to the prosecutions for witchcraft, soon vindicated his innate nobleness by a solemn act of repentance in a public assembly of his fellow-citizens. The finer qualities of this Puritan judge re-appeared in Mr. Sewall. A man of pure and upright life, an eminent lawyer, a wise and incorruptible friend of public liberty, he naturally rose to be a conspicious character, and was more than once honored with the nomination and support of his party for the office of Governor. Mr. Bowditch was the son of America's most illustrious mathematician, the interpreter of Laplace. He was a physician of eminence, and, like Mr. Sewall, uncompromisingly hostile to the fugitive slave act.

It was the desire of these gentlemen to have a writ of replevin served with instant dispatch; they were quite prepared to deliver Burns from duress without waiting for the Commissioner's decision. But there was a serious difficulty in the way. Burns was in the custody of an officer who had expressed a determination to resist the state process, and who had a strong civil and military force to back him. It was plain that if the writ was to be efficiently served, if Burns was to be taken out of the Marshal's hands, it could only be done by the aid of a force sufficient to overcome that which he had at his command. Provided such a force were furnished him, Coroner Smith expressed his readiness to serve the writ and release the prisoner. The necessity of this condition was apparent, and Mr. Sewall with his coadjutor proceeded to take measures for obtaining the required aid.

Under the circumstances, the ordinary posse comitatus was out of the question; for it was not to be expected that an undisciplined throng of civilians would be able to make head against the serried ranks and balls and bayonets of the Marshal's United States troops. The two gentlemen, therefore, repaired to the State House for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, a military force through the intervention of the Governor, Emory Washburn. They met him, by chance, in the office of the Secretary of State, and at once made known the object of their visit. Without informing him that a writ of replevin had actually been issued, they put the case by supposition. A coroner of the city, they said, was ready to undertake the service of such a writ, provided he could be sustained by a proper force. They asked, therefore, whether the Governor could not order out a sufficient number of the militia to enable him to do so. In reply, the Governor first reminded them of the singular spectacle which would be presented to the world if he were to comply with the request. The militia were already under arms, by order of the Mayor of Boston, to keep the peace and, suppress any attempt, by a popular outbreak, to wrest Burns from the custody of the United States Marshal: was it seemly for the Governor, he inquired, to command the same militia to aid one of the state officers in taking him by force from the same custody? Aside from this view of the case, he said that while he was willing to do anything in his power to aid their wishes, he thought that the officer to whom the writ might be committed, was invested by the statute with all necessary power to summon to his aid the posse comitatus. But he doubted whether he had authority to order out troops to aid in serving a particular precept, unless a case of threatened violence or actual breach of the peace could be made out, sufficient to call into exercise the general power confided to the Commander-in- chief for such an exigency. He then read the provisions of the statute upon the subject, and asked Mr. Sewall whether he, as a lawyer, considered that the Governor had authority to call out troops for the express purpose of executing the writ in question. To this Mr. Sewall replied that he had looked at the matter, himself, and had great doubts if the Governor had the authority. But he added that in his view the fugitive slave act was unconstitutional, and that, consequently, the detention of Burns by the Marshal was unlawful. In answer to this, the Governor said, that whatever might be his private opinion on that point, he had been taught to regard the judiciary as the interpreters of the law; that he understood the courts to hold the law to be constitutional; and that therefore he felt bound, in his official relations, to regard it as such.

Mr. Sewall now raised a different question. By the statute providing for the writ of replevin, no person could enjoy its benefit who was “in the custody of a public officer of the law by the force of a lawful warrant or other process, civil or criminal, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Burns was in the custody of the United States Marshal by virtue of a Commissioner's warrant. Mr. Sewall did not regard the Commissioner as a court of competent jurisdiction, and consequently held that Burns was entitled to the writ. But the Governor, planting himself on the decisions of the Supreme Court, held that the warrant was lawful, and that Burns could not be properly interfered with while in the Marshal's custody. Yielding for the moment to this view of the case, Mr. Sewall now inquired if the Governor would order out troops to aid in serving the writ, after Burns, by virtue of the Commissioner's certificate, should have passed out of the Marshal's custody and before he should have been removed from the State? To this question, which was substantially the same as that which Coroner Smith had propounded to the City Solicitor, it does not appear that the Governor returned any specific answer, nor was it important that he should. Mr. Sewall was satisfied, on a subsequent examination of the fugitive slave act, that the Commissioner's certificate would not give Suttle the immediate possession of Burns, but that he would remain in the custody of the Marshal without any interval until he should be surrendered in Virginia. No opportunity, therefore, would be afforded for the writ upon Suttle within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts.

