]> <emph>The Story of the Life of John Anderson, the Fugitive Slave:</emph> Electronic Edition. Ed. by Harper Twelvetrees, M.A. Funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities supported the electronic publication of this title. Text scanned (OCR) by Bethany Ronnberg and Kevin O'Kelley Images scanned by Bethany Ronnberg and Kevin O'Kelley Text encoded by Lee Ann Morawski and Natalia Smith First edition, 2000 ca. 350K Academic Affairs Library, UNC-CH University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000.

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 The Story of the Life of John Anderson, the Fugitive Slave. Harper Twelvetrees, M.A. 184 p., ill. London William Tweedie, 337, Strand, W. C. 1863 Call number 326.92 A547T (Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University Libraries)

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 Library of Congress Subject Headings, 21st edition, 1998 English Latin Anderson, John, b. 1831? -- Trials, litigation, etc. African Americans -- Missouri -- Biography. Fugitive slaves -- Missouri -- Biography. Slaves -- Missouri -- Biography. Slavery -- Missouri -- History -- 19th century. Plantation life -- Missouri -- History -- 19th century. Fugitive slaves -- Legal status, laws, etc. -- Canada. Extradition -- United States. Extradition -- Canada. Antislavery movements -- Great Britain. 2000-07-20, Celine Noel and Wanda Gunther revised TEIHeader and created catalog record for the electronic edition. 2000-01-27, Natalia Smith, project manager, finished TEI-conformant encoding and final proofing. 2000-01-19, Lee Ann Morawski finished TEI/SGML encoding 1999-12-29, Bethany Ronnberg and Kevin O'Kelley finished scanning (OCR) and proofing.

Yours trulyJohn Anderson[Frontispiece Image]

[Title Page Image]

 THE STORY OF THE LIFE OF JOHN ANDERSON, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE. EDITED BY HARPER TWELVETREES, M.A., CHAIRMAN OF THE JOHN ANDERSON COMMITTEE. LONDON: WILLIAM TWEEDIE, 337, STRAND, W.C. 1863. LONDON: BURNS AND CO., STEAM PRINTERS EDGWARE ROAD, W. DEDICATION.

TO GEORGE THOMPSON, ESQ., LATE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR THE BOROUGH OF THE TOWER HAMLETS, THE STORY OF THE LIFE OF JOHN ANDERSON IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, IN RECOGNITION OF THE EMINENT SERVICES RENDERED BY HIM TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD: AS A SMALL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS KINDNESS TO JOHN ANDERSON, AND TO MANY OTHERS OF THE COLOURED RACE: AND AS A SLIGHT EXPRESSION OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND ESTEEM WITH WHICH HE IS REGARDED BY THE EDITOR.

 PREFACE.

THE STORY OF THE LIFE OF JOHN ANDERSON has been prepared for publication by the Editor at the earnest request of the Committee and of John Anderson himself, and whatever profits may accrue from its sale will be devoted to the benefit of Anderson, whose history must, in many respects, be regarded as an extraordinary one. The circumstances connected with the demand for his rendition are of such general interest, that the Editor makes no apology for presenting them in a permanent form in the following pages. He also desires to express, on his own behalf, and in the name of the John Anderson Committee, the warmest thanks to the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, for the noble manner in which they vindicated the cause of freedom, when called upon to resist a foul wrong attempted to be perpetrated on a subject of the British Crown. A variety of circumstances combine to make the history of John Anderson one of deep interest. The novelty and peculiarity of the case itself, the excitement which it created in Canada, England, and the United States; the gravity of the proceedings to which it gave rise; the opinions of the many eminent men in Parliament, in the Cabinet, in Courts of Law, and of the Press, which it drew forth; the importance of the question to be decided, as affecting the freedom and safety of thousands of fugitive slaves in the British American possessions; the lofty, disinterested, and honourable position, which, from the first, was assumed by England; and the prompt, decided, and magnanimous conduct of the British Government; these, and other features of the case are brought out in the succeeding sketch of the brief, but singular and eventful, career of an American slave—now, happily, a slave no longer.

In addition to the above circumstances, the history of John Anderson will be found to illustrate the actual condition of a slave in all countries where chattel servitude is permitted. He is the type and representative of eight millions of the human race— Africans and their descendants—who, at this hour, are held in debasing and cruel bondage by nominally Christian nations. In the light of the facts of Anderson's slave life, we see the true nature and effects of Slavery, as it exists in the Confederate States of America, throughout the empire of Brazil, and in the islands of the Gulf of Mexico.

The father of Anderson was a slave, who—not, that he loved kindred less, but that he loved freedom more—forsook his wife and little one, and became an exile, a fugitive, and an outlaw upon the face of the earth. The mother of Anderson was a slave, who, but a few months after she became a parent, was left, virtually, a widow; her natural protector—he who should have been her counsellor and stay, and the example and guide of her child—lost to her for ever; and she, while yet that child was in its infancy, severed from it, sold like a bale of merchandize, or a four-footed beast of the field, and sent far from the scenes of her youth and the centre of her associations, to labour and to die upon the cane-fields of Louisiana. Behold the havoc which the execrable system of slavery makes of the sacred and divine relationships of the family!

The genealogy of an American slave is traced only through the maternal line. The progenitors on the male side are rarely known in fact, and are never recognized in law. A slave, in law, has no father. The legislation of the Slave States makes no reference to paternal ancestry, and acknowledges the mother—not in respect to any natural rights, duties, or affections, but simply for the determination of the question of title, and for the purpose of fixing the legal status of the child. The natural relation between parent and child is not considered; and hence, neither in a legal nor in a religious sense, has a slave-born child either a father or a mother; as is the condition of the mother, so is the condition of the child. This is the recognized and law-established principle, laid down for the administration of the brutal system of American slavery. As early as 1715, it was enacted by the state of Maryland, and it has since become the general law of the United States, that children born of slave mothers are slaves during their natural lives. It was thus that the atrocious maxim,—Partus sequitor ventrum,—(the offspring follows the condition of the mother,) was introduced into the civil law; and from that day to the present, the condition of the mother has determined the fate of the child. Who is he, who does not at once perceive that this revolting and horrible maxim of civil law is one of the most cruel and degrading principles by which the institution of slavery, for which the rebel states are fighting, is distinguished? By this law, any child whose maternal ancestor, even in the remotest degree, can be shewn to have been a slave, is declared the property of him who was the owner of its mother at the time of its birth; and it is, therefore, doomed to perpetual bondage, although its paternal ancestor, at every successive generation, may have been a free white man. Where is the man of intelligence who does not instantly see that this provision of human law perverts the divine ordinance of marriage from a holy institution, into a slave-breeding commerce between the sexes; into a perpetual manufacture of property in human flesh, for the profit of the slave master; that it breaks up and destroys the parental relation, and converts the children of slavemothers into household cattle, for the pecuniary benefit of the owner; that it abrogates the commandment of the decalogue—“Honour thy father and thy mother” —and that it makes the relation, between father and mother, that of mere agents for increasing the gains of him who claims a right of property in the human chattel, whose offspring, by law, are his? Well may that eloquent defender of the rights of the injured slave, Dr. Cheever, observe—

“The essence of American slavery, the central fundamental element of cruelty and crime by which it is sustained and made perpetual, is just this, namely, the incessant stealing of children from their parents, by the factorship of the marriage relation,—perverted, corrupted, diabolized, into an engine of anguish and debasement to the parents, and of gain to the masters; that hath on it, more than any thing else in the world, the stamp of hell.”

The particulars furnished in the following pages, of the events in the slave-life of John Anderson, and of the condition and treatment of his companions in bondage, though far from exhibiting slavery in its worst horrors, do more or less, illustrate its peculiar evils. They show that slavery is human chattelism; that it reduces beings created in the image of God, to the level of the beasts that perish, or the clods of the earth. Anderson was a piece of property. It will be seen that slavery annihilates the heaven-ordained right of marriage, and encourages concubinage and adultery; that slavery ruthlessly sunders every conjugal, parental and filial bond; that slavery deprives the child of the protection, support, example, and instruction due to it from the parent; that slavery totally neglects the moral, rational and spiritual faculties of the being claimed as property; that slavery denies the use of letters, and abandons its victim to intellectual darkness; that slavery transforms professing Christians into hypocrites, taskmasters and menstealers; and perverts the Word of God into a law in favour of robbery and oppression. Finally, that slavery is remorseless and unforgiving, and will abate no jot or tittle of its iniquitous demands.

H. T. Eversley House, Bromley, Middlesex, March 9th, 1863. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. MISSOURI. Birthplace of Anderson—Purchase of the Territory of Louisiana— Missouri, originally a part of the Territory—Its settlement by shareholders— Efforts made to bring it into the Union—The repeal of the Missouri “Compromise”—Its admission in 1820—Subsequent Missouri Compromise—Geography, climate, products and population . . . . . Page 1 CHAPTER II. ANDERSON'S SLAVE LIFE. His parentage—The fate of his father and mother—His life in the plantation—His marriage—Is sold and separated from his wife— Character of his new master—Morality of slaveholders—Why he resolved to run away . . . . . 8 CHAPTER III. ANDERSON'S ESCAPE FROM SLAVERY—DESPERATE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE AND LIBERTY. Leaves the plantation—Bids farewell to wife and child—Encounters Diggs, a slaveholder—“Give me liberty, or give me death”— Wounds his adversary and flies—Perilous journey through the woods—Reaches the State of Illinois—Hospitality of an English settler—Proceeds to Chicago . . . . . 13 CHAPTER IV. ANDERSON BENEATH THE BRITISH FLAG. Arrives at Windsor, Upper Canada—His first employment as a fireman—Discovers a plot to get him back to slavery—Changes his name and residence—For five years remains unmolested . . . . . Page 21 CHAPTER V. ANDERSON'S ARREST, AND DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE THEREON. Anderson's confidence is betrayed—He is arrested and afterwards released—He is arrested a second time, and after some weeks' confinement discharged—He is a third time arrested, and is committed to the county gaol—His rendition is demanded, diplomatic correspondence thereon . . . . . 24 CHAPTER VI. FIRST WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. The Court of Queen's Bench, Canada, issues a writ—The decision on the case is postponed—Anderson petitions the Governor-General—The Extradition clause of the Ashburton Treaty—The Act of the Canadian Parliament providing for its execution—The arguments of Counsel, pro and con . . . . . 28 CHAPTER VII. THE OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES. The 15th of December, 1860—Intense excitement within and around the Court House in Toronto—Description of the crowd—Appearance and demeanour of Anderson—Adverse decision of the Bench—Remarks of Mr. Justice McLean in favour of Anderson's discharge—Anderson is remanded to prison . . . . . 37 CHAPTER VIII. GREAT MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF TORONTO, TO PROTEST AGAINST THE EXTRADITION OF ANDERSON. Character of the Meeting—Resolutions adopted—Masterly speech of John Scoble, Esq.—Memorial to the Governor-General . . . . . 43 CHAPTER IX. PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND—SECOND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. First knowledge of Anderson being a slave—Prompt and praiseworthy conduct of the Duke of Newcastle—Action of the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society—Memorial to the Colonial Mission— Application to the Court of Queen's Bench, Westminster—The Lord Chief Justice issues a Writ of Habeas Corpus—American Minister's despatch describing the state of the anti-slavery feeling in England—Agitation throughout the country—Language of the public journals—Times, Weekly Dispatch, &c. —Exertions made by the Anti-Slavery Society and its Secretary—The writ is sent to Canada . . . Page 35 CHAPTER X. PROCEEDINGS IN CANADA - THIRD WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. Writ granted by the Court of Common Pleas, Canada—The Case argued, February the 1st—Judgment delivered, February the 16th—Opinion of Mr. Justice Draper—Comments on the termination of the Struggle.—Course taken by the Canadian Press . . . . . 65 CHAPTER XI. Anderson in England—Great Reception Meeting in Exeter Hall . . . . . 85 CHAPTER XII. John Anderson's Speeches at Folkestone, Dover, Hastings, St. Leonard's, &c. . . . . . 125 CHAPTER XIII. John Anderson at Corby . . . . . 135 CHAPTER XIV. Farewell Soirée to John Anderson . . . . . 147 CHAPTER I. MISSOURI.

