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Transcript on deposit at The Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Library
Citation of this interview should be as follows:
“Interview A-0026, in
the Southern Oral History Program Collection #4007,
Southern Historical
Collection, The Wilson Library,
University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill”
Dale Bumpers was elected governor of Arkansas in 1970, before his election to the United States Senate in 1974. Bumpers begins the interview by offering an assessment of his administration as governor of Arkansas. Emphasizing such accomplishments as tax reform and reorganization of state government, Bumpers describes how his election and administration helped to demystify political myths in the South. In particular, Bumpers explains that his successful elections in 1970 and 1974 demonstrated that political power could be wrested from those who had a larger financial backing, and that it was not necessary to be highly visible in the state in order to garner enough support. On the contrary, Bumpers was a virtual unknown on the political landscape when he defeated Governor Winthrop Rockefeller in 1970. Rockefeller was the first Republican governor to serve in Arkansas since Reconstruction. According to Bumpers, Rockefeller's election demonstrated a shifting political landscape that ultimately foretold the crumbling political power structure that had dominated southern politics for decades. It was the weakening of this power base that, in part, allowed Bumpers to defeat Rockefeller in 1970 and incumbent senator William Fulbright (who had served in the United States Senate for thirty years) in 1974. In describing his successful campaign strategies, Bumpers explains how he sought to appeal to Arkansas pride and a tendency of citizens to feel defensive about their rural roots. Bumpers had just been elected when the interview was conducted, and he offers his predictions for southern politics in coming years. Namely, Bumpers expresses his hope that southern Democrats would rejoin the national Democratic Party. Bumpers concludes the interview by offering his thoughts on the changing political landscape of the South, arguing that the term "emerging South" was more appropriate than "New South" in describing the region's economic growth and social developments.
Arkansas Governor Dale Bumpers describes the accomplishments of his administration (1970-1975), the changing political conditions and the political strategy that had allowed for his election, and his hopes for the future as he prepared to enter the United States Senate.
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
Let me start by asking you this. Commentators and editorial writers within a few months will probably be writing about your administration, the past four years. What are they going to be saying about it?
I think they're going to be saying . . . you know it's very difficult for me to answer that without answering what I hope they'll be saying, the things that I—
Was going to ask you that next.
Yeah. The things that I consider to be relevant. And I can tell you what the more astute observers, who have really been on the scene while it was all taking place, are going to be writing. I think they're going to be, first of all, saying that I surrounded myself with some very capable, dedicated people. You know, the success of any administration depends on both the intelligence, the dedication, and the integrity of the people you surround yourself with. Every administration that winds up getting in trouble, you find that the man who's been doing the personnel selection has, shall I say, been a poor judge of character. Or, on the other hand, they have picked people that they thought would not overshadow them or people that they thought would never constitute a political threat to them. I've done my best, even with our limited salaries, to pick the people I thought who could do the job and would do the job. Now that is sort of subjective analysis of the administration.
To get down to the point, what you're asking me is what part of my
administration do I think future generations will
And secondly, that ties in with the reorganization that we made and did in fact accomplish. The reorganization of state government because two things happened. One, a reorganization in and by itself would have been a very significant accomplishment simply because from an administrative standpoint, when I came in, the governor had 165 department heads reporting to him. He couldn't possibly stay on top of a situation operating the government with that many people reporting to him. So what we did, we took 65 of the major departments, the big ones, and consolidated them into 13 departments. So I now have 13 people reporting to me. And of course this has given us an opportunity to implement personnel policies and other broad policies in cabinet meetings and implement those policies.