Having delivered his own views on the subject, the Governor proposed that Mr. Sewall and his coadjutor should lay the case before the Attorney General, John H. Clifford, the legal adviser of the Executive. If that officer were able to suggest any lawful mode in which he could aid in serving the writ, he was ready to adopt it. Here the interview ended. Mr. Sewall at once sought the Attorney-General; but, not finding him readily, desisted from further pursuit, in the conviction that his opinion would be of an adverse character.11 A little later in the day, John A. Andrew, a member of the Suffolk Bar, waited on the Governor for the same purpose, but on learning of the interview with the other gentlemen and its result, he did not press the matter. The Governor received no other application of any sort on the subject.

The conduct of the Governor in this affair was subjected, at the time, to severe animadversion. But those who blamed him most were least informed respecting the facts. Mr. Sewall, who, as one of the parties, was familiar with all the circumstances, acquitted and justified him. With the opinions which the Governor entertained respecting his constitutional obligations, there was, Mr. Sewall thought, no other course for him to pursue. There, however, the justification stopped. The conduct might be justified by the opinions of the Governor, but the opinions themselves were condemned.

It has been seen that the Governor felt bound, whatever his private opinions or predilections, to defer to the authority of the Supreme Court. A more comprehensive survey of the action of that Court would have furnished him with equal authority for an opposite line of conduct. The particular decision upon which he rested was that in the case of Sims. But there was an earlier judgment of the Court, which, in the opinion of eminent jurists, furnished ample sanction for the application of the writ of replevin to persons in precisely the predicament of Burns. This opinion was directly connected with the restoration of the writ of personal replevin to the statute book, in 1837. The committee of the legislature which reported the bill restoring the writ, also made an elaborate report on the general subject of the trial by jury in questions of personal freedom. In this report the opinion of the Court was cited, and its vital bearing upon the question, whether a person arrested as a fugitive slave was entitled to the writ of replevin, was illustrated in the comments of the committee. Very pertinently, the-opinion had its origin in the arrest of a fugitive slave. One, Griffith, had been indicted for an assault on a negro named Randolph. In his defence, he alleged that Randolph was his slave, and that, by virtue of the fugitive slave law of 1793, he had a right to seize him. In their reply, the prosecuting officers presented arguments against the validity of that law. The Chief Justice, Parker, in giving his opinion, thus disposed of them: “It is said that the act which is passed on this subject is contrary to the amendment of the Constitution securing the people in their persons and property against seizures,&c., without a complaint on oath, &c. It is very obvious that slaves are not parties to the Constitution, and the amendment has relation to the parties. * * * * But it is objected that a person may, in this summary manner, seize a freeman. It may be so, but it would be attended with mischievous consequences to the person making the seizure, and a habeas corpus would lie to obtain the release of the person seized.” And if a habeas corpus, said the committee, then of course the concurrent remedies, including the writ of personal replevin.

“The principle here stated,” observed the committee, “when carried out relieves the act of Congress (the act of 1793) of all its obnoxious features, and places the question, under the law, precisely where the committee would have placed it, under the constitution, without the law. It holds that the proceedings are constitutional as to slaves, and unconstitutional as to freemen, and gives the person seized, the right to try the question as to his character, by any suitable independent process. And this principle must extend to his situation, either before or after the certificate, for the jurisdiction of the magistrate, upon the same reasoning, must be special and limited, depending entirely for its foundation upon the fact whether the person so seized be a slave; for if he be not, the whole proceedings are void, as against the express provisions of the constitution. It makes, then, the claimant act at his peril throughout, and gives the person seized an opportunity to try, in another form, the applicability of the process to him, and that, too, wherever he chooses.”

The committee therefore expressed the opinion that “whether the law be considered unconstitutional on the one hand, or valid on the other, upon the construction recognized by the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth, the same result must be arrived at. In either case, a person seized under the act of Congress, before or after certificate given, may have an independent process, under which he can try his right to the character of a freeman.” In concluding their report, the committee remarked, in view of the fact that the writ of personal replevin might be used by persons arrested as fugitive slaves in the investigation of their claim to freedom, that “they looked to that use of the writ as one of its just and legitimate offices.” 11 Report of the Judiciary Committee “on the trial by jury in questions of personal freedom” made to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, March 27, 1837. The author of the report was James C. Alvord.