The Birthplace of Anderson.—Purchase of the Louisiana Territory.— Missouri originally a part of that Territory.—Its Settlement by Slaveholders.— Efforts made to bring it into the Union.—“The Missouri Compromise.” —Its Admission in 1820.—Subsequent Repeal of the Missouri Compromise.—Geography, Climate, Products, and Population.

BEFORE entering upon the narration of the personal history of John Anderson, it may not be out of place to introduce a notice of the State in which he was born, and in which he spent the days of his enslavement. He was “raised” in the territory of Missouri. The admission of Missouri into the Union was a trying crisis in the life of the Western Republic, and occurred when the nation was yet comparatively young.

In the year 1787, and previous to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, an ordinance was passed by the Continental Congress for the government of “all the territories of the United States, lying to the North-West of the river Ohio. One of the provisions of this ordinance was as follows:—

“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crime, whereof the parties shall be duly convicted.”

When Ohio (in 1802-3) was constituted a State, the residue of the vast regions, included in the provisions of the ordinance of 1787, remained under the exclusive control of the Federal Government, as a part of the natural domain—the property of the nation, and sacred, therefore, according to the compact, to freedom, and free labour. It went by the name of the “Indiana Territory.” From 1802 to 1807, inclusive, efforts were yearly made to induce Congress to allow slavery for a limited period in this territory, but without effect. It will be seen in what way this Ordinance has been since treated.

In 1803, the vast and indefinite territory, known by the name of Louisiana, was ceded by France to the States, for the sum of fifteen millions of dollars. The territory had just before been ceded by Spain to France, but without any pecuniary consideration. Slaveholding had been allowed under both these governments. The treaty, ceding the territory to the United States, guaranteed to the inhabitants their rights as slaveholders. The State of Louisiana, according to its present limits, was fully admitted into the Union, with a State constitution recognizing slavery, in 1812. The rest of the territory passed under the name of the Missouri territory. Those who chose to dwell in this territory continued to hold slaves within its scattered and thinly populated, but increasing settlements.

On the assembling of Congress in 1817, a delegate from Missouri was admitted to take his seat from that territory, and to present petitions from sundry of its inhabitants, praying for admission into the Union. The matter was referred to committee, who made a report to the House, but nothing was done during that session. In 1818, the subject was again introduced, when a resolution passed the House to the effect that Missouri should be admitted, provided—“That the further introduction of slavery, or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party should be duly convicted; and that all children of slaves, born within the said State after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be free, but may be held to service until the age of twenty-five years.” The vote upon this resolution was 87 ayes to 76 noes. The bill, upon the basis of this resolution, was read a third time—ayes, 98; noes, 56. This bill was sent up to the Senate, and was returned to the House with the provisions contained in the above resolution struck out. The Senate adhered to its amendment, and remanded the bill to the House. The House adhered to its resolution, so the bill was lost in the struggle. A motion was then made to organize the Southern portion of the territory into a State under the name of Arkansas, whereupon it was attempted to apply the same provisions to that State also; but, ultimately, the bill for organization passed without any allusion to slavery. Arkansas thus became a slave State, and was fully admitted as such in 1836.

The second great struggle regarding Missouri, was in the following year, 1819, on the assembling of a new Congress. This protracted and celebrated conflict, between the friends of the extension of slavery, and the friends of restriction, ended in a compromise between the extreme men of the two parties. The champions of extension were conciliated by the agreement to receive Missouri as a slave State; and the leaders of the non-extensionists were won over by the consent of their opponents to a provision that slavery should, for ever afterwards, be excluded from all the territories lying north and west of Missouri. It was, in effect, an offer from the milder opponents of slavery restriction to the moderate and flexible advocates of that restriction. “Let us,” said the former, “have slavery in Missouri, and we will unite with you in excluding it from all the uninhabited territories north and west of that state.” It was, in substance, an agreement between the North and the South to that effect, though the more determined champions, whether of slavery extension or slavery restriction, did not unite in it. Such was the virtual termination of the struggle to prohibit slavery in Missouri: the opposition was overcome by the plan of offering instead thereof, an exclusion of slavery from the then Federal territory west and north of that State. This was the great Missouri compromise; the accomplishment of which is due, mainly, to the efforts of the great American statesmen, Henry Clay.

Notwithstanding the solemnity of the compact then entered into, and the universal belief of the people of the free states that it would be perpetual, it was repealed by a clause in the fourteenth section of a Bill for the organization of the territory of Nebraska, the words of which are as follows:—

“That the constitution and laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth section of the Act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6th, 1820; which being inconsistent with the principles of nonintervention by Congress with slavery in the states and territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this Act not to legislate slavery into any territory or state, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the constitution of the United States.”

This repealing section of the Bill at once removed every impediment to the introduction of slavery into the vast and as yet unpeopled territories of the North-West, and led to the attempt made to establish slavery in Kansas, and all the outrages, horrors, and blood which were the consequence.

Missouri is bounded on the north by Iowa, on the west by the Indian territory, on the east by the Mississippi, which separates it from Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and south by the State of Arkansas. Its length is 280 miles, and its medium breadth about 230; the area being about 65,000 square miles. Besides the great rivers, the Missouri and Mississippi, the country is watered by others of inferior magnitude, among the largest of which are the Osage, the Sult, the Chariton, the Gasconade, the Maranec or Merrimac, the Big Black, and the St. Francis.

The best and most thickly inhabited portions of the State are those lying between the Mississippi and the Missouri. Beyond the western limit of the State there is an almost boundless region of prairie land. A great part of the country is admirably adapted for the growth of wheat, rye, and oats. Indian corn is cultivated to the highest perfection, yielding from seventy to seventy-five bushels to the acre. With an adequate population, under the stimulus of free labour, Missouri might be made to produce wheat for all the inhabitants of the United States, eastward of the Rocky Mountains, and establish a claim to be regarded as one of the most prolific granaries in the world.

Missouri, above any other State in the Union abounds in fruits. The pumpkin, squash, and melon, are produced in profusion. The apple attains its utmost development and beauty. The vine is common throughout the country; one species of grapes ripens in June, a second in October, and a third during the winter. The peach is luxuriant and abundant beyond description; and the pear, the apricot, and the melon thrive well. The mulberry tree is common throughout the woods, affording the means of breeding the silk-worm to any extent, and thereby raising Missouri to the highest position among the middle States as a country for the production of raw silk. Above all other regions in North America, Missouri is the land of flowers. In the season, every prairie is an immense flower-garden. In the early stages of spring there is a generation of flowers whose prevalent tint is peach blow. To this succeeds one whose line is of a deeper red, then follows one of yellow, and to the latest period of autumn the widely extended prairies are redolent of flowers exhibiting a golden lustre. Bears, wolves, panthers, buffaloes, elks, and deer, are found in Missouri. There are also myriads of waterfowl—swans, pelicans, cranes, geese, and ducks; and besides prairie hens, two large and beautiful kinds of grouse, turtle doves, and wood pigeons. The Virginia nightingale and parroquet are also frequently visitors.

The population of Missouri was, in 1810, 19,833; in 1820, 66,586; in 1830, 140,074; in 1840, 383,702, of whom 58,240 were slaves. In 1850, the free population was 594,622, and in 1860, 1,085,596; shewing an increase, in ten years, of 590,974. In 1850, the slaves were 87,422, and in 1860, 115,619; being an increase of only 28,197. It will thus be seen that there has been but a small positive increase of slaves, while, compared with the free population, which has doubled, there has been an enormous relative decrease.

 CHAPTER II. ANDERSON'S SLAVE LIFE.

His Parentage.—The Fate of his Father and Mother.—His Life on the Plantation.—His Marriage.—Is Sold and separated from his Wife.— Character of his new Master.—Slaveholders' Morality. — Why he resolved to Run Away.

LIKE the great majority of those reared under the institution of American slavery, Anderson is ignorant of the precise date of his birth, but believes that he is at the present time thirty-one or thirty-two years of age. His mother was the property of a person named Moses Burton, of the town of Fayette, Howard County, Missouri. Burton cultivated a farm, raised tobacco, and at the same time followed the business of a carpenter, and was the owner of several slaves. Anderson, at his birth, according to the law referred to in a preceding chapter, became the chattel personal of the man who claimed his mother, and was reckoned among his live stock. As he increased in years he increased in value, until at the age of manhood he was worth a thousand dollars, and was sold for that sum. During the time he was with his first master he was known as Jack Burton.

Anderson cannot remember his father, but has heard him described as a person of light mulatto complexion, who pursued the occupation of a servant on board the steam boats employed on the Mississippi. While Anderson was yet an infant, his father made his escape from slavery, and, it was believed, went to South America. When seven years of age, his mother, having given offence to her master, was sold to a negro trader for transportation to the slave market of New Orleans, and he was thus left an orphan. It was his good fortune, however, to possess a mistress of a kind disposition, who supplied, in a great degree, the place of the parents of whom he had been deprived. He invariably speaks of Mrs. Burton in terms of gratitude and affection, calls her his “mother,” and says he was “raised” by her. This lady lived until Anderson was about nineteen.

Anderson grew up upon his master's farm, and was early put to agricultural pursuits. The produce of the land was tobacco, wheat, Indian corn, and various kinds of fruits. Anderson's youth does not appear to have passed unhappily. The whip was occasionally in requisition, and he, doubtless, sometimes felt its smart in common with the other boys on the farm. But his time, upon the whole, appears to have passed pleasantly. He was fond of athletic sports, such as running, jumping, and wrestling; enjoyed his evenings after the labours of the day; and joined with eagerness in the frolics and festivities permitted to the Negroes during the Christmas holiday, which is the carnival and saturnalia of the plantation Negroes of the South.

