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Transcript on deposit at The Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Library
Citation of this interview should be as follows:
“Interview
L-0122, in the Southern Oral History Program Collection #4007,
Southern
Historical Collection, The Wilson Library,
University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill”
Economist David Breneman worked briefly for the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) under President Jimmy Carter. In this interview, Breneman
reflects on his ninety days of service as the aide to HEW General Counsel, Peter
Libassi, in 1977, and his role in HEW's establishment of
desegregation criteria for southern universities and colleges. Breneman begins
the interview with a discussion of his role in the drafting of those criteria
following the Adams v. Califano decision in 1977. In addition
to outlining his own role in the process, Breneman discusses the work of
Secretary of Education Joe Califano, Arlene Pact, and Libassi. Although
Breneman's focus is on HEW throughout the interview, he also mentions
the role of the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the establishment of a federal
desegregation policy, and discusses the leadership of director David Tatel.
After briefly outlining how HEW worked to establish the criteria for
desegregation, Breneman turns to a discussion of the role of southern states in
determining and following the criteria, focusing specifically on North Carolina.
Breneman offers an assessment of HEW's meeting with the president of
the University of North Carolina system, William Friday, and other UNC officials
in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. According to Breneman, HEW was especially
concerned about finding ways to work with Friday in the process, which he
describes as both "cordial" and "adversarial.
" According to Breneman, claims that North Carolina was unfairly
targeted during the desegregation process are unfounded, although he does
acknowledge that members of the OCR thought education officials in North
Carolina were not interested in implementing federal policies. In addition to
outlining the unique negotiation process in North Carolina, Breneman also
identifies HEW's emphasis on eradicating duplicate programs at
historically white and historically African American universities and colleges
as an impediment to desegregation. Breneman concludes the interview with a brief
discussion of his work on the American Council on Education (ACE) later on in
the 1980s.
Economist David Breneman discusses his brief tenure with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977. In this interview, Breneman describes his role in the establishment of federal criteria for school desegregation, focusing particularly on HEW's interactions with education officials in North Carolina.
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
Hello.
Yes, I'm still here.
I just wanted to make sure—I'm tape recording and that's what we'd said before. I hope that's okay with you. Is that okay?
Okay.
You understand that and everything?
Yeah, sure.
I wanted to make sure. Okay, you had mentioned earlier that you knew Bill Friday in connection with the Carter campaign and the task force, or —
Well, that's too fancy of term. It really wasn't a
full blown task force. It really amounted to Bill Friday, I think Mike
Kinpain[?], myself, and then I guess we probably may have drawn in
others as needed. But mainly we just—I forget the name of the
young man in the Carter campaign crowd that was sort of our go-between.
But he had contacted Bill
Uh-huh. I was going to ask you what kind of presentation you had? Or was it —
Oh, it was, you know, a variety of memoranda, essentially. And, I mean we were, I think, you know, at least Bill Friday certainly was, I think, a designated official, you know. He was not ad hoc[?] to the extent that there would have been no record of it. I mean I'm sure he was—I mean, I think, he was actually, you know, in some considerable contact with the campaign group. And he was kind of official representative of education to that group.
I see.
So there was a certain irony, you know, when the administration got in office that we turned—that we're turned around and we're down there pressing a fairly tough desegregation plan on the very party that had helped us campaign.
Yeah. He had sort of understood himself to have close contacts, I guess, with the administration.
Well, I mean, other people would have to comment on that. I didn't never really discuss that at great length with him. But, I mean, he somehow or another he had been singled out. I suppose as a leading educator in the south he was sort of a born natural.
Natural people they would contact. How exactly did you—how and when did you get into the administration work? Did you join the administration? Was it right in the beginning of the —
It was fairly early. Let me think. There was something like six
economists from Brookings that joined the Carter administration. And I
was by no means the first. I think I was fifth or sixth. So there must
have been several months. You know, as a deputy assistant secretary that
comes after the, you know, the array of under-secretaries and assistant
secretaries. And those appointments have to be made. And then I was
simply was contacted—I forget by whom. I
actually—you know, the administration had a small staff of
people that were actually doing a kind of personnel round-up for them.
And I was contacted
I see.
I was there—I would have been there probably three to four months, or five months after things got going, I guess. It was about that scale. It was early. Early into the first year.
How long did you stay?
I stayed exactly, believe it not, ninety days.
Yes, I'm still here.
— in part because so many of us were going into the
administration, Bruce McCroy[?] had decided he couldn't
afford to do that any longer so you really had to resign. And I was very
dubious about the
I see. So you had sort of a ninety day trial period?
