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Transcript on deposit at The Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Library
Citation of this interview should be as follows:
“Interview
A-0321-2, in the Southern Oral History Program Collection #4007,
Southern Historical Collection, The Wilson Library,
University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill”
In this second of two interviews, Albert Gore, Sr.—a congressman from Tennessee—summarizes his senatorial career. He begins with his election to the House of Representatives in 1948. While there, many of the issues that would come to characterize his time in the Senate began to come to a head. Through his relationships and committee assignments, he realized that he could not support U.S. involvement in Korea or the role the nation played in the Cold War. In 1952, he ran and was elected to the U.S. Senate, and while there, he worked on a variety of committees related to his key interests. Especially meaningful to him were his positions on the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, the Joint Committee on the Library, and the Foreign Relations Committee. He continued to develop his social justice interests, taking a stand against Vietnam earlier than most other politicians did. He tried to use his relationships with Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and William Fulbright to argue for better civil policies. One of his most famous actions related to civil rights was his refusal to sign the Southern Manifesto, a 1956 document decrying the desegregation of public spaces in America. In the interview, he explains how that happened and what effect his decision had on his career. He ends by describing his impressions of the American political system, including what the government does well and what it does poorly.
Albert Gore, Sr.—a politician from Tennessee noted for being one of two Southern senators to refuse to sign the Southern Manifesto, a 1956 document decrying the desegregation of public spaces in America—summarizes his senatorial career. He discusses his opposition to the Korean and Vietnam wars, as well as his activities on a variety of Senate committees.
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
James Gardner and I are very pleased indeed to be able to resume our interview with you this afternoon on your farm on this cloudy but beautiful Sunday afternoon, October 24, 1976. And as you will recall, when we were speaking with you last in the late spring of this year we finished covering, fairly systematically, your public career through your House of Representatives tenure—though I think we might start with one or two questions having to do with the transition from your House career to your Senate service. And let me begin the interview by asking if you will speak a bit about the election of 1948, both about your own re-election to the House and the national election of that year.
As you will recall in that election Mr. Strom Thurmond, former governor of South Carolina (maybe he was then governor of South Carolina) . . .
I think he was.
. . . ran as an independent on, I believe he called it, the States'
Rights ticket. Whatever the name of the ticket and whatever the status
of Mr. Thurmond at the time—of course he later became United
States Senator, but I don't recall his exact status at the time; I think
that he was either governor of South Carolina or had been
governor—it was an anti-civil rights ticket. It was a racist
ticket; it was a racist campaign, ultrarightist in other respects too
(on economic issues). It had a very important bearing in Tennessee. Now
you will also recall that at that time Edward H. Crump was the
undisputed political boss of Shelby County, Tennessee, which is our
largest county (in fact, almost 20 percent of the population of
Tennessee then and now lives in Shelby County). Crump supported the
Strom Thurmond ticket, thus taking his organization and the
Another significant thing, later on of course, was the murder of Martin
Luther King Jr., and the strife and the riots and the racial and
economic polarization in the Memphis area. So '48 was a watershed; it
had great importance and great bearing. Also in 1948 I believe Estes
Kefauver was elected to the United States Senate here in Tennessee, and
Gordon Browning (then very anti-Crump) was elected as governor of the
state. So Edward Crump had suffered severe defeats in the Democratic
primary, and I had a significant part in that. Other than Kefauver and
Browning themselves I made far more speeches than anyone else in that
campaign. As I recall I supported Browning very strongly and opposed the
Crump machine by name, etc.
Senator, your use of the figure "watershed" for Tennessee in referring to the significance of the election of 1948 seems to me to be a very apt phrase. Let's pursue that a bit further. Would you say that the reaction, the dissent and rebellion, the opposition on the part of Crump and the others in Tennessee in 1948 resulted from President Truman's civil rights program and what came to be known as "Fair Deal" proposals? Or would you think that this cleavage in the Democratic party was the result of long-developing trends or issues? Would you comment on that?