Thus the time passed away, and Anderson became a man. He was expert in all the duties of the farm, could manage the tobacco crop for his master, and was allowed to cultivate a little patch on his own account, and also to sell the produce for his own benefit. This peculium is not uncommon in Missouri; and slaves, not unfrequently, by availing themselves of the privilege, are enabled to purchase their freedom with the money they obtain for that which they cultivate in their over-hours.

Anderson states that he made a profession of religion among the Freewill Baptists, and attended the ordinances of religion among the members of that denomination. Like other young men he, in due time, also entered into the matrimonial relation. The person whom he chose to be his future help-meet was Maria Tomlin, the daughter of Lewis Tomlin. Lewis had been a slave, but had obtained his freedom by purchase—had also purchased his wife, and was, when Anderson left Missouri, making his living as a barber in the town of Fayette. This marriage was contracted by the parties agreeing to live together as man and wife, and promising to be faithful to each other. A colored minister was present when Anderson pledged his troth to Maria. They were married at Christmas, 1850, and towards the close of 1851 the union was crowned by the birth of child. Maria was a slave upon the farm of Mr. Samuel Brown, distant about two miles from the farm of Burton. Maria had been previously married to a slave of the name of Green Shepherd, by whom she had had two children, the eldest, Emily, now about thirteen; the second, a boy, now about eleven. She had been a widow twelve months when Anderson married her. She stipulated that Anderson should act the part of a father to her children, and that, should he succeed in obtaining his own freedom, and afterwards possess the means, he should exert himself as much for the freedom of his step-children as for the freedom of his own, which he agreed to do.

As nearly as it can be ascertained, with the assistance of Anderson, it was about the middle of August, 1853, when Burton effected the sale of Anderson to a man of the name of McDonald, whose residence was thirty miles distant from that of Brown, the owner of Anderson's wife. This separation was, naturally, a great trial to the young husband, and it was rendered more bitter by McDonald's refusal to permit Anderson to visit his wife and infant child. When Anderson requested a pass to return and see his wife and infant, he was told that he must abandon and forget them, and take a new wife, or mistress, from amongst the slaves of his present owner. Such is the humanity and morality of the owners of slaves in America! The motive which influenced McDonald was obvious, and was perfectly understood by Anderson. His master wished him to become the father of children who should be born upon his farm, who should call his slave mother, and, hence, become his property, and increase the number of his live human stock.

To such an arrangement Anderson determined he would never be a party, and further, that if his master insisted upon his compliance, he would adopt means for making his escape from Missouri, and for reaching the free soil of Canada, from whose shores he might hurl defiance at slaveholders and kidnappers, secure of the protection of British law, and the sympathy and support of British philanthropy. At this time Anderson was ignorant of the nature of international treaties and the meaning of extradition laws.

 CHAPTER III. ANDERSON'S ESCAPE FROM SLAVERY.—DESPERATE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE AND LIBERTY.

Leaves the Plantation.—Bids farewell to his Wife and Child.—Encounters Diggs, a Slaveholder.—“Give me Liberty, or give me Death.”—Wounds his Adversary and Flies.—Perilous Journey through the Woods.—Reaches the State of Illinois.—Hospitality of an English Settler.—Proceeds to Chicago.

As Anderson's master insisted that he should follow the practice usual among plantation slaves, he at once proceeded to carry out his resolution to bid Mr. McDonald and slavery, “good bye.” He chose a Sunday at the latter end of September (having been but six or seven weeks in his new position) for his departure. The day seemed favourable for his project, as his master had been summoned from home to attend a church meeting, called to investigate a charge brought against a religious slaveholder of whipping a slave to death! To aid him in his flight he borrowed one of his master's mules, and two hours before daybreak made fast his blankets on the back of the mule, took a rope, some twenty feet long, to be of use in making a raft, and helping himself to a bridle, started for a ferry on the Missouri river. This river was about thirty-five miles from the point of starting. Here he tried to induce the ferryman to give him a passage across, but being unable to produce a pass was compelled to retire. He betook himself to the wood and lay till night, when he returned to the river, and was about to seize a boat that was lying on the bank, when some one appearing, he was obliged a second time to retreat into the woods. About two hours before sun-rise he ventured again to the river side, and was fortunate enough to find a skiff upon the bank, but without oars. Furnishing himself with a piece of bark for a paddle, he launched the boat and succeeded in reaching the opposite bank, where he landed and drew up the skiff. This was the first time he had ever been in a boat. He immediately started for Fayette, the residence of his father-in-law. It was yet dark. Fayette was about six miles away, but he was fortunate enough to get a lift part of the way by a stage.

To Lewis Tomlin, Anderson made known his intention of making his way to Canada, and his determination to surrender his life rather than be captured in his attempt to gain his liberty. His father-in-law did not attempt to dissuade him from his purpose, and offered him a pistol for the defence of his person, which, however, he declined, saying he had a dirk knife which he thought would be sufficient for his purpose. He next visited his wife, with whom he had a brief and affecting interview; and after caressing his infant child, bade both farewell, and hastened forth upon an unknown path to the soil whose touch gives freedom to the slave. He returned to Fayette to the roof of his father-in-law, and bidding him also adieu, pursued his journey.

We now come to Anderson's encounter with the man whom he is charged, under the laws of Missouri, with “wilfully, maliciously, and feloniously stabbing and killing.”

About noon on Tuesday (the third day of his departure from McDonald's plantation), Anderson, while pursuing his journey to the North, passed a field belonging to one Seneca T. P. Diggs, who was at the time engaged in superintending the drying of tobacco. Diggs demanded of him who he was, where he was going, and whether he had the necessary pass. It should be known that, according to the law of the State of Missouri, any Negro, found more than twenty miles from the plantation of his master without a pass, may be arrested, and that the person taking him back is entitled to a reward of five dollars and mileage, at the rate of ten cents or fivepence per mile.

Anderson confessed to being without a pass, but represented that he had legitimate business in that direction, and that he was bound on that business to a certain place. Diggs told him to accompany him to the house, saying he would give him some dinner and then shew him the way. This offer Anderson declined, upon which Diggs expressed his belief that Anderson was a runaway, and that he should be restored to his owner. Upon this Anderson immediately started; Diggs calling to three of his Negroes, saying, “Catch that runaway, and I will give you the reward.” Diggs also pursued, having at the time an axe in his hand, which he threw at Anderson, but without hitting him. After about an hour's pursuit, Anderson fled into the woods, followed by the Negroes, whose number had been increased to half-a-dozen. When they had hunted Anderson for two or three hours they were joined by Diggs, who encouraged his slaves to seize the fugitive, and at last issued an order that they should take him dead or alive. Anderson had repeatedly shown his dirk knife, and declared that he would not be taken alive. He was now exhausted, and Diggs was able to come up with him, brandishing at the time a club; the Negroes, also, were near and armed, each with a similar weapon. Anderson's sole hope of escape now lay in the use of his knife. With this he struck a blow at Diggs and retired from the spot; but hearing him repeat his order that the slaves should take him dead or alive, and fearing that he had not inflicted sufficient injury to prevent pursuit, he returned and again struck Diggs, and effectually disarmed him. The Negroes followed for a short distance, but being advised by Anderson to go back and say they could not take him, they retired and left him to himself.

Anderson, the same night returned to his wife and informed her of what had transpired. She said that a rumour had reached her master's plantation of some old slaveholder having been struck by a Negro with a knife, and exhorted him at once to make his way out of the State with all possible speed. She was much frightened when informed that her husband was the man who had committed the act of which she had already heard. After receiving a shirt or two from his wife, he again started for the land of true liberty, and has seen neither wife, nor child, nor his birthplace since.

Anderson commenced his distant and perilous journey with only a dollar and-a-half in his pocket. His travelling was, for the most part, performed during the night, and what rest he got he took, where he thought himself most secure, in the day time. He was often greatly in want of food, and for days together had to subsist upon what fell in his way—corn, hazelnuts, pawpaws, or raw potatoes. He had several narrow escapes from being captured. On one occasion, while resting himself by the wayside, a man on horseback rode up, and, charging him with being a fugitive slave, would have made him a prisoner, but he fled into a neighbouring field, and succeeded in concealing himself amongst some tall Indian corn. In the evening he ventured again into the public road, and observing a fire in the wood not far distant, and imagining that some of his own people might be engaged husking corn, he drew near the spot, and discovered, just in time to avoid the trap that had been set for him, that the fire had been kindled by the man from whose clutches he had escaped during the day. His enemy had adopted this method of decoying him into his ambush.

Under the provocation of extreme hunger, Anderson was sometimes impelled to levy contributions upon the eatable property of those whose dwellings lay in his way. Creeping into the back kitchen of a farm house, he filled one of his pockets with salt, and from a farm yard at another place he helped himself to three chickens, and having pulled their necks, retired into the woods to regale himself upon their flesh. He speedily deprived two of them of their feathers and roasted them; but in the midst of his repast, though not until he had nearly picked the bones of both birds, he was alarmed by the sounds of approaching footsteps, when, suspecting that the owner of the chickens was in pursuit, he hastily decamped, carrying the uncooked chicken with him, which was his entire supply of food during the next two days. He crossed the Mississippi as he had done the Missouri, by using a boat which he found on the bank. It was now Saturday night, and he had been just a fortnight absent from the plantation of McDonald, and had gained the free State of Illinois. Knowing however, that successful attempts had been made to recover fugitives in that State, he did not feel secure, and therefore resolved to observe the same circumspection he had practised in Missouri.

On the following day providence directed his footsteps to the threshold of an English settler, who gave him a cordial reception, and offered him a night's lodging. Before putting him to bed, his host furnished him with a good supper. Anderson's mind was afterwards greatly disturbed, and his apprehensions excited, by seeing a gun in his lodging room, which he thought might be kept for the purpose of overcoming runaway subjects like himself. His weariness, however, soon got the better of his fears, and after a long and sound sleep he rose much refreshed. Before breakfast his kind entertainer supplied him with a razor, and he was enabled to indulge in the luxury of a shave. In addition to a substantial breakfast, the good-hearted Englishman filled his pockets with apples and bread, and he departed on his way well rested, well cleansed, well fed, and well supplied. After several adventures, some of them of a critical nature, during the day and the night that succeeded, Anderson again ventured to present himself at the door of a white man's dwelling. Here he got a breakfast, and purchased a loaf of bread of the housewife. The farmer undertook to direct him, and went forth with him under pretence of doing so. They had not proceeded far, however, when Anderson perceived that the man was leading him back towards the house, through a field in which two of his sons were working. Fearful that he was about to be betrayed, Anderson took to flight, and soon left the farmer and his sons far behind him.

At the end of two days he struck a branch of the Illinois river, which he crossed, and after proceeding some distance, came to a railway track, with the use of which he was acquainted. He kept by this track until he arrived within a short distance of Bloomington.

