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Transcript on deposit at The Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Library
Citation of this interview should be as follows:
“Interview C-0044, in
the Southern Oral History Program Collection #4007,
Southern Historical
Collection, The Wilson Library,
University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill”
In 1948, Edward L. Rankin left his job as a journalist in order to work as
William Umstead's press assistant during the his gubernatorial campaign. Umstead
was not elected in 1948, but when he chose to run again in 1952, Rankin eagerly
joined him on the campaign trail and became Umstead's private secretary after
his election that year. Rankin describes his perception of Umstead as a personal
friend and as a political figure, his struggle with illness, and his death in
1954. Rankin focuses on Umstead's reaction to the Brown v. Board of
Education decision, handed down just prior to his untimely demise.
According to Rankin, Umstead took care to understand the meaning of the decision
and its potential ramifications for the South before working to establish a
citizens group headed by Tom Pearsall. Although Umstead believed that Brown was a mistake on the part of the Supreme Court, he was
determined that North Carolina would abide by the Court's decree. Following
Umstead's death, Rankin stayed on as private secretary to Umstead's successor,
Luther Hodges. According to Rankin, although Hodges and Umstead had not had the
most congenial personal relationship, Hodges was determined to maintain
Umstead's approach to the issue of school desegregation. Rankin describes in
detail the activities of the Pearsall group, the spectrum of responses to the
Brown decision and the Pearsall Plan (1956), and efforts
to challenge its implementation. He discusses the leadership roles of such
individuals as Governor Hodges, Tom Pearsall, lawyer Paul Johnston, and state
superintendent Charlie Carroll. Rankin's recollection of this tumultuous time in
North Carolina history draws attention to the role of political leaders in
mediating a potentially explosive political minefield.
Edward L. Rankin served as private secretary to North Carolina Governors William
Umstead (1952-1954) and Luther Hodges (1954-1961). In this interview he
describes their political leadership, the Pearsall Plan, and the spectrum of
political responses to the Brown v. Board of Education
decision.
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
This is Jay Jenkins for the Southern Oral History Progam interviewing Ed Rankin at his home in Concord on August 20, 1987. As always, it's nice to see you again. Brings back a lot of memories. You've had a very interesting life and you're still doing two or three jobs. It's nice to see you so vigorous. The primary purpose of this interview is to elaborate on the Pearsall Plan enacted some thirty years ago. I want to start out by asking you to recall those early days with Governor Umstead when you went in as his private secretary when he took office.
Jay, a little background of how I got to know Mr. Umstead. Actually, I had never met Mr. Umstead until he was appointed to the United States Senate following the death of Senator Josiah W. Bailey. As you recall, Governor Cherry had the responsibility of finding a replacement. Mr. Umstead was not only a close friend of Mr. Cherry but had been his campaign manager in Cherry's campaign for governor. He selected Mr. Umstead, who went to Washington to be the junior United States Senator. He soon found that Senator Bailey had long since moved over into the chairmanship suites of the Senate Commerce and Banking Committee which he headed for many years.
The North Carolina Senator's office was understaffed, and there wasn't a
whole lot going on there. Mr. Umstead needed additional people. He
called to discuss this with Governor Cherry and Governor Cherry in turn
discussed it with his private
The upshot of it is, I was working in Raleigh. I had come up from Columbia, South Carolina. Well, what happened, I got out of World War II and came back and went to work for the Associated Press in Charlotte as an assistant night editor. Then I was transfered down to Columbia as night editor. I soon found that that was the end of the line, was at that time, of the Associated Press. You filed into Atlanta, and Atlanta decided whether to file anywhere else. We had a line with Charlotte but basically we were reporting to Atlanta.
To make a long story short, John called and said Sandy Graham needed some help and could I come up and work with him at the highway commission. I jumped at the chance. I liked the AP, I did, but I wanted to get back to North Carolina. So I was there.
Mr. Umstead was in Washington. John set up an appointment, and I went up
and was interviewed by him. He hired me as his press assistant, writer,
baggage smasher, whatever
Around '48?
Yeah, '48. Fran and I were married in '48. We were married June 12 after the primary in May of '48, and moved to Greensboro that fall. It was later because his term didn't expire until the end of the year. So that's how I met Mr. Umstead. Of course, working with him I developed a close friendship and a tremendous admiration—just a remarkable human being, a man of great intellectual ability, absolutely unshakeable character. One thing about William Umstead, of course, everybody knew he didn't smoke; he didn't drink; he didn't curse. But these characteristics were very, they were very much a part of the man.
He did smoke.
Oh, excuse me. I beg your pardon. Oh, he did smoke, yes. That's another
story. You're right. That was different. He grew up on a tobacco farm.