I don't think you can draw the line that way. It was a part of all those
things. Mr. Crump (most people called him that) was aligned with the
business element in Memphis. Now he used the vote of blacks to exercise
his control, but his alignments and his affinities were with the
business elements. Crump himself became a very rich man in the insurance
business—and maybe otherwise. I'm not saying that there's
anything wrong about it, but it just happened that with all of his
political power his insurance agency became a very popular and a very
profitable agency, again without implying that any venality was
involved. So Crump himself, both as a local leader and as a congressman,
was very conservative; I mean by that he was aligned in his sympathy and
in his votes with the rightist element
Mr. Crump's biographer, William Miller, has suggested a rather odd reason
for Crump's opposition to Truman. He says that Crump opposed Truman
because he was aligned with the Pendergrast machine in Kansas [laughter, Albert Gore]
I'm unable to rationalize that one [laughter]
I was just wondering. The opposition appeared so early, as early as '44, to Truman on the part of Crump. I believe there had been at one time an investigation; Truman had led a Senate investigation that somehow touched one of the Crump people. I don't know whether there might have been more personal animosity.
There may have been, but I'm not aware of it.
Could you say a bit more, Senator Gore, about your
Well, Estes Kefauver and I were congressmen before we ran successfully
for the Senate. We were personal friends. There was then and throughout
our careers an element of competition (competitiveness, so to speak; not
animosity, but competitiveness). Both of us thought about running for
the Senate in 1948. Each of us knew that the other was thinking about
it. We had no understanding as to which would run and which would not
run. We talked about it from time to time in the cloak-room and over
coffee in the dining room and so forth, and kidded about it. He decided
to run and made his announcement, which meant that I could not run. But
I had not decided to run, and I never thought that I really was going to
do it. I was tempted to do it, but I didn't think that I was ready for
it. So I don't mean to imply that Senator Kefauver beat me to the punch,
so to speak, and announced surreptitiously and beat me to the draw. That
was not the case. He did not consult me about his announcement, but the
announcement was no surprise to me and no particular disappointment to
me because I had not reached the conclusion to make the race. I did even
then intend to run in 1952, if not in '48. I had then been in the House
for ten years, and the time had come when I was looking for other
political preferments or maybe private life. That's the choice one must
take as a congressman: he either goes up or out most of the time, at
least as far as the Senate is concerned or as far as the governorship
is
Before turning to the election of 1952, I wonder if we could ask you to
recall your attitude toward and any significant positions you took
during President Truman's Fair Deal, beginning with his inaugural in
1949
By and large I was a supporter. Doubtless there were issues on which I did not support him; I just don't recall. But generally speaking I was a supporter of the Truman program.
This would not include civil rights, would it? Civil rights is an issue we doubtless will get into eventually, but since we're talking about the Fair Deal and Truman's proposals of a civil rights measure in 1949, could you comment on your position on the various items incorporated into his civil rights program?
I don't have the details readily at hand. The best I recall, his program had about nine or ten points in it—do you remember which?
Ten, I believe.
Ten, I believe. And as I recall it, I supported either seven or eight of the ten. I advocated repeal of the poll tax; I supported all the right-to-vote legislation. I just don't recall the ten. The only one I recall specifically that I opposed was the Fair Employment Practices Commission, the FEPC as we called it. I opposed that one.
By that time Senator Kefauver was opposing anti-lynching provisions. He seemed to think that federal legislation on lynching was not necessary, that it should be left to the states. What was your position on that?
The best I recall, this was one instance in which Senator Kefauver and I
differed. I supported the anti-lynching legislation. Whether it was a
federal or state question, I was just opposed to lynching anywhere.
Unless I could see the list I really can't . . . The only one I
specifically recall opposing was the FEPC. There were some others,
either one or two
Well, I think this illuminates your general position. And let me push this just a bit to ask about Truman's labor program, for example, repeal of Taft-Hartley.
I supported that.
His position on national health insurance and medical care?
Well, I was the author of the first Medicare bill that passed either house of Congress, but that was after I became a Senator. I supported it, however, in the House.
I don't remember—perhaps Mr. Gardner does or you will—what action was taken in the House on Truman's health insurance proposal.
I don't recall.
But your recollection is that in general you supported the administration's programs in this area.
That's my recollection, yes.
Do you think of other items, Mr. Gardner, that we might ask the Senator about in thinking about the latter years of his House career?
Perhaps something on Korea?
Yes, why don't we touch on that before we move to the election of 1952. Did your service in the House, the votes and issues that came up in the House in connection with the intervention in Korea, did this prove to be an issue?
I supported the Truman position, both with respect to entering the conflict, the conduct of the conflict, and the dismissal of MacArthur.
