"WASHINGTON,
June 25, 2.35.
"MAJOR GENERAL McCLELLAN:
"We
have no definite information as to the numbers or position
of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's
statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand
men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson at
Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg
and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia
was threatened, and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing
to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram
from Fremont contradicted this rumor. The last telegram from Banks
says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people
decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last
two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is
circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a
view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is
at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear
to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted
to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, an
the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was
designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked
Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone
to Richmond in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like
a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now
is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly
designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think,
therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be
a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you
any further information on this subject that may be
received here.
"EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of
War."
(a)
Jackson's command consisted of nine brigades at this time.
Whiting with two brigades and Lawton with one had joined him after
the engagements at Cross Keys and Port Republic, at which time he
had only six brigades, three in Ewell's division, and three in his
own.
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE ON HIS HORSE, "TRAVELLER," 1867.
(By permission of A. H. Plecker)
Page 75
This movement had been made with such dispatch
and secrecy, that the approach of Jackson towards
Washington was looked for by the authorities at that
city, until he was in position to fall on McClellan's rear
and left.
Having started on my return to the army, without
having any knowledge of the contemplated movement,
on my arrival at Lynchburg I found that the fighting
had already begun with brilliant results. I hastened
on to Richmond and arrived there late in the afternoon
of the 28th of June. Though hardly able to take the field
Page 76
and advised by the surgeon not to do so, immediately on
my arrival in Richmond I mounted my horse, and with
my personal staff rode to General Lee's headquarters
at Gaines' house, north of the Chickahominy, for the
purpose of seeking a command and participating in
the approaching battles which seemed inevitable. I
arrived at General Lee's headquarters about 11
o'clock on the night of the 28th, and found him in bed.
I did not disturb him that night but waited until next
morning before reporting to him. The battles of
Mechanicsville and Chickahominy* had been fought on
the 26th and 27th respectively, and that part of the
enemy's army which was north of the Chickahominy
had been driven across that stream to the south side.
The troops which had been engaged in this work
consisted of Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and A. P. Hill's
divisions, with a brigade of cavalry under Stuart, from
the army around Richmond, and Jackson's command,
consisting of his own, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions.
All of these commands were still north of the Chickahominy,
and Magruder's, Huger's, McLaw's, and D. R.
Jones' divisions had been left on the south side to defend
Richmond, there being about a division at Drewry's and
Chaffin's Bluffs under Generals Holmes and Wise.
Magruder's, McLaw's and Jones' divisions consisted
of two brigades each, and were all under the command
of General Magruder.
A reorganization of the divisions and brigades of
the army had been previously made, and my brigade,
composed of troops from two different States, had been
broken up, and my regiments had been assigned to other
brigadier generals. On reporting to General Lee on the
morning of the 29th (Sunday), I was informed by him
that all the commands were then disposed of, and no
* So called by General Lee, though designated by subordinate
commanders as the battle of Cold Harbor or Gaines' Mill, according
to the part of the ground on which their commands fought.
Page 77
new arrangement could take place in the presence of
the enemy; but he advised me to return to Richmond
and wait until a vacancy occurred, which he said would
doubtless be the case in a day or two.
I rode back to Richmond that day, and on the next
day, the 30th, called on the Secretary of War, General
Randolph, who gave me a letter to General Lee,
suggesting that I be assigned to the temporary command
of Elzey's brigade of Ewell's division, as General Elzey
had been severely wounded, and would not be able to
return to duty for some time. On the day before, our
troops on the north of Chickahominy had crossed to
the south side in pursuit of the enemy, and were marching
towards James River, and Magruder had had an
engagement with the rear of the retreating column at
Savage Station on the York River Railroad. On the
afternoon of the 30th, I rode to find General Lee again,
and, being guided by reports of the movement of our
troops and, as I got nearer, by the sound of artillery, I
reached the vicinity of the battlefield at Frazier's farm,
just about the close of the battle near dark. This battle
had taken place between Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's
divisions and a large body of the enemy's retreating
forces. There had been a failure of other portions of
the army to come up as General Lee expected them to
do, but the enemy had been driven from the field with a
loss of some artillery and a considerable number in
killed, wounded and prisoners on his part.
I gave General Lee the letter of the Secretary of
War, and next morning he gave me an order to report
to General Jackson for the purpose of being assigned
temporarily to Elzey's brigade. This was the 1st of
July, and I rode past the battlefield of the day before
with our advancing troops, until we reached the road
leading from across White Oak Swamp past Malvern
Hill to James River, where I found the head of General
Jackson's column. I rode forward and found the General
on the road towards Malvern Hill with a cavalry
Page 78
escort, awaiting a report from some scouts who had
been sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position.
On reporting to General Jackson, he directed his
adjutant general to write the order for me at once,
but while Major Dabney, the then adjutant general,
was preparing to do this, the enemy opened with some
of his guns from Malvern Hill, and several shells fell
near us. This rendered an immediate change of quarters
necessary, and the whole party mounted at once and
retired to the rear, followed by the enemy's shells in
great profusion, as the cloud of dust arising from the
movement of the cavalry enabled him to direct his fire
with tolerable precision. As soon as we got out of
immediate danger, Major Dabney wrote me the necessary
order, on his knee, in a hurried manner, and I thus
became attached to the command of the famous "Stonewall"
Jackson. I found General Ewell's division in
the rear of Jackson's column, and upon reporting to
him the command of Elzey's brigade was at once given
me, it being then about ten o'clock p.m.
The brigade was composed of the remnants of seven
regiments, to-wit: the 13th Virginia, the 25th Virginia,
the 31st Virginia, the 44th Virginia, the 52nd Virginia,
the 58th Virginia, and the 12th Georgia Regiments. The
whole force present numbered 1,052 officers and men,
and there was but one colonel present (Colonel J. A.
Walker of the 13th Virginia Regiment), and two lieutenant
colonels (of the 25th and 52nd Virginia Regiments
respectively), the rest of the regiments being
commanded by captains. General Jackson's command at
this time was composed of his own division, and those
of Ewell, D. H. Hill, and W. H. Whiting, besides a
number of batteries of artillery. Ewell's division was
composed of Trimble's brigade, Taylor's Louisiana
brigade, the brigade to which I had been assigned, and
a small body of Maryland troops under Colonel Bradley
T. Johnson.
After remaining for some time in the rear, we finally
Page 79
moved forward past Willis' Church, to where a line of
battle had been formed confronting the enemy's position
at Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill's division had been formed
on the right of the road leading towards the enemy, and
Whiting's on the left, with an interval between his
right and the road into which the Louisiana brigade
of Ewell's division was moved. My brigade was posted
in the woods in rear of the Louisiana brigade, and
Trimble's brigade was formed in rear of Whiting's left,
which constituted the extreme left of our line. Jackson's
division was held in reserve in rear of the whole.
The enemy soon commenced a heavy cannonade upon
the positions where our troops were posted, and kept it
up continuously during the rest of the day. From the
position which I occupied, the enemy could not be seen,
as a considerable body of woods intervened, but many
shells and solid shot passed over us, and one shell
passed through my line, killing two or three persons.
We remained in this position until about sunset, and,
in the meantime, D. H. Hill on our immediate right and
Magruder on his right had attacked the enemy and
become very hotly engaged. Just about sunset I was
ordered to move my brigade rapidly towards the right
to support General D. H. Hill. General Ewell accompanied
me, and we had to move through the woods in a
circle in rear of the position Hill had first assumed, as
the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery prevented our
moving in any other route. As we moved on through
intricate woods, which very much impeded our progress,
we were still within range of the shells from the enemy's
numerous batteries, and they were constantly bursting
in the tops of the trees over our heads, literally strewing
the ground with leaves.
After moving through the woods for some distance
we came to a small blind road leading into an open flat,
where there had once been a mill on a creek which ran
through swampy ground between our left and the enemy.
On reaching the edge of the open flat I was ordered to
Page 80
halt the head of my brigade, until General Ewell rode
forward with a guide, who had been sent to show us
the way, to ascertain the manner in which we were to
cross the creek. The musketry fire was now terrific,
and reverberated along the valley of the creek awfully.
General Ewell soon returned in a great hurry and
directed me to move as rapidly as possible. As soon as
the head of the brigade, led by Lieut. Colonel Skinner
of the 52nd Virginia Regiment, emerged into the open
ground, General Ewell turned to him and directed him
to go directly across the flat in the direction he pointed,
cross the creek, and then turn to the left through the
woods into the road beyond, ordering him at the same
time to move at a double quick. Before I could say
anything General Ewell turned to me and said, "We
will have to go this way," and he dashed off in a gallop
on a road leading to our right along the old dam across
the creek into another road leading in the direction of
the battlefield.
I had no option but to follow him, which I did as
rapidly as possible, but this required me to make a
considerable circuit to get to the point where I expected
to meet the head of my brigade. There were now
streams of our men pouring back from the battlefield,
and on getting into the road leading towards it I lost
sight of my brigade, as a woods intervened. I did not
find it coming into the road at the point where I
expected, and after some fruitless efforts to find it, in
which I was often deceived by seeing squads from the
battlefield come out of the woods in such manner as to
cause me to mistake them for the head of my brigade,
I rode back to find if it was crossing the flat.
I saw nothing of it then, and the fact was, as afterwards
ascertained, that, after crossing the creek, Colonel
Skinner had turned to the left too far, and moved
towards the battlefield in a different direction than that
indicated. His regiment had been followed by three
others, the 13th, 44th, and 58th Virginia Regiments,
Page 81
but the 12th Georgia and 25th and 31st Virginia Regiments,
being in the rear in the woods when the head of
the brigade moved at a double quick, were left behind,
and when they reached the flat, seeing nothing of the
rest of the brigade, they crossed the creek at the dam
and took the wrong end of the road. In the meantime,
while I was trying to find my brigade, General Ewell
had rallied a small part of Kershaw's brigade and
carried it back to the field. I saw now a large body of
men, which proved to be of Toombs' brigade, coming
from the field and I endeavored to rally them, but with
little success.
While I was so engaged, the 12th Georgia of my
own brigade came up, after having found that it had
taken the wrong direction, and with that regiment under
the command of Captain J. G. Rogers, I moved on,
followed by Colonel Benning of Toombs' brigade with
about thirty men of his own regiment. Lieutenant
Early, my aide, soon came up with the 25th and 31st
Virginia Regiments, which he had been sent to find.