He helped work his way through school priming tobacco and working in the
fields. So that's another story but that's how I met him. Of course,
during the campaign back in those days things were a lot different. I
was his driver, and we always shared a room together. I mean we slept in
the same room for all those months, what sleep you got, because you're
traveling a lot. His pattern was to campaign all day and drive all night
to the next place. So we would long day. It started like at 6:00 that
morning. That's the kind of thing that the candidates and their staff
have to put up with. But to make a long story short, he, of course,
returned to private law practice, and I went to Greensboro. I stayed
there four years. John Harden was the vice president of public
relations, and I was his right hand man and ran the department and
whatever. I was very happy with it. We loved Greensboro and enjoyed
being at Burlington. Mr. Umstead then ran for governor, and of course,
as a volunteer I helped him, and I did some writing.
This was 1952.
Right. That's right, 1952. So I did what I could to help him from
Greensboro. Then I was delighted to see him win the nomination,
delighted to see him elected in the fall. That was it as far as I was
concerned. One day I got a call, and Mr. Umstead said he wanted to see
me. So I went to Durham, and he said he wanted me to be his private
secretary. It had never crossed my mind. I didn't know exactly what a
private secretary did. I had a long talk with John Harden. I talked with
the president of the company, J. C. Cowan, at Burlington and decided to
accept. I never will forget, John said, "Ed, I really don't want to lose
you but I know enough about the job to tell you it's
The inauguration date came up and we went up for that and spent the day
which was Thursday. Then Friday morning it was very hectic in the
governor's office. People just packed in, you know. Of course, when you
are a winner, nobody ever voted against you, you know. After you win,
that's the way it is.
I made a list, and I went back to Greensboro Friday night, and he went back to Durham.
This was after the inauguration?
Yeah. This was the week of the inauguration, Thursday night. Then Friday, we were in the office, just one day in the office. So Sunday, Fran and I had gone to church. We came back to our place in Greensboro, and I got a telephone call from Mrs. Umstead. She said that the governor had had a heart attack. His condition was uncertain. They thought he was going to be all right but he had had a heart attack. That's all she knew. I then called the wire services in Raleigh and dictated a brief bulletin about the Governor's sudden illness. The first thing Monday morning, I struck out for Raleigh and walked in that office and it was half staffed. The legislature was in session. The Governor had made his inaugural address. The program, per se, had not been completed. Of course, you've got to follow through on all this. His legislative address said I'm going to have a program in this and a program in this. Much of this was not completed at all. None of the bills had been drafted. So it was a wild period in my life. I say, too, that I got some great help from some fine people. Fortunately, he had Frank Taylor, a former Speaker of the House, who was his legislative liaison.
W.W. Taylor. No, Frank Taylor.
Frank Taylor was on hand. Of course, his brother, William Umstead's
brother, John, was in the House as a stalwart, of course. John and Frank
didn't get along at all, never had. They were philosophically different,
too. John was very implusive and outspoken and also more liberal
politically than Frank. Frank was a conservative and also was a
deliberate
John was very mercurial.
Yeah, true. John was quickly going to tell you everything right off the bat. They were just two different people so they didn't… So I found myself, in a way, kind of referreeing between them. During this period we, of course, had to follow the Governor's condition day by day—we were issued daily medical bulletins and talked to the doctor and so forth. The Governor was in Watts hospital about six weeks in Durham during this first session. Each day Frank and John and I would go over to the hospital—this was after, maybe, the first week—and see the doctor who told us very little, as usual. Often times he would say, "The governor did not have a good night. Just go in and don't trouble him with anything." Just wave and whatever. So literally, sometimes we just stood at the door and said, "Everything's fine. Don't worry about it. All your friends are behind you," and that's it. On the way back to Raleigh, we'd say, "What are we going to do about this?" We'd just make decisions. We'd say, some things you could not wait on. We put off as many big things as we could. But there was a period when the three of us were making the decisions normally the governor would have made. We'd come back and say the governor said go ahead on that or hold back on that or whatever we could do. It was a very, very hairy period.
After about six weeks the doctor allowed him to return to the mansion
with the understanding that he would spend most of
He was supposed to be on a limited schedule there. I think maybe half a
day or so but he quickly went back to a fairly full day. But he was wise
enough—what I didn't realize about Mr. Umstead, he was a very tense
person. He was unrelenting on himself, physically, emotionally,
everything. He just thought
I mean he did what he had to do for that legislative situation, for that
first year. Appointments to boards, commissions, etc., of course, were a
big, major thing that came up and had to be handled. He cut out really
as much other things as possible. You know a governor really wears three
hats. He's the administrator of the executive branch of government. He
is a public figure who's expected to go everywhere and open everything
and speak and do whatever it is, educational, cultural, business,
commerce. Whatever is happening in the state, they want him there. So
he's got a full time job for that. Then he's also the titular head of
the Democratic party which is no small thing. It certainly wasn't then.
He was expected to, in effect, oversee the operations and to see that
the Democrat party organization functioned, and that all the factions
worked together, and to be a liaison with the congressional delegation.
This took an
Harold Minges was the governor's highway patrol chauffeur.