Yeah. That's right. I stayed ninety days and
then—it was just—part of the problem was that the
position of the Assistant Secretary of Education, which Mary held, was
really a strange and untenable one. You know, it was a
brand—a relatively new position. And theory it was the top
position in the department on education. In practice it really
wasn't. In practice the Commissioner of Education has
ninety-nine percent of the budget and all of the history and the
tradition and all of the program and everything. But Mary essentially
had a small policy staff, was about all she had. So when I joined it I
talked to her at some length and expressed my view, which I think is and
was an accurate one, that given the circumstances what she could
accomplish, if
And that was going on from the beginning?
Well, yeah, that was going on very quickly early on. So, I just didn't—I felt I had—and my position as deputy was I had no independent status other than as Mary's—you know, I was on Mary's team. And I either had to back her or betray her. And I wasn't prepared to betray her and I didn't feel like backing her. So, I went back and wrote books.
I see. Tell me about the development of the criteria. I know that the
criteria—relating that is to desegregation of higher ed. I
know that these were
Right.
Which specified that HEW draft guidelines or criteria. I wonder if you could tell me about—a little bit about the development of those and particularly who was involved in the drafting of the criteria and how they were drafted?
Well again here, I probably should have kept a diary from that period, but I didn't.
Yeah, well, it's been awhile.
And my memory is a little fuzzy. Oddly enough, the ninety days I was in
almost, I think, exactly coincided with the heaviest work on the
Adam's criteria. I mean, it was just one of those things. And
I got involved with it almost right away. And probably saw through at
least, you know, a major part of it in the formative period. My memory
of it is as follows. Peter Libassi was on board by that time and had
been given, you know, the responsibility to work this out. And I was
sort of delegated, almost to an offense to his staff, to help on it. And
I don't know,
Arlene Mindelson Pact[?].
Mindelson?
Well, it was Mindelson Pact—Pact—what it must have been then, Arlene Pact. Is that right?
She and I were—at one stage, I remember the two of us working
on it. I mean, she was sort of bringing the legal—the legal
background, and I was bringing the educational knowledge about, you
know, sort of what's possible and what's doable,
and how fast can you do it. And we were trying to blend
To what extent did you consult with the states, the ten states involved, while you were drafting? Did you have —
Well, let's see. I remember we had one or two visitations in
Washington. It seems to me, and again this is very hazy, but it seems to
me there was a group from Arkansas or Oklahoma that came in and saw us,
and we talked with them. And, you know, essentially what we
did—what we did in our conversations with the affected party,
once we got on to this general strategy, is we explained the strategy to
them. And said, "This is the way we're going to go.
Did you divide—was there a division of labor in terms of some of the people working on the criteria from HEW, who were responsible for certain states? Or was it not divided up that way?
I don't think it was divided that way, really.
There was just a general drafting of the criterion, then?
Yeah, as I remember, we had six states that were central to the case. And then there were other—there were several other states that were in some kind of secondary capacity. And I don't remember why exactly. Either they had had separate rulings that put them in a different category. But, as memory serves me, I think we were really focusing strongly on six states. It seems to me it would have been what, Florida, Georgia, Arkansas, maybe Louisiana, North Carolina, —
Virginia, perhaps?
Virginia, I guess you're right. Probably Louisiana wasn't in there. Virginia, and then it seems to me Oklahoma.
Oklahoma, right, that's right.
They were sort of the big—somehow the big six were the ones that we were really —
Focusing on?
— concentrating on.
I've heard reference made to a so-called Blue Ribbon Panel that reviewed the criteria. Do you know anything about it?
Well, gee, I've forgotten all about it. You're right. There was some kind of a group, and I can't even—I can't tell you who was on it. And I can't even remember —
Do you know how many times they met?
I know they did meet once.
They met once?
Yeah. I guess they met once while I was there, at least. I can remember
that now. And I think that was just sort of, you know, it was not
a—it was a good faith effort to try to get some additional
parties involved. But I'm sure, you know, there was, you
know, there was a political agenda, too, to either gather their support
or to give the whole thing a greater sense of legitimacy, or clout, or
something. I don't remember them, honestly, having a major
Yeah.
I think it may have been a little bit of window dressing.
And they met not that much? Maybe once. That seems to be my impression.
Mind you—they—what may have happened—I'm really unclear as to the details of what happened after I left. So, I mean, most everything I'm saying is really on this ninety day window.