On reaching the field, I found General Hill and General
Ewell endeavoring to form a line with that part of
Kershaw's brigade which had been rallied, while Ransom's
brigade, or a part of it, was moving to the front.
I was ordered to form my men in line with Kershaw's
men, and this was done in a clover field in view of the
flashes from the enemy's guns, the guns themselves and
his troops being concealed from our view by the darkness
which had supervened. General Hill's troops had
been compelled to retire from the field as had been the
greater part of Magruder's, after a very desperate
struggle against immense odds, and a vast amount of
heavy siege guns and field artillery. I was ordered to
hold the position where I was and not attempt an
advance.
The enemy still continued a tremendous fire of artillery
from his numerous guns, and his fire was in a circle
diverging from the main position at Malvern Hill so as
Page 82
to include our entire line from right to left. This fire
was kept up until after nine o'clock, and shells were
constantly bursting in front and over us, and crashing
into the woods in our rear. It was a magnificent
display of fireworks, but not very pleasant to those exposed
to it. After being gone some time the part of Ransom's
brigade which had advanced in front of us, retired to
the rear. Trimble's brigade had arrived from the extreme
left, and was posted in my rear. Generals Hill
and Ewell remained with us until after the firing had
ceased, and then retired after giving me orders to remain
where I was until morning and await further
orders. During the night General Trimble moved his
brigade back towards its former position, and General
Kershaw and Colonel Benning retired with their men
for the purpose of looking after the rest of their commands.
My three small regiments, numbering a little over
three hundred in all, were left the sole occupants of that
part of the field, save the dead and wounded in our immediate
front. My men lay on their arms in the open
field, but they had no sleep that night. The cries and
groans of the wounded in our front were truly heart-rending,
but we could afford them no relief. We observed
lights moving about the enemy's position during
the whole night, as if looking for the killed and wounded,
and the rumbling of wheels was distinctly heard as of
artillery moving to the rear, from which I inferred that
the enemy was retreating.
At light next morning I discovered a portion of the
enemy's troops still at his position of the day before,
but it was evidently only a small portion and it turned
out to be a heavy rear guard of infantry and cavalry
left to protect the retreating army. The position which
he had occupied and which our troops had attacked was
a strong and commanding one, while the whole country
around, over which our troops had been compelled to
advance, was entirely open several hundred yards and
Page 83
swept by his artillery massed on the crest of Malvern
Hill.
In my view were nearly the whole of our dead and
wounded that had not been able to leave the field, as
well as a great part of the enemy's dead, and the sight
was truly appalling. While watching the enemy's movements
I observed to our right of his position and close
up to it a small body of troops lying down with their
faces to the enemy, who looked to me very much like
Confederates. I moved a little further to my right for
the purpose of seeing better and discovered a cluster
of Confederates, not more than ten or twelve in number,
one of whom was also looking with field glasses at the
body which I took to be a part of our troops. On riding
up to this party, I found it to consist of General Armistead
of Huger's division with a few men of his brigade.
In answer to my question as to where his brigade was,
General Armistead replied, "Here are all that I know
anything about except those lying out there in front."
He had spent the night in a small cluster of trees around
some old graves about two hundred yards from my right.
After viewing them with the glasses, we were satisfied
that the troops lying so close up to the position
of the enemy were Confederates, and it turned out that
they consisted of Generals Mahone and Wright of
Huger's division with parts of their brigades. The
whole force with them only amounted to a few hundred,
and this body constituted the whole of our troops making
the assault who had not been compelled to retire.
They maintained the ground they had won, after mingling
their dead with those of the enemy at the very
mouths of his guns, and when the enemy finally retired
this small body under Mahone and Wright remained the
actual masters of the fight. Before the enemy did retire,
a messenger came from Generals Mahone and Wright,
with a request for the commander of the troops on the
part of the field where I was to advance, stating that
the enemy was retreating and that but a rear guard
Page 84
occupied the position. I was, however, too weak to
comply with the request, especially as I was informed
that their ammunition was exhausted.
Shortly after light, General Ewell came in a great
hurry to withdraw my command from the critical position
in which he supposed it to be, but I informed him
that the enemy had been retreating all night, and he sent
information of that fact to General Jackson.
Early in the morning a captain of Huger's division
reported to me that he had collected nearby about one
hundred and fifty men of that division, and he asked
me what he should do with them. I directed him to
hold them where they were and report to General
Armistead, who was on the field. About this time a
considerable body of the enemy's cavalry advanced
towards us on the road from his main position of the
day before, as I supposed for a charge upon us, and I
requested General Armistead to take command of the
detachment from Huger's division and aid me in
repulsing the charge, but, while I was making the necessary
preparations, a few shots from a small party of
infantry on the left of the road sent the cavalry back
again. By this time our ambulance details had commenced
to pass freely to the front for our dead and
wounded, and they began to mingle freely with those
of the enemy engaged in a similar work. For some
time a sort of tacit truce seemed to prevail while details
from both armies were engaged in this sad task, but
the enemy's rear guard finally retired slowly from our
view altogether, on the road toward Harrison's Landing.
It was not until this movement that I discovered
what had become of the rest of my brigade, and I then
ascertained that when the missing regiments had arrived
on the battlefield at a different point from that intended,
Colonel Walker had taken charge of them. It was dark
by that time, and they got in amongst some of the
enemy's regiments, when Colonel Walker quietly withdrew
them, as the force into which they had got was
Page 85
entirely too strong for him to attack. My brigade did
not draw trigger at all, but it sustained a loss of thirty-three
in killed and wounded from the artillery fire of
the enemy. During the 2nd it commenced raining, and
before night the rain was very heavy, continuing all
night. After being employed for some time in picking
up small arms from the battlefield, my command was
moved to a position near where we had been in line, the
day before, and there bivouacked with the rest of the
brigade, which had returned to that point the night
before.
At the battle of Malvern Hill, the whole army of
McClellan was concentrated at a very strong position,
with a limited front and both flanks effectively protected.
General Lee's entire army was likewise present,
and it was the first time during the seven days' fighting
around Richmond that these two armies had thus
confronted each other.
McClellan's army, however, was so situated that each
portion of it was in ready communication with, and in
easy supporting distance of, every other part, so that
the whole was available for defence or attack, while
such was the nature of the ground over which General
Lee's army had to move to get into position, and in
which it was drawn up after it got in position, that
communication between the several commands was very
difficult, and movements to the support of each other
still more difficult.
General Lee made the attack, and it was his purpose
to hurl the greater part of his army against the
enemy, but there had been much delay in getting some
of the commands into position, owing to the difficulties
of the ground and an unfortunate mistake as to roads.
When the attack was made, it was very late in the
afternoon, and then, from the want of concert produced
by the want of proper communication, only a portion
of our troops advanced to the attack of the enemy. The
troops which did so advance consisted alone of D. H.
Page 86
Hill's division of Jackson's command, Magruder's command
of three small divisions of two brigades each,
and three brigades of Huger's division, in all fourteen
brigades.
From some mistake in regard to the signal for the
advance, D. H. Hill, hearing what he supposed to be
that signal, and was probably intended as such,
advanced to the attack on the enemy's front with his five
brigades alone, and for some time confronted the whole
force at Malvern Hill, but after a desperate conflict
and a display of useless valor, was compelled to retire
with heavy loss. Magruder's command, including
Huger's three brigades, was then hurled upon the enemy
by brigades, one after the other, but those brigades
were likewise, compelled to retire after making in vain
the most heroic efforts to force the enemy from his
position.
In the meantime, Holmes' division of three brigades,
Jackson's division of four brigades, Ewell's division
of three brigades, and Whiting's division of two
brigades, were inactive, while Longstreet's and A. P.
Hill's divisions, of six brigades each, were held in
reserve some distance in the rear. It is true two
brigades of Ewell's division, and Jackson's whole
division, were ordered to the support of D. H. Hill after
his command had been compelled to retire, but it was
only to be thrown into confusion by the difficulties of
the way and the approaching darkness, and to be exposed
to a murderous fire of artillery, for it was then
too late to remedy the mischief that had been done.
In addition to all this, our troops had to advance over
open ground to the attack of the enemy's front, while
exposed to a most crushing fire of canister and shrapnel
from his numerous batteries of heavy guns and field
pieces massed on a commanding position, as well as to
a flank fire from his gunboats in James River, as it was
impossible from the nature of the ground and the position
of the flanks to turn and attack either of them.
Page 87
Moreover, such was the character of the ground occupied
by us that it was impossible to employ our artillery,
as in attempting to bring the guns into action on the
only ground where it was possible to use them, they
could be knocked to pieces before they could be used
with effect, and such was the result of the few experiments
made. Longstreet's and Hill's divisions were
held in reserve because they had been heavily engaged
at Frazier's farm the day before, but why the rest of
Jackson's command was not thrown into action I cannot
say, unless it be that the difficulty of communicating,
and the impossibility of seeing what was going on on
our right, prevented the advance from that quarter from
being known in time. Certain it is that I was not aware
of the fact that it was any other than an affair of artillery,
until ordered to General Hill's support, as the roar
of the artillery drowned the sound of the small arms.
General Hill states that his division numbered ten
thousand men at the commencement of the fighting
north of the Chickahominy, and he had sustained
considerable loss in that fighting. General Magruder says
his force of three divisions (six brigades) numbered
about thirteen thousand men when the movement to the
north of the Chickahominy began, and he had been
severely engaged at Savage Station. Huger's three
brigades numbered perhaps seven or eight thousand,
certainly not more. Our troops engaged could not, therefore,
have numbered over thirty thousand, and was
probably something under that figure, while McClellan
was able to bring into action, to meet their assault on
his strong position, his whole force, or very nearly the
whole of it.
The loss in the two armies was very probably about
equal, and we were left in possession of the battlefield,
and all the abandoned muskets and rifles of both armies,
besides those pieces of artillery abandoned on the
retreat, and some wagons and ambulances, but all this
did not compensate us for the loss of valuable lives
Page 88
sustained, which were worth more to us than the material
of war gained or any actual results of the battle
that accrued to our benefit.
Both sides claimed the victory, but I do not think
any advantage was gained by either army from the
battle, though McClellan made good the retreat of his
shattered army to the very strong position at Harrison's
Landing. If General Lee's plans for the battle had been
carried out, I have no doubt that it would have resulted
in a crushing defeat to the enemy.