Highway patrol chauffeur, like you say. In those days, incidentally,
nobody ever said bodyguard. Security was not much of a problem. But we
were aware of the fact that Harold was there. From time to time as we
left on a trip, I'd say, "Harold, you got your gun?" He would often say,
"No, I'll run back and get it."
Relaxed.
Relaxed or whatever. I'll finish up here with Mr. Umstead. During the summer, of course, the Advisory Budget Commission was meeting, and Mr. Umstead was intensely interested in this. He wanted to sit in on many of these meetings. He wanted to hear these things himself. So he would begin to go to most of these advisory budget sessions. Then, I've forgotten, it was about August, I believe, about this time of the year, he began to have health problems. He really had respiratory problems. I think congestive heart failure was the cause of his death. He would not be able to get his breath and was just weak, but he went as far as he could.
At one of the ABC hearings, Harold called me and said, "I had to go get the governor and take him back to the mansion. He's really not feeling very well." Then the next thing, they took him over to his doctor in Durham, and he put Mr. Umstead back in Watts hospital. He went through, I've forgotten, one or two of these periods of resting, and you know, they'd work on him a little bit.
As a matter of fact, he was in the hospital when hurricane Hazel struck
in October, 1954. That was another wild episode in which—hurricane Hazel
forgot it was a hurricane and came in and just came right through
Raleigh and everywhere else and played hell. He was in the hospital
then. I was in the governor's office. You can imagine what was going on.
As the reports came in that this storm was apparently coming inland, I
began to get calls from people in state government that said, "Well,
they're closing the schools, letting the children go home. State
Hazel came through, and I was trapped at the capitol. I couldn't get out.
Fran was home with the baby, two babies. Funny thing about that whole
thing, we could talk to each other on the phone. The phone connection
between us never went out.
It was November…
I've got the book. It's in the letter book. I'd be glad…
We can find it. That's all right. We can get that.
It was in November, I believe.
Early November.
Early November. It was Sunday morning (November 7, 1954), fairly early.
Harold called me, and he said, "Ed, I just want you to know that I'm
taking Mrs. Umstead and Merle Bradley over to the hospital." I said,
"Why?" He said, "I don't know
The doctor?
The doctor came down the corridor. When I saw him, he threw up his hand
so I went over to him. We shook hands and I said, "Hi, how are you?" He
said, "Fine." And we just began walking down the corridor without me
knowing where we were going. Suddenly, right out of the blue, he said,
"The governor expired at 9:10 or 9:11," or whenever this happened. Just
like that. I was so dumbfounded, I was speechless. Finally I said, "Who
knows it?" He said, "Well, Mrs. Umstead and Merle Bradley had been in
the room with him. They had just left when he died. I have called John
Umstead but he hasn't been able to get over here yet." That's how it
happened. I just walked into the
Sort of casual about the whole thing.
Well, you know how some people are. This doctor, he's a fine man, but his
manner was just very low key, just matter of fact—how are you today,
shall we have a cup of coffee. I mean, but I was so stunned… So then
began another wild period. Of course, I called Fran and dictated a
bulletin for her to call the news media. She called the AP, I think, the
UP and maybe the News and Observer. I've forgotten
now, but that was the way the news got out. Then I did call Luther
Hodges and got him at his home in Leaksville. It was almost a blur
during that first day. There had not been, of course, a governor to die
in office in this century. So there was no precedent. What do you do?
I'm talking about from the state standpoint. Obviously a funeral is a
funeral. But this is more than just a funeral, you know. So I had to
work between the family, and Thad Eure kind of served as Council of
State representative. Luther Hodges was calling and saying what could he
do and what do you want me to do? Again, it got back, I guess, as much
to John Umstead and Mrs. Umstead and me, we just sort of worked it out.
So the funeral was planned and held. Then it's funny how life goes. I
guess under the stress I was under I had the world's worse cold, a head
cold. I felt terribly distraught to start with. Then I had this terrible
cold. I was blowing my nose. It was a really hectic time. I do remember
that.
I do remember another little thing. Mr. Umstead's funeral was at the big Methodist Church down town. I've forgotten the name of it now. He was buried in a very heavy coffin. It was big, copper or bronze or something. I mean it was a big thing. I was a pallbearer. The entrance to the church had these long steps that go down to the sidewalk. I don't remember any problem going in but coming out, when we were to take the coffin off of the roller thing underneath, whatever, the little trolley, whatever it is they put coffins on… I didn't realize it but I was the only young person among the pallbearers. Everybody else, I've forgotten who they were, but they were older men. So we started out from the church with that coffin, and the hearse was down below on the street. When we reached those steps, the weight naturally shifted down. We came within an ace of dropping that coffin. There was a young guy from the funeral home walking ahead of us. He looked back and realized what was happening, and he quickly turned and grabbed, just held the end of, you know, he grabbed the coffin and stopped it. I mean with the momentum, we couldn't have stopped it without his help. So I could just visualize the governor of North Carolina's coffin sliding down those steps onto the street.