Secondly, it has given the governor the opportunity to keep his mandate
with the people because in the past the governor would go out and tell
the people in the state what he believed, what his philosophy was and
the specific things he wanted to accomplish, only to arrive at the
capital and find that these 165 people had their own ideas about what
the state was doing and how it was going to be operated and what we were
going to do. And in many of those instances you had virtually autonomous
boards and commissions for each one of those departments. And these
department heads and those boards and commissions which had this
autonomy, they were making policy decisions and it may or may not,
And then finally . . . you can say to these people . . . you have the fiscal responsibility. Of course now when I talk about policy I'm sort of separating fiscal policy from say other policy of all kinds. But so far as fiscal policy is concerned, the governor is the one who has to sit there and either veto or sign bills on the basis of how much money we're going to have to spend. And so I sit down and go through all these thirteen department budgets and I cut where I think the priorities ought to be. So that there's enough money, for example, for the medical center. And maybe some other program over here has two or three exotic programs in it that we can do without because it's not as important, for example, as health care. And you know when it comes to making the money fit in the pie, that's the governor's responsibility. And reorganization has, for the first time, given the governor the opportunity to see that overview so that he knows before the legislature comes in what those budgets are, what he will accept, and what he cannot accept.
So those are the things, the reorganization of state government coupled
with the tax reform programs. See, we put a fairly stiff progressive
income tax into effect. And the upper income levels now pay a
significantly bigger share of income tax in this state than they used
to. We took away some privileges the utilities had. Tax exemptions,
which they never had any right to except they just happened
What about your impact in the Democratic Party?
You're going into politics now.
I'm just trying to get an assessment, looking back.
I don't know how to evaluate that and I don't know what impact I have had on the Democratic Party. I do believe this. I believe there have been many . . . I think there are probably more myths that surround the profession of politics by far than any other profession. Since I've been in office I have heard and I've watched the commentators wax eloquently about all kinds of things and party politics and about politicians that are pure myths.
Such as?
Well, for example . . . let's take the election I just completed. I was
interested for example in
You think you shattered some of those myths?
I hope so. I like to think I have. I think that the more of those myths
that are shattered . . . it seems to me though . . . the funniest thing
is, they continue to crop up. In 1976 and 1978 you're going to hear all
these same things said again because it's just been done for so many
years. But for example, some people said well, the governor's too
liberal for the people of Arkansas. This doesn't mean anything, the
people of this state. You can say I'm too conservative or I'm too
liberal or I'm indecisive or you can make all those subjective judgments
which are made by people who, incidentally, indulge themselves in the
luxury of an attitude of moral and intellectual superiority. The truth
of the matter is, the people will base their judgments on specific acts
of specific conduct while you're in office. They aren't looking at you,
and they're not going to base their judgment of you, based on whether
they think you're too liberal or too conservative or moderate or
anything else. They're going to judge you based on your day-to-day
activities. And at election time they're not going to go back and say
I'm against him because of this or I'm for him because of this. It's the
overall picture. And this is the reason politicians should always, in
each individual case, do what he thinks is right. Even though it may be
intensely unpopular and particularly unpopular with some very vocal
minority group or some very vocal vested interest group. Because if he's
concerned about being elected next time
So the voters in Arkansas aren't that different from other voters in the South?
They're not. There are some things that . . . well, you've seen . . . busing for example. You've seen a lot of the people in the North who had no feelings one way or the other about busing, right. It was unique in the South simply because the Supreme Court had made a distinction between those states that had had segregation in the past and those that had not. And for a while the South bore the brunt of that and everything was lovely in the rest of the country. But the minute the courts began to extend their orders to Michigan, for example, you heard that same hue and cry that you heard in the South. The point I'm trying to make is people are very much the same all over the nation.
Is another one of the myths that, if you have the backing of the county courthouse and the so-called organization Democrats, that you automatically win in the primary?
There was a time, not very long ago, during the days of the poll tax, when that was not a myth. That was fact. If you had the backing of the courthouse crew back during the old poll tax days, you know, you were a serious candidate.
But in neither of the campaigns, the three you've been in—
No. No, as you've said, I've never had any significant backing. As a matter of fact, in 1970, I had little or no backing.