Yeah. What about the Legal Defense Fund? Did they have any input in the drafting of the criteria? Or, only insofar as they had to be informed in advance about the plan. I think that was of the court—court requirements was that all documents had to—all HEW policy had to be given to them in advance of it becoming public. Do you recall any other?
Let me just think. Tell you what, this is maybe not related, but your question triggered something else that I just remembered.
Yeah.
Which was when we started this. Let's see, Peter Libassi was what, the General Counsel?
Yes.
And he was very much, you know, my memory was he was very much in charge of it. I mean, it's his baby, you know, it was his thing. And people from other parts of HEW were sort of delegated to work with him and his staff on it. And I remember a big kind of shift occurring when David Tatel joined. You know, he came in to the office to head up, what, OCR, I think, Office of Civil Rights.
When Tatel joined the administration, you mean?
Pardon?
When he became director of OCR? Is that what you mean?
Yeah. He must not—he came on later than I did, even, I guess.
Yeah. He came on in May.
Yeah. And suddenly when he came on board, then things kind of got derailed a little bit. And I don't remember again the specifics. But all of a sudden he wanted to—he had opinions and definite interests in this case. And suddenly he wanted to get OCR into it in a much more significant way than they had been into it up to that point. And I seem to remember some very genuine conflict between him and Libassi. And I don't know, you know, whether that was over substance or over turf, I'm not sure. But I think, you know, his arrival marked a definite internal change of sorts. I mean, just in terms of another significant player that wasn't, you know, all together happy. You know, my memory was he probably—I'm not sure he was as happy with the approach we were taking as we were. But that ought to be independently confirmed. Now, the Legal Defense Fund—yeah, I remember them, now that you mention it, that they were involved. But I can't really say anything that stands out in my memory about that.
Was OCR pretty much uninvolved until Tatel? Is that what you're saying?
Well, they were supplying a lot of data. There was a—let's see, a woman who—let me think, Paula—oh gosh, what was her name? She's now married to John Phillips, who is a friend of mine. He was head of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities for ten years. He and Paula got married. Anyway —
Oh, Paula Coobler[?]. Coobler. Coobler.
Coobler. That's right. She's the principle person from OCR. Where was Ar—was Arlene—let's see, was she OCR? Or was she General Counsel? I guess she was General Counsel, wasn't she?
I believe so, yes.
Anyway, Paula was very much involved, but mostly from a
data—you know, she—they had, you know, we were
using numbers anywhere we could get 'em. And the Office of
Civil Rights had, such as it was, the best data we could get our hands
on. And since the criteria were very intensely data-oriented kinds of
criteria, you know—they were mostly, as I
Uh-uh.
And then I think when Tatel came in that's when somebody with a definite, you know, a more pronounced opinion on things, and a little more equal weight, came into it from OCR's side.
He came in with a good bit of weight, didn't he? I mean he —
I think so.
Yeah.
Yeah.
Definitely a strong appointment on the part of Califano.
Right. And I, you know, I think it would pay you—it would be
worth your while to make sure you understand the whatever it
was—the
Do you know—one of the things I've heard about OCR is that it was in some disarray.
Yeah, I think that's right.
Is that something you might have heard about?
Well, to some degree, yeah. I mean they were—yeah, I would—partly, you know, they were being—trying to do an awful lot of things. And they running around collecting data. And a lot of the people who were doing some of the data collecting, I think, weren't really trained to do that sort of thing. So they were—you know, it was not a very—it seemed to me not to be a terribly well run department at the point I got there. I don't know their internal history that well, who was their—who their head was coming out of the Nixon era —
It was slightly demoralized during those years.
Yeah. I would guess that. Yeah. I think there was a lot of uncertainty about exactly what they were doing, and why, and how.
You attended this meeting in Chapel Hill, I gather?
Right.
This is June sixth and seventh in 1977?
Yeah.
And the purpose of that meeting was to—well, what was the purpose of that meeting? How would you describe it? Information gathering, mainly?
Well, I think, again my memory—partly that. But my memory was
I think we—partly because of Bill Friday's role,
you know, in the campaign and his connection, you know, in the sense
that he had connections in the Carter administration, the feeling that
he was, you know—I think there was a real sense of political
sensitivity with regard to North Carolina on this one. I mean a feeling
that, you know, somehow we didn't want Bill Friday
running—trying to run back up through the
Carter—directly to Carter with
That delegation?