I want to take you back, if I may, to May of 1954. That was when the
desegregation decision was issued by the U. S. Supreme Court. Governor
Umstead had not formulated any response and so forth. He expressed
disappointment. One of the, I don't know whether you would call it a
legend or not—Irving Carlyle of Winston Salem, who was a close friend of
the governor's, spoke to
In my opinion, it did not. As a matter of fact, I don't think Irving Carlyle would have been selected.
You don't.
I do not. I do not think that, you know, based on my best recollection
after so many years. We had a few deaths while I was there, as a matter
of fact, so I went through this senatorial appointment procedure several
times with the governor. I learned a few things out of this. A
senatorial appointment is more than politics. It really is. Politics is
a major component of that decision but an appointment to the U.S. Senate
by a governor is about as important a decision as a governor will ever
make. He is keenly aware of not only the immediate facts involved, [but
also of] the future, the fact that his place in history is on the line.
It's just different from anything else I've ever been through,
appointments of judges, or to the Supreme Court. There's an intensity of
feeling about this among
Well, that's very interesting.
Now, Mr. Umstead, another interesting thing about him, he kept his own counsel as well as any man I've ever seen. I mean with me he was as candid as anybody could be but also he didn't, in things like this, he didn't speculate about them. He didn't talk about such decisions before they were made.
There's another thing about Mr. Umstead, unlike any other governor I've
ever seen, Mr. Umstead had more close personal friends scattered over
North Carolina than any governor I've ever worked for. Much of this went
back to his days at Chapel Hill. His class at Chapel Hill were made up
of a rather remarkable group of men. They all went back to their home
towns, but they stayed in touch. Many of them were in World War I. Many
of them were in the American Legion together. Many of them were big
democratic workers. They stayed in touch. They would go to the reunions
in Chapel Hill. So I could call any one of these persons—one I think of
is Jim Hardison from Wadesboro, for example—I could call him at four
o'clock in the morning, and I'd say, "The governor, William Umstead,
asked me to do this." [And they'd say] "What does he want done?" I mean
like that. There was a bond of personal friendship that meant a great
deal to these men and to Mr. Umstead. He would talk to these people,
It's funny you bring this up because I told Sam Ervin this story three weeks before he died. Hugh Morton and I went to interview him and got a tape. Bless his heart, when we first got there, I didn't think he'd be able to talk because he had terrible emphysema. But he got interested in talking to us and suddenly he was breathing better. We had an interview of about an hour. But I told him this story. When the governor was near a decision, and we knew it was close, Mr. Umstead buzzed me and said, "Get Sam Ervin for me on the telephone. I want to talk just to him personally." I called Ervin's law office or wherever he was. It was Morganton, I think. I got him on the phone.
The Supreme Court.
Yeah, the Supreme Court but I think he was not in Raleigh. He was in
Morganton. He was at his home, I think, or maybe in his law office. I
don't remember. Anyway, I said, "Sam, Governor Umstead wants to speak
with you. Will you hold on, please?" I put him on hold. I walked in the
office, and I picked up the phone for Mr. Umstead. Mr. Umstead said,
"Sam, (or words to this effect) Sam, I've been thinking about this a
long time. I want to appoint you to the United States Senate." That was
it. They talked about how the announcement would be made. It was a big,
big day. I think Sam Ervin was the type of person that Mr. Umstead was
looking for. Sam Ervin and William Umstead were close personal friends.
They both were World War I buddies.
Of course then Luther Hodges came into office. When did the Pearsall plan have its genesis? Mr. Umstead, I believe, started that, didn't he?
Yeah. Let's stop just a minute, and let me get a cup of coffee.
As we mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court decision on desegregation came down in May, 1954. I'd like for you to talk about the genesis of the Pearsall Plan. I believe Governor Umstead began it all with the appointment of a committee.
That's correct.
Let's talk about that.
Well, first of all, I think it's important to understand that the Supreme
Court decision came as a great shock, not only in North Carolina, but
throughout the South. The different governers in different states
reacted in different ways. Mr. Umstead was shocked by the first
bulletin, and the first information I gave him. Of course, we were
overwhelmed with calls from the media for comment from the governor. His
first reaction, and just within minutes, he said, "I will not have any
immediate comment until I see the opinion and have a chance to read it
and understand the ramifications." This in itself was rather unusual
because other governors were expressing
In effect, he said that he thought that the Supreme Court had made a mistake. The Court did not realize the serious complications they were causing the South and its states but that after all was said and done, North Carolina will abide by the law of the land. It would work toward that end. Unlike some other governors, he did not make all kinds of wild allegations or promises or threats. He expressed his dismay at the problems raised by the decision but said North Carolina would do the best it could to deal with the problems. Again, he had resorted to the same procedure of talking to his many close friends and to those he thought had expertise in these areas. He was good at this. He'd get on the phone at the mansion, and he'd have them come in one by one.