Was that a popular position in Tennessee? How did constituents
Well, to begin with the intervention in South Korea was strongly supported in Tennessee. Truman's firing of MacArthur was a very unpopular thing in Tennessee; MacArthur was strongly supported. So in supporting the intervention and supporting the war in South Korea I was on the popular side of the question insofar as Tennessee was concerned. In supporting Truman on his dismissal of MacArthur I was on the unpopular side
I can't resist, Senator, before we leave the House and your service in the House, asking you (particularly because of your later identification with a position critical of American foreign policy in the 1960s) about your position in the late forties and the early fifties on the cold war and the way the United States was conducting the cold war generally. We talked about your support of intervention in Korea. In reflecting back to these early years, and especially, as I say, in view of your later involvement in crucial debate involving Viet nam and American foreign policy, could you say anything about your attitudes and thinking on the conduct of the cold war in this early period?
I think I experienced some contradictions. I certainly experienced some
trauma of decision. If I had the history very fresh in mind I'm sure I
could elucidate more meaningfully. But maybe I can cite one or two
instances. In the first place, I think the question inevitably leads to
what appeared to some to be a contradiction in my support of the
intervention of the war in South Korea and in South Vietnam. But before
I come to that, let me say that I doubted that the cold war was
Fulton, Missouri: Westminster College.
. . . without this speech and all of the political movements that
followed I don't know. That's just something that historians must later
try to determine. But whether it was by original design or whether in
response to the Fulton speech by Churchill and the United States'
actions following that I do not know. But whatever it was, the action of
the Soviets, some of which I've outlined, led me to be a strong partisan
of the cold war. And I supported the Marshall Plan; I supported aid to
Greece and Turkey; I supported U.S. rearmament. I was a strong advocate
of the cold war actions. I don't recall now one instance in which I
faltered
Senator, we'll come back to foreign policy in the Senate days.
I'm racing ahead.
Could we at this point turn to your election to the Senate in 1952? And would you reflect on the background of that election, including your decision to run (which you referred to earlier), the circumstances in the state, anything else that seems pertinent to you in thinking back to your very important breakthrough here and defeat of the remnant Crump machine and election to the Senate in your own right?
Well, as I've said I had earlier (four, maybe as much as five or six
years earlier) determined that I would make an effort to be elected to
the Senate. I think it was perfectly natural that I would consider 1952,
because it was at that time that Senator Kenneth D. McKellar's term came
to an end. And he was quite advanced in years, and I believe had said
when he ran in 1946 that he would not again be a candidate. So here was
a vacancy in the United States Senate. And I had been a [laughter]
Then I handled the appropriations for Oak Ridge, for the first atomic
bomb. I was one of the five people in the House who were selected on a
highly confidential basis to handle in secret appropriations for the
first atomic bomb. Well, this too was sort of a prestigious assignment,
and it gave me an opportunity to play a key part in the development of
Oak Ridge, which later became our fifth largest town. So in addition to
my own congressional district-which had varied; I'd gone
You certainly were in a uniquely strong position to challenge the Crump machine and to be successful in 1952. I wonder if you could say a bit more about the campaign itself, and about the factors which, in your opinion, enabled you to be successful.
Well, the strategy was carefully determined. The late Senator McKellar
was a very powerful man: he was chairman of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, and as such he had led in the Senate many of the battles
which I had led in the House. Indeed, he was far more powerful than I.
Sometimes I would lose the battle in the House, it would be retrieved by
him in the Senate, and then in conference between the House and Senate
he and I would work closely together to cement the victory. This was
repeated several times with respect to TVA matters. So when he decided
to run
So there were issues between us which I could have utilized in the
campaign, those and other things that we differed on. But he had been so
helpful to me in the matter of securing appropriations for TVA's
expansion, and our records were so alike in that regard (his the more
successful because of the power that he wielded as chairman of the
committee) that I chose (both because of those reasons and because of
his advanced age and the esteem in which he was held) to make no
reference to him at all. Not one time did I call his name during the
campaign or criticize him on a single issue. Having made that decision,
I announced it at my first state-wide organization with leaders. And it
was discussed around the room. Some doubted that it was wise; most
seemed to [laughter]
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]
. . . said, "Bill, we've been discussing here the strategy and
tactics of my campaign. How do you think I should deal with the problem
of my adversary, the venerable Senator Kenneth McKellar?" Right
off Bill said, "I think you should say he's too old to cut the
mustard." [laughter] [laughter] [laughter].