— the three of us go down. And I think, as I say, I think
we—it was with the—with due deference to the
political clout that we thought might exist there. And also I think we
felt we were probably going to be up against, in some ways, a more
astute group of people in North Carolina. And that
I gather one of the main areas of concern was this question of enrollment and the —
Yeah, that was one of our key criteria.
And the—what eventually became the 150 percent rule, that —
Well, I don't even know—what was that? I don't remember that.
Well, that may have come after you left. That was evolving out of those discussions that was along about the latter part of the summer, which you may have been gone by then.
Yeah. I think I left June 30.
Okay. But the focus of that meeting was on enrollment.
Yeah, that was a big issue in the criteria. There were a couple of incidents, I think, let's see, where was it? Was it in North Carolina? Anyway, there were a couple incidents where schools literally and practicably, you know, across the street from each other were—
Yes.
— were established. And we were concerned about that.
I'm sure we had criterion in
Yes.
They may have been affected by that.
Well, A&T and Greensboro.
Greensboro, yeah.
A&T is in Greensboro.
Oh, okay, yeah. It was those two.
Two campuses two miles apart. Yeah.
One of the other issues that we were really perplexed about, and I
can't remember how we ultimately handled it, but we were very
concerned about the historically black colleges. And, you know, the
question arose, I mean, were we applying the same criteria to them that
we were applying to the historically white colleges, and in other words
were we going to have to have, you know, were they going be under the
pressure to have proportionate share of white enrollment in them. And my
sentiment was we were
I'm wondering about the intent behind, I believe it was Criteria 1-C, which was the—had to do with program duplication, elimination duplication, because there seems to be a difference in terms of timing. And duplication doesn't become the central issue long after you had left, until about 1978, January of '78. Very little said about it in '77. And —
Well, the only thing I remember was we, you know, we—I think where we had a case of a historically black college, you know, very close to a non-black college. I forget, there was a case where, and gosh, I think it was in North Carolina, where, you know, the state had tried to set up some comparable programs in the black college.
Yeah.
And sort of, and I think in our view, that had the—was clearly for the intent and purpose of maintaining a segregated system, and therefore we were trying to, you know, we didn't want them exercising, you know, using that kind of out. Maybe the thing that's a little fuzzy about '77, is in '77 to get into program duplication would in a sense have been a violation of the sort of the spirit of what we were trying to do. Because we were trying to back HEW and OCR out of the business of that kind of micro-management.
Right.
I mean, you know, we were trying to just say, "Look, you know, in principle, we want to get a set of agreed upon criteria that can be measured and monitored and, you know, we will agree then—that if—and if we all agree, and the judge agrees, that if you meet these criteria by the time, you know, the time frame we suggest then you will be in compliance. And don't bother the internal process. I mean, that's not our business. Anyway you want to get there you can do it." So, in a way the program duplication doesn't sound like the kind of thing we should have been dealing with as long as we were in that style.
My impression —
I do remember discussion of it.
It seems—well, once the question of negotiations becomes completely under David Tatel's control it seems duplication arises. It becomes much more important. It's much more a kind of central issue.
You know, I think what you've just done is to clarify, in my
thinking, what the disagreement was between Libassi and Tatel. And that
was, the whole OCR mentality, I think, had been very much this, you
know, first off, they were really—the OCR people were
intensely hostile toward higher education. I really think that was
apparent. Maybe that's a blanket statement. But I think most
of the time—in my memory of Arlene was, you know, she viewed
Bill Friday and people like Bill Friday as the, you know, pretty bad
guys. And out to try to defeat any attempt to, you
know—completely opposed to desegregation and not about to do
a damned thing to help it. And so with that mind-set I think the OCR
view was, you've got to just flat control these people every
way you can. You've got to tie 'em down, nail
'em down, you've got to, you know, you really have
to go in and practically
Yeah.
I was very supportive of the outcomes orientation. And so, you know, I
think Michael Keef was. And I guess Libassi must have been, as well. So,
sort of the three of us were kind of—internally thought of
ourselves as trying to get the job done. But also trying to do it in a
way that made some sense
Yeah.
In their view it was best done by direct intervention.
What—the reception—what kind of reception did you have in Chapel Hill? Was it —
Well, it was utterly cordial. But it was adversarial. I mean, we did not
have the feeling we were down there on any kind of honeymoon. And, you
know, it was very nice. I think we had a nice dinner. And, you know,
I—you know, plain, good hospitality. But there was no
question they were on one side of the table and we were on the other.