I won't ever forget, Donnie Sorrell, who was an old buddy of his… This
was back when the Governor was confined to the mansion. He told me to
call Donnie. Said, "I want to talk to Donnie. Tell him to come over to
the mansion at eight o'clock." He said, "Tell him to come directly to
the mansion. Don't go to
He did a great deal of hard work before he came up with the idea that
there had to be some sort of citizens' group. Of course, the legislature
was not in session, and this was something the governor could do. I
can't tell you why he selected Thomas J. Pearsall. It was an act of
great fortune for North Carolina. I do think that Mr. Umstead realized
that it had to be someone who understood the significance of this great,
far reaching opinion. Such a person had to be able to look down the road
and see where North Carolina eventually had to end. At the same time he
or she had to fully understand the implications, political, emotional,
everything else, impact that it was going to have on the people of North
Carolina, especially from eastern North Carolina. I think Tom was an
ideal choice because he was a former Speaker of the House, a respected
person, lawyer, businessman, well known and well liked throughout the
state. He was a sensitive person, a person who knew how to work with
people
Meanwhile, of course, this was all happening during that same period in 1954, when the governor was trying to follow the work of the Advisory Budget Commission. You know, Mr. Umstead was really up to his eyeballs. So this was all going on at the same time. Tom's account in the manuscript tells about this early period. The truth of the matter, as far as I could tell, Jay, no one knew what the answer was. I mean, above all, there was no crystal ball you could look into. But the one thing that North Carolina did, and I think Tom Pearsall and his initial group and William Umstead understood, was, we've got to have time. We don't know how fast the court will move, or the federal court system will move on this thing, but we've got to have time. People have to adjust to this, and, above all, we've got to save our public schools. That was foremost in William Umstead's mind from the very beginning. How they were going to do it, he and the Pearsall Committee didn't know. But we're going to save our public school system, and we're going to get through this some way. So in that period from May until his death in November, he was involved in these early deliberations. Perhaps it was more the assurance that he understood what they were strugging with. It was a very difficult time.
And then, of course, Hodges, it continued under Hodges. As I recall, in
the 1955 session was when they passed the Pupil Assignment Act. Is that
correct? In effect I think they gave
The details of the Pearsall Plan are all in manuscript, plus available elsewhere. Let me just tell you that another great stroke of fortune was that Luther Hodges also chose Tom Pearsall to continue this assignment. Hodges may have known who he was but, I mean, these two men didn't actually know each other. Following Mr. Umstead's death, one of the first things that Hodges had to do, was what are we going to do about school integration and the Supreme Court decision? Here he was in November with the 1955 General Assembly coming up. Please remember that Mr. Umstead and Mr. Hodges were not close at all. I've never quite understood why except that, in my opinion, they had different backgrounds, and their paths had never really crossed much. I think people close to both of them were at odds. In other words, some of the coolness resulted from their close allies saying, "You can't trust Hodges… or that fellow Umstead won't give you air in a jug." There's a lot of that in politics. Those around the king, they don't want anybody else to…
Yeah. Horn in.
Or they don't like somebody affiliated with the other group, and so you get this. But Umstead and Hodges were polite to each other. Mr. Hodges said this, that he was always treated with courtesy but that, he described it, "There was a coolness."
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]
There was a coolness, you were saying, between Umstead…
Right. In the document we are discussing, Mr. Hodges refers to that. He, of course, offered his support in any way he could as lieutenant governor during 1953-54. He suggested that the State Board of Education, which he chaired as lieutenant governor, meet and cooperate and do anything the governor and the committee wanted them to do. Mr. Umstead kept insisting, "That's fine. We welcome your support but let the Pearsall committee work." He kept saying, "Let this committe work," the Pearsall committee. But Mr. Hodges said in the manuscript that the Board of Education did have a meeting and discussed the integration problem and, in effect, authorized him as chairman to do whatever he thought could be done to cooperate.
Excuse me, I want to interrupt just for the benefit of people who may be
using this tape. The document Ed refers to and will refer to at other
times is a document that was called "Transcription Session on the
History of the Integration Situation in North Carolina, Saturday,
September 2, 1960 in the Governor's Office at the State Capitol."
Chairman Tom Pearsall and Ed Rankin, the former private secretary to
Governors Umstead and Hodges, suggested this taping session be held. It
was an excellent idea. The participants were Governor Hodges, Thomas J.
Pearsall, Paul A. Johnston, state director of administration, Robert E.
Giles, administrative assistant to the governor, and Rankin. This
document is on file at the Southern Oral History
Very definitely.
… as well with W. W. Taylor, who was the chief lawyer, and Tom Ellis, who was the assistant. Then, of course, Dr. I. Beverly Lake, who was the deputy attorney general, and was most influential, because of Harry McMullin, the Attorney General, who was not very vigorous.
He had been ill. He'd had a heart attack, and he was not in good health.