On the 3rd of July the army was put in motion again,
and Jackson's, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions moved
around to the left and approached McClellan's new position
by the road leading from Long Bridge to Westover,
Ewell's division being in front. On the 4th we arrived in
front of the enemy, and advanced, with Ewell's division
in line of battle, and skirmished in front, until we
encountered the enemy's skirmishers, when our progress
was arrested by an order from General Longstreet, who
had come up. We remained in line skirmishing heavily
with the enemy for a day, when we were relieved by
Whiting's division. It was now judged prudent not to
attack the enemy in this position, as it was a strong one
with very difficult approaches, and on the 8th our army
retired, the greater part of it returning to the vicinity
of Richmond, thus leaving McClellan to enjoy the consolation
of having, after near twelve months of preparation
on the most gigantic scale and over three months
of arduous campaigning, accomplished the wonderful feat
of "a change of base."
McClellan in his report (Sheldon & Co.'s edition of
1864) shows that there was an aggregate present in his
army on the 20th of June, 1862, of 107,226, of which there
were present for duty 4,665 officers and 101,160 men,
making the aggregate present for duty 105,825. See
page 53. On page 239, he says: "The report of the
Chief of the 'Secret Service Corps,' herewith forwarded,
and dated 26th of June, shows the estimated strength
Page 89
of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown,
to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same
report puts his numbers on the 26th of June at about
180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding
their organization warrants the belief that this estimate
did not exceed his actual strength."
He seems to have been troubled all the time with
the spectre of "overwhelming numbers" opposed to him,
and that he should have believed so when he had "Professor
Lowe" with his balloons to make reports from
the clouds, and his "Chief of the Secret Service" and
"intelligent contrabands," to fool him with their inventions,
may be perhaps conceded by some charitable
persons, but that he should have written such nonsense
as the above in 1863, and published it in 1864, is perfectly
ridiculous. If the United States Government with
its gigantic resources and its population of 21,000,000
of whites could bring into the field for the advance on
Richmond only 105,000 men, and some fifty or sixty
thousand men for the defence of Washington, how was the
Confederate Government, with its limited means, its
blockaded ports, and its population of less than 6,000,000
of whites, to bring into the field, to oppose this one of
several large armies of invasion, 180,000 men, and if it
could get the men where were the arms to come from?
When I was at General Lee's headquarters, on the
night of the 28th of June, at Gaines' house, General
Longstreet, who occupied a part of the same house and
had accompanied General Lee from the commencement
of the operations on McClellan's flank and rear, informed
me that, when the movement commenced, we had
about 90,000 men in all, including Jackson's command,
60,000 being employed in the movement north of the
Chickahominy, and 30,000 being left on the south side
for the protection of Richmond. This latter number included
the troops at Drewry's Bluff and Chaffin's Bluff.
This statement was elicited in reply to a question by me,
in which I expressed some surprise at the boldness of the
Page 90
movement, and asked how it was possible for General
Lee to undertake it with his force. General Longstreet
had no reason to underestimate the force to me, and his
estimate was a sanguine one, and, I think, perhaps rather
too large, as it was based on the idea that General Jackson's
force was stronger than it really was.
The very active campaign and rapid marching of
that part of Jackson's command which had been employed
in the valley, had very much reduced its strength,
and the brigades and regiments were very weak. The
whole force was probably somewhere between eighty and
ninety thousand, and certainly did not exceed the latter
number. A very large portion of the army was armed
with smooth-bore muskets, and it was not until after
the battles around Richmond, and of second Manassas,
that we were able to exchange them for rifles and minie
muskets captured from the enemy.
The movement of General Lee against McClellan was
a strategic enterprise of the most brilliant character,
and at once demonstrated that he was a general of the
highest order of genius. Its results, independent of the
capture of artillery, small arms, and stores, were of the
most momentous consequences, as it relieved the capital
of the Confederacy of the dangers and inconveniences
of a regular siege for a long while, though it had not
resulted in the destruction of McClellan's army as General
Lee had desired, and the army and country fondly
hoped; but in a thickly wooded country, where armies
can move only along the regular roads, and move in
line of battle or compact columns along those roads,
there are facilities for the escape of a beaten army which
one accustomed to reading of European wars cannot well
understand. This was peculiarly the case in the country
through which McClellan retreated, where the impracticable
character of the swamps and woods enabled him
to conceal his movements and to protect his trains, rear,
and flanks by blocking up the roads and destroying
bridges.
Page 91
General McClellan, it must be confessed, displayed
considerable ability in conducting the retreat of his
army after it was out-manoeuvred and beaten,
notwithstanding the excessive caution he had shown on the
Potomac and at Yorktown, and I think there can be no
doubt he was the ablest commander the United States
had in Virginia during the war, by long odds. During
the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two
armies were more nearly equal in strength than they
ever were afterwards.
Page 92
CHAPTER IX.
BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN.
AFTER McClellan had been safely housed at his new
base on James River, Major General John Pope, of the
United States Army, made his appearance in Northern
Virginia, between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers,
at the head of an army called the "Army of Virginia,"
and composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and
Fremont, the latter being then under Sigel. General
Pope issued a vain-glorious address to his troops, in
which he declared that he had never seen anything of
the "rebels" but their backs; and he talked largely about
making his "headquarters in the saddle," and looking
out for the means of advancing, without giving thought
to the "lines of retreat," which were to be left to take
care of themselves. He certainly was producing great
commotion in the poultry yards of the worthy matrons,
whose sons and husbands were absent in the service of
their country, when General Lee sent "Stonewall"
Jackson to look after the redoubtable warrior.
After remaining in camp several days near Richmond,
Ewell's and Jackson's divisions were ordered to Gordonsville
under General Jackson, and, taking the lead,
Ewell's division arrived about the 15th of July. On
the next day after our arrival, a body of the enemy's
cavalry, having crossed the Rapidan, advanced through
Orange Court-House towards Gordonsville, and my
brigade and the Louisiana brigade were moved out with
a regiment of cavalry for the purpose of intercepting the
retreat of this body, but it made its escape across the
Rapidan by swimming that river, as the water was high.
Ewell's division went into camp near Liberty Mills on
the Rapidan, on the road from Gordonsville to Madison
Court-House, and I remained there, with occasional
movements when approaches of the enemy's cavalry
Page 93
were reported, until the 7th of August. In the mean
time, Jackson's force had been reinforced by the
division of A. P. Hill, and there had been skirmishing
and fighting between our cavalry and that of the enemy
in Madison County and at Orange Court-House.
General Jackson ordered a forward movement to be
made on the 7th of August, and on that day Ewell's
division crossed into Madison at Liberty Mills, and
moved down the Rapidan toward Barnett's Ford,
bivouacking for the night near that point. Early next
morning, we moved past Barnett's Ford, driving a small
detachment of the enemy's cavalry from the Ford, and
took the road for Culpeper Court-House. General
Beverly Robertson's cavalry now passed to the front and
had a skirmish and some artillery firing with the enemy's
cavalry at Robinson's River, where the latter retired.
We crossed Robinson's River and bivouacked north of it
at the mouth of Crooked Creek, Robertson's cavalry
going to the front some two or three miles.
On the morning of the 9th, I was ordered by General
Ewell to move forward in advance to the point occupied
by our cavalry some three or four miles ahead of us,
and to put out strong pickets on the road coming in from
the right and left. My brigade had now increased in
strength to something over 1,500 officers and men for
duty, by the return of absentees. As we moved forward,
the 44th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Scott, and six
companies of the 52nd Virginia were detached to picket
the side roads. Robertson's cavalry was found at a position
about eight or nine miles from Culpeper Court-House,
not far from Cedar Run, and in his front, in some
open fields, bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in view,
watching his movements. On our right was Cedar Run
or Slaughter's Mountain, and between it and Culpeper
road were the large open fields of several adjacent farms
in the valley of Cedar Run, while the country on the
left of the road was mostly wooded.
After General Ewell came up, my brigade was moved
Page 94
to the right towards the mountain, for the purpose of
reconnoitring, and a section of the battery attached
to it was advanced to the front under Lieutenant Terry
and opened on the cavalry in our view. This elicited a
reply from some of the enemy's guns concealed
from our view in rear of his cavalry, but no
infantry was visible. My brigade was then moved
back to the Culpeper road and along it about a mile, to
its intersection with a road coming in from Madison
Court-House, where it remained for some hours.
Shortly after noon, Captain Pendleton, of General
Jackson's staff, came with an order from the General,
for me to advance on the road towards Culpeper Court-House,
stating that General Ewell would advance on the
right, over the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain,
with the rest of the division, and that I would be supported
by Brigadier General Winder with three brigades
of Jackson's division, which would soon be up; but I
was ordered not to begin the movement until I received
information from General Winder that he was ready to
follow me.
While waiting for the message from General Winder,
General Robertson and myself reconnoitred the position
of the enemy's cavalry, and the country immediately in
my front, for the purpose of ascertaining how I would
advance so as to surprise the force immediately in front
of us. Just ahead of me, the Culpeper road crossed a
small branch, a tributary of Cedar Run, and then passed
for some distance through a thick woods, leaving a
narrow belt on the right of it. Between this belt and
the mountain the country was an undulating valley,
consisting of several adjoining fields.
All of the enemy's cavalry visible was in the field in
this valley, and the position where my command was
posted was hidden from its view by an intervening ridge,
which crossed the road diagonally from the woods into
the fields and fell off into the low grounds on the small
branch mentioned. No infantry had yet been discovered,
Page 95
and we were in doubt whether the enemy had any in the
vicinity. On the left of the road was a long, narrow
meadow on the branch, and as my brigade could not
march along the road except by flank, nor without great
difficulty through the woods if deployed in line, I determined
to form it in the meadow out of view of the
enemy, and then advance obliquely across the road,
against his cavalry, following it through the fields on a
route parallel to the road.
About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, a messenger came
from General Winder saying that he was ready to follow
me, and I commenced my movement. The brigade
was formed in line in the meadow, on the north of the
branch, with the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Walker,
thrown out as skirmishers to cover the front and flank
of the left of the brigade, which had to pass obliquely
through the corner of the woods. It then advanced to
the ridge behind which the enemy's cavalry was posted,
the right regiment (12th Georgia) moving by flank so as
to avoid observation, and forming in line as it reached
the ridge, when the whole moved over the crest and came
in view of the cavalry, which scampered off in a great
hurry, receiving as it went a slight volley at long range,
by which one or two saddles were emptied.