After various adventures he overtook some teams which were on the way to a place called Rock Island, and being permitted to mount one of them he reached the town that evening. The next day he hired himself to a barber, though quite ignorant of the art of shaving any one besides himself, but stayed with him only two days, and then started for Chicago, his fare being paid by a society of abolitionists. In Chicago, Anderson lived for three weeks with another barber, and then left for Windsor, Upper Canada, where he safely arrived.

 CHAPTER IV. ANDERSON BENEATH THE BRITISH FLAG.

Arrives at Windsor, Upper Canada.—His first employment as a Free man.— Discovers a plot to got him back to slavery.—Changes his name and residence.—For five years remains unmolested.

ANDERSON reached Windsor in the month of September, 1853, and obtained employment as a labourer on the Great Western Railway of Canada, on that part of the line lying between Windsor and Chatham, and was paid at the rate of about seven shillings per day; his work consisted in laying “ties” for the rails, and the job lasted six or seven weeks. During the month of October, he got a friend to write two letters to his wife in Missouri, one of which he sent to the care of Tomlin, his wife's father, and the other to a free coloured man, of the name of Allen, following the trade of a shoemaker, in the town of Fayette; the information in both letters was the same—to the effect that he had got safely to Detroit. When he had finished his job upon the railway, he returned to Windsor; with his earnings he purchased himself some clothes and entered the institution of Mr. William Bibb —a fugitive slave, who had established a school—resolving to devote one half of his time to his education, and the other half to manual labour, and thus be able to support himself and attend school at the same time. He found in a lady of the name of Evelyn a very kind friend; she was a widow, and obtained her living by teaching. This lady sent for Anderson to inform him that a letter had arrived in Windsor, stating that his wife and children had reached Detroit, and were waiting for him. Mrs. Evelyn read the letter to him, and told him it was her belief that it had been sent to decoy him across the river into the State of Michigan, and that if he crossed he would, in all probability, be seized and carried to Missouri. Mrs. Evelyn advised him to leave the institution, to remove to Chatham, and the better to avoid detection, to assume another name. He acted according to this counsel, and making up a small bundle of clothes, and leaving his trunk under the care of a Mrs. Jackson, immediately started for Chatham, which place was sixty or seventy miles from Windsor; he avoided the high road, and walked as far as Belle River, where he took the railway cars for Chatham. This change of residence took place in the second or third week of April, 1854. In Chatham he took another name. In Missouri he had always been called Jack, in Windsor he went by the name of John Anderson, but in Chatham he became James Hamilton. This was the name of a coloured man—like himself, a fugitive— who resided in the town, and who was old enough to pass for his father. In Chatham, Anderson went to wood chopping, by the “cord,” for which he was paid at the rate of three and sixpence per cord, and he could do on an average two cords a day. He had not been many weeks in Chatham before a rumour spread among the coloured people of the place, that certain parties were on the look-out for him, and that a reward had been offered for his apprehension. The report alarmed him, and he deemed it advisable to go to a lawyer, and tell him in what way he had made his escape from slavery, and at the same time, take his advice as to the course he should pursue. Having related to him all the facts of the case, the lawyer told him he had better leave the neighbourhood, and again change his name, for though his enemies might not be able to “get him,” they might give him a “heap of trouble.”

It is difficult in the absence of reliable information, to furnish any connected account of the proceedings of Anderson during the five following years of his residence in Canada. He has stated that he travelled from place to place, and pursued various employments, until having learned the trade of a mason and plasterer, he settled down in the town of Caledonia, where he became the owner of a house. With this brief notice of his first six years of freedom, we proceed to record those events in his history, which excited so much public attention, and made his name so widely known.

 CHAPTER V. ANDERSON'S ARREST, AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE THEREON.

Anderson's confidence is betrayed.—He is arrested, and afterwards released.—He is arrested a second time, and after some weeks confinement discharged.—He is a third time arrested, and is committed to the County Jail.—His rendition is demanded.—Diplomatic correspondence.

ABOUT the commencement of the year 1860, Anderson was imprudent enough to mention, in confidence, to a person of the name of Wynne, with whom he was at the time on terms of intimate friendship, the facts connected with his escape from slavery, including his encounter with Diggs. Wynne, in retaliation for some offence given him by Anderson, reported what he had heard to a Justice of the Peace of the name of Mathews; who, upon the information thus furnished, caused the fugitive to be arrested. It is believed that he (Mathews) further communicated the fact of Anderson's capture to the friends of the deceased Diggs. After several weeks' imprisonment—no witnesses appearing, Anderson was released. But on the 30th of April, and only three days after his discharge, he was again arrested on the information of a man of the name of Gunning—a detective police officer, and professional slave-catcher, who came over from Detroit, in the State of Michigan, and deposed on oath, that he “verily believed Anderson had wilfully, deliberately, and maliciously murdered Diggs, on the 28th of September, 1853.”

After some additional weeks imprisonment, Anderson was again set at liberty through the interposition of legal aid; but the man Gunning did not abandon his intention of procuring his extradition. Accordingly on his return to the United States, Gunning applied himself to the obtaining of evidence from Missouri in support of his original charge, and returning with witnesses, Anderson was once more arrested, and brought up for examination. The case was gone into on the 27th of September, when there appeared as witnesses, against him, William C. Baker, of Howard County, Missouri; also, two sons of the deceased Diggs; also a lawyer of the name of Holliday; also a constable of the name of Hazlehurst, and finally, a slave called Phil. The evidence of these witnesses having been taken, Anderson was committed to the common jail of Brantford, “to be there safely kept, until he should be delivered by due course of law.” The warrant was dated the 28th of September, and was signed by Mathews and two other Justices of the Peace.

There appears to have been an immediate application by Anderson's prosecutors to Washington, as on the 2nd of October, the Secretary of State, General Cass, addressed a letter to the British Minister, requesting her Majesty's government to issue the necessary warrant to “deliver up the person of John Anderson, otherwise called Jack, a man of colour, charged with the commission of murder in the State of Missouri.” There was an important omission in this official requisition. John Anderson was described simply as a coloured man and not as a slave; and therefore, a piece of property. This omission might have been attended with serious if not fatal consequences, as the proceedings, both at the British Embassy at Washington, and at the Foreign and Colonial offices in London, were based upon the presumption that Anderson was a free man, and that he was charged with the crime of murder in the capacity of a free man. At a later date, April 8th, 1861, Lord Lyons, in a despatch to Lord John Russell, says,—“When I despatched the requisition for the surrender, to Canada, I was not aware that John Anderson had been a slave, or that there were any peculiar circumstances in the case.”

Lord Lyons, on receiving the requisition of General Cass, transmitted it to the Foreign office in London, and on the 22nd of October, 1860, Lord John Russell requested the Secretary of State for the Colonies “to take the necessary steps for complying with the application should there be no objection thereto.” Accordingly, on the 27th of October, a despatch from the Colonial office, and a letter from the Foreign office, went out to Canada, instructing Sir Edmund Head “to take such measures as were authorized by the laws of Canada, for the extradition to the authorities of the State of Missouri, of the person of John Anderson, otherwise called Jack, charged with the commission of murder in that State.”

 CHAPTER VI. FIRST WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

The Court Of Queen's Bench, Canada, issues a Writ.—The decision on the case is postponed.—Anderson petitions the Governor-General.—The extradition clause of the Ashburton Treaty.—Act of the Canadian Parliament. —The provision for its execution.—The arguments of Counsel, pro and con.

We return to Canada.

Justice Mathews, having decided that the evidenced adduced before him was sufficient to warrant a demand for Anderson's extradition, certified the Governor-General to that effect; but his Excellency's legal adviser, unwilling to take the responsibility of giving an official opinion, brought the question before the Court of Queen's Bench Of Canada, by Habeas Corpus. The writ was issued on the 20th of November, and was made returnable on the 23rd. The Judges, after hearing arguments, took time to consider, and fixed the 15th of December for the delivery of their decision. In the interval, the following petition was presented to the Governor-General, by John Anderson:—

“To His Excellency the Governor-General of Canada, &c., &c.

“The petition of the undersigned, John Anderson, confined in the jail of the county of Brantford, humbly showeth:—

“That your petitioner was born in the state of Missouri, one of the United States of America.

“That to the best of his knowledge he is of the age of thirty years.

“That he was the slave of Burton and another, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one. That the plantation of Burton and the other, was within about thirty miles from the plantation of Samuel Brown. That in the last mentioned year your petitioner was married to one Maria Tomlin, who was the daughter of Tomlin, who had purchased his liberty from his master. That about six weeks before he formed the determination to come to Canada, for the purpose of obtaining his freedom, he was sold and transferred by said Burton, and his partner, to one MacDonnell, who lived about thirty miles distant from your petitioner's wife.

“That your petitioner had always felt that he had a right to his freedom.

“That he had never done anything to forfeit his liberty, and was not subject to any restraint through crime.

“That he might lawfully use any means within his power to obtain his liberty, and with that object ran away from MacDonnell. That he went to his wife, who was a slave of, and lived with Samuel Brown, and consulted with her as to his intentions, and she concurred with him in his views, with an ultimate hope as to herself, and a young child, then about eight months old, the issue of our marriage, obtaining their liberty.

“That while he was then there he was pursued, but escaped. That in his course to Canada he had to pass the plantation of Seneca F. T. Diggs, and that while passing it he was accosted in nearly the manner mentioned in the evidence transmitted to your Excellency. That he made the excuse of wishing to go to Givens's, so that he, Mr. Diggs, would allow him to pass.

“That this will be manifest, or otherwise, your petitioner could have had no reason, under the evidence, for attempting to escape.

“That when said Diggs refused to allow this excuse for not having a pass, your petitioner found it necessary to make his escape, and endeavoured to do so.

“That your petitioner was run down, having been chased for nearly an hour in a circle, and at the moment he was looking for success, Mr. Diggs appeared before him.

“That he could not turn, his pursuers being at his heels with clubs, and being borne on by the first impulse, he dashed against said Diggs with an open knife, with which he had threatened his pursuers, as will appear from the evidence of Phil, hereto annexed, which is nearly true; whether your petitioner struck with it more than once, he cannot recollect; but whatever sudden impulse bid, that he did to obtain his liberty. That your petitioner was imprisoned for about the space of three weeks, last spring, on this charge; but as no one appeared against him, he was discharged. That another warrant was issued against him for his arrest for the same crime, on the third day after his discharge, on an information quite insufficient, as he is advised.

“That your petitioner was not aware of such second warrant having been issued until he was arrested in the town of Simcoe, about two weeks since. That he had gone from Caledonia, where he resided at the time of his arrest, in the hope of obtaining employment at his trade as a mason. That your petitioner therefore prays that your Excellency will be graciously pleased to withhold an order delivering your petitioner to the authorities of the state of Missouri, inasmuch as by the British law he is entitled to be free there, and the evidence shows that he only used such force as was necessary to maintain that freedom there; and your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever pray.”

his (Signed) JOHN X ANDERSON. mark.(Witness) A. S. REACHIE, Deputy Jailor. Brantford, 1st October, 1860.