Did you have a good organization for that campaign?
Yes I did. I'd been working at it for a long time. I drew heavily upon the friends and acquaintances growing out of the campaigns I had managed and in which I had taken an active part. Even when I started I had friends in every county, and I built upon that. Yes, I had a good organization. It was not a money organization in many ways.
The reference to money, Senator, leads me to ask a question about financing campaigns. Nowadays, as you know, money is a critical consideration, and lots of money. Could you comment on the amount of money required, and how imperative it was in 1952 to have enough money to run a state-wide campaign?
Well, it's always there. You never have enough—I mean I never had enough. I think my total campaign in 1952 was about $50,000. That's now inadequate for a commercial. That's about what I spent. I do not know what amount was spent in the campaign of Senator McKellar—I daresay considerably more than that.
Isn't there a significant difference between your campaign in 1952 (the financing of it) and your campaign in 1970, though, in that in 1952 I suspect you had little worry in the general election. Your problem was the primary, was it not?
Entirely, entirely.
I had understood that perhaps one reason that you might not have had as much problem with finances is because you were such an able manager of your own campaign and of the use of money, that some of the other candidates in Tennessee were not as thrifty or wise in their use of money. The Kefauver campaign organization could run through an amount of money much quicker with less results. Did this make a lot of difference? Was there a great difference in campaigns as to how much money was needed by a particular candidate or organization?
Well, I suppose that played its part. Necessity being the mother of invention, some of this frugality on my part was not by choice.
Did you keep tight control over your own campaign?
Yes indeed.
Or did you delegate a lot of this?
Yes indeed. Incidentally, it was as a result of that campaign in 1952 that the Supreme Court of Tennessee handed down a decision making the candidate responsible for the expenditures of his political lieutenants. Senator McKellar was later sued for debts incurred by his supporters, members of his political organization. And as I recall this case went all the way to the Supreme Court. I was always aware throughout my political career that there might be financial liability in the campaign; so I guess in my customary precaution in the handling of the finances I did exercise surveillance or control over expenditures to a considerable extent.
What sort of state-wide organization did you have? I understand that candidates would have, say, a county manger; others had committees in the counties rather than a single manager. What sort of organization did you have? Were there levels, congressional managers or committees? What was the advantage of a committee over a single manager, or the other way around?
Well, it largely depends upon the political situation in a particular county, and your availabilities. I had a state-wide committee, with a chairman. Then I had a committee in each congressional district, with a chairman. When it came to the county level it was about half and half. One man or one woman was the manager in a county, or a committee of three or a committee of five. It depended upon the situation in each county.
I understand that the use of committees was a fairly new sort
It was not new to me. I had both in my congressional campaign.
I was interested in talking about Senator McKellar. What was it that made him so vulnerable? Was it just his age in '52? What about the Crump machine? Did it not bring out the vote as it had in the past? I believe in '46 McKellar had not even visited Tennessee and yet had won re-election. Why could he not pull it off in '52? You were not overly critical of him. You campaigned on a rather positive approach. What made him so vulnerable?
[laughter] [laughter].
Until afterwards [laughter].
It took all I could do and all the campaigning and organizing and financing I could amass to pull off a victory. He was deeply entrenched all over the state.
Was it then a matter of organization, of your ability to organize and counteract the Crump machine? I was wondering what made the difference in '52.
Well, he was of course advanced in years. But you will recall that Browning lost a great deal of favor in the state after his election in 1948. He suffered severely after that. And wasn't it 1950 that Crump regained control of the state?
He didn't regain the governorship until '52, the same year you ran, when Frank Clement was first running. But he had made a number of gains in Shelby County.
So lest it appear easy, remember at the same time I was winning against the Crump-McKellar group (and Crump and McKellar were closely aligned), McKellar largely handled organization matters outside of Shelby. In East Tennessee, for instance, it was largely the forces of Senator McKellar that wielded the power in the various counties. So despite the fact that I was winning in 1952, the same forces were winning the governorship. So it was not as easy as it might appear.
You yourself suggested earlier that in '48 you thought that the governorship was perhaps more important than the Senate seat in defeating the Crump machine. Some observers at the time thought perhaps Crump in '52 had decided that he would perhaps sacrifice McKellar if he could just regain the statehouse by electing Clement to the governorship. Did you see any lessening of effort on the part of the Crump machine in '52 in the Senate race? Do you think they in any sense gave up on McKellar because of his age?