The court's opinion and the committee's interpretation of it had reference to the fugitive slave act of 1793. But they were equally applicable to the fugitive slave act of 1850, for they asserted the general principle that no act of Congress could deprive a person of his constitutional right to try the question of his freedom. Accepting this exposition, planting himself by the side, deferring to the venerable authority, of Chief Justice Parker and his associates on the Supreme Bench, the Governor might have said to Mr. Sewall: “Burns is entitled by the constitution and the law to the writ of personal replevin. Make your writ and bid the officer serve it upon the United States Marshal forthwith. If he refuses to obey, let the officer summon the posse comitatus and enforce the service. If the Marshal resists with the military force under his command, the case will have arisen in which it becomes the duty of the Governor by law to act. Then make your application to me, and I will call out troops to aid in enforcing the writ.” 11 The whole argument may be briefly stated thus: 1. The fugitive slave acts of 1793 and 1850 are commensurate as to “competent jurisdiction.” 2. The constitutionality of both has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in two different decisions. 3. The right of the person seized, to an independent trial of the question of his character, is affirmed in the first decision and not denied in the second, 4. The writ of personal replevin was provided by the Commonwealth expressly to secure such a trial; therefore, 5. The affirmation of the constitutionality of the fugitive slave act of 1850 is no bar to the use of the writ of personal replevin for the purpose of determining the character of the person seized as a slave.

The interview with the Governor took place on Monday, the twenty-ninth. Nothing further was done respecting the writ until the following Wednesday. By that time the prisoner's case had assumed an unexpectedly favorable aspect. It was anticipated that the Commissioner would set him at liberty. In such a case threats had been made that Suttle would seize him again without warrant and carry him off.22 Suttle had resolved, under the advice of District Attorney Hallett, if the Commissioner's decision should be adverse to his claim, to seize Burns by force, remove him from the State, and for justification of the act rely on his ability to prove ownership after getting back to Virginia. This purpose was announced by Suttle, on the morning of June 1, to a circle of his southern friends at the Revere House, and in the hearing of the Rev. M. D. Conway, of Washington, who subsequently stated the fact to Charles M. Ellis, Esq., of Boston, and the Rev. George E. Ellis, of Charlestown. To meet this contingency (and no other), a writ of replevin was made on that day and placed in the hands of Coroner Smith. The contingency did not occur, and the writ remained as waste paper in the officer's possession.33 See Appendix B.

The first announcement of this purpose was made in open court on Saturday morning. The counsel for Burns had moved for a postponement of the examination, for the purpose of gaining a little time to prepare the defence. To this the counsel for Suttle objected.

“Let the examination proceed now,” said one of them, Edward G. Parker, “and if Burns is given up, I am authorized to say that he can be purchased.”

Among those who heard this statement, was one who had already done and suffered much in behalf of fugitive slaves. This man was the Rev. L. A. Grimes, the pastor of a congregation of colored persons in Boston. Approaching the counsel, Mr. Grimes inquired upon what authority the statement had been made. “Col. Suttle has agreed to sell Burns,” was the reply. Mr. Parker added that the sum which he had agreed to accept was twelve hundred dollars. But a condition annexed was, that the sale should be made after the surrender had been decreed. Mr. Grimes inquired if Col. Suttle would not consent to receive the sum named and close a bargain before the surrender. The counsel thought not. Bent on securing this concession, Mr. Grimes sought an interview with the Marshal, by whom, on mentioning his object, he was referred to Col. Suttle. An introduction of the slave-rescuer to the slave-hunter took place, and a long conversation ensued. Suttle enlarged on the fact of his ownership, on the kindness with which he had treated Burns, and also on the latter's good character. But to all suggestions for a sale before the surrender, he refused to listen. A private interview between Suttle and his counsel followed. At the close of it, the latter sought Mr. Grimes and informed him that their client had at length agreed to sell his slave before the surrender was made. The prompt response of Mr. Grimes was—“Between this time and ten o'clock to-night, I'll have the money ready for you; have the emancipation papers ready for me at that hour.”