I've always been impressed by the fact that in spite of all those problems, they came up with the plan. What I wanted, I was interested in, I know the legislature, before the governor had that special session in 1956, had briefings. Ralph Howland was called in to help on one of those things. I don't know…
Ralph was called in. Here's where he came in. Holt McPherson was asked to be chairman of the state campaign to adopt the constitutional amendment. Ralph was asked to come in and help with the passage of the amendment.
Was that what it was?
That's right. He was not…
What Ralph told me, you'll be interested in this, he told me that
Governor Hodges' initial plan was to issue a little
I'm not saying that Ralph was not consulted. He was close to all the principles involved.
Yeah. I just want to know what his role was.
Right. But he was not a part of this.
Of the Pearsall thing?
That's correct.
He was just trying to sell the package.
Well, he was trying to be helpful. Ralph was regarded as sort of a senior press statesman at that time, and they were interested…
Well, now, one thing I noticed, and we may be jumping around here, but the governor had meetings with all the legislators from the Piedmont, west, and east. Of course, I was a newspaper man. I remember a lot of those legislators were restive. They didn't think that this was enough and so forth. A lot of them were torn, even though only two of them voted against it. My question was, I got the feeling that Hodges must have gotten pretty firm commitments from members of the legislature from the regional meetings that they had to keep them from going off half-cocked.
Okay. The value of the regional meetings was to prepare for the special
session. When you look back at it, it's astonishing—the governor,
Pearsall and legislative supporters
One of the great things about that, Hodges, in many ways, was the opposite of Mr. Umstead. He understood how to run a big organization. You have to delegate. You have to hold people responsible and accountable to you but you've got to let them go, you know. So he was open to whatever constructive suggestions were made. Of course, he was, as you know, a great communicator. So I imagine that Tom had as much to do as anybody in saying…
First of all, you're correct. The legislators were restive. They didn't
know what we were doing. Also, they are accountable to their voters. In
others words, how do I run for the General Assembly and get elected or
re-elected? What is my position? You could have had a hundred and
seventy different positions
So the meetings were set up. I think the Charlotte
Observer or somebody jumped on it—or maybe it was the News and Observer, I don't know—talking about meetings in the
woods or something.
Well, one feeling that I got just by conversations with these legislators
during the special session—and I think that this is something that the
opponents didn't recognize—all the impulses of the people that I talked
to was going the other direction, massive resistance or some form of it.
Jonathan Daniels, of course, was the chief opponent, the editor of the
News and Observer.
On the other side.
I notice in your document that Charlie Carroll was a little skittish at first, State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Of course that's understandable because he's an elected officer. He might have some legitimate fears, you know. But that's the reason I wondered if you knew whether Hodges got firm commitments. Did he seek to get a binding commitment from all these legislators?
Not to my knowledge. I didn't attend any of these meetings. Bob Giles went to them. That would be a good question to ask him. Not to my knowledge, but the Pearsall leaders definitely caucused after every meeting and asked, "What's the response? How do we stand now?" I'm talking about the group. They kept in close touch, and they kept in close touch with, of course, the Governor. I'm sure many of the legislators would say, "Governor, I'm with you. I'm going to vote for it."
I was just curious because…
No, I don't think any effort… You know, I think the hardest thing—this is one of the great things about historic perspective—was to look back and realize that everybody was floundering. I mean really. Except there was an instinctive feeling in North Carolina among many people that somehow we're going to save our schools. We're not going to destroy our public school system in this process. We don't know how we are going to do it, but we're going to do it. They were coming at it from different ways. I don't mean that that was a clear statement. As you well know T. Taylor came back from his swing around the South and had this proposal to just take the requirement for public schools out of the constitution. That the State of North Carolina would not offer public education. I mean it was as dramatic as that.
It was W. W. Taylor's and Tom Ellis'…
This was T. Taylor. Yeah, W. W., that's right, T. Taylor.
This was after they went on their great trip through the South.
Yeah, they went on that big trip, you know. They did this dog and pony show down to Louisiana and other states, and they came back with all kinds of…
Said take it out of the constitution all together.
Yeah, that was one of their proposals.
So I'm saying there were all shades of resistance to the Brown decision.
Much of it was just absolute fury and anger at interference of the
federal government, and of course as many public elected
I think one element in this, as a businessman who spent all his life in business, big business, that Hodges was able to get the support of the business establishment in North Carolina behind this plan. I'm sure one argument was disruption is bad for business. Don't you think that was a pretty big factor.
Definitely. Mr. Hodges was a man of many talents. I worked for him for
five years. I traveled with him and everything, all over the United
States. I traveled with him in western Europe, and I went with him
wherever. He could walk in a board room and command the respect of Tom
Watson of IBM, or he could go in a crossroads store and sit down and
talk to a bunch of guys sitting around a cracker barrel and communicate
with them. He had that talent. He was an amazing combination. I've just
never seen anybody in public life who had quite that range, maybe FDR,
somebody like that had it. There are not many people who had that
ability. He was respected by the business, industrial community mainly
because he'd been successful. He knew what it was to meet a payroll and
do all the things that business people respect. And he had devoted his
time to it, and he said, "This is the answer." Yes, business people were
concerned. But I think he was able to cut across a wider range. Part of
it might be the fact that he had so little background in the Democratic
political party. He didn't have a lot of scars from past campaigns. I
mean that was a benefit for him really. What business people knew about
him was basically favorable. He hadn't had to battle in the political
arena. He hadn't had to make a lot of people mad,
Well, now, as you recall those days, did the governor's office get a whole lot of input from the public, and if so, what was the tone of it during this period?