No, they fought very hard.
Along this line, Senator, did you run a race in the primary that was quite separate from that of Governor Browning?
Oh yes; I ran my own.
Some people suggested at the time that there was some sort of rift between yourself and Governor Browning, that he had wanted to run for the Senate in '52. Did you know of any aspirations that he had? Was there any problem between the two of you?
There was a time when he did wish to run for the Senate in 1952. There
was some inside competition between us. Later, however, his primary
interest (in fact his almost sole interest) was to retain the power of
the governorship, as against the desire of the Crump machine to
Did Browning's weaknesses in Tennessee—it appeared that he wasn't quite the organizer (I know there were some problems in Shelby County with the election commission appointments, with some controversy over whether he was favoring one group or another)—did Browning's administration cause problems for the anti-Crump group in the state? Did the disaffection with Browning cause you problems?
Well, my identification with Browning helped more than it hurt. Of course there were instances in which it was hurtful.
What about Kefauver's presidential bid in '52? I believe you supported him in that bid?
Yes I did.
Was there any connection between those races? Was there any feeling that if Kefauver could get the nomination he would help the other anti-Crump candidates? I know Browning's race became tied to the presidential race. He was a strong supporter of Senator Kefauver, and I guess the '52 convention hurt Browning considerably when he backed Kefauver all the way.
I didn't go to that. I deliberately did not go to that convention.
Aware of the problems?
Aware of the problems, yes. I was primarily interested in my race for the Senate. I chose to stay out of . . . Chicago, wasn't it?
What time did the primary elections occur that year?
In August.
Following the convention?
Yes.
The convention was in late July.
And Governor Browning was severely hurt by that convention. I was not hurt by it. I remember I was campaigning in Woodbury when the most controversial things were happening, and I kept campaigning.
Mr. Gardner, are there other items connected with this very significant race the Senator won in 1952? If not, I think we'd like to turn to your committee assignments in the Senate (they're fairly extensive, as you know) and simply ask you to tell us what you can about your work on those committees, your contributions, and issues that were significant, even though in some cases this may take us over some years (over eighteen years, to be exact, and in others not over such an extensive period). We'll begin with the District of Columbia Committee, which you served on from 1953 to 1955. Do you have any observations to make about service on that committee? We realize that this is onerous in the sense that we're asking you to comment on things that happened long ago, and sometimes committees that were not all that important, perhaps.
Well, it's usually a freshman who is assigned to the District of Columbia
Committee. I did not find it very attractive, mainly because it did not
deal with issues important to Tennessee. However, I found it
interesting, because by serving on the committee I became familiar with
the problems of a large urban area. I became familiar with the problems
of administration, problems of urban America with which I had had little
association in my congressional district or in the problems of my
district or things in which I was primarily interested. I had become
knowledgeable
Another of your first committees in the Senate was the Public Works Committee, on which you served, I believed, from 1953 through or to 1957. Could you comment on your service on that committee?
Well, it was by my membership on that committee that I achieved one of the most (shall I say) notable events of my career. The Public Works Committee handled legislation in the Senate for the TVA, for public roads, for reclamation, interior problems, environmental problems. So I learned a great deal about the problems of our country and the problems of our society by my service on that committee. It was a wonderfully educational experience. And then I was appointed chairman of the Public Roads Subcommittee. I introduced in 1956—no, I introduced earlier—the Interstate Highway bill, I believe in 1954. And it was in 1956 that that bill finally became law. For most of two years my principal interest in the Senate and in the country was holding hearings, visiting, making observations of the highway problems, and fighting the battle in the committee and later on the floor of the Senate and in conference with the House to bring the enactment of the Interstate and National Defense Highway bill (or to give it a short name, the Gore bill) in 1956. I was elated when it finally passed and President Eisenhower signed it into law. It initiated the largest public works program in the history of the world, which is not even yet quite completed.