Didn't you prove in 1970 and 1974 that you could take the nomination away
and quote
Yes.
So you shattered that myth.
Absolutely.
Absolutely. But in all fairness I think it should be known that I did
have . . . the county judges who have been considered usually the most
powerful influence in the county courthouses in Arkansas. I'd have to. .
. . in all fairness I had probably ten to fifteen of the seventy-five
county judges in my corner. But I had . . . this was an interesting
thing. Probably the most controversial, certainly one of the most
controversial things that came up in 1973 in the legislature was a bill
which the municipal league and the organization of Arkansas counties had
fought for a year to get. And it would have allocated 7% of all money
that came into the state treasury to the counties and cities. I told
them, when I realized that that thing had begun to move, you know, more
dramatically than I thought it would, and I realized that it was
probably going to pass. I injected it in my inaugural address just
thirty minutes before I delivered that address. And I just said, you
know, we're not going to do this. We're not going to destroy the fiscal
integrity of this state with such a bill. Allocating money out on a
percentage basis. So we had quite a fight. And they passed it by a
landslide. And I vetoed it and they were never able to override that
veto even though it requires a simple majority to override a veto in
Arkansas. None of that two-thirds stuff. You veto a bill and it just
takes that same majority to override that it took to
Was the reason the poll tax, when it was in effect, made a difference
because of the
Yes.
It was the latter?
No, it was the purchase of poll taxes by some of the landed gentry in certain areas, you know, would go out and buy two or three thousand poll taxes receipts. Almost in blank. Fill the names in later. And they did constitute a big bloc of votes in this state.
We've asked a lot of people about your strengths and weaknesses. In fact, we don't find too many weaknesses. The only one, the one you said, that you're indecisive.
Yes.
Then we try and probe. What's the basis of his indecisiveness? Is it because he's thinking through a decision or what is it? Maybe you—
Two things. One is I have a long-standing policy of not commiting myself
until I have to commit, simply because I feel that anything that might
come up from the time I would otherwise make a decision and the time I
had to make a decision might have caused me to see it in a different
light. Might have caused me to change my mind. So as long as nobody's
hurt . . . you know, if it's a decision that needs to be
It's just the way you approach decision making.
Exactly. Plus the fact . . . there's a personality thing. You see, I have
never been a
Someone told us that you had the support of less than ten legislators in this last race. Is that true?
No, that's not true. But it would certainly be a minority. I didn't have the support of a majority of them.
Why was that?
I really don't have the answer to that. I don't know. You know I may have to back up and give that another thought. That certainly . . . that's patently untrue that I wouldn't have had the support of more than ten. I had the support of significantly more than that. But just how many, I couldn't say. But you know . . . I honestly don't know the answer to that. One of the things probably is that local legislators are more responsive to local courthouse politics than the governor is.
But wouldn't that tend to lead to another myth? If you had support, say
of less than half of the legislature—they're supposed to
That's never been considered . . . that wouldn't be classed as a myth in this state because that's never been considered all that essential, the support of the legislature. For example, when I ran the first time, I would say in the first primary I probably had less than five legislators in the state supporting me. When I got to the run off against Orval Faubus. But having the support of the legislators has never been considered a very potent force in this state. There are notable exceptions to that. I can name you a half a dozen legislators who can be extremely effective for you. And I might add that most of that half dozen were for me this last time. But they're not considered, as a bloc, a powerful group. Most of them usually have opposition which sort of nullifies what effect they would have anyway. But I really don't know quite how to treat that. The reason I'm sort of equivocating on that is because I think the figures probably were wrong. I think probably it was . . . I never sat down and tried to figure it out, but my guess would be that I had pretty good support among the legislators.
Perhaps less than ten vocal legislators.
Well, I can tell you that there are a lot of legislators who are extremely vocal when the session's going on and who are for Fulbright.