The article of the Ashburton treaty, under which the extradition of Anderson was claimed, is as follows:—

“It is agreed that her Britannic Majesty and the United States shall, upon mutual requisitions by them or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons, who, being charged with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or be found within the territories of the either, provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality, as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed; and the respective judges, or other magistrates of the two governments, shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges or other magistrates respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate, to certify the same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may issue for the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery, shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive.”

The act of the Canadian Legislature, prescribing the duties of the judicial and executive officers under the treaty, reads as follows:—

“Upon complaint made under oath or affirmation, charging any person found within the limits of this province, with having committed, within the jurisdiction of the United States of America, or of any of such States, any of the crimes enumerated or provided for by the said treaty, any of the judges of any of Her Majesty's superior courts, in this province, or any of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in the same, may issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such judge or justice of the peace, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient, by him, to sustain the charge according to the laws of this province, if the offence alleged had been committed herein, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the governor, that a warrant may issue, upon the requisition of the proper authorities of the said United States, or any of such states, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulation of the said treaty; and the said judge, or the said justice of the peace, shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person, so charged, to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender be made, or until such person be discharged according to law.” (12 Vic. c. 19, s. 1.)

On behalf of the Crown it was urged, that the offence of Anderson was one which, if committed in Canada, would subject him to trial for murder; that Diggs, in attempting to arrest Anderson, was engaged in enforcing the laws of Missouri, and therefore the latter was clearly guilty of murder, and ought to be given up in obedience to the requisition of the United States Government. On behalf of the prisoner it was contended, that the proceedings of the committing magistrate, were, in some respects, illegal; that the affidavit of Diggs's slave was improperly admitted, the witness being under constraint; but, mainly, that a slave attempting to escape from bondage, and killing the person who attempted to re-enslave him, did not, according to the common law, commit murder, but justifiable homicide, and that the rendition of Anderson, would be a virtual recognition, on British soil, of the slave laws of the United States.

 CHAPTER VII. THE OPINIONS OF THE JUDGES.

The 15th of December, 1860.—Intense Excitement within and around the Court House in Toronto.—Description of the Crowd.—Appearance and Demeanour of Anderson.—Adverse Decision of the Bench.—Remarks of Mr. Justice McLean in favour of Anderson's Discharge. —Anderson is Remanded to Prison.

THE court room, on the 15th of December, was densely crowded with persons eager to learn the decision upon which the fate of the prisoner hung. Would he be delivered over to the tender mercies of slaveholders' law—the essence of cruelty and injustice—or would he be declared a free man, and go forth to inhale the atmosphere, and walk in the light of liberty? That was the question. Would he be pronounced a fugitive from justice—a criminal, a felon, and a murderer; or would he be proclaimed a man who had vindicated, in his own person, the rights of the whole human race, and in obedience to the law of nature, and in accordance with the universally allowed natural prerogative of our species, had struck a justifiable blow in defence of his personal liberty? Amongst the audience that awaited the decision of the bench were many persons of the same colour as the prisoner. They, too, had been slaves—they, too, were fugitives from the house of bondage, and if Anderson were surrendered, their liberty would be placed in jeopardy, and they also might be dragged back to the toils of slavery from which they had escaped. The multitude on the outside of the court room presented an extraordinary spectacle: men of all ranks, degrees, and complexions, were animated by a common hope that, in the case to be adjudicated, right would triumph over might. The police mustered in large numbers, and piled their muskets in front of the hall; but no disposition to commit violence was manifested by the crowd. The people could not bring themselves to believe that the Judges would decide against the fugitive, and were confident that the law would set him free. In anxious expectation, the groups assembled within the court room awaited the delivery of judgment on some ordinary cases, and there was an eager stir when the prisoner, who had been freed from his fetters in the anteroom, entered the chamber, and was accommodated with a seat within the bar. He was described by a local paper as a stout-built man of middle height, and of a very deep yellow complexion, with a full development of forehead, and a countenance in which mildness and intelligence were strongly marked. He looked round upon the faces of the crowd, but apparently thinking that its sympathy could not avail him, he turned his gaze upon the Judges, and, with manifest intelligence, collected himself to listen to their decision—a deep sigh now and then escaping from his broad chest. It must have been an anxious moment when, as the clock struck the hour of noon, the Chief Justice produced his paper and began to read. The life or death of a human being hung on his words. The liberties of hundreds of self-emancipated slaves depended upon the opinion of three fallible men! The thought must involuntarily have suggested itself to many—“Was this poor fellow, after he had by desperate adventure achieved his liberty, and enjoyed its sweets for more than five years, to be sent back to certain slavery, if not death? Were the hundreds of fugitives in a province of the British crown, who had committed what the laws of the slave states denominate felonies in effecting their escape, to be henceforth at the mercy of the man-stealer?”

Chief Justice Robinson and Mr. Justice Burns concurred in refusing the application for Anderson's discharge. Mr. Justice McLean dissented, on the grounds which every sincere hater of slavery, and everyone who admits the equal manhood of the black man, must deem conclusive. On a review of the proceedings of the Justice (Mathews), and the evidence in the case, he remarked:—

“Looking, then, at all the testimony taken before the justice of the peace, and rejecting such portion as is unnecessary and inadmissible, there is not a witness who connects the prisoner with the stabbing of Diggs, unless it be Thomas Diggs, in his statement of the death-bed declarations of his father to him, and these only shew that the negro by whom Diggs was stabbed made certain declarations as to himself and his identity, which would be true if made by the prisoner; but rejecting the deposition of the slave Phil there is no testimony which establishes satisfactorily that the prisoner is the person who caused the death of Diggs. On the grounds, therefore, that the prisoner was arrested in the first instance on an insufficient complaint, and that he is now detained in custody on a warrant of commitment until discharged by due course of law for an offence committed in a foreign country; and on the further grounds, that the offence stated in the warrant of commitment is not one for which the prisoner is liable to be detained under the provincial act for carrying out the treaty with the United States for the surrender of certain fugitive criminals, and that the evidence, as given before the justice of the peace, is of too vague a character to establish the offence of murder against the prisoner according to the laws of this province, I am of opinion that the prisoner is now entitled to be discharged from custody.”

The learned judge concluded his opinion in the following terms:—

“Can it then be a matter of surprise that the prisoner should endeavour to escape from so degrading a position; or rather, would it not be a cause of surprise if the attempt were not made? Diggs—though he could have had no other interest in it but that which binds slaveholders for their common interest to prevent the escape of their slaves—interfered to prevent the prisoner getting beyond the bounds of his bondage, and, with his slaves, pursued and hunted him with a spirit and determination which might well drive him to desperation; and when at length the prisoner appeared within reach of capture, he, with a stick in his hand, crossed over a fence, and advanced to intercept and seize him. The prisoner was anxious to escape, and, in order to do so, made every effort to avoid his pursuers. Diggs, as their leader, on the contrary, was most anxious to overtake and come in contact with the prisoner, for the unholy purpose of rivetting his chains more securely. Could it be expected from any man indulging the desire to be free, which nature has implanted in his breast, that he should quietly submit to be returned to bondage and to stripes, if by any effort of his strength or any means within his reach, he could emancipate himself? Such an expectation, it appears to me, would be most unreasonable; and I must say that, in my judgment, the prisoner was justified in using any necessary degree of force to prevent what, to him, must inevitably have proved a most fearful evil. He was committing no crime in endeavouring to escape and to better his own condition; and the fact of his being a slave cannot, in my humble judgment, make that a crime which would not be so if he were a white man. If in this country any number of persons were to pursue a coloured man with an avowed determination to return him into slavery, it cannot, I think, be doubted that the man pursued would be justified in using, in the same circumstances as the prisoner, the same means of relieving himself from so dreadful a result. Can, then, or must the law of slavery in Missouri be recognized by us to such an extent as to make it murder in Missouri, while it is justifiable in this province to do precisely the same act? I confess that I feel it too repugnant to every sense of religion and every feeling of justice, to recognize a rule, designated as a law, passed by the strong for enslaving and tyrannizing over the weak—a law which would not be tolerated a moment, if those who are reduced to the condition of slaves, and deprived of all human rights, were possessed of white instead of black or dark complexions. The Declaration of Independence of the present United States proclaimed to the world, that all men are born equal and possessed of certain inalienable rights, amongst which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; but the first of these is the only one accorded to the unfortunate slaves; the others of these inalienable rights are denied, because the white population have found themselves strong enough to deprive the blacks of them. A love of liberty is inherent in the human breast, whatever may be the complexion of the skin. ‘Its taste is grateful, and ever will be so till nature herself shall change.’ And in administering the laws of a British province, I never can feel bound to recognize as law any enactment which can convert into chattels a very large number of the human race. I think that, on every ground, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged.”

All the judgments were listened to with profound silence; but when Mr. Justice McLean concluded the delivery of his opinion with the words—“I think that, on every ground, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged,” the suppressed feelings of the crowd found vent, and the and the court house was rent with acclamations. Those who watched the countenance of Anderson, as each of the judges in turn addressed the court, saw it darkened with sadness or brightened with hope, as the opinions given were friendly or adverse. Alas! the majority had decided that he must be surrendered. No wonder his eyes filled with tears, and the cloud of anxiety settled upon his brow, for would not the effect of that adverse judgment be to consign him to the hands of a jury of slaveholders? and had it not been publicly asserted that roasting to death, at a slow fire, was fate in reserve for him? One hope remained—the Court of Error and Appeal might yet reverse the decision that had been given, and establish the inviolability of the right of asylum—the proudest institution of the British empire.

The authorities, aware, perhaps, beforehand of the nature of the decision to be given, and fearing an attempt at a rescue, had prepared an exhibition of armed force; but this demonstration of power excited derision rather than indignation or terror.

The order made by the court on the termination of the judgments, was—“That the said John Anderson be recommitted to the custody of the keeper of the gaol of the county of Brant, under which he had been detained, until a warrant should issue, upon the requisition of the proper authorities of the United States of America, or of the state of Missouri, for his surrender; or until discharged according to law.”

At the conclusion of the case, the counsel for Anderson intimated his intention of referring the judgment just delivered to the Court of Error and Appeal, and the counsel for the crown said that no obstruction would be thrown in the way.

 CHAPTER VIII. GREAT MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF TORONTO TO PROTEST AGAINST THE EXTRADITION OF ANDERSON.

Character of the Meeting.—Resolutions Adopted.—Masterly Speech of John Scoble, Esq.—Memorial to the Governor-General.

THE excitement in Toronto, caused by the proceedings in the Court of Queen's Bench on the 20th and 23rd of November, was intensified by the decision delivered in the full court on the 15th of December; and, in the evening of the 19th of the same month, one of the largest and most enthusiastic meetings ever held in the City took place, over which the Mayor presided. St. Andrew's Hall was densely packed, and many hundreds were unable to find entrance. The speakers included the leading clergymen, lawyers, and merchants of the city. The state of the public feeling may be inferred from the fact, that the sentiments expressed by some of the speakers that the rendition of Anderson might result in the loss of the province to Great Britain, was warmly applauded. It will be admitted, therefore, that the proceedings of this meeting deserve to be permanently recorded.