We got, it was…
Across the spectrum.
Yeah, across the spectrum. We were battered on all sides. Overwhelmingly correspondence and calls and visitors [said], "Why don't you do something? Tell them (the Federal Courts) to go to hell. What the heck are you going to do?" The majority—then on the other side, those who agreed with the Brown decision, the academic, the liberal people—I don't even like to use that term anymore because it's hard to define liberal and conservative anymore. But back in those days perhaps it was clearer, like Irving Carlyle who said, "Of course, we're going to obey the law." Well, the problem with that approach is, it's over simplistic. You've got to say, certainly, North Carolina will obey the law, but it's going to do this within a framework of the kind of state we are, and where we are, and the circumstances. We are going to have to work our way through it, and at that point in time. That was a very simplistic statement to make. I mean Irving was a great person and a fine man, but just to say, of course, "we'll obey the court opinion" was ludicrous.
You've got to have public support.
Right. You may, in effect, be absolutely working against what it was that you're trying to achieve by just that simple statement.
The document that we've been talking about, State Superintendent Carroll
was at first sort of indifferent to the thing but later on he came
around. Do you recall anything else
You're talking about Charlie Carroll's…
Any general subject matter.
Well, let me say, if you know Charlie Carroll—he's a very fine gentlemen, he really is, first rate—he's the personification of a school man. By that I mean the rectitude of doing things by the numbers, you know. We are going to operate correctly. We are going to show up on time. School's going to open on time. You're going to keep your attendance. You're going to do your studies. He is a school man. His whole life was built around this. Certainly, he understood the ramifications, the political ramifications within the state superintendency of education, the school systems, the county boards and all that, thoroughly familiar with that. [He was] a man highly respected by most school people and legislators. Some of them didn't think that Charlie Carroll was a very effective school superintendent, per se, but they all respected him. This had nothing to do with the Pearsall Plan. They just said here's a good man but he probably is not the best we could have there, but he's all right. Now, when the Brown decision hit, of course, he was in the middle of a whirlwind. I think his reaction was to pull back.
The other thing you have to remember, too, is the fact that he and Hodges
didn't get along very well. Hodges looked upon Charlie, I think, as kind
of a ho-hum, status quo, and Hodges was an action man. You know, "Let's
get on with it. What's the
Tom Pearsall told me something interesting. I don't know if you know
anything about this or not. He said that when T. Taylor and Tom Ellis
brought back some of these alternatives or whatever you want to call it,
recommendations, that he
They were in the Agricultural Building.
Pearsall told me that he took, personally took that thing out and burned
it.
Well, that must have been another report because somewhere in there he
refers to the report that Ellis and Taylor brought back. He makes a
reference to some document as if he still had it. I'm not sure which one
that was. The appointment of Tom Ellis was an unfortunate choice. In
this document Tom Pearsall admits that Colonel William Joyner, who
incidentally was one of the great legal minds in North Carolina at that
time and contributed enormously to the success of drafting the law and
related matters, but he had recommended Tom Ellis.
I notice that Dave Coltrane recommended T. Taylor. They didn't have a very scientific way of going about getting counsel.
Talking about Dave Coltrane. I never will forget Paul telling me this
story. Paul Johnston said that when Dave was running the budget office,
they were preparing the budget recommendations for the legislature. He
went in Dave's office, and Dave was going over a budget document with a
pencil, striking through certain line items. Paul said, "What are you
doing?" Dave said, "I'm cutting this budget. It's too much." Paul asked,
"Well, what's the basis for your cuts?" Dave, "I'm
Well, you have to remember about T. Taylor and Tom Ellis—they went on to
later fame or whatever—I think first of all that both men were well
meaning. They were representing a spectrum of thought as was I. Beverly
Lake that was counter to reality in my judgment and in Governor Hodges'
and others. In other words, they were for bitter resistance at any cost,
including the public schools, to not allow integration to happen. But
their opposition was very genuine. I don't think at the time that they
were using it for their own personal gain, per se. I think they were
carrying out what they felt was right for North Carolina. They did
create problems for the Pearsall Committee, especially later on in the
special session of the General Assembly. Taylor and Ellis were making
comments, and they were making some speeches, and they were issuing
statements or comments without authority of the committee. But their
efforts did not change the committee's recommendations because they
didn't concur. Tom understood their position, as did the other members
of the committee, and so the Pearsall leaders basically just worked
around them. But you understand it wasn't just these two guys. I mean
there were other people. I. Beverly Lake, of course, was the major one
but Byrd Satterfield, Sam Worthington in the
He was Hodges' first legal assistant.