A busy day's work lay before the benevolent pastor. The morning was already well advanced, and before the day closed, twelve hundred dollars were to be raised, not one of which had yet been subscribed, Without resources himself, he had to seek out others who might be disposed to contribute to the enterprise. A wealthy citizen, whose sympathies had hitherto been on the side of the fugitive slave act, had been heard to say that if Burns could be purchased he would head the subscription list with a hundred dollars. Informed of this by Suttle's counsel, Mr. Grimes called at the gentleman's house, and on the third attempt succeeded in finding him. The gentleman admitted that he had made the pledge already mentioned, but he now declined to redeem it. He had since met a person, he said, who had assured him that the slave could not be purchased,—that he must be tried.

“I have heard no one take that ground but the United States District Attorney,” said Mr. Grimes.

The gentleman confessed that it was Attorney Hallett who had dissuaded him from acting upon his benevolent impulse. Without money, but with a promise from him to give “something,” which was never redeemed, Mr. Grimes left the house.

He now bent his steps toward the mansion of a gentleman distinguished for his immense wealth, his rare munificence, and the eminent position which he had formerly held in the service of his country abroad. Everything conspired to ally him with the conservative class of society, and it was with them that public opinion commonly ranked him. What view he would take of the passing events was uncertain. Mr. Grimes found him in an unusually discomposed frame of mind. The announcement of his errand at once called forth an emphatic expression of sentiment and feeling. He denounced the fugitive slave act as “an infamous statute,” and declared that he would have nothing to do with it. It had been the cause of bloodshed and slaughter, and would be the cause of still more. Referring to the death of Batchelder, he intimated that, as the man had been killed while voluntarily assisting to execute an infamous law, he had no regrets to express at the occurrence. He could give no money to purchase the freedom of Burns, as that, in his view, would be an implied sanction of the law; but, if Mr. Grimes needed any money for his own uses, he might draw on him for the required sum, or even for a larger amount.11 The above was written while ABBOTT LAWRENCE was yet living. Now that death has set his seal on all his acts and opinions, I need no longer hesitate to name him as the person alluded to. Let the sentiments expressed in the text go forth to the public under the sanction of such a name. Thus encouraged, Mr. Grimes took his leave.

A gentleman belonging to a family distinguished for its ability, and especially for its devotion to the fugitive slave law, was next applied to. At once intimating his readiness to contribute to the proposed purchase, he suggested that his brother, a wealthy merchant, should be summoned for the same purpose. The latter soon made his appearance and entered heartily into the scheme. Each subscribed one hundred dollars on condition that the whole sum should be raised. Both were urgent in pressing forward the matter; “the man,” said one of them, “must be out of the Court House tonight.” If the sum should not be made up, he was ready to increase his subscription. From another distinguished citizen the sum of fifty dollars was obtained; he was the only member of the national legislature from Massachusetts who had perilled his reputation by voting for the fugitive slave bill. A subscription was next solicited from a certain rich broker in State street. He had been an ardent supporter of the fugitive act; on the occasion of sending Sims back into slavery he had offered five thousand dollars, if need were, to secure that triumph. Mr. Grimes now found him in a different mood. He would give nothing to purchase Burns—there would be no end to demands of that sort; but he would readily contribute one hundred dollars, he said, to procure a coat of tar and feathers for the slave-catchers. Apparently, his patriotism cost him nothing on either occasion. Another millionaire of the city, who enjoyed a reputation for liberality, upon being solicited to subscribe, declined on the ground that it would only furnish an inducement for slaveholders to repeat their reclamations. At the same time, he declaimed with great bitterness against the law.

Hamilton Willis, a broker in State street, responded to the call with the most active sympathy. He urged Mr. Grimes to obtain pledges for the necessary amount, and agreed to advance the money upon those pledges. Another noble contributor was one who, as a Trustee of the Emigrant Aid Society, afterward distinguished himself in peopling Kansas with freemen. This was J. M. S. Williams, a native of Virginia, but then a merchant in Boston. Subscribing at once a hundred dollars, he gave assurance that whatever sum might be deficient in the end, he would make good.