The brigade then swung around to the left and moved
forward in line for about three-fourths of a mile, until
we reached a farm road leading from Mrs. Crittenden's
house on our right across the Culpeper road, Colonel
Walker still continuing to cover the left, by moving with
his regiment extended as skirmishers into the woods
across the road, until we came to the farm road. At this
latter point the Culpeper road emerged from the woods
and ran along the left of a field in our front, by the side of
the woods to its termination, where it passed between
a cornfield on the right and a wheatfield on the left.
Colonel Walker immediately re-formed his regiment on
the left of the brigade and we advanced across the farm
road into the field beyond, to the crest of a ridge, where
Page 96
we discovered a considerable body of cavalry on the
opposite side of the wheatfield, on a high ridge over
which the Culpeper road ran, and three batteries of
artillery opened on us, from over the crest of the ridge
in front.
No infantry had yet been seen, but the boldness with
which the cavalry confronted us and the opening of the
batteries, satisfied me that we had come upon a heavy
force, concealed behind the ridge on which the cavalry
was drawn up, as the ground beyond was depressed. I
therefore halted the brigade, causing the men to cover
themselves as well as they could by moving back a little
and lying down, and then sent word for General Winder
to come up. The position which I now occupied was
in an open field on Mrs. Crittenden's farm. Immediately
to my right and a little advanced, was a clump of cedars,
and from that point the ground sloped off to our right
to a bottom on a prong of Cedar Run, the whole country
between us and Slaughter's Mountain consisting of open
fields. The northern end of the mountain was opposite
my right and about a mile distant. On my left was the
woods mentioned, which was very dense and extended for
a considerable distance to the left.
In front of this woods, about a hundred yards from
my left, was the wheat field, in a hollow, or small valley,
and immediately in my front was the cornfield, and a
small branch ran from the wheatfield through the cornfield,
to which the ground sloped. On the farther side of
the wheatfield was the high ridge on which the enemy's
cavalry was formed, and beyond which his batteries
were posted; and it extended across the road into the
fields on the right, but was wooded on the left of the
road. It was on and behind this ridge the enemy's batteries
were posted, and it was in the low ground beyond
that I supposed, and it subsequently turned out, his infantry
was masked.
Immediately after sending for General Winder, I sent
back for some artillery, but this request had been
Page 97
anticipated, and Captain Brown, with one piece, and Captain
Dement, with three pieces of their respective batteries
of Maryland artillery, soon came dashing up, and were
posted at the clump of cedars on my right. They immediately
opened on the enemy's cavalry and his batteries,
causing the former speedily to retire through the woods
over the ridge. Those guns continued to be served with
great efficiency during the action and rendered most
effectual service.
As there was a long interval between my right and
the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain, where General
Ewell was, I posted the 12th Georgia Regiment,
under Captain Wm. F. Brown, on that flank, to protect
the guns which were operated there. During all this
time the enemy poured an incessant fire of shells upon
us, and we were looking anxiously for the opening of
Ewell's guns from the mountain, and the arrival of
Winder. General Winder came up as rapidly as possible,
and, when he arrived, he took position on my left,
and at once had several pieces of artillery brought into
action with good effect. Ewell's guns had by this time
opened and a brisk cannonading ensued.
From the position I occupied, I had an excellent view
of the whole ground--except that beyond the ridge where
the enemy's infantry was kept concealed,--and seeing
that a force could be moved from our left around the
wheatfield, under cover, so as to take the enemy's batteries
in flank, I sent information of the fact to General
Winder; but, in a very short time afterwards, the glistening
bayonets of infantry were discovered moving stealthily
to our left, through the woods on the ridge beyond
the wheatfield, and I sent my aide, Lieutenant Early, to
warn General Winder of this fact, and caution him to
look out for his flank. Lieutenant Early arrived to find
General Winder just mortally wounded by a shell, while
superintending the posting of some batteries at an advanced
position, and the information was given to General
Jackson who had now arrived on the field.
Page 98
After the artillery fire had continued some two hours
from the time it was first opened on me, the enemy's
infantry was seen advancing through the cornfield in my
front, but it halted before getting within musket range
and lay down. His line overlapped my right and I sent
a request to General Jackson for a brigade to put on that
flank, which was promised.
Before it arrived, however, several pieces of the artillery
battalion attached to A. P. Hill's division, which
was just coming up, dashed in front of my brigade down
the slope to within musket range of the enemy in the
cornfield, and commenced unlimbering, when the enemy's
whole force rose up and moved forward. I saw at once
that these pieces would be captured or disabled unless
relieved immediately, and my brigade was ordered
forward at a double quick. On reaching the guns, the
brigade halted and opened fire on the enemy, checking
his advance and enabling the artillery to open on him
with canister. At the same time a heavy force of infantry
had moved through the wheatfield, and fire was
opened on it from the brigades of Jackson's division on
my left, which were posted in the edge of the woods
adjoining the field, and the fight became general, raging
with great fury. Brown's and Dement's guns opened
with canister, and the 12th Georgia was brought from
the right and posted on the crest of a small ridge, leading
out from the main one around in front of the clump
of cedars on my right, so as to have a flank fire on the
enemy immediately in front of the brigade.
Just as I had made this arrangement, Thomas'
brigade of Hill's division came up to my support as
promised, and I posted it on the right of the 12th Georgia,
behind the crest of the same ridge, which was so shaped
that Thomas' line had the general direction of the main
line, but was in advance of it. The arrival of this
brigade was very timely, as the enemy was advancing
with a line overlapping my right considerably. Thomas
confronted this part of the opposing force, and effectually
checked its progress, strewing the ground with the
Page 99
killed. While posting this brigade, the left of my own
brigade was concealed from my view, and as soon as I
had given Colonel Thomas his instructions, I rode to
see what was the condition of things on that part of the
line. On getting to where I could see, I discovered that
it had given way, and the men of several regiments were
retiring rapidly to the rear, while a portion of the enemy
had crossed the little stream in front of where my left
had been. The only thing now standing, as far as I
could see, was Thomas' brigade on my right, the 12th
Georgia, four companies of the 52nd Virginia, and part
of the 58th Virginia.
It was a most critical state of things, and I saw that
the day would probably be lost, unless I could hold the
position I still occupied. I could not, therefore, go to
rally my retreating men, but sent my Assistant Adjutant
General, Major Samuel Hale, to rally them and bring
them back, while I rode to the rest of my troops and
directed their commanders to hold on to their positions
at all hazards. On my giving the directions to Captain
Brown of the 12th Georgia, he replied: "General, my
ammunition is nearly out, don't you think we had better
charge them?" I could not admit the prudence of the
proposition at that time, but I fully appreciated its gallantry.
This brave old man was then 65 years old, and
had a son, an officer, in his company. The position was
held until other troops were brought up and the greater
part of the retreating men rallied, and the day was thus
prevented from being lost.
The enemy had penetrated into the woods on my
left, and the brigades of Jackson's division there posted
had been driven back, after a desperate conflict. The
left of the line had thus given way, and the enemy had
got possession of the woods, from which he had poured
a galling fire into the rear of my regiments on the flank,
which had been thrown into confusion, and compelled
to retire in some disorder. Colonel Walker of the 13th
Virginia had withdrawn his own regiment and part of
the 31st Virginia in good order, after they had been
Page 100
almost surrounded by the enemy. Only my own brigade,
Thomas' brigade, and the three brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged up to this time, but some
of the other brigades of Hill's division were now coming
on the field, and being at once ordered into action, the
temporary advantage gained by the enemy was soon
wrested from him, and he was forced back into the wheatfield,
and then across it over the ridge beyond.
Colonel Walker with the 13th Virginia, and part of the
31st, and Captain Robert D. Lilley with part of the 25th
Virginia, returned to the attack while the woods on our
left was being cleared of the enemy, and participated in
his final repulse. Finding himself being driven from the
field, after sunset, the enemy made a desperate effort
to retrieve the fortunes of the day by a charge with
cavalry. We had no regular line formed at this time,
and our men were much scattered in advancing, when a
considerable body of cavalry came charging along the
road from over the ridge, towards the position where
the left of my brigade and the right of Jackson's division
had rested during the action. Without being at all disconcerted
or attempting to make any formation against
cavalry, small regiments nearby, among which was the
13th Virginia, poured a volley into the head of the approaching
cavalry, when it had got within a few yards,
causing it to turn suddenly to its right up through the
wheatfield, followed by the whole body, which made its
escape after encountering a raking fire from our troops
further to the left, by which many saddles were emptied.
The attack on the enemy was thus resumed and he was
driven entirely from the field.
We were ordered to pursue on the road towards Culpeper
Court-House, and the division of General A. P.
Hill was placed in front, my brigade following it. Pursuit
was made for two miles, when the enemy's reinforcements,
coming to the aid of the beaten troops, were encountered,
and there was some skirmishing after dark
between Hill's leading brigade and the enemy, and an
affair between one of our batteries and some of the
Page 101
enemy's artillery, but night put an end to any further
operations. During the night, General Jackson ascertained
that Pope's whole army had concentrated in his
front, and he therefore determined not to attack him.
In moving forward in pursuit of the enemy from the
field, my brigade rejoined the rest of the division under
General Ewell, and, after operations for the night were
suspended, we bivouacked about where the enemy's infantry
had been masked when I first encountered his batteries.
The two brigades with General Ewell had not
been engaged, but his artillery had done good service,
and prevented any attempt to flank us on the right.
On the morning of the 10th (Sunday), after some
manoeuvring on our part, and a little shelling from the
enemy, we moved back and covered the battlefield with
our troops, while the wounded were being carried off,
and the small arms abandoned by the enemy were being
gathered. Later in the day we moved farther back and
took position in rear of the battlefield, Ewell's division
being posted on the end and side of Slaughter's Mountain,
and the other divisions crossing the Culpeper road
on our left. We remained in this position all night and
next day, but there was no fighting, as each army awaited
the advance of the other.