Yeah. I'll tell you a quick story about how Paul came to joing Governor
Hodges' staff. So many things are just happenstance. You say, well, how
did a man of Paul Johnston's ability and stature end up working for
Hodges? They didn't know each other. What happened was this. Mr. Umstead
died. As I told you, he had never really completed his staff
appointments. I was his only male employee. I was running everything. I
was operating the office. I was the administrative person. I signed all
the notary commissions and other legal requirements. I was, you know,
doing everything, handling media, and writing speeches, and news
releases, etc. One of the reasons that Mr. Umstead was very angry at
Governor Kerr Scott—of course, they were not close at all—he said Scott
wasted a lot of money by having two men in the office. Scott had Ben
Roney and John Marshall. Mr. Umstead said, "We don't need two men. You
can run it."
After he said let's get on with it, I said, "Governor, there's a couple
of things we've got to do. We've got to have a lawyer. All work stuff
with the attorney general, fugitive warrants, and things, I can sign my
name but I don't know what all this is about. I've got too much else to
do. We need a lawyer." So he said, "Well, I can understand that. I'll
take care of it." Two or three days went by (this was in late November
of '54 and the 1955 legislature is coming, the Pearsall thing's going
on, etc.) and the Governor said, "Ed, I've having trouble finding an
attorney. I've called two or three people, and you just can't pick up a
good lawyer right now. They just can't drop everything and come in." He
called the name of a lawyer over in Greensboro, Elton Edwards, and he
said, "I've known him, and I asked him if he couldn't just drop
everything." Edwards said, "It'll take me three months at least to clear
out things so I can come." So I said, "Governor, let me make a
suggestion. You're a good friend of Albert Coates, and Albert will do
anything in the world for you. I know he's got a lot of
You say he was a key player in the Pearsall Plan?
He was a key player in the Pearsall Plan. Had the ability to run
interference between these various people involved, between the Attorney
General, Tom Pearsall, Colonel Joyner, and I. Beverly Lake, who was a
big player on the scene. Mr. Lake was over there, you know, churning
around. Paul was a respected legal scholar. He quickly proved his
ability. He was a key person. Now let me say one thing, Paul understood
better than most people the challenge facing North Carolina. He said,
"What a position to be in. We have to publicly have a goal of opposing
integration and doing everything in our power to prevent it from
happening while at the same time planning to let it happen. We know
we're going from A to Z but we don't know yet how we're going to get to
Z, and when we find out, we can't admit we're getting to Z." That's the
kind of mind he had. He realized this early on. So he was very much a
major player. Colonel Joyner, as I said, was probably the most
preeminent lawyer in the group and respected both in the General
Assembly and in school circles. His father, James Y. Joyner, had been
the patron saint of public schools for years, and the Colonel was a very
respected corporate lawyer. Paul worked hand and glove with him. He
could work with Joyner, work with Pearsall. He had the respect of the
people in the Attorney General's department. He did it quietly and
effectively, and yet he really could turn out the work. So he was a key
player. Bob Giles later came when Paul became the first director of
administration. He also was a valuable and talented member of the team.
It was an interesting
Now, Ed, if you would, elaborate a little bit about Tom Pearsall and his fellow members of that commission, and how they were able to do what they did.
Well, I think the main thing is the nature of the people involved. Is that still running?
Yeah, it's running.
The key players in this were people who had a deep understanding and a deep love of North Carolina, and, above all, I don't think allowed their own ego and their own personal ambition to interfere with what they were doing. And through this understanding they were able to deal with—as Albert Coates said, "Any young lawyer or public official must suffer fools gladly." I don't mean those opposing the Pearsall Plan were fools. I mean the Pearsall Plan leaders had an openness and willingness to deal with whatever the position other people came from because they could really understood how they felt about it. They understood the anger. They understood the frustration. They understood the political sensitivities involved for these members of the General Assembly and for the people in the state government.
I think the Pearsall group was disappointed generally with Charlie
Carroll. They didn't think he was a strong leader, and they thought he
was not supportive enough of what they were trying to do. But they
understood that. So this enabled them to work around and through to try
to still move forward without open
One thing, you had some opponents. My recollection is you didn't have any
ground swell of opposition. The constitutional amendments, and so forth,
passed about four to one. You had some, I mean, Jonathan Daniels and a
few other
Well, in many cases, of course, your opposition like Jonathan Daniels helps you at a time like this. You need somebody on the other side to take a position that, you know, can motivate many people to say, "Well, I'm not going to do that." It is often human nature to react this way: "If he takes that position, I'm going to go the other way." And you're going to have opposition, too.
One of the ingenious features of the plan was that—while you can call it a safety valve and say you could get a tuition grant or something to send your child to a segregated school and so forth—in intolerable