Could I ask you something about the Republican Party? Which was really no
party at all until '64 and '66 when Winthrop Rockefeller won. It seems
to us that what the party, what Rockefeller did in those four years was
provide a climate where somebody like you could get elected or nominated
in the Democratic Party. What it in effect did was reform, or maybe
revitalize is a better word, the Democratic
I've said that many times.
Have you?
Yes. I think that's the very analysis. It would have been—Governor Rockefeller's election was probably for the first time a repudiation of what people thought was machine politics in this state. And it was his election and his subsequent championing of a very significant reforms in the state that sort of laid the foundation that made it possible for a guy like me to be elected.
And to do some of the things you did as governor.
Right. No, no. I'll back down on the last statement. Retract that. That's not necessarily true.
I was thinking of the climate for tax reform, for reorganization, the constitutional convention.
No, no. The state was in terrible financial condition when I became
governor. The legislature knew it and the people knew it. And the fact
that Governor Rockefeller had tried to get a tax reform bill through and
was unable to was simply, I think, a resentment of him by the
legislature. Plus the fact that his tax proposals were totally
unrealistic. He proposed a $100 million increase back at a time when
that would have been like a 40% increase in the general revenues of the
state. And the state was just not prepared to accept a tax increase of
that magnitude. And the legislature resented his even putting them on
the spot to vote on such a thing. And when I was elected two things
happened. One is the legislature and the people both knew the state was
in serious financial straits. I mean we could survive, but it was in
serious financial straits so far as trying to do more things for
education and prison reform, medical care and all the things that we
needed to do. And the other thing was—there were two
things—one, the
I think the biggest impact was breaking up a very strong political power structure in the state that had dominated politics in this state for many years. That's why I say his election gave a chance to somebody like me. It was the fact that his election, as I say, pretty well destroyed another myth. And that is that—it wasn't a myth at that time, it was real. That there was a power structure in the state who had been accustomed to naming the candidates and getting them elected.
You talking about the utilities?
Well, I'm talking about not necessarily the utilities. But they were
people who like to dominate state politics in their respective areas.
Maybe a county. Maybe a region. Maybe it was somebody who did business
with the state. But it was a very significant group of them all over the
state. And so he diminished their influence when he got elected. And
then my election, I think, finalized that because there was nobody for
me except the people. You know, I didn't have any of that.
Wasn't that true of '74 as well?
Yes, essentially, in '74.
So you managed to make the point twice, in '70 and '74?
I like to think I have.
How about in so far as your '74 governor's race?
First of all, while most people backed David Pryor, that was not the reason he got elected.
What was the reason?
I think it was a case of alternatives to people.
Was it anti-Faubus?
There was a significant anti-Faubus and then of course David still had a pretty good organization intact from his Senate campaign in 1972. And they were pretty effective. And . . . I think it was that combination. I don't think it was the fact that fifty men gathered in a hotel room and decided he's our man that got him elected.
Do you think that got other candidates out of the race, as has been alleged?
Unfortunately, I'm afraid it did. As I say, that is unfortunate because,
you know . . . I was never confronted with anything like that in 1970
and I started out low man on the totem pole in a field of eight people.
And nothing like that daunted me at all. I didn't expect their support.
I knew I wouldn't get it. I knew that you concentrated on two or three
of the big names and so I didn't even see it
Were you disappointed that they were scared off by that?
Yes.
Why didn't you think in 1970—
Listen, I don't mean to denigrate anybody who ran for governor. I'm just simply saying I'm disappointed that that tactic would scare anybody off.
Why did you think you could win in '70? When you were a complete unknown politically.
Didn't you know what the conventional wisdom was in 1970?
No. You know, you say how did I know I was going to win or why did I think I was going to win. And I'm not sure how strongly I felt that I would win in 1970.
What were you thinking when you entered that race?