On Monday, the 11th, the enemy requested a truce
for the purpose of burying his dead, which was granted,
until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and subsequently extended,
at his request, to give him time to complete the
burial--the arrangements on our side being under the
superintendence of General Stuart, and on the side of
the enemy under that of Brigadier General Milroy.*
*Milroy, in his report, states that the truce was requested by us,
but General Jackson says it was applied for by the enemy, and no one
will doubt his word. I know that the extension was applied for by
Milroy or his staff officer, for I was on the ground in communication
with General Stuart at the time. This same Milroy was himself prevented
by me from riding to the rear of the ground on which the
enemy's dead lay, and he witnessed the taking from the field, under
my directions, of very large quantities of small arms, which had been
abandoned by Banks' men on the day of the battle.
Page 102
I went on the field under General Ewell's orders, to
superintend the burial of a portion of our dead, who had
not been buried by their proper commanders. I found
on the field, stacked up, a very large quantity of excellent
rifles, which the division, detailed to gather them up,
omitted to carry off. Some of the enemy's men were
taking these rifles, but I made them desist, and demanded
that a part already carried off, under direction of a staff
officer of General Sigel, should be brought back, which
was complied with. I then sent for a detail from my
brigade and had these arms carried off in wagons sent
to me from the rear, there being six full wagon loads.
While this work was going on, I heard a Federal soldier
say: "It is hard to see our nice rifles going that way,"
to which another replied: "Yes, but they are theirs,
they won them fairly."
The enemy had very large details on the field, and
several general officers rode on it, while the burial was
going on. This work was finally concluded a little before
dark, when the truce was concluded. The enemy buried
on this day over six hundred dead, a very large proportion
of which were taken from the cornfield in front of
the positions occupied by Thomas' and my brigade on
the day of the battle. My detail buried the bodies of
98 of our men, nearly the whole of which were taken
from the woods in which the brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged. From the want of sufficient
tools on our part and the hardness of the ground where
we buried our men, our work was not completed until
about the same time the enemy completed his.
On returning to my brigade, I found our troops preparing
to move back to our former position south of the
Rapidan, as the army of Pope concentrated in our front
was entirely too large for us to fight. Our movement to
the rear commenced immediately after dark, Hill's
division bringing up the rear of the infantry and our
cavalry that of the whole army. On the next day, the
12th, Ewell's division recrossed at Liberty Mills and
Page 103
returned to its old camps in that vicinity, the withdrawal
of our entire force having been effected without serious
molestation from the enemy. In this action, Banks
commanded the Federal troops immediately on the field, but
Pope came up at its close with a portion of McDowell's
Corps and the whole of Sigel's.
The loss in my brigade was 16 killed and 145 wounded,
and the loss in General Jackson's whole command was
223 killed, 1,060 wounded and 31 missing, making a
total loss of 1,314. The enemy's loss in killed and
wounded very greatly exceeded ours, and we captured
400 prisoners, including one Brigadier General (Prince),
besides securing one piece of artillery and more than
5,000 small arms.
Pope, or at least his soldiers, had now seen something
more of the "rebels" than their backs, and he was
soon to see other sights.
Shortly after our return from the battle, Lawton's
brigade was transferred from Jackson's division to
Ewell's, and Starke's Louisiana Brigade, newly created
out of regiments which had been attached to other
brigades during the battles around Richmond, and had
accompanied Hill's division, was attached to Jackson's
division. General Jackson's command, as now constituted,
was composed of fourteen brigades, to-wit: four
in his own and Ewell's divisions each; and six in Hill's
division, besides the artillery attached to the divisions
(about four batteries to each); and Robertson's cavalry
which was co-operating with us.
Page 104
CHAPTER X.
OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.
THE presence of General Jackson in the vicinity of
Gordonsville, again bewildered the minds and excited
anew the fears of the Washington authorities. The
spectre of "overwhelming numbers" at Richmond and
of a speedy advance on the Federal Capital now assumed
a fearful shape, and McClellan was ordered to remove
his army from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek as
rapidly as possible, for the purpose of uniting with Pope,
and interposing for the defence of Washington--Burnside,
with 13,000 men from the North Carolina coast on
his way to join McClellan on James River, having been
previously diverted from that point to Fredericksburg
on the Rappahannock.*
* The
following correspondence taken from McClellan's report is
interesting, as it exhibits the bewilderment of the Federal authorities
and the hallucination under which McClellan himself continued to
labor in regard to the strength of General Lee's
forces:
"WASHINGTON, July
30,
1862, 8 P.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B.
McCLELLAN:
"A dispatch just received from
General Pope, says that deserters
report that the enemy is moving south of James River, and that the
force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that he be pressed in that
direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case.
"H.
W. HALLECK, Major
General."
WASHINGTON, July 31, 1862,
10 A.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B.
McCLELLAN:
"General
Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be
evacuating Richmond, and falling back on Danville and
Lynchburg.
"H. W. HALLECK, Major
General."
"WASHINGTON,
August 6, 1862.
MAJOR GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN:
"You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and small batteries
of artillery to Burnside's command at Aquia Creek. It is reported
that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.
"H. W.
HALLECK, Major General."
The
following is an extract of letter from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, 1862, explaining the reason for the order for
the removal of the troops from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek.
"Allow
me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and
your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's force around
Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they
have and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. General
Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your
effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are about thirty
miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the
enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers
upon one or the other, as he may elect."
"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, BERKLEY,
August 14, 1862, 11 p.m.
"Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be
away to-morrow night. Everything done to carry out your orders. I
don't like Jackson's movements, he will suddenly appear where least
expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning.
"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General."
"MAJOR GENERAL
HALLECK, Washington, D. C."
Page 105
The execution of the order given to McClellan on
the 3rd of August for the evacuation of his base on James
River, was not completed until the 16th. In the meantime,
General Lee had ordered the divisions of Longstreet,
Hood (formerly Whiting's), D. R. Jones, and
Anderson (formerly Huger's), to Gordonsville for the
purpose of advancing against Pope, and the three first
named arrived about the 15th of August, Anderson's
following later. The greater part of Stuart's cavalry was
also ordered to the same vicinity.
On the 15th Jackson's command moved from its
camps and concentrated near Pisgah Church on the road
Page 106
from Orange Court-House to Somerville Ford on the
Rapidan, preparatory to the movement forward. While
here the 49th Virginia Regiment, Colonel William Smith,
joined my brigade. Pope's army, then reinforced by
the greater part of Burnside's Corps under Reno, was
in the County of Culpeper, north of the Rapidan; but
before we were ready to move it commenced to fall back
to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.
On the 20th, our whole army, now consisting of two
wings under Longstreet and Jackson respectively, and
Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Rapidan--Longstreet at
Raccoon Ford, and Jackson at Somerville Ford,--the
cavalry having preceded them early in the morning.
Jackson's wing, comprising the same force he had at
Cedar Run, camped at Stevensburg on the night of the
20th. On the 21st he moved past Brandy Station on
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the direction of
Beverly's Ford on the Rappahannock. Jackson's division
under Brigadier General Taliaferro was in front
and moved to the ford, where there ensued some
cannonading, and a fight between a portion of our cavalry
and the enemy on the northern bank. Ewell's division
bivouacked in the rear of Taliaferro near St. James'
Church.
On the morning of the 22nd the division moved up
to the vicinity of the ford, where the cannonading still
continued. It was then moved to the left, across Hazel
River at Wellford's Mill, towards Freeman's Ford,
Trimble's brigade being left at Hazel River to protect
our trains from a movement of the enemy from across
the Rappahannock. At Freeman's Ford, a portion of
Stuart's cavalry was found, and an artillery fight was
progressing with the enemy's batteries on the opposite
bank. The three remaining brigades passed to the left
from Freeman's Ford, and moved by a circuitous route
through the woods and fields towards the bridge at
Warrenton Springs. Late in the afternoon, Lawton's brigade
moved to the bridge at the Springs for the purpose of
MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER
Page 107
crossing, and my brigade, followed by Hays' (formerly
Taylor's) under Colonel Forno of the Louisiana Infantry,
was moved to the right, under the superintendence
of General Ewell, and crossed over about a mile
below the Springs, on an old dilapidated dam.
Hays' brigade was to have followed, but as it was
nearly dark when my brigade succeeded in getting over,
and the crossing was very difficult, that brigade was
left on the south bank until next morning. General
Ewell ordered me to occupy a pine woods or thicket in
front of the place at which I had crossed, and to establish
communications with General Lawton, the whole of
whose brigade it was expected would be crossed over
at the Springs. There had been a hard rain before I
was ordered to cross the river, and it was still raining
slightly. As soon as General Ewell left me, I moved
my brigade into the woods indicated, and established
my left near a road found leading from the Springs
towards the lower fords, throwing out pickets on the
front and flanks. By this time it had become intensely
dark, and we could see nothing except when the flashes of
lightning gave faint glimpses of things around.
As soon as the brigade was established in its position,
Major A. L. Pitzer, a volunteer aide, was sent to seek
General Lawton for the purpose of opening communications
with him. After he had been gone for some time, he
came back with a sergeant and six privates of Federal
cavalry as prisoners, with their horses, equipments and
arms complete. This party had passed up the road a
few minutes before I had taken position near it, and, on
getting near the Springs and finding that place occupied
by a portion of our troops, was deliberating as to what
should be done when the Major rode into it. He was at
once hailed and forced to surrender himself as prisoner,
and his captors started with him down the road leading
past my left. On getting near the point at which he
knew my brigade was posted, the Major told the party
having him in charge that they must reverse positions,
Page 108
and when he explained the condition of things and stated
that General Lawton was on the right, my brigade on
the left with pickets all around, he succeeded in inducing
the whole of it to surrender to him and come quietly into
my camp, to avoid being fired upon by the pickets. After
this attempt, as it was very dark and quite late, I did not
renew that night the effort to communicate with General
Lawton.
During the night there was a very heavy rain, and by
light on the morning of the 23rd, the Rappahannock, or
Hedgeman's River, as it is here called, was so much
swollen as to defy all attempts at crossing except by
swimming, as the bridge at the Springs had been burned
by the enemy.
A messenger sent to find General Lawton soon returned
with the information that only one regiment of
Lawton's brigade, the 13th Georgia under Colonel
Douglas, and Brown's and Dement's batteries of four
guns each, had crossed at the Springs, the morning
before. As soon as this condition of things was ascertained,
I sent a messenger, who was directed to swim
the river, with a note for General Ewell or Jackson,
whichever might be first met with, stating that if the
enemy advanced upon us in force, the whole of our
troops on the north of the river must be captured, and
suggesting the propriety of my attempting to extricate
them by moving up towards Waterloo bridge, several
miles above.