Another of your committees, a committee on which you served for
I said earlier in this interview that as chairman of the Independent
Offices Subcommittee (at least as chairman of a subcommittee that
handled TVA, and I think this was a subgroup of the Independent Offices
group) I handled appropriation bills for the TVA and for the Atomic
Energy Commission. As a result of that I had become as intimately
acquainted with nuclear energy problems as a layman could become. So
after election to the Senate it was but natural, I think, that I would
wish to be assigned to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, furthering
my interest and my opportunity both to serve and to benefit politically
because of Oak Ridge being located in Tennessee. So I found my work
there very intense. I was a strong champion of nuclear energy, nuclear
power. I was a co-author of the first nuclear power bill; it was called
the Gore-Holifield bill. Congressman Chet Holifield of California, who
was then chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, introduced the
bill in the House, and I introduced it in the Senate. And I succeeded in
passing it in the Senate. So my role in legislation in advocacy of
nuclear energy and the development of nuclear power, the development of
nuclear submarines and of nuclear carriers was an interesting
experience, an engrossing experience. I was enthusiastically involved in
it, and I think (without being a braggadocio) that I was influential in
numbers of developments in this field, including later being a delegate
to the disarmament conference and a delegate to the United Nations. I
negotiated as delegate to the United Nations the agreement on outer
space between the Soviet
I was thinking as you talked about the way in which service on this important committee might have contributed to your increasing interest in foreign affairs, in foreign policy. You've just mentioned some ways in which that indeed was the case. Mr. Gardner, do you have questions relating to the Atomic Energy Committee?
I was just wondering if you'd like to comment on your role in the Dixon-Yates controversy, which I believe came before and then during your first years on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy? To what extent did your leadership in the Senate debate on the Dixon-Yates contract, another provision of the Atomic Energy Act, what role do you think that played in your getting this appointment? The appointment came in late 1954, after the mid-term elections, but actually before the Democrats regained control of Congress in '54.
I'm not sure that that had any particular bearing on my assignment to the
committee. My leadership in that fight was more or less a
happenstance—and yet I don't suppose it was either, because I
was so full of the TVA issue, so wrapped up into the enthusiasm and
support of the Tennessee Valley Authority and my opposition to the
private power industry in America, and the many attempts to destroy TVA
and to grab portions of the Authority. So when the Dixon-Yates issue
came along it was not necessary for me to do a great deal of detailed
study and research, because as I say I was full of it. I remember when I
kicked off the national fight about Dixon-Yates. Late one afternoon I
rose in the Senate without expecting to speak for very long, without any
text, without any plan to make a full-dress debate. [laughter] [laughter]. [laughter]
Senator Kefauver, I understand, was also interested in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and in fact inquired of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson if there might not be an opening on the Joint Committee in '54: that it would be a great help with his constituents, that it was a vital issue to Tennessee and was something he was also interested in. Yet when the opening came up, Senator Johnson chose you over the senior senator from the state. What do you think was the reason this? Was it simply a reflection of your own involvement and the concern of the Democrats to continue with perhaps the most prominent leader of the Dixon-Yates fight because the fight was not yet over—you continued it in the Joint Committee? What do you think was the reason? Did Kefauver get along well with Senator Johnson?
No, he didn't get along with the Senate leadership, any of the Senate leadership at that time. You will recall (I'm not sure) that Scott W. Lucas was leader, I believe, at the time.
He had been defeated.
In '54?
I believe before '54, because Lucas had opposed Kefauver's presidential nomination in 1952 in retaliation for his own earlier defeat.
Well, that's correct. So I guess Johnson had become Democratic leader. I know that Senator Lucas was very much opposed to Senator Kefauver, as was Harry Truman. And I think there was not a good equation between Senator Kefauver and Senator Lyndon Johnson at the time. There was a very good equation between Senator Johnson and me at the time. And I suppose because of that and then because of my experience in the House and my identification with the nuclear energy issue, with the TVA, with power, with energy, the whole category of legislation, I had been closely identified with it and Senator Kefauver had not. Now this may have played a part; I can't tell you now what brought it about, but I won it.
Pursuing the same sort of thing, I understand that in 1955 Senator Kefauver wanted an investigation of the Dixon-Yates contract through the Judiciary Subcommittee on Anti-Monopoly. But yet he was blocked again on that. The Democratic leadership just didn't seem to be too interested in Kefauver's investigation. Yet I understand you had some role in persuading the leadership to let Kefauver set up this panel that eventually was important in exposing a conflict of interest in the contract negotiations.
I favored it; I favored it and did support Senator Kefauver in that. And he rendered a very notable service.
Wasn't it unusual for the junior senator to have this much influence, that he had to help the senior senator from the state?