I thought it was going to be a wide open race between a lot of
candidates, some of whose names people were tired of hearing. And I
thought it was a golden opportunity to bring a new face and some new
thoughts into Arkansas politics. You know this state, the people in this
state, have always had a great deal of pride. But they're always rather
defensive about us being a rural state. We're always defensive about us
being a rural state and about us being a poor state. And, that's one of
the reasons, for example, that Arkansas race riots were always . . .
that was always the focus of attention. Because this was someplace where
we could excel. This was one place where we could compete
It certainly will. That's a very legitimate conclusion. And I think that will be born out in 1980. I'll tell you something else. I hope that's the wave of the future past 1980.
Then this suggests that the politics of race, if there ever was such a politics in this state, is dead. Or died in the '60s as a blatant, open issue.
Race will never be an issue in Arkansas politics again. Not with 150,000 blacks registered.
Do you think the 35% that Faubus got this time and '70—and that's about what Wallace got too.
He got 37 in 1970 and he got 33 this time in the first primary.
Well, around 35%. Is that a hard-core conservative vote on the race matter?
No, 'cause Fulbright also got it.
What is it?
It's a cross section.
It's not a bloc?
See, some of the votes that Faubus got in this election were
As you know, some of the strongest Fulbright supporters . . . a certain amount of bitterness out of this campaign. Why did you decide to run for the Senate this time? We heard several theories on it.
Well, the theories you hear for the most part, at least from people who
are
But the truth of the matter is, my decision to run was made very late.
Almost at the last minute. It was based on a number of things. One, I
genuinely feel that seniority is a basic problem in this country. Two,
and it's tied directly to the first, Congress is simply going to have to
reorganize itself and that includes seniority. Three, there is a certain
unresponsiveness that develops over a period of time. It's based on
doing things the same old way. Congress cannot respond to the
complexities of this society because they're trying to use 1900 decision
making processes in 1974. And it just simply will not and cannot work.
And finally, having been a governor, the most desperate need I saw was
to diminish—not necessarily dismantle—the so-called bureaucracy, but at
least recognize that Washington and the Washington bureaucracy can no
longer effectively control the operations of this country on a
day-to-day basis. They don't have that kind of expertise; they don't
have that kind of planning process; they're not that close to the
people. I'm one that believes that conceptually the president's new
federalism is imminently correct. Unfortunately, he's crippled and he
couldn't sell a sick hen a mess of worms. But the concept of new
federalism is good. Muskie's subcommittee on governments showed that
nationwide, people liked that government which was closest to them.
Municipal, county, state, federal. In that order. Fortunately in
Arkansas, incidentally, state level in that same survey—or at least the
survey of the advisory committee on intergovernment relations—showed
that in Arkansas state government had the most respect
This is the reason I'm saying that the federal government is going to have to abandon some of the things that they've been doing in the past and defer to the states and give the states the money to do it. There are some things, such as defense, that obviously have to be done on a national basis. But the whole spectrum of human resources and social services, land use planning, health care, education, all of those things can best be done at the local level. Until the government recognizes that it's going to have to abandon its responsibility in those fields . . . either abandon some of its tax gathering powers or use its tax gathering powers to return the money to the states to do those things. The states and the cities and the counties simply must have more flexibility if they're going to operate efficiently. And the way most of the guidelines come to us now, the flexibility isn't there. Those are all the reasons. But I felt that Senator Fulbright, having been there thirty years, I felt that he had been fairly insensitive to these things. I frankly felt that Senator Fulbright had not been . . . I'm just one of those people who never felt that he is always right. That's another myth, incidentally. You know this is something the newspapers and particularly the Gazette and some of the eastern papers tried to peddle. And I don't want to try to take anything away from those instances where Senator Fulbright has been a visionary and he has been right. But one of these things about how he's always right is certainly a myth.
How do you think you're going to function in a legislative arena. Your basic government experience . . .
Very little transition to make.