It was moved by the Rev. Principal Willis, seconded by Alderman McMurrich, and RESOLVED,—“That this meeting, impressed with the danger to the cause of humanity and liberty which would result from the rendition to the United States of the fugitive Anderson, now imprisoned in this city, hold it an imperative duty to give expression to those feelings, on this subject, which were implanted in the human breast prior to all legislation, and which has been the honour of British law to recognize and vindicate.”

It was moved by Professor D. Wilson, seconded by the Rev. Dr. Burns, and RESOLVED,—“That, believing slavery—a system which dooms human beings to perpetual servitude, treats them as vendible chattels, and places the dearest personal rights and domestic ties, even the very prerogatives of conscience, at the mercy of arbitrary power—to be unscriptural, and a violation of the fundamental principles of the law of nature, this meeting holds it to be unjust to apply the designation of ‘murder’ to such violence as a fugitive may find necessary, to resist aggression, and defend his personal liberty.”

It was moved by John Scoble, Esq., formerly, and for many years, secretary to the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Socety; seconded by M. C. Cameron, Esq., and RESOLVED,—“That in the opinion of this meeting the British Government, in negociating the Ashburton Treaty, could not have intended that a fugitive slave escaping from bondage to Canada, and charged with the commission of crime in his struggle for freedom, should be returned for trial in the slave states.”

The speech of Mr. Scoble on this occasion, is so important—as a clear and conclusive exposition of the true meaning and intent of the extradition clause of the treaty referred to in the Resolution—that we deem it worthy a place in this narrative. Mr. Scoble said:—

“I understand it is expected from me that I shall give to this meeting a statement of facts with reference to the extradition treaty, as we find them in the public records. I well remember that, in the year 1843, when the first printed copy of the extradition, or Ashburton treaty with the United Sates was presented to the Provincial Parliament, we took the alarm at the probable consequences that might result from it with reference to fugitive slaves. I had the honour then of being the secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society of England, and of being associated in the Anti-Slavery cause with such men as Clarkson, and Brougham, and Lushington, and Denman, and other eminent individuals. And in our associated capacity we felt it to be our duty to submit the question of the effect the treaty might have, as it respected the fugitive slaves in Canada, to the consideration of the government. It fell to me to make the permanent record of all the transactions that then took place, and having refreshed my memory within the last few days, by a reference to those records, I am able to state most distinctly and unequivocally that in our communications with Lord Ashburton, with Lord Aberdeen, then the Foreign secretary, and with Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was then about returning to Canada as Governor-General of this Province, it was most clearly understood that fugitive slaves were to be excepted from the operation of the treaty. (Cheers.) I well remember the agitation of the public mind in England in reference to this question, for we felt that it was just possible for the slaveholders of the United States to charge crimes upon fugitive slaves in Canada, and to produce a certain amount of evidence in relation to such alleged crimes, which might by a strict interpretation of the treaty, lead the Government here to hand over to the tender mercies of slaveholders the fugitives they might claim. We first approached Lord Ashburton on this subject. We wished to understand from him what was his impression as to the 9th Article, more particularly on its bearing on fugitive slaves. I have here the record of what that distinguished nobleman said. After we had explained to him the precise object we had in view, he replied, ‘That the article in question was no more designed to touch the fugitive slave, than to affect the case of deserters, or parties charged with high treason.’ (Cheers.) Not satisfied, however, with having appealed to Lord Ashburton, as to his understanding of the treaty, or that particular clause of it which might be used against the fugitive slave, we presented a memorial to the Earl of Aberdeen, then Foreign Minister, in which we set forth the status of slaves in the United States, showing to his lordship that it was impossible for a slave to obtain justice at the hands of those who held him in their power, and that the laws of the Slave States, in reference to the slave, were of the most sanguinary and atrocious description. We shewed that there were not less than seventy offences for which the slave might be punished with death, and for which a freeman, if he committed them, could only be fined or imprisoned, or, at the most, placed in the Penitentiary. We then pointed out to his lordship the character of the tribunals before which offending slaves were tried, and shewed that it was utterly impossible for a slave to look for justice under any circumstances that could be imagined from such courts. We concluded our memorial in these words:—‘The committee enter not into the discussion of the policy or impolicy of the general principle involved in the extradition clause, they refer that to the wisdom of the Government and the Legislature; but they cannot willingly be parties to any arrangement which involves the possibility of the restoration of fugitive slaves to bondage, or which renders any part of the British dominions less an asylum of liberty than it is at present. They, therefore, earnestly beseech your lordship that, in the contemplated Act of Parliament for giving that clause effect, the Government will be pleased to provide that it shall not, under any circumstances or under any pretence whatsoever, apply to the case of fugitive slaves, but that they shall be wholly exempted from its operation.’ That was the prayer of the committee of the Anti-Slavery Society, and it was sustained by the whole of England. Now, what was the answer which Lord Aberdeen gave to us? ‘His lordship received the deputation with great courtesy, and intimated that he took the deepest interest in the security and welfare of the fugitive slaves who have sought refuge in Upper Canada. His lordship stated also that the greatest care should be taken to prevent, in their case, the abuse of the extradition article.’ And from my own recollection I am able to state another fact in connection with that interview; it is this—that his lordship stated that, in order to prevent the possibility of the misuse of the 9th clause of the treaty, strict instructions should be forwarded to the Governor of Canada that, in the case of fugitive slaves, the greatest care should be taken that the treaty should not work the ruin of them.” (Loud cheers.)

It was moved by the Rev. Mr. Topp, seconded by the Rev. Mr. King, of Buxton, and RESOLVED,—“That as it is the boast of Britain that its soil cannot be trodden by a slave, so it is the high distinction of this province that it has hitherto afforded an inviolable sanctuary for the oppressed; and, while desiring no immunity to be afforded by our law for real criminals, whether bond or free, we feel that the disposal of the pending cause, in the manner to which the decision of the court points, would be to destroy the security which many British subjects now happily enjoy within our territory.”

It was moved by P. Brown, Esq, seconded by J. G. Bowes, Esq., and RESOLVED,—“That this meeting, while reposing well-merited confidence in the equitable spirit of British law, and cherishing becoming respect for British tribunals, regard it as entirely consistent with such sentiments to seek, in due order, the most deliberate award of justice on a question respecting which our judges are divided in opinion, and resolve to leave nothing undone to have the present case submitted to the courts of last resort in the province, and, if need be, in the empire.”

It was moved by the Rev. F. H. Marling, seconded by Alexander Manning, Esq., and RESOLVED,—“That the following petition be forwarded to His Excellency the Administrator of the Government, praying him to withhold his warrant for the delivery of the fugitive slave, Anderson, to the United States authorities for the reasons set forth in the preceding resolutions:—

“To His Excellency, &c.,—The memorial and petition of the undersigned most respectfully sheweth,—

“That as inhabitants of this free British province, and warmly attached to the British Constitution, we feel deeply concerned in any event, or act of civil administration, by which the reputation of our country, as one whose soil cannot be polluted with slavery, might be tarnished, or the influence of British laws given directly or indirectly to the upholding of a cruel oppression.

“That, alarmed by the manner in which the rash, and, as your petitioners believe, improper act of a local authority in Canada, in arresting and detaining, under an alleged charge of murder in the State of Missouri, the person of Anderson, now in jail in Toronto, has been affirmed by a majority of the judges of the Queen's Bench, your petitioners gladly betake themselves to your Excellency as the acting head of the Executive Government, in the earnest hope that such a decision may not prevent your Excellency from disposing of this case in harmony with the spirit of our laws and the dictates of eternal justice.

“That your petitioners believe that a just as well as liberal interpretation of the Ashburton Treaty would exempt the accused party, Anderson, from the range of its application, and they are strengthened in this belief not only by the authority of a Judge of long experience on the Queen's Bench itself, but by the opinions of eminent practical lawyers in Canada, and by decisions in analogous cases both in Britain and the United States; also by documents, extant and accessible, illustrating the meaning of Lord Ashburton and other parties closely connected with the arrangements of said treaty.

“That were the prisoner in question remanded to a United States jury in the circumstances alleged, and in the present state of the slave law, the prisoner's opportunities of obtaining impartial judgment are so small, and so diminished beyond all that could have been foreseen by the parties to the Ashburton Treaty— especially since the decision in what is known as the Dred Scott case, which affirms that a coloured person has no rights that he can assert or which the citizens of the Republic are bound to respect—that his rendition on the evidence alleged would be to recognize a state of things never contemplated by those who framed the Treaty. And your memorialists submit that where so much as a doubt of the reading of the Treaty exists, the benefit should, as usual, but especially where such momentous interests are concerned, be given to the accused; and the case, so far as it happily comes for preliminary Judgment before our own Government, should be decided in a large and humane construction of the clauses of the Treaty, and the Acts of Parliament bearing upon it, rather than by mere technicalities.

“That the consequences of disposing of this cause otherwise, cannot, your memorialists hope, but appear to your Excellency and your Government most dangerous to the sacred interests of just liberty, in rendering the condition of many industrious residents in this province one of extreme peril; nothing being easier than, by means of such evidence as has been brought forward in this case, to drag them back to bondage, or subject them to the cruel pains of a law which gives no equal protection to the slave, whether as regards life, chastity, or religion, and thus to render our happily free territory a hunting ground for persons whose crime may only have been that they dared to be better than slaves, and defended at the risk of their own lives, or with possible danger to the lives of aggressors and spoilers, their inalienable rights and their dearest domestic relations.

“That reposing confidence in the generous and British-like spirit of your Excellency, and in the belief that your memorialists plead only for what is just and right according to the law of nations, the sacred demands of religion, and the true reading of international compacts, they pray your Excellency to release the prisoner aforesaid, and hold him not liable to be rendered up to foreign authorities, as claimed.

“And your memorialists will ever pray, &c.”

Such were the proceedings of one of the most numerously attended, enthusiastic, and important meetings ever held in the capital of Western Canada.

It has been already stated that, at the conclusion of the case in the Court of Queens Bench in Canada, the counsel of Anderson stated his intention to refer the judgment then delivered to the Court of Error and Appeal. Accordingly, on the 22nd of December, an application for leave to make such an appeal was heard by the court, but it was decided that no appeal would lie from its judgment upon a writ of Habeas Corpus to the court above. Mr. Freeman, the able and zealous counsel for Anderson, then said that it was in contemplation to sue for a writ of Habeas Corpus from the Court of Common Pleas, and also from the Court of Chancery, and that, if necessary, application would be made to the Legislature of Canada, and, in the last resort, to the Privy Council and Parliament of England.

 CHAPTER IX. PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND—SECOND WRIT OFHABEAS CORPUS.