Before this note could be delivered, I received a
verbal message from General Jackson, which had been
given across the river at the Springs and was brought
to me by a sergeant of one of the batteries, directing me
to move my brigade up to where Colonel Douglas' was,
take command of the whole force, and prepare for defence,
stating, at the same time, that there was a creek
running a short distance from the Springs into the river
below me, which was past fording also, and that no enemy
was in the fork of the river and this creek; and also
Page 109
informing me that he was having the bridge repaired
as rapidly as possible. Very shortly after the reception
of this message, I received a note from General Jackson,
in reply to mine, containing the same instructions conveyed
by his message, and directing me in addition, in
the event of the enemy's appearance in too heavy force
for me to contend with, to move up towards Waterloo
bridge, keeping close to the river; and stating that he
would follow along the opposite bank with his whole
force, to cover my movement.
I at once moved towards the Springs and found
Colonel Douglas occupying a hill, a short distance below
the buildings, which extended across from the river to
Great Run (the creek alluded to by General Jackson).
Colonel Douglas, on crossing the morning before, had
captured a portion of a cavalry picket watching the ford,
and there was still a small body on the opposite banks
of Great Run with which he had had some skirmishing.
Colonel Walker with the 13th and 31st Virginia Regiments
had been posted across the road leading from
below, about three-fourths of a mile from Colonel Douglas'
position, and I now posted the remaining regiments
of my brigade and the 13th Georgia along the hill occupied
by the latter, so as to present the front to any force
that might come from the direction of Warrenton, across
Great Run above, resting my right on the Run and my
left on the river. The artillery was also posted on this
line, and the whole concealed as much as possible by the
woods. In this position, Colonel Walker guarded my
rear, and my right flank was the only one exposed, but
that was safe for the present, as the creek was very high
and Colonel Douglas had commenced the destruction of
the bridges across it, which was soon completed.
The body of the enemy's cavalry on the opposite side
of Great Run continued to hover about my right flank
all the morning, and some companies were posted on that
flank to watch the creek. Some time during the morning,
General Jackson sent over an officer familiar with the
Page 110
country, to pilot one of the staff officers over the route
to Waterloo bridge, which it might be necessary to pass
over in case of emergency, and Major Hale was sent with
him to ascertain the road.
In the meantime, the creek began to fall, and in the
afternoon it was in a condition to be crossed.
It now began to be evident that the enemy was moving
up from below in very heavy force, and that my
command was in a critical condition, as large trains
were seen moving on the road, east and north of us,
towards Warrenton. Late in the afternoon a heavy
column of infantry with artillery made its appearance
on the hills beyond my right, but it moved with great
caution, and the enemy was evidently of the impression
that my force, which was concealed from his view, was
much larger than it really was. I now changed my front
so as to present it towards the force in sight, but this
movement was so made as to be concealed from the
enemy's view by the intervening woods.
About this time, General Robertson, who had accompanied
Stuart on a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope's headquarters, arrived from the direction of
Warrenton with two regiments of cavalry and two pieces
of artillery. After consulting with me, General Robertson
posted his two pieces on a hill north of the Springs,
which commanded a view of the enemy's infantry and
opened on it. This fire was soon replied to by one of
the enemy's batteries, and I sent two Parrott guns from
Brown's battery to the aid of Robertson's guns, which
were of short range. A brisk cannonade ensued and was
kept up until near sunset, with no damage, however, to
my infantry or artillery, but one or two shells fell into
one of Robertson's regiments which was in rear of the
battery, on the low ground near the Springs, doing some
slight damage.
After the cessation of the artillery fire and very near
dark about a brigade of the enemy was seen approaching
the bank of the creek opposite where my brigade was
Page 111
posted, and in a few moments it delivered a volley into
the woods, which was followed by three cheers and a
tiger in regular style. Two of Dement's Napoleons were
immediately run out to the left of my line, and opened
with canister upon the enemy, who was scarcely visible
through the mist which had arisen. This fire was, however,
so well directed and so rapid that the enemy was
soon driven back in confusion, and his cheering was
exchanged for cries and groans, which were distinctly
audible to those in his front. The volley delivered by
the enemy was entirely harmless, and my men reserved
their fire with great coolness, until there should be
greater need for it. A very short time before this affair,
the 60th Georgia Regiment of Lawton's brigade, under
Major Berry, had crossed over on the bridge, which was
now in a condition for the passage of infantry, though
not for artillery or wagons, and had been placed in
position.
There was no further attack on me, but it was now
very certain, from the noise of moving trains and artillery
and the reports of scouts, that a very heavy force
was being massed around me, with a view of cutting me
off. I drew in Colonel Walker closer to my main force,
as he reported that the enemy had crossed the creek on
the road he was guarding and were massing in his front;
and I sent a messenger to General Jackson, after dark,
with information of the condition of things and the
suggestion that I be reinforced sufficiently to hold my
ground or be withdrawn. The remainder of Lawton's
brigade was crossed over on the temporary bridge, and
when General Lawton himself arrived, which was about
1 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, he informed me that he had
seen written instructions to General Ewell, directing to
cross over himself at daylight in the morning, and if it
was evident that the enemy was in heavy force, to recross
the troops, as it was not desired to have a general engagement
at that junction.
On receiving this information, I immediately
Page 112
dispatched a messenger to General Ewell, to inform him
that there could be no doubt that the enemy was in very
heavy force, and if I was to be withdrawn, it had better
be done that night without waiting for daylight, as by
moving to my left the enemy could post artillery, so as
to command the bridge and ford completely, and prevent
my being either withdrawn or reinforced, and that I was
satisfied that he was preparing for that very object. In
response to this, General Ewell came over himself a
little before three o'clock A.M., and, after consultation
with me, gave the order for recrossing, which was begun
at once, Lawton's brigade crossing first and carrying
over the artillery by hand, and my brigade following,
so as to complete the withdrawal a very little after dawn.
General Ewell had not been entirely satisfied that the
enemy was in such strong force as I represented, and
he was rather inclined to the opinion that movements I
had observed indicated a retreating army. To satisfy
him, we remained behind until the advancing skirmishers
of the enemy made it prudent for us to retire, and we
then rode across the bridge in rear of my brigade. Soon
Sigel's whole corps, supported by those of Banks and
Reno, moved to the position which I had occupied, and
a very heavy cannonading followed.
My command was thus rescued from inevitable destruction,
for it would have been impossible for General
Jackson to have crossed his troops in time to arrest its
fate, as his only means of crossing the river consisted
of one narrow, temporary bridge, unsuitable for the passage
of artillery, and which the enemy could have commanded
from several positions beyond the reach of our
artillery on the south bank. Pope's whole army was in
easy supporting distance of the force sent against me,
and I had in part confronted that army on the 23rd and
the following night.
The men of my command, including Douglas' regiment,
had had very little to eat since crossing the river,
and were without rations, as there had been little opportunity
Page 113
for cooking since leaving the Rapidan; and they
had lain on their arms during the night of the 22nd in a
drenching rain; yet they exhibited a determined resolution
to withstand the enemy's attack at all hazards,
should he come against us.
After recrossing the river, Lawton's brigade and mine
retired to the vicinity of Jefferson for the purpose of
resting and cooking rations.
Page 114
CHAPTER XI.
CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.
ON the same morning I had crossed the river, Stuart,
with a portion of his cavalry, after crossing the river
above, had made a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope's headquarters at Warrenton Junction, and among
other things had captured Pope's dispatch book.
The captured correspondence showed that Pope was
being reinforced from the Kanawha Valley and also from
McClellan's army, and General Lee determined to send
General Jackson to the enemy's rear, to cut the railroad,
so as to destroy his communications and bring on
a general engagement before the whole of the approaching
reinforcements could arrive.
Jackson's wing of the army was put in motion early
on the morning of the 25th, with no wagons but the
ordnance and medical wagons, and with three days'
rations in haversacks, for a "cavalry raid with infantry."
Moving with Ewell's division in front, we
crossed the river at Hinson's Mill above Waterloo bridge,
and marched by a small place called Orleans to Salem,
near which place we bivouacked after a very long day's
march. On the morning of the 26th, we moved, with
Ewell's division still in front, past White Plains, through
Thoroughfare Gap in Bull Mountain to Gainesville on
the Warrenton Pike, and there turned off to the right
towards Bristow Station on the Orange & Alexandria
Railroad. At Haymarket, before reaching Gainesville,
we halted two or three hours to wait for Stuart to come
up with his cavalry, which had started that morning to
follow us, and did join us at Gainesville. Hays' brigade,
under General Forno, was in the advance of the division
on this day, and it arrived at Bristow Station a little
before sunset, just as several trains were approaching
from the direction of Warrenton Junction.
Page 115
There was but a small force of cavalry at Bristow,
which Colonel Forno soon dispersed, and he then arrested
and captured two trains of empty cars with their engines,
the first train which approached having made its escape
towards Manassas before the road could be sufficiently
obstructed, and other trains in the rear running back, on
hearing the alarm, towards Warrenton Junction. General
Trimble was sent, soon after dark, with two of his
regiments, to capture Manassas Junction, and in
conjunction with General Stuart succeeded in taking the
place and securing eight pieces of artillery, a considerable
number of prisoners and horses, a long train of
loaded cars, and a very large amount of stores of all
kinds. As soon as the remainder of Ewell's division
arrived at Bristow, it was placed in position to prevent
a surprise by the enemy during the night.
Very early on the morning of the 27th, Hays' brigade
and one regiment of Lawton's with a piece of artillery
were moved towards Kettle Run in the direction of
Warrenton Junction on a reconnaissance, and a train of cars
was seen re-embarking a regiment which had been sent
to drive off the "raiding party," but, on finding the
strength of our force, was about retiring. A shot from
one piece of artillery sent the train off in a hurry, and
one regiment of Hays' brigade was left on picket and
another regiment to tear up the railroad, with orders to
fall back skirmishing towards the main body, on the approach
of the enemy in force.