Because it's the reversal of what most people do. The tendency would be
go from the Congress to the executive office rather than vice
Well, I'll say this. I think it's possible. I may be wrong, but I think it's possible to be a leader in the Congress. If you work hard. And when I say work hard, I'm talking about providing some options. You know, a senator doesn't have to wait for the White House to speak on a subject in order for the Congress to address the problem. And this is one of the problems I thought that Congress had indulged itself in the past and allowed to perpetuate itself, is that Congress is simply sitting there either shoot down or approve what the president sends over. I think that there are some national policy decisions that can and should be instituted and initiated by the Congress. They don't have to wait for the president. I'm saying that in order to do those things there has to be some congressional leadership. My present thought as the simple method of doing that is through the party caucus. I think in many of these areas you can get the party caucus to agree on certain policy and design the legislation. I'd like to stay in close touch with the governors as a senator. Last year the National Governors' Conference drafted the manpower legislation bill and they drafted most of the social services legislation. Incidentally, Fritz Mondale, some of them asked us to do this, because they recognize we're the ones out here having to deal with these problems. And we did it, through our staffs. You know, then they finally ruin it after we get it up there and get it introduced, you know, and it gets amended and we get some of the rules put on it that just make the same inflexibility back in it.
If this were 1980 and we're sitting in your senate office in Washington
or the office of the vice president, whatever, and looking back over the
last six years. What would you say then that you wanted or
That's the best question you've asked today. Because . . . first of all, if I look back in 1980 and find that I have not been as effective as I had hoped to be and that the country is not in a more stable condition economically and spiritually than it is right now, I strongly suspect that I would be willing to leave . . . you know, that I would want to gracefully exit. There are people, for example, who'd like to stay in the governor's office forever. That has no appeal to me for a number of reasons. One is, it's very hard work and intense pressure. You know, you're making administrative decisions that affect thousands of people's lives every day. And while I don't mind doing that, I know that you can only be effective over a certain period of time. Any job carries with it the possibility that you're going to grow tired and you're going to grow ineffective because there's a lethargy sets in after a certain period of time. And I might add that this is one of the things I suspect is happening in Congress, too.
What would you have—
To answer your question, I would hope to have accomplished some of this dismantling of the bureaucracy that we talked about a moment ago. I would hope, through that process, to have reestablished people's faith in the political system and some of its institutions. Namely, Congress. You know, the real danger in this country—
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]
—stems from a lack of confidence in the way the system is
functioning. And it is at an all-time low, a dangerous low right now.
That in turn stems from people feeling that they're not being treated
fairly. For example, if you ask a barber or a man who operates a service
station or a welder out on a job . . . you know, you ask him about
Watergate. He may not understand the meaning of obstruction of justice
and conspiracy
Are you concerned with what some people consider to be a lack of openness in government at the federal level?
Yes.
Yes. I think there's always the possibility and the temptation to overreact to that criticism, but I do feel that—
If those are your goals, if the opportunity for a vice presidential or presidential nomination came, wouldn't that be one of the best ways to fulfill those goals?
You know, the one thing that you cannot sell oftentimes in politics, or a
politician can't sell, is the truth. I'm not flattered by all the talk
about the vice presidency. I think it would be presumptuous to talk
about it in the first place. And secondly, I think it's hypocrisy to say
that you'd shove down the options, that you'd accept the presidency or
the vice presidency. But, you know, I answered this question for the
national press. I'm going to Washington today and in between now and
tomorrow night I'll have to discuss that no less than twenty times with
every commentator that comes up to talk to me
What about the Democratic Party nationally or in the South. If you were looking back six years, what would you want to be able to say about it?
I'd like to be able to say that the South has rejoined the national Democratic Party. And I think it will.
What do you think would be the best strategy for the national Democratic Party in regards to George Wallace? In 1976.