And we were the enemy. And I suppose to some extent we saw them as the
enemy, even though oddly enough the three of us were, you know, in our
own view probably thought of ourselves as being sympathetic to the
interests of higher education. And I found it awkward because here
I'd been, you know, a few months earlier working with Bill
Friday on behalf
Yeah.
Sort of on that line of discourse.
Was there—you've mentioned that politically Bill
Friday and North Carolina were given special handling. Was
there—in any other sense was North Carolina treated
differently? The UNC people, well, after all of this, and, you know,
once it got into more of a courtroom sort of situation, claimed
No, I don't know what they would base that on. I mean the criteria were, you know, presumably applicable to all states. Right?
Right.
I mean there wasn't anything—there
wasn't a special set of criteria for North Carolina. So I
don't know why they would have—I'm not
sure what basis they would have had for that comment. In fact, I mean if
anything, I would say—let me put it this way. I remember two
different things going on. On the one hand, there was, as I mentioned, I
think a good deal of sensitivity regarding North Carolina and Bill
Friday's status, vis-a-vis the Carter administration. And,
you know, if anything that would have weighed against—that
would have weighed in their favor. You know, we'd have gone
out of our way to not do something of the hostile nature in that
setting. On the other hand, those people, see, there was—most
of—most of us, Libassi, I, Moteef[?], all of us were brand
new to this case, really. I mean we hadn't any history of
working at it and so on. The
But would have been perhaps concern with breaking North Carolina or making an example of North Carolina? Or is that stretching it too far?
It could have been. I mean I—I don't know how that played out. I mean, I suppose this would have showed up ultimately in David Tatel's behavior because he would have been sitting on the staff that felt this way most strongly. So if there is any crick in my memory, I would have thought it would have showed up increasingly through his involvement. I don't know if you've got any evidence of that.
Well, it's not direct evidence. It's sort of indirect. Someone like Burton Taylor. Do you remember him?
I remember the name. Yeah, I don't think I ever met him. Or if I did I only met him once or twice. I can remember his name. And I remember sending stuff back and forth to him. He was one of those long term OCR people, right?
Right. The person sort of in charge of the higher ed. part of the—at OCR.
Well, I think in that group, North Carolina was really was singled out in their minds as the most obstreperous and the most—the toughest adversary they had. And there was really no love lost. No question about that. That predated—I mean, that attitude certainly predated the Carter administration. And predated our arrival. And then my sense was, until Tatel got there, there wasn't anybody in the leadership part of the HEW group that would have necessarily shared that view. So, it only—I think it would have gotten voiced primarily through, you know, at the leadership level through Tatel.
Through Tatel?
If it got through at all.
Certainly not through Libassi?
I don't think so.
Yeah.
You know, I don't think so. Now I think after we had that meeting down there, and I'm not absolutely sure I remember this right, but, I mean, I don't think Libassi came out of that meeting feeling all that well-disposed toward Friday and the North Carolina folks. I mean, it was a tendinous[?] meeting. And, you know, we had—I think, you know, we had gone down there kind of feeling like, rightly or wrongly, kind of feeling like we were sort of the good guys. You know, we felt we were sort of the voice of sweet reason trying to find a reasonable way to deal with the law and deal with the nuances of higher education. And we felt we knew something about higher education. And so we went down there, I think, thinking we were bringing good news, potentially. And we didn't get received that way. So I think there may have been a heightened level of irritation.
That's interesting.
For all I know that—it may have percolated and gotten worse, in fact, after that meeting.
What sort of role in this meeting did Bill Friday play? Was he—he had his team—you say he had this large group of people with him. He had his administrative team with him, I guess?
Yeah.
Was he the primary spokesman? Or did he then —
No, I seem to remember a—somebody who was basically a numbers cruncher. You know, at the VP-type level. I don't know whether it was the business officer, the provost, —
Joyner, probably?
Who?
Felix Joyner.
Boy.
He was the budget guy.
Yeah, I'll be honest with you, I don't remember the name well enough to confirm it. But I seem to remember, you know, somebody there who had books, you know, stacks and stacks of books with numbers in them. And had gone through and, you know, had taken each of our criteria and had come up with examples of how that would apply to North Carolina. And how utterly bizarre and absurd the criteria were in that regard. I mean I think Friday was kind of the host and, you know, he was mixed in with it, certainly. I don't remember him setting back as a declining—as a fading lily or anything. But I do seem to remember some of his lieutenants kind of carrying the charge.