First knowledge of Anderson being a Slave.—Prompt and praiseworthy conduct of the Duke of Newcastle.—Action of the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.—Memorial to the Colonial Minister.—Application to the Court of Queen's Bench, Westminster.—The Lord Chief Justice issues a Writ of Habeas Corpus.—American Minister's Despatch, describing the state of Anti-Slavery feeling in England.—Agitation throughout the Country.—Language of the Public Journals—Times, Weekly Dispatch, &c.—Exertions made by the Anti-Slavery Society and its Secretary.— The Writ is sent to Canada.

LEAVING Anderson in jail in Canada, the attention of the reader is directed to England for the purpose of noticing the proceedings taken by the Government, the Press, and the anti-slavery portion of the community, in the novel case first made known by the contents of the American mail, at the commencement of the mouth of January, 1861.

The application made to the Court of Queen's Bench in Canada, and the decision thereon, appear to have furnished the earliest information received by the Queen's Government in London, of the fact, that John Anderson, whose extradition had been sanctioned, was a slave. On this fact becoming known at the Colonial Office, the Duke of Newcastle addressed a despatch to the officer administering the Government of Canada, dated January 9th, 1861, stating that he had just received a report of the judgment delivered in the Court of Queen's Bench at Toronto, in the case of Anderson, a fugitive slave; and, also, information that the prisoner's counsel had given notice of appeal. His Grace directed that, “If the result of that appeal should be adverse to Anderson, it was to be borne in mind by the acting Governor of Canada that, under the treaty of extradition, Anderson could not be delivered over to the authorities of the United States by the mere action of the law, and that he could be surrendered only by a warrant under the hand and seal of the Governor.” The Duke further stated, that “the case of Anderson was one of the greatest possible importance, and that Her Majesty's Government were not satisfied that the decision of the Court at Toronto had been in conformity with the view of the treaty which had hitherto guided the authorities in this country. Such being the case, the Government of Canada were to abstain, in any case, from completing the extradition, until Her Majesty's Government should have had further opportunities of considering the question, and, if necessary, conferring with the Government of the United States on the subject.” In conclusion, the Duke expressed his desire to be kept fully and immediately informed in reference to any further steps which might be taken in a case at once so peculiar and so important.

About the same time, the committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery society presented a memorial to the Duke of Newcastle, urging him to interpose to prevent the extradition of Anderson, and submitting that the clause in the Treaty under which he had been claimed, was not applicable to the case, inasmuch as it provided for the surrender of a criminal to justice only upon such evidence of criminality as according to the laws of the place where the fugitive so charged shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had been there committed. The question to be decided was, whether, according to British law, a man would be chargeable with the crime of murder, who had resorted to extreme means to preserve the liberty of which another was seeking unjustly to deprive him—which was the case with regard to Anderson. In addition to this memorial, the committee considered it advisable to take a more decided step than that of simply asking Government to issue instructions to the superior authorities in Canada not to deliver up Anderson without a direct order from Her Majesty's advisers. Accordingly, on the 10th of January, the Duke of Newcastle was notified that a motion would be made on affidavit in the Court of Queen's Bench, Westminster Hall, for a writ of Habeas Corpus to issue for the production of the person of Anderson in that Court, and on the 15th the motion was made upon the grounds stated in the memorial, and others which were most ably presented; and the writ was granted.

The following is an accurate, though abridged account of the proceedings in this most important case.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH WESTMINSTER, January 15th. (Sitting in Banco before Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN, and Justices CROMPTON, HILL, and BLACKBURN.) EX PARTE ANDERSON.

Mr. EDWIN JAMES, Q.C. (with whom were Mr. Flood and Mr. G. Allan) moved for a writ of habeas corpus, to be directed to the Governor of the Province of Canada, to the Sheriff of Toronto, and the keeper of the gaol there, to bring up the body of one John Anderson, together with the cause of his detention.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN asked why the name of the Governor was introduced.

Mr. JAMES said the reason was because, in the St. Helena case, to which he should have to refer, the name of the Governor was introduced, as well as that of the keeper of the gaol. The affidavit on which the learned counsel moved was made by L. A. Chamerovzow, of No. 27, New Broad-street , in the city of London, Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society. He stated that John Anderson, of the city of Toronto, in Her Majesty's Province of Canada, a British subject, domiciled there, was, as he verily believed, illegally detained in the criminal gaol of the said city there, against his will, not having been legally accused, or charged with, or legally tried, or sentenced for the commission of any crime, or for any offence against or recognized by the laws in force in the said Province, or in any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, or not being otherwise liable to be imprisoned or detained under, or by virtue of any such laws. The affidavit further stated, that the deponent verily believed, that unless a peremptory writ of habeas corpus should immediately issue by this honourable court, the life of the said John Anderson would be exposed to the greatest and to immediate danger. The learned counsel proceeded to observe, that in moving for this writ of habeas corpus, the persons for whom he appeared would have to satisfy the court that they had jurisdiction to issue this writ to the Province of Canada; and if he established that proposition, their Lordships would have no doubt that, under the pressing circumstances of the case, the writ ought to be directed to issue. The proposition for which he should contend was, that the Crown had power to issue the writ of habeas corpus into any part of Her Majesty's possessions. Canada was a part of the possessions of the British crown, and, in the language which had been adopted in these cases, Her Majesty had a right to have an account of the imprisonment of all her subjects in all her dominions. He contended that the court had as much right to issue this prerogative writ into Canada, as a possession of the British crown, as into the Isle of Wight or Yorkshire. These writs had gone to Calais, when a possession of the British crown, and also to Ireland, and he should contend that Canada stood in precisely the same position, as a possession of the British crown. Canada, which was a part of the continent of America, was colonized in the reign of James I., and the first charter was granted in the 13th of James I. At that time (and the expression was material) the whole of that portion of America was called “the Plantations,” and the Board of Trade was called “the Board of Trade and Plantations.” Canada belonged to the British crown till the year 1633, when it was ceded to France; and it was held by the crown of France till the year 1759, when it was retaken, and ceded to the British crown. The statute 14th George III. cap. 83, treated Canada as a colony in the possession of England.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said that in the Lower Province of Canada the French law prevailed; but Toronto was an English colony in Upper Canada.

Mr. Justice HILL said the 8th section of the statute the 14th of George III. reserved civil matters for the old law; but, by the 11th section, the criminal law of England prevailed through the whole of Canada.

Mr. JAMES read an extract from the judgment delivered by Lord Denman in the case of the Canadian prisoners (9 A, and E., 782), where Lord Denman said—

“The difficult questions that may arise, touching the enforcement in England of foreign laws, are excluded from this case entirely; for Upper Canada is neither a foreign state nor a colony with any peculiar customs. Here are no mala prohibita by virtue of arbitrary enactments; the relation of master and slave is not recognized as legal; but Acts of Parliament have declared that the law of England, and none other, shall there prevail.”

By the 11th section of the statute the 14th of George III. cap. 34, the criminal law of England was in force through the whole of Canada, and, beyond all question, a British subject in Canada was within a portion of Her Majesty 's dominions. The learned counsel contended that it was matter of right and clear law, that as soon as a country became a portion of Her Majesty's dominions, more especially if, like Canada, it became so by conquest or cession, that the writ of habeas corpus issued into it, upon the ground that Her Majesty had a right to know what had become of every one of her subjects. No instance could be found of the writ going into Canada, and therefore it was necessary to rely upon the argument byway of analogy, which empowered the court to issue the writ. That the writ lies and runs into every part of Her Majesty's dominions was laid down in Bacon's Abridgement—tit. Habeas Corpus (B)—in these terms :

“2. To what places it may be granted. It hath been already observed that the writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ, and that, therefore, by the common law it lies to any part of the King's dominions; for the King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are imprisoned, and therefore no answer will satisfy the writ, but to return the cause with paratum habea corpus, &c. Hence it was holden that the writ lay to Calais at the time it was subject to the King of England.”

Mr. James then referred to Cowle's case, in the 3rd vol. of Burrows' Reports, p. 834, where Lord Mansfield said:

“Writs not ministerially directed (sometimes called prerogative writs, because they are supposed to issue on the part of the King), such as writs of madamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, are restricted by no clause in the constitution given to Berwick: upon a proper case they may issue to every dominion of the Crown of England. There is no doubt of the power of this court where the place is under the subjection of the Crown of England; the only question is as to the propriety. To foreign dominions which belong to a Prince who succeeds to the throne of England this court has no power to send any writ of any kind. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the Electorate; but to Ireland, the Isle of Man, the Plantations, and (as since the loss of the duchy of Normandy they have been considered as annexed to the Crown in some respects) to Guernsey and Jersey we may, and formerly it lay to Calais, which was a conquest, and yielded to the Crown of England by the treaty of Bretigny.”

Mr. JAMES said, that by the industry of his junior (Mr. Flood), he had copies of the writs which had been issued to Calais in 1387 and 1389. They might be seen in Rymer's Fœdera, p. 15. In 1389 such a writ was issued by the House of Lords, sitting as a court of justice. The learned counsel relied strongly on the authority of Lord Mansfield, who said that the writ would issue to “every dominion of the Crown of England;” and that this court could send the writ to Ireland, to the Isle of Man, and to “the Plantations.” He also referred to Vattel's Law of Nations, b. 1, chap. 18, p. 210, as an authority for the position, that where a nation took possession of a distant country, and settled in it, it became a part of the parent State; and to Grotius de Jure Belli ac Pacis b. 2, c. 9. to the same effect. He also referred to Peere's Williams's Reports, b. 2, pp. 74, 65, where it was said:—

“Memorandum, the 9th of August, 1722.—It was said by the Master of the Rolls to have been determined by the Lords of the Privy Council, upon the appeal to the King in Council from the foreign Plantations, ‘That if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by British subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go they carry their laws with them, and therefore such new-found country is to be governed by the laws of England.’”

Mr. JAMES then referred to the case of “Reg v. Crawford” (13 Q. B., 613), which was an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum to the Isle of Man, and in which it was held that the writ would run into that island since the 5th of George III., by which the island was vested, in the Crown, and formed part of its dominions. The learned council also cited the case of “Campbell v. Hall,” in Cowper's Reports, p. 204.

Mr. Justice CROMPTON thought the question was whether the courts in Westminster Hall had now a concurrent jurisdiction with the local Courts in granting this writ.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said, that in the Berwick case, Berwick was not subject to the law of Scotland, and therefore there was no superior court which could send a habeas corpus to prevent an illegal imprisonment, unless this Court took upon itself jurisdiction. But was that the case in Canada?

Mr. JAMES said he did not dispute that Canada had both legislative and criminal jurisdiction; but his argument was, that the courts in England had a concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts in Canada. The present was not the case of a man who had been tried in Canada, or who was under the sentence of a court which had power to sentence him, for the affidavit shewed that he had never been tried; and he contended that the mere institution of a local jurisdiction would not oust the Queen of the right which she had to ascertain whether any of her subjects were illegally imprisoned. In the case of the Isle of Man, there were local courts which had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, and so also in the St. Helena case (“Ex parte Lees, Ellis, Blackburn, and Ellis, 28). In this latter case a writ of habeas corpus had been very recently granted, after a writ of error had issued.