To treat him like they would any other candidate. After all, this is a
democratic system, it's a representative form of government. And for the
national Democratic Party, which is essentially the national Democratic
committee, between elections, to say that we are or are not going to
treat George Wallace in a certain way, I think would be a serious
mistake. I think they would to accept him and treat him as they would
anybody else. There's a 10-15% strong, very vocal minority in the
Democratic Party that would like to read George Wallace out of the party
once and for all. But, you know, that's like some fellow deciding on the
front end who's a presidential nominee that he's going to ride the
saddle off the front end. I can tell you categorically that any
candidate who in the future says that I'm writing off 150 electoral
votes on the front end is going to have a difficult if not impossible
time being elected president. And I think it would be the height of
folly for the national Democrats to write George Wallace off. He has a
constituency; he has a philosophy that a lot of people identify with.
And whatever he's able to do with it, let him do with it. But
I want to ask you one other question about your decision to enter the Senate race.
We're going to have to terminate . . .
This is the last question. One of the stories that we hear is that one of the reasons you entered that race was that the polls showed early that Senator Fulbright was very weak, that Governor Faubus was seriously considering the race, and that you felt that it would be unfortunate for the state if Governor Faubus became U.S. Senator, and you felt there was a very real chance that might happen.
You know that's a question I really, I don't want to get into.
Let me ask one final question. We're doing a book on the South. The premise or assertion is that it is different than the rest of the country, politically and governmentally and so on. In your period of experience with the national government, Congress, and others, around the country, are there any basic differences between the South and other regions of the country?
There's probably 5% difference in a number of people who would still be
considered very conservative as opposed to the rest of the nation. But,
you know, television and modern transportation has eliminated virtually
all of that, the last vestige of those differences except . . . there
are still certain things that are the result of our geography and of our
culture that still exist. And some of it I hope always will. When people
say do you consider yourself a spokesman for the New South, I always
say, "Well, I don't like to use the term New South." I like to use the
emerging South or the maturing South when
Would you mind elaborating just a little bit on what you see as the emerging South?
Yes. When I say the emerging South, I'm talking about socially and
economically. Socially, the blacks in the South are probably as well off
right now . . . certainly educationally they're better off in the South
than they are in many sections of the country. And the South will begin
to bear the fruit of their education of the blacks. They're already
beginning to reap the benefits of educating blacks. And two,
economically the South is rapidly becoming as viable as any other
section of the country. The beautiful thing about the South is, you see,
we have developed late, industrially. And it's my hope that we're going
to be able, before we industrialize much further . . . One, you know we
can be selective. We're trying to be selective in Arkansas right now.
We're not inviting just anybody and everybody to come into this state
that wants to come. As a matter of fact I'm not inviting just people
into this state. Population growth is not one of the goals I've sought
since I've been governor. We've increased our population by 6% in the
last two years. And that's a little disturbing to me because that
creates special problems and particularly in certain
Would you just extend your comments just to the politics of this
It's difficult for me to say what effect that's going to have on politics in Arkansas and the South. But my guess is that you're going to see . . . and of course, you know that the fact that you hear my name mentioned quite frequently and Ruben Askew and Jimmy Carter, for example, on the national ticket in 1976 . . . that in itself is something sort of new, you know, just in the last three or four years. That you've heard that sort of thing being mentioned. And I always felt the eastern press, they knew Arkansas was one of the fifty states, that it was out there somewhere. And frankly that's still pretty much the way it is. And I don't overestimate what's happening in the South in the eyes of the rest of the nation. But I'm here in it and I know what's happening. The point is, it's probably going to make the South, the South like the blacks, are going to be a factor to be dealt with in national politics in the future. And I think the Democratic Party for one recognizes that.
Do you see election of more progressives? Is this the trend?
Yes, I think the trend is definitely—
Southwide
Yes, I think the trend has been set by people such as Carter and Askew and the rest and myself. And I think it's going to continue because I think the people identify with it and they like it. They see the benefits that have accrued to their states from it and they want to continue it.
END OF INTERVIEW