Trimble's other regiment, and the 12th Georgia,
which was now transferred from my brigade to his, were
sent to him at Manassas Junction this morning, and the
two other divisions of Jackson's command were ordered
to the same place. General Ewell had been ordered by
General Jackson to remain at Bristow with his three
remaining brigades to check any advance from Pope's
army along the railroad, but, if the enemy appeared in
heavy force, to retire upon the Junction, as he did not
desire a general engagement at this time. General Ewell
Page 116
accordingly disposed his command across the railroad
and facing towards Warrenton Junction as follows: my
brigade on the right, Lawton's on the left and Hays' in
the centre, the main body being posted on a slight ridge
covering the station. The 49th Virginia Regiment of my
brigade was moved to a ridge on my right, on the road
leading to and past Greenwich, and a regiment of Lawton's
brigade (the 60th Georgia), with one piece of
artillery, was advanced on the left of the railroad so
as to support Forno's two regiments which were in
front, while the batteries were posted so as to command
the approaches on our front and flanks.
In the afternoon indications were seen of the approach
of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton
Junction, and the wagons were ordered to Manassas. In
a short time the enemy advanced in force with infantry
and artillery, and the 6th and 8th Louisiana Regiments
which had been left in front fell back to a woods about
three hundred yards in front of the remainder of the
brigade. As soon as the enemy got within range, our
batteries opened on him from their various positions,
and the 6th and 8th Louisiana, and 60th Georgia Regiments
received him with well directed volleys, by which
two columns of not less than a brigade each were sent
back. The 5th Louisiana was sent to reinforce the 6th
and 8th, but by this time fresh columns of the enemy
were seen advancing, and it was apparent that his force
was larger than ours. As the position we occupied was
a weak one, and the enemy could very easily have turned
our flank by moving a force on the ridge to our right,
which he appeared to be doing, General Ewell determined
to retire in accordance with General Jackson's instructions.
The order for the withdrawal across Broad Run
was given, and I was directed to cover it with my brigade.
At this time the Louisiana regiments in front were
actively engaged, and a heavy column of the enemy was
moving against them. Lawton's brigade was first drawn
back across the ford at the railroad bridge over Broad
Page 117
Run, and took position on the northern bank. Hays'
brigade then followed, the regiments engaged in front
having retired in good order. My own brigade had been
withdrawn from a pine woods in which it was posted,
and covered the movements of the others by forming
successive lines of battle back to the ford, and was then
crossed over by regiments successively. All the artillery
was successfully withdrawn, a part crossing at Milford
several hundred yards above the bridge, at which point
the 49th Virginia also crossed.
In the meantime, the enemy had been advancing in
line of battle on both sides of the railroad, preceded by
skirmishers, and keeping up a constant artillery fire. The
13th Virginia had been deployed as skirmishers to keep
those of the enemy in check, and kept them from advancing
beyond the station until all the rest of our force
had crossed the Run, when it also retired. Lawton's
brigade had been formed in line on the north bank of
the Run, and some batteries put in position. Hays'
brigade was ordered to proceed to Manassas Junction
as soon as it crossed, and my brigade was moved back
about three-fourths of a mile and formed in line on a
hill commanding the road to the Junction, and in full
view of the enemy, who had halted on the ridges near
Bristow Station.
In a short time afterwards, General Ewell with
Lawton's brigade passed through my line, which was
across the road, and ordered me to remain in position
until further orders should be sent me. He left a battery
with me and directed that one or two regiments should
be so moved and manoeuvred as to present the appearance
of the arrival of reinforcements to my assistance.
This was done, and a small party of the enemy which had
crossed the Run, and was moving along the railroad, was
driven back by a few shots from the artillery, but the
enemy's main force, which consisted of the advance
division of Pope's army under Hooker, did not come
further than the station.
Page 118
Shortly after dark, under orders from General Ewell,
I retired to the Junction, where my men filled their haversacks
with rations of hard bread and salt meat from the
stores captured from the enemy, but this was all of the
plunder obtained at that place which they could get.
Our loss in this affair was comparatively slight and
was confined almost entirely to the 5th, 6th and 8th
Louisiana, and the 60th Georgia Regiments, which were
the only troops who drew trigger on our side, except the
13th Virginia when deployed as skirmishers to cover our
withdrawal. The enemy reported his loss at 300.
The two captured trains had been burned in the early
part of the day, and the railroad bridge across Broad
Run had been destroyed. A brigade of the enemy which
advanced towards Manassas, after having been landed
from a train coming from Alexandria, had been met by a
party of our troops moving out from the Junction and
routed, its commanding officer being killed.
As soon as Ewell's division had rested and broiled
a little meat, it moved from the Junction towards
Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run, and the brigades became
separated and bivouacked at different places, mine lying
down in the open field.
The other divisions had previously moved, and
Stuart proceeded to burn the trains, and such stores as
had not been carried off.
Page 119
CHAPTER XII.
THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON.
IT having become evident that Pope had found it
necessary to look after his "lines of retreat," and was
moving his whole army back for the purpose of falling
upon General Jackson's comparatively small force, the
latter determined to move to the left so as to be in a
position to unite with the right wing of General Lee's
army under Longstreet. Jackson's division, under
Brigadier General W. S. Taliaferro, had therefore been
moved on the night of the 27th to the vicinity of the
battlefield of the 21st of July, 1861, and A. P. Hill's to
Centreville, with orders to Ewell to move up, by the
northern bank of Bull Run, to the same locality with
Taliaferro early on the morning of the 28th. At dawn
on that morning, my brigade resumed the march, moving
across Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and then up the
north bank to Stone Bridge, followed by Trimble's
brigade. We crossed at a ford just below Stone Bridge,
and moved across the Warrenton Pike and through the
fields between the Carter house and the Stone Tavern,
where the battle of the 21st of July had begun, to the
Sudley road, near where Jackson's division was already
in position.
Lawton's and Hays' brigades had by mistake taken
the road to Centreville, but had now rejoined the rest
of the division, and the whole of the brigades were placed
under cover in the woods, north of the Warrenton Pike,
through which the Sudley road ran. Hill's division came
up from Centreville subsequently. In the meantime
Pope's whole army had been moving by various roads
upon Manassas Junction, with the expectation of finding
Jackson's force there, but in the afternoon the corps of
McDowell's en route for Manassas had been ordered to
move to Centreville, and a portion of it marched along
Page 120
the Warrenton Pike. Very late in the afternoon, Jackson's
division under Taliaferro was moved along parallel
to the pike, under cover of the woods, across the track
which had been graded for a railroad, until it passed the
small village of Groveton on our left. Ewell's division
followed Jackson's until the whole had crossed the railroad
track, and the two divisions were then halted and
formed in line facing the pike. General Ewell ordered
me to take command of my own brigade and Hays' and
form a double line in the edge of a piece of woods, with
my left resting on the railroad, and to await orders;
and he moved to the right with Lawton's and Trimble's
brigades.
My line was formed as directed, with my own brigade
in front and Hays' in rear of it, and as thus formed we
were on the left and rear of Starke's brigade of Jackson's
division, whose line was advanced farther towards
the pike. About sunset a column of the enemy commenced
moving past our position, and Jackson's division
and the two brigades with General Ewell moved forward
to attack him, when a fierce and sanguinary engagement
took place. While it was raging, and just before dark,
I received an order from General Jackson, through one
of his staff officers, to advance to the front, which I
complied with at once, my own brigade in line of battle being
followed by that of Hays.
While advancing, I received an order to send two
regiments to the right to General Jackson, and I detached
the 44th and 49th Virginia under Colonel Smith
for that purpose. On reaching the railroad cut in my
forward movement, I found it so deep that it was
impossible to cross it, and I had therefore to move to the
right by flank until I found a place where I could cross.
This proved to be a ravine with embankments on both
sides for a bridge or culvert, and I had here to pass
through by flank and form by file into line in front of a
marsh beyond. This brought me near the left of the
position to which Trimble's brigade had advanced, and I
Page 121
had passed a part of Starke's brigade on the railroad
track. While my brigade was forming in line it was
exposed to a galling fire of canister and shrapnel, and
before it was ready to advance the enemy had begun to
retreat and it had become so dark that it was impossible
to tell whether we should encounter friend or foe. I
therefore advanced no farther and Hays' brigade was
halted on the railroad; and in this position the two
brigades lay on their arms all night.
A short distance from me General Ewell was found
very severely wounded by a ball through the knee, which
he had received while leading one of the regiments on
foot, and I had him carried to the hospital, after having
great difficulty in persuading him to go, as he insisted
upon having his leg amputated before he left the ground.
Lawton's and Trimble's brigades lay on their arms
a short distance to my right, near the points where they
were at the close of the action, and both had suffered
heavily. The enemy had retired from our immediate
front, and we could hear the rumbling of his artillery
as he was moving off in the distance.
Page 122
CHAPTER XIII.
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.
THOUGH the force of the enemy, consisting of King's
division of McDowell's Corps moving on the left flank
of that corps, with which the engagement took place on
the afternoon of the 28th, had retreated in the direction
of Manassas, other troops had moved up to the vicinity,
and early next morning it was discovered that Pope was
moving his whole army against us from the direction
of Manassas and Centreville, to which point it had gone
in search of us.
It now became necessary to change our front to meet
the approaching columns, and Ewell's division, under the
command of Brigadier General Lawton as senior
brigadier, was formed in line facing Groveton, near
where it had lain on its arms the night before, on a ridge
running nearly at right angles to Warrenton Pike, with
its right, my brigade, resting on the pike. The other
divisions were retired behind the unfinished railroad on
our left, and the whole line faced towards the enemy. At
an early hour the enemy's batteries opened on us and
were replied to by ours. After this artillery firing had
continued for some time, the position of Ewell's division
was changed, and General Jackson in person ordered me
to move with Hays' brigade and my own, and Johnson's
battery of artillery, to a ridge north of the Warrenton
Pike and behind the railroad, so as to prevent the enemy
from turning our right flank, a movement from Manassas
indicating that purpose having been observed. Two of
my regiments, the 13th Virginia and 31st Virginia, under
Colonel Walker, were detached by General Jackson's
order and placed in position south of the pike, for the
purpose of watching the movements of the force that
was advancing from the direction of Manassas towards
our right.
Page 123
Hays' brigade and my own were formed in line on
the ridge indicated, in the edge of a piece of woods, and
skirmishers were advanced to the line of the railroad,
Johnson's battery being placed in position to command
my front. In the meantime our main line had been
established on the railroad a mile or more to my left,
and Lawton's and Trimble's brigades had been moved
so as to conform thereto. The artillery firing had continued
all the morning, on my left at our main position,
and there had been some infantry fighting. The two
regiments under Colonel Walker, by skirmishing, kept
the head of the force moving from Manassas on our
right in check, until the appearance of the leading
division (Hood's) of Longstreet's force on the Warrenton
Pike from the direction of Gainesville, which occurred
about ten or eleven o'clock A.M.