Mr. Justice CROMPTON said he issued the writ as ancillary to the writ of error.

Mr. JAMES said, that if this court refused a writ of habeas corpus, the party had a right to go in succession to each of the superior courts; and if this court should refuse their writ, he would have a right to go to every court in Westminster-hall. He thought that was a strong argument to shew that this court had a concurrent jurisdiction with the Canadian courts.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said the question was whether it was within the ambit of this court's jurisdiction, or whether the power of granting the writ was not vested by the Crown in another jurisdiction.

Mr. JAMES contended that the mere establishment of such a jurisdiction in a local court could not limit the rights of the Crown without the authority of an Act of Parliament.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said that, by the conquest or session of Canada the law of England attached, and this court had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus into that country, unless the Crown had either expressly or by implication taken away that power. The question was, whether, by the establishment of a local judicature, and committing to it the duty of protecting the subject by issuing writs of habeas corpus, the Crown had not, by implication, taken away the jurisdiction of this court.

Mr. Justice CROMPTON said the Legislature might do that.

Mr. JAMES said it was open to a party in this country to apply for the writ of habeas corpus to any court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice HILL.—And also for a prohibition.

Mr. JAMES contended it was a common-law right of the subject to go to every tribunal for this writ, and à fortiori, the courts in this country would have a concurrent jurisdiction with Colonial courts, unless it was taken away by an Act of Parliament.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN asked whether the right to go to every one of the courts had not arisen from the Habeas Corpus Act?

Mr. JAMES contended it was by the common law, and all this court was asked to do was, not to interfere with any judgment, but to grant a habeas corpus to liberate a man who was in illegal custody. He was not in custody under the commitment of any local court which had the power to try him; there was no judgment to set aside; but it was shewn to the court that he was detained for no crime cognizable by the law of England. The learned counsel then referred to Carus Wilson's case (7 Q. B., 984), in which the writ had issued in the Isle of Jersey; and then proceeded to argue that the case might arise when the courts in Canada might be unable to discharge their duties, as a reason why this Court should still retain the power of granting these writs.

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN inquired, supposing the writ should go, what means had the Court of enforcing it?

Mr. JAMES said the Court could enforce the writ by attachment, but it could not be assumed that the Queen's writ would not be obeyed. The court would send its own officer to execute the writ. An application had been made to the local court for a writ of habeas corpus, and refused; and it was now shewn to this court that John Anderson, a British subject, was illegally detained in prison, having been guilty of no crime cognizable by the law of England. There were precedents for this application, and he confidently submitted the mere fact that there were other courts which had a concurrent jurisdiction would not deprive the applicant of that protection for which he now prayed the Court.

The learned counsel then handed in the affidavit upon which he moved, and which was in these terms:

“IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH.

“The affidavit of Louis Alexis Chamerovzow, of No. 27, New Broad-street, in the city of London, Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.

“I say, 1. That John Anderson, of the city of Toronto, in Her Majesty's Province of Canada, a British subject domiciled there, now is, as I verily believe, illegally detained in the criminal goal of the said city there, against his will, not having been legally accused, or charged with, or legally tried, or sentenced for the commission of any crime, or for any offence against, or recognized by the laws in force in the said province, or in any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, or not being otherwise liable to be imprisoned, or detained, under or by virtue of any such laws.

“I verily believe, that unless a prematory writ of habeas corpus shall immediately issue by this honourable Court, the life of the said John Anderson is exposed to the greatest, and to immediate danger.”

Their Lordships then retired to consider their decision.

During their Lordship's absence greatinterest was manifested by a large number of the bar, who were present, and their Lordship's return was waited for with the greatest anxiety. After a short absence, their Lordships returned and resumed their seats, and

Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN said: We have considered this matter, and the result of our anxious deliberation is, that we are of opinion that the writ ought to issue. We are, at the same time, sensible of the inconvenience that may result from the exercise of such a jurisdiction. We are quite sensible that it may be felt to be inconsistent with that higher degree of colonial independence, both legislative and judicial, which has happily been carried into effect in modern times. At the same time, in establishing local legislation and local judicial authority, the Legislature has not gone so far as expressly to abrogate any jurisdiction which the courts in Westminster Hall might possess with reference to the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus to any of Her Majesty's dominions; and we find that the existence of that jurisdiction in these courts has been asserted from the earliest times, and exercised down to the latest. We have it upon the authority of my Lord Coke, we have it upon the authority of my Lord Mansfield, we have it upon the authority of Mr. Justice Blackstone, and on the authority of Bacon's Abridgement—that these writs have been issued, and are to be issued, into all the dominions of the crown of England, wherever a subject of the crown is illegally imprisoned, and kept in custody; and not only have we these authorities in the shape of dicta of most eminent judges and afterwards of text writers, but we have the practical application of the doctrine in cases from the earliest period down to modern times. The more remarkable cases are the instances in which the writ of habeas corpus has issued into the Islands of Jersey and Man, and St. Helena: all this being in very modern times. Finding that upon these authorities it has been not only asserted as matters of doctrine, but carried into effect and execution as matter of practice; that even where there were local judicatures, and local legislatures, the writ of habeas corpus has been issued into these dominions of the crown, we feel that nothing short of legislative enactment, depriving the court of such a jurisdiction, would warrant us in omitting to carry it into effect, where we are called upon to do so for the protection of the personal liberty of the subject. It may be that the Legislature has thought proper, in its wisdom, to leave a concurrent jurisdiction between these courts and the colonial courts, as there has been, as very properly pointed out by Mr. James in his argument, between the different courts in Westminster Hall. We can only act on the authorities that have been brought before us, and we feel that we should not be doing that which it is our duty to do under the authority of the precedents to which our attention has been called, by refusing this writ; therefore the writ must go.

At the conclusion of the judgment there was a very general but suppressed expression of applause, and the countenances of all in court seemed lighted up with extreme pleasure at the result.—Writ of habeas corpus granted.

Mr. Dallas, the United States Minister in London, was no unconcerned spectator of the interest manifested in the fate of Anderson, as we find from a letter addressed by that gentleman to the Secretary of State at Washington, dated January the 16th, the day after the issuing of the writ by the Lord Chief Justice. Mr. Dallas, in his despatch, informs the Secretary of State that, “The claim made by the United States upon the Government of Canada for the extradition of one, Anderson, a fugitive slave, charged with the crime of murder, had awakened, as of course, so much interest in England, and invoked so much professional astuteness to defeat the operation of the 10th article of the treaty of 1842, that he had thought it expedient to place in possession of the department, all the papers published in England relating to the subject.” His Excellency then went on to say that “it was scarcely necessary for him to remark on the pungent and uncompromising hostility to social bondage, which prevailed throughout this country; that, as it had already led to giving by statute to the American slave who deserts his ship, a discriminating immunity over the freeman, so it could not be expected to shrink from another manifestation on the interpretation of an international convention for the mutual surrender of culprits. In truth it might be said, generally, that in British opinion, the status of slavery incapacitated the individual for contract or crime.” His Excellency further called the special attention of the Secretary of State to the fact “that Lord Chief Justice Cockburn had, with surprising celerity allowed a writ of Habeas Corpus, addressed to the jailer in Canada to issue, and that Anderson would thereupon be brought to England, notwithstanding the very full and deliberate decision of the Colonial Court ordering him to be delivered up.”

The excitement throughout Great Britain at this time was universal, and the sympathy in behalf of Anderson, profound and ardent. The question was discussed in all the newspapers, and, with scarcely an exception, the writers were in favour of refusing to the demand of the United States Government, the surrender of the fugitive who had sought an asylum on British territory, and whose offence was no crime in the eye of British law. The following article which appeared in the Times, justly represented the public opinion. After a careful analysis of the facts in the case, as stated in the Canadian Court, it said,—

“In their hearts and consciences the Canadian authorities must have felt that Anderson slew his enemy in defence of all that man holds dear; they must have felt that to surrender him to his pursuers to be burnt alive—a fate probably reserved for him—would be a most dreadful responsibility, and yet, as judges bound to administer the law uprightly, they may have hardly seen how to evade the conclusion. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that they have taken refuge in indecision, and remitted the case successively from one court to another. First the magistrates gave up the attempt, and referred the matter to the Attorney-General; then the Attorney-General, after two months' consideration, alleged his incompetence; and now the Court of Queen's Bench has cognizance of the question, by which tribunal it must be finally decided. Before this time, indeed, judgment has doubtless been given, though on which side it would be hard to conjecture.

“We suppose there will be hardly a man in England who will not hope for the success even of his forcible rescue if things come to that extremity. The fate, probably, in store, at this crisis of Southern fanaticism, for a slave who not only ran away but killed the white planter who attempted to arrest him, is too shocking to think of, and yet the Missouri agents may establish their case. The truth is, that such complications must for ever be contingent upon institutions like that of slavery. Wherever an institution is at variance in its very essence with the moral instincts of our nature, the antagonism thus created will pervade every question concerning it. All except slaveholders will judge this case by feelings which they will place above the law. They may not carry their convictions to the length of breaking the law, but in their hearts they will condemn it, and will sympathize with the offender. This is a conflict of laws, which can never be terminated by any political compromise or legal adjustment. It must prevail as long as slavery prevails, for slavery cannot prevail without enactments against which humanity rebels. Nature and law are therefore forced into collision, and under such conditions no peace can be reasonably expected.”

In a subsequent article the same journal remarked,—

“But are we, therefore, to surrender this man to the cruel fate which awaits him in the neighbouring State? The suggestion is preposterous. That we, who look with such scorn upon the little State of Saxony for delivering up a Hungarian nobleman who had trusted to her hospitality, should, in our strength and our grandeur, deliver up a wretched slave who had run for our soil as to the ark of freedom, may be argued as logical necessity in a court of law, but is an obvious impossibility as a fact. How it will be we do not pretend to foretell. How the logical necessity will be shown to be a practical impossibility, we are by no means prepared to explain; but very confident we are that this negro is at this moment as safe, in the prison of Toronto, from ever being sent before a Missouri jury of slave owners as he would be if he were in the wilds of Central Africa. Meanwhile, as we gather from the report, there is no immediate hurry, or any danger of any steps being taken to carry out the judgment. From the decision of the Queen's Bench, there is, it appears, by the Canadian Law, an appeal to the Bench of Judges, and thence again, there is an appeal, as we understand, to the Privy Council in England. Although we may fear that upon the broad question of law, the decision of English lawyers must concur with that of the Queen's Bench of Canada; and although the ingenuity of counsel and of anxious judges may fail to discover any technical objection which may vitiate the proceedings, yet time will be afforded for the intervention of diplomacy, within the province of which a difficulty of this character specially falls. It is not because we have heedlessly gone into an engagement which involves an unsuspected obligation to burn an innocent man, that we are therefore to burn him. It is not because we have blindly and unknowingly bound ourselves systematically to outrage all the common laws