Well, there were unusual features. Senator Kefauver was not the usual type of legislator. Senator Kefauver was in many respects a public relations senator. He was a national figure; he personalized or epitomized many popular causes. And because of the renown he achieved and also because he seemed to eschew the daily give-and-take of legislation, he was never particularly popular with his colleagues in the Senate. To put it in common parlance, he was never exactly a member of the Senate club. I was more inclined to do the day-to-day chores. I was regularly in attendance to committees and on the floor of the Senate, and frequently in debate. I don't think I was ever a full member of the inner club, but I was a member of the Senate club—if that explains some of the differences.
Your position in this regard, Senator, strikes me as having been very similar to that of Hubert Humphrey in that period.
Well, I'm not sure it was similar. He was more loquacious than I [laughter]
But did he not make his way into the club, perhaps not the inner club, despite the fact that he had been critical of some administration positions such as civil rights?
Well, he was longer in gaining admission to the club, but he finally
became a member of the inner club, which I didn't. He was longer en
route, but he succeeded more than I [laughter]
He went farther, eh? [laughter]
Yes. By then my maverick tendencies had come to assert themselves.
So to pursue that a bit, you two perhaps reversed roles. He was more a maverick in the beginning and you more near the end of your career.
Yes. And he wound up as a strong supporter of Lyndon Johnson, and I wound
up as an opponent of Lyndon Johnson. As of then that affinity or
non-affinity with Lyndon Johnson determined whether you were a member of
the inner circle or whether you were not [laughter]
Mr. Gardner, anything further on the Joint Committee? Why don't we ask you about the Rules and Administration Committee in 1955-56.
Frankly, I don't remember very much about that, except there was a question of an investigation of . . .
In 1956 a proposal to investigate lobbying.
Lobbying, yes. That's the only thing I remember of dramatic content as a result of my service on that committee. And that was not a happy experience. I wanted a thorough investigation, and I was selected as chairman of a subgroup to conduct such an investigation. But I soon found that a majority of the committee had no intention of having such an investigation, and I resigned as chairman.
What about the Senate leadership on this particular issue? I understand that Lyndon Johnson was not particularly interested in a very thorough investigation—and that the Republicans weren't either—in an election year of contributions of oil and gas lobbies.
Well, Lyndon wasn't. Throughout his political career he worked hand in
glove with the oil industry, and of course he was not in favor of a
thoroughgoing investigation. I've forgotten who the Republican members
of the committee were, but I know he appointed Senator Clinton P.
Anderson
Wasn't that a rather ticklish subject with the 1956 presidential election coming up? Were they just afraid you'd be too honest in pursuing the lobby . . . ?
Oh, I don't know whether honesty [laughter]
This was in a presidential year, and we'll talk about that later, I suppose. Do you think this helped your image nationally, that you were interested in investigating lobbying, that you had been blocked by the Senate leadership in your endeavors? The image of the white knight, would that have helped you nationally, say in terms of the vice-presidential nomination in '56?
If I had had a majority of the committee who would have supported me, I was determined to have a thorough investigation. And had I been able to conduct a thorough investigation the outcome of the 1956 convention might have been very different, in terms of the vice-presidency or the presidency. There was an issue on which I could ride, but Lyndon Johnson tied my hands. That's putting it briefly.
That's sort of what I had thought.
Another of your committee assignments, Senator, for one term
Yes, but not in detail. I learned of the organization of the library, the structure of its very great activities. I was intensely interested in it. Even today I'm assigned a desk at the Congressional Library. I did some of my writing there after I left the Senate. That's about all I recall of that.
Did that service and that early interest in the Library of Congress lead you to any thought about the need for a more systematic policy in preserving and protecting public papers of the president, vice-president, senators, members of the House, the judiciary?
It may have, but my memory doesn't fix on anything in particular.
Well, let's turn to a committee on which you served longer, the Interparliamentary Union. What was your work in that capacity?
Well, the work on that was not legislative. This was the source of a
great deal of international education, a good many trips; some critics
call them junkets, and I suppose in the strict sense that was an apt
term for it. But almost annually after adjournment of Congress during my
service as a member of that group, Mrs. Gore and I would go with a few
other delegates to a conference in some part of the world for a week or
such, and en route we would stop at other places. It gave me an
acquaintance with other nations, with world affairs. It was very
educational and very helpful to me. I don't think the Interparliamentary
Union has ever achieved anything other than a broadening of contacts, of
education and more understanding one with the other. Even this
Would you say that it contributed to your growing interest in foreign policy?