Do you have any sort of, in retrospect, any observations you'd like to offer on the—this is kind of a critical period in terms of what came later because the criteria—provide the basis for —
I guess I had the sense, you know, knowing a certain amount about higher
education—and this is my first time ever to get into
something that had a legal dimension to it. I felt that the approach we
were taking was the right approach. I mean, I
Well, the case is actually closed officially now.
It is now?
Yeah, as of June 1990.
Does that mean, ostensibly, the criteria, or something like it, has been met, or what? Or did people just wear out?
Well, I think everybody got worn out, including the judge.
A war of attrition, huh?
Yeah. Because it got so—it was such a broad case. Not just higher ed. but eventually became to include everything.
I definitely remember—I mean I remember having a feeling that a lot of the people in OCR, I felt, really were zealots. You know, I had a—I did not have a lot of sympathy with some of the attitudes I got over there. I mean they were really single-minded. And I didn't feel they understood at all what they were dealing with. So it was—I guess I have just sort of memories of it being extremely interesting. And I learned a lot personally. But whether it did the country any good, it's kind of unclear to me right now.
Well, I want to thank you for all your time.
Are you getting hold of everybody that —
Pretty much —
[END OF TAPE 1, SIDE A]
[START OF TAPE 1, SIDE B]
— too much in the thick of it.
Did Califano play many—did he intervene very much? Or just kept informed about it, I guess?
Well, in a sense, he's the kind of guy that intervenes in
everything, if he can. I mean
Yeah.
But he wanted to get the job done, too. I think he wanted to get the case handled and done right. I don't remember any particular ideological picks on it that he had, other than having the thing work out and go well. But I, you know, definitely interested. It wasn't just something that he was, you know, off in another corner ignoring.
Yeah.
Oh, yeah. What was that?
— not getting into that at all. But he chaired that. And I was a member of that group.
What—tell me about that group?
Well, that was a very fascinating exercise. He chaired that with a very
light hand. You know, I think the group was mostly presidents. And it
turned out that the real contention there was between Derrick Bach and
John Broudermous[?]. And as my memory serves, we met, I don't
know, seven or eight times, something like that, banging away on that
thing. And we had a poor staff guy, Art Hoffman, trying to write it. And
Broudermous and Bach never seemed to come at the same—to the
same meeting. I mean, one would be there and the other would be missing.
Whoever was missing would then get whatever draft or notes we had and
would write a great lengthy tome back saying he totally disagreed with
the approach being taken. And it really kind of boiled down to those two
guys sparring with each other through the medium of that committee. And
never facing each other head on. The basic issue was that, you know,
this was supposed to be
He was chair of this, though?
Pardon?
He was chair of the commission?
Yeah, he was chair of it. But he kind of, you know —
Kind of laid back?
Pardon?
He laid back on it?
Yeah, he really laid back. He didn't try to steer it or force it at all. And maybe that was smart. I mean, given he was playing with some big egos. Maybe he was smart to do it that way. But he was a little more—you know, I don't know whether it was just age, or a little bit of indifference. I don't know what it was. But he was not a monumental force in that one at all that I can remember.
Which committee—tell me the exact name of this commission?
Oh, I forget exactly. Let's see, it was the—it was the American Counsel on Education, sponsor.
I see.
And it was a report published under the title, A Memo or a Message to the Forty-first President.
Oh, I see.
And it was an ad hoc commission. I mean it was pulled together by ACE,
essentially. I think
I see.
Something like that. Maybe a little larger. Maybe it was more than that. Maybe it was twenty-five or thirty of us for all I can remember. But we—it was—the people there at ACE, American Counsel on Education, took it very seriously. They were trying to, you know, get something out that would be punchy and readable and sensible and might really have an impact. I mean they really, they carried the wa—I mean, after Bush was elected, I mean, they arranged, I think, to get—a couple of the presidents managed to meet with Bush and pass it on to him personally. And, you know, they really tried to work it. And it's a decent enough report. Nothing earthshaking. But, anyway Bill chaired that. I don't know whether he was terribly active in any of the follow-up. I think he did do some. But it came out, what, right around the—it must have been right around the—it must have been right around just before or after the election, I guess.
I see. '88, '89, it was?
Yeah, something like that.
Yeah.
It was really `89.
Well, okay, anything else you'd like to add, or do you think we've —
No, I think you've got just about everything. More—in fact, you've got more than I thought I could remember.
I certainly appreciate your time.
Right. Well, good luck. It should be an interesting book.
And I'll send that form along to you.
Good.
I appreciate your help.
Thanks.
Thanks a lot.
Bye.
Bye.
END OF INTERVIEW