No. I felt very strongly that Eisenhower was a fair minded man of good
will. And that if there were any opportunity for a settlement it would
have to be between the president and myself on that basis. Therefore I
did not take an attorney. Now I was misled in this respect. When I got
there they had the Attorney General of the United States there and I was
not informed of that nor led to believe that there would be any such.
The only person that I had with me was my executive secretary, Arnold
Sykes, who was not a well informed person on matters of that kind at
all, and Brooks Hayes, who hadn't practiced law for years. Just been a
member of Congress. I think he is a licensed attorney, not sure of that.
Because I didn't think it could be settled by arguing over technical
points or legal points. I felt it had to be some kind of understanding,
a meeting of the minds, on the basis of good will, and that we both
preferred harmony and peaceful methods rather than any other. And in
that I do not believe I was mistaken about President Eisenhower. But
Eisenhower was not a man of his own. He had to rely, as he always had in
the military, on staff. Second nature to him. And I'm not sure that he
had the independence to rely completely upon himself.
Page 23 He was the most misinformed man about the situation in Arkansas and
Little Rock than any man I've ever talked to about any subject with
which he had to deal in the manner with which Eisenhower had to deal
with this problem. In fact on the outside, Hagerty, visiting with Arnold
Sykes, asked Arnold if school had begun yet in Little Rock! Heaven sake,
that's what the controversy was all about!
[Laughter.] They had told Eisenhower nothing about the situation. I thought
about it in this respect. That if I, as a state executive, had had a
controversy with the authorities in a certain county, before I had a
meeting with those county authorities or leaders to try to settle an
issue like that, I would want all the information there was available
about that situation. The personalities and attitudes of the leaders.
What was the situation? What had they accomplished before? How near had
they come to complying with what was required on the part of the state?
Or in the case of the federal government, required on the part of the
federal government of the state. He didn't have any of it. And at first
he lectured me like a colonel, you know, talking to a second lieutenant.
And I sat and listened until he got through. Then I said "Mr
President, I have a lot of information about the situation which you may
not be aware. And with your permission, I'd like to make it known to
you." Then I began to tell him. For example, I was the first
governor in all the South to put black men on the state Democratic
central committee. Did that in 1954 before I was inaugurated. We
desegregated all the institutions of higher learning without any
fanfare, without any difficulty. This was accomplished by a meeting with
the college presidents where they followed my advice. We had more
integrated public schools in Arkansas alone than 11 other states
combined that had a comparable problem. We had black people serving as
school board members. Aldermen, in some cities like Hot Springs. We
had
Page 24 Negroes on boards and commissions. More in
my administration than any other, although McMath had made some progress
in this field. And then I went even farther, and we had black people in
positions of administration and law enforcement. Like we had some black
people in, I'll call it beverage control. Enforcement agents. Never held
positions like that before. We had already desegregated all our
transportation in Arkansas, and we had a bus system in Little Rock at
the time, without any particular difficulty. And most businesses and
eating establishments. There were a few that held out. Well, the
president was amazed at this information. As most people in the nation
could be right now. Because the press never took the trouble to tell
anyone. In fact my son was attending an integrated college at the time,
unknown. So when we went back out then, to join
Brooks Hayes and Sherman Adams. We had four people in the conference.
The president confirmed all of this from Brooks Hayes. So then he called
in Brownell. I never shall forget talking to him. Oh yeah, we had black
people also in the state committee of the Republican party as well as
the Democratic party. Not in the Democratic party until, by my wishes,
in 1954 after I was nominated. And I never shall forget the president
talking to Attorney General Brownell. Called him Herb. And he began to
tell him "Now the governor tells me" thus and so and
he cited a number of these things. And Congressman Hayes here confirms
it. "Why," he said, "they've even got Negroes
on . . ." and he was trying to think of the party machinery
central committee and he couldn't think of it. And he said "Oh,
you know, the set up." Meaning the political set up. So then he
said to him, said "Why can't you go down to Arkansas, or send
one of your men and ask the court to postpone the implementation of this
order for a certain amount of time and give things a chance to cool off
and see
Page 25 if this won't work out peacably."
And I had told the president that in my opinion this was the only thing
that might help to bring it about peacably, as it had in Charleston, Ft
Smith, Bentonville, Fayetteville and the other schools across the state
where integration had already been implemented. And the state supported
institutions of higher learning as well. And Brownell—he was a
cold faced individual, in my opinion, ruthless, unfair if he had to be
to gain his ends, and motivated almost completely by politics. Maybe
philosophically also, I don't know the man well enough to judge that.
And he told the president, he said "it isn't legally possible.
We just can't do it, Mr President. It's not possible at all."
Well, it was a complete falsehood. An outright lie. Now the attorney
general lied to the president in my presence either intentionally or
through ignorance. And either one to me is inexcusable in the attorney
general of the United States advising the president on a question that
had become so widely known and disputed. So the president just yielded.
Wasn't any more that could be done. I started to speak up and to argue,
but I'm not an attorney. I didn't think I could dispute effectively from
a legal standpoint with the attorney general of the United States. But
just as soon as we got away I told Brooks Hayes, I said
"Brooks, the attorney general is wrong. I have read the court
order. And the Justice Department is invited in by the court to make any
recommendations or suggestions that it sees fit." That was in
the court order itself. But we didn't have one with us. Because I hadn't
gone to argue the legalities of it. I'd gone to try to work out
something with the president, in which I was very successful in laying
the groundwork for it. And had him in the attitude of trying to help.
Now I didn't tell him it would solve the problem, but I told him that
was the only opportunity. Said "I can't assure you, Mr
President, that this
Page 26 if you will write the bill to
authorize the governor to call an election in the district and let the
people vote on what they want to do, then I'll sign it. And then if the
occasion arises, I will use the authority which is given me."
So that's the way the measure was passed and then when it came up in
1958 I didn't have the authority to close the schools. I had only the
authority to call an election, which under the laws, an administerial
function of the governor, he can be mandamused to do so, if he declined.
So I called the election and the people voted, almost three to one to
close the schools themselves rather than have them integrated under a
federal court order.