Oh yes, oh yes indeed. It not only contributed to my growing interest, but, as I've said my knowledge and my limited understanding on international affairs.
Very good. Moving to a more significant committee insofar as your length of service and contributions perhaps, what about the Finance Committee, on which you served from 1957 to 1970, a long period on a very important committee? Could you reflect upon your service on that committee?
Oh yes, I have many specific memories of that. I wanted on this committee as soon as I arrived at the Senate; of course the freshmen couldn't be assigned to that. I had chaffed at my inability as a congressman to have very much influence on tax legislation. The Ways And Means Committee then, as now, had jurisdiction over tax legislation, and the House of Representatives had a rule which was followed whether in Democratic or Republican administrations, of considering tax bills . . .
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]
[START OF TAPE 2, SIDE A]
The Gag Rule in the House, by which all tax bills were considered, was a
rule which prohibited the offering of amendments to a tax bill. Only one
amendment, as I recall, could be offered to a tax bill, and that was
reserved to the minority side of the committee. So though I was anxious
to achieve amendments [laughter]
Thinking back over those fourteen years on that committee, could you summarize your contributions or the areas of your greatest interest and involvement?
Well, the Senate Finance Committee handles several things other than tax
reforms: international trade was one, Social Security was another. It
was because of my membership on that committee that I had the
opportunity to introduce and to bring to passage in the Senate several
international trade matters, the whole reciprocal trade program, for
instance. I was a delegate to the International Conference on Trade and
Agreements two or three times in Geneva. So as a member of that
committee, and becauseipso facto adopted in the Senate. Well, I
proposed to alter all that, because the majority of the Senate Finance
Committee when I was assigned to it and throughout my tenure on it was
an ultra-conservative group closely aligned with vested special
interests. Most of my amendments received only about four votes in the
Senate Finance Committee, with eight against them. But I think my
legislative gun has twelve marks on it. I defeated the Senate Finance
Committee twelve times on the floor of the Senate. Some of my colleagues
on the committee became a little ruffled at it, particularly the
chairman, Russell Long. But I went in and represented the spirit of tax
reform, the movement of tax reform. I was its principal spokesman. And a
majority of the Senate came to be aligned with me, as did much of the
public sentiment in the country. I became nationally known as a champion
of tax reform. That was in the form of percentage oil depletions and
many of the so-called loopholes. I need not
Let me interrupt to ask if you have any strong feeling today as to the most desirable tax system that we could adopt. That is, what kind of tax reform do we need today?
Well Doctor, we'd better set a new day for that and have a [laughter]
The purpose of my question is to ask, really, if you feel that the kinds of proposals you had in mind back in the nineteen sixties and earlier are still needed in many cases?
Yes, and many of them are in the Democratic platform today.
As an outspoken proponent of tax reform, didn't you have some disagreement with the Kennedy administration, when Kennedy proposed a tax cut and you suggested an increase in the personal exemption? I understand that there was some disagreement between you and the Kennedy administration generally on economic matters, that you did not agree with his selection of the Secretary of the Treasury, that sort of thing, that there were some real problems over economic policy.
Well, President Kennedy and I served together in both the House and the
Senate. We had been personal friends. My wife and his wife were warm
friends. In fact, Mrs. Gore and I were two of a small party one night
when young congressman Kennedy was the odd young man and Jacqueline
Bouvier was the odd young woman, and they hadn't met before. There was
some evidence of interest even that night [laughter]
Then later on when this particular issue of tax reduction was under
consideration I remember going to Mrs. Roosevelt's funeral at Hyde Park.
President Kennedy had flown on Air Force One and another delegation had
flown on, I believe, maybe two other planes. We all landed at, I
believe, West Point, the nearest airport to Hyde Park where large planes
could land. At the home, before the ceremonies, President Kennedy and I
met; he sort of plucked me aside and said, "What do you think I
ought to do about tax reduction?" I said, "Forget
it." Well, he wasn't ready to forget it, [laughter] [laughter]Let The Glory Out which deals with that subject,
where I outlined with considerable detail my views of the much greater
merit of expenditure by way of appropriating funds through the specific
areas of need rather than by tax reduction, which usually gives relief
where it is least needed.
Senator, could we turn finally among your committee duties to
We can turn to that if you'll let me bring us down a little refreshment.