Of those who were present, the most conspicuous, if not the most numerous portion, were pimps and bullies, whose vile passions and brutal natures had left a permanent impress upon their persons. Some of them, now appearing as officers of justice, were convicted criminals and had served out their sentence in the prisons. These carried it boldly, as though they had been presented with the freedom of the court-room; while the few good citizens present,—some, men of substance, and some, men of renown,—took their seats quietly as being conscious that they were there on sufferance. Nothing, perhaps, more clearly revealed the nature of the business in hand than the fact that the Marshal was compelled to rely for aid, chiefly, on the most depraved class of men in the community.

At length the court was opened. Alone, upon the bench from which Judge Story had been wont to dispense justice, sat the Commissioner, evidently oppressed by the load which he had chosen to take upon himself. In his appropriate place on the right stood the Marshal, Watson Freeman, in whose massy face, seamed by small pox, a certain look of good humor somewhat modified the prevailing relentlessness of its aspect. Over against the Commissioner, upon a seat just without the bar, sat Anthony Burns. On either side of him, as guards, sat two or three brutal-looking men, and in front of him, just within the bar, were four or five more, with pistols and bludgeons lurking in their pockets and but half concealed from the offended eyes of the spectators. At the clerk's desk, apart, sat the United States District Attorney, Benjamin F. Hallett, whose business there did not clearly appear. The counsel for the slaveholder and the slave respectively, the reporters for the press, the slaveholder and his southern friends, Theodore Parker, the Rev. L. A. Grimes, Morris, the colored lawyer of Boston, and some few others occupied the seats within the bar; while a moderate number outside completed the assemblage.

The first incident in the proceedings illustrated the character of the tribunal. Charles M. Ellis, the junior counsel for Burns, began with a protest against proceeding in the case under the extraordinary circumstances of the occasion.

“It is not fit,” said he, “that we should proceed while counsel here (meaning the counsel for Suttle) bear arms. It is not fit that the prisoner should sit here with shackles on his limbs. It is not fit that we should proceed while the court-room is packed with armed men, and all the avenues to it are filled with soldiery, making it difficult for the friends of the prisoner to obtain access to him. I protest against proceeding under these circumstances.”

“The examination must proceed,” was the prompt response of the Commissioner. But Mr. Hallett, whose offensive and unexplained presence within the bar has already been alluded to, now joined issue, and proceeded to harangue the Commissioner in reply to what had been said. The Commissioner, immediately interrupting, reminded him that, as he had already decided the point, any further remarks were unnecessary. The District Attorney persisted. The conduct of the Marshal, he said, had been called in question, and he was present to act as his counsel. Again the Commissioner interposed: “Mr. Hallett, these remarks are irrelevant and entirely out of order.” But the Attorney, without even pausing in his speech, went on with raised voice, inflamed countenance, and increased vehemence of manner, not only to repel the reflections that had been cast upon the Marshal, but also to instruct the Commissioner in his own duty. Insolence triumphed, and the Commissioner sank back in his seat with a helpless air, until the browbeating was ended. Men who had been wont to see the Bench treated with the profoundest respect by the Bar, who had known Daniel Webster bow in silence and resume his seat at the bidding of a common pleas judge, looked on indignant and amazed. Why was not the Attorney ordered into instant custody? Had the Court no power to protect itself?

Another incident, that occurred at a later stage of the examination, furnished an answer to this question. In attempting to return to the courtroom, after one of the short recesses that were reluctantly granted, Mr. Dana, the senior counsel for Burns, found his progress obstructed by the bayonets of the guard. In vain he urged his well known relation to the prisoner; he was kept waiting upon the stairs until it was the pleasure of the Marshal to permit him to pass on. The outrage was made known to the Commissioner, and he was moved to instruct the Marshal upon the subject. “I have no authority to direct the actions of the Marshal,” was the short but pregnant answer, while that officer stood grimly smiling upon the foiled advocate of Freedom. The Marshal did not sustain the relation of a sheriff to a justiciary court; he was in no wise amenable to the Commissioner. He might surround the court-room with soldiery, admit or exclude whom he pleased, subject one party in the suit to personal outrages and bestow special indulgences on the other, and there was no one to call him to account. The Commissioner was not supreme in his own court. Under this confessed state of things, the examination went forward.

The case of the claimant had already been presented, while as yet Anthony had no one to defend him; but now, upon the demand of his counsel, the Commissioner ordered that the examination should commence anew. The complaint was read by Edward G. Parker, the junior counsel for the claimant. William Brent was then placed upon the stand. It appeared that he was a slaveholding grocer of Richmond, Virginia. He testified that