I remained in position until Longstreet's advance had
moved far enough to render it unnecessary for me to
remain longer, and, without awaiting orders, I recalled
Colonel Walker with his two regiments about one o'clock
P.M., and then moved the two brigades to the left, to
rejoin the rest of the division. I found General Lawton
with his own brigade in line in rear of the railroad, not
far from the position I had occupied, the previous morning,
before the fight, and Trimble's brigade was in line
on the railroad between Jackson's division and Hill's,
the former being on the right and the latter on the left.
Along this railroad Jackson's line was mainly formed,
facing to the southeast. The track of the road was
through fields and woods, and consisted of deep cuts
and heavy embankments, as the country was rolling.
The two brigades with me were formed in line in the
woods, in rear of Lawton's brigade, with Hays' on the
right of mine.
We remained in this position until about half-past
three P.M., and in the meantime the enemy was making
desperate attempts to drive our troops from the line of
the railroad, having advanced some heavy columns
Page 124
against Hill's brigades and been repulsed; and the battle
was raging fiercely in our front. Just about half-past
three, Colonel Forno, with Hays' brigade, was ordered
to advance to the assistance of one of Hill's brigades
which had been forced from his position, and he did so,
driving the enemy from the railroad and taking position
on it with his brigade. He was subsequently wounded
very seriously, while holding this position, by a sharpshooter,
and had to be removed from the field.
Some time after Forno's advance, a messenger came
from A. P. Hill, with the information that one of his
brigades, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, was
being very heavily pressed, and with the request that I
should advance to its support. I did so at once, without
waiting for orders, and moved directly ahead, as I was
informed the attack was immediately in my front; the
8th Louisiana Regiment under Major Lewis, which had
been sent to the wagons the day before to replenish its
ammunition and had just arrived, accompanying my
brigade. As I passed Lawton's brigade I found the
13th Georgia Regiment preparing to move forward under
the General's orders. I continued to advance until I
came to a small field near the railroad, when I discovered
that the enemy had possession of a deep cut in the railroad
with a part of his force in a strip of woods between
the field and the cut. General Gregg's and Colonel
Thomas' brigades, having very nearly exhausted their
ammunition, had fallen back a short distance, but were
presenting a determined front to the enemy.
My brigade, with the 8th Louisiana on its left, advanced
at once across the field, and drove the enemy
from the woods and the railroad cut, dashing across the
railroad, and pursuing the retreating force some two
or three hundred yards beyond, before I could arrest
its progress. The messenger from General Hill had
stated that it was not desired that I should go beyond
the railroad, but should content myself with driving the
enemy from it, as General Jackson's orders were not to
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advance but hold the line. I, therefore, drew my men
back to the railroad cut and took position behind it.
This charge was made with great dash and gallantry
by my brigade and the 8th Louisiana Regiment, and
very heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy with a
comparatively slight one to us, though two valuable officers,
Colonel William Smith of the 49th Virginia and Major
John C. Higginbotham of the 25th Virginia, were severely
wounded. At the time my brigade crossed the railroad,
the 13th Georgia advanced further to the right and
crossed over in pursuit.
This was the last of seven different assaults on General
Hill's line that day, all of which had now been
repulsed with great slaughter upon the enemy, and he
did not renew the attack, but contented himself with
furiously shelling the woods in which we were located.
Jackson's division had also repulsed an attack on his
front, and General Trimble was severely wounded during
the course of the day by an explosive ball from a
sharpshooter. General Jackson had accomplished his
purpose of resisting the enemy until General Lee with
Longstreet's force could effect a junction with him. The
latter force was now up and a part of it had been engaged
just about night with one of the enemy's columns.
Pope, in his report, claims that General Jackson was
retreating through Thoroughfare Gap, when his attack
arrested this retreat and compelled Jackson to take position
to defend himself, and that he drove our troops
several miles, but there was no thought of retreat, and
the various movements of our troops had been solely for
the purpose of defence against the enemy's threatened
attacks as he changed their direction.
Hill's brigades, to whose relief I had gone, went to
the rear to replenish their cartridge boxes and did not
return to relieve me after the close of the fight on the
29th. I had therefore to remain in position all night with
my men lying on their arms.
I had understood that some of Hill's brigades were
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to my left, but it turned out that they had also gone to
the rear to get ammunition and did not return; and very
early in the morning of the 30th, the enemy's sharpshooters
got on the railroad embankment on my left
and opened fire on that flank, killing a very valuable
young officer of the 13th Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant
Leroy. I thus discovered for the first time that my
flank was exposed, and the enemy's sharpshooters soon
began to cross the railroad on my left and advance
through a cornfield. I immediately sent word to General
Hill of this state of things, and, after some delay, some
brigades were sent to occupy positions on my left, who
drove the sharpshooters back. During the morning there
was very heavy skirmishing in my front, and the
skirmishers of my brigade, under Captain Lilley of the
25th Virginia, drove back a heavy force which was advancing
apparently for an attack on our position.
Subsequently our troops were arranged so as to place
Ewell's division in the centre, leaving Hill's division on
the left and Jackson's on the right, but when Lawton's
brigade was moved up, there was left space for only
three of my regiments, and leaving the 44th, 49th and
52nd Virginia Regiments on the line under General
Smith of the 49th, I retired about 150 yards to the rear
with the rest of the brigade. Hays' brigade, now under
Colonel Strong, had been sent to the wagons to get
ammunition and had not returned.
The fore part of the day was consumed by the main
body of the enemy and Longstreet's wing of the army in
manoeuvring and cannonading, but about four o'clock
P.M. the enemy brought up very heavy columns and
hurled them against Jackson's line, when the fighting
became very severe, but all of the attempts to force our
position were successfully resisted, and a very heavy
punishment was inflicted on the enemy. My three regiments
under Colonel Smith, participated in the repulse
of the enemy, and as he retired they dashed across the
railroad cut in pursuit, very unexpectedly to me, as I
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had given orders to Colonel William Smith not to advance
until the order to do so was given. His men, however,
had been incapable of restraint, but he soon returned
with them. In the meantime, I advanced the
other regiments to the front of the line that had been
vacated. Trimble's brigade, now under Captain Brown
of the 12th Georgia, and Lawton's brigade had participated
in this repulse of the enemy likewise.
The attack on the part of the line occupied by Jackson's
division had been very persistent, but Longstreet
now began to advance against the enemy from the right
and was soon sweeping him from our front. Some of
Hill's brigades also advanced and the enemy was driven
from the field with great slaughter. While this was taking
place, the other divisions of Jackson were ordered
to advance, and my brigade was soon put in motion in
the direction taken by Hill's brigades, advancing through
the woods in our front to a large field about a quarter
of a mile from the railroad. I halted at the edge of the
woods to enable the other brigades to come up, as I was
ahead of them, when General Jackson rode up and
ordered me to move by my left flank to intercept a body
of the enemy reported moving up Bull Run to our left.
I did so, moving along with skirmishers ahead of the
brigade until I came to the railroad, and then along that
until I came to a field.
It was now getting dark, and as my skirmishers
moved into the field they were fired upon from their left.
This fire came from a very unexpected quarter, and I
immediately sent to let General Jackson know the fact,
as it would have been folly to have advanced in the
direction I was going if it came from the enemy. A
message was soon received from General Jackson, stating
that the fire very probably came from some of Hill's
troops, and directing me to send and see. This had been
anticipated by sending a young soldier of the 44th Virginia,
who volunteered for the purpose, and he soon returned
with the information that the firing was from
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the skirmishers from Gregg's and Branch's brigades
of Hill's division who mistook us for the enemy. Fortunately
no damage was done, and I was moving on when
I received an order to advance to the front from where
I was, and in a few minutes afterwards another to move
back by the right flank, as the report of the movement
of the enemy around our left flank had proved untrue.
I found that the other brigades of the division had
bivouacked near where I had left them, and my own
did the same.
The enemy had been driven beyond Bull Run, and
was in retreat to Centreville, our pursuit having been
arrested by the approaching darkness.
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CHAPTER XIV.
AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY.
JACKSON'S command, after having rested on the
morning of the 31st, in the afternoon of that day was
put in motion for the purpose of turning the enemy's
position at Centreville. Crossing Bull Run at and near
Sudley's Ford, it moved to the left over a country road,
Jackson's division in front followed by Ewell's and Hill's
bringing up the rear, until the Little River Turnpike
was reached, when we turned towards Fairfax Court-House
and bivouacked late at night. Early on the morning
of September the 1st, the march was resumed, and
continued until we reached the farm of Chantilly in the
afternoon. The enemy was found in position, covering
the retreat of his army, near Ox Hill, not far from
Chantilly, and a short distance beyond which the Little
River Pike, and the pike from Centreville to Fairfax
Court-House, intersect.
General Jackson at once put his troops in position on
the ridge on the east of the Little River Pike, with his
own division on the left, Hill's on the right and Ewell's
in the centre; Hays' and Trimble's brigades only of
Ewell's division being on the front line, Lawton's and
mine being formed in the woods in their rear. As we
moved into position the enemy opened a heavy artillery
fire on us, and soon the action commenced with some of
Hill's brigades on the right, extending to Trimble's and
Hays' brigades. During this action a severe thunder
storm raged, and while it was progressing, General
Starke, then in command of Jackson's division, represented
to me that a heavy force was threatening his left,
between which and the pike there was a considerable
interval, and requested me to cover it with my brigade
to protect him from the apprehended danger.
After examining the position I reluctantly consented
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to yield to General Starke's entreaty, without awaiting
orders, as Hays' brigade was in my front and he represented
his situation as critical, and I proceeded to move
my brigade by the left flank to the point designated by
him. I had put myself on the leading flank, and while
moving I heard a considerable musketry fire, but as the
woods were very thick and it continued to rain I could
see only a short distance, and took it for granted that
the firing proceeded from the troops in front of where I
had been.
On reaching the position General Starke desired me
to occupy, which was but a short distance from the place
I had moved from, as his left was drawn back in a circle
towards the pike, I discovered that the 13th, 25th and
31st Virginia Regiments which were on my right had
not followed the rest of the brigade. I immediately sent
my aide, Lieutenant Early, back to see what had become
of the missing regiments, and he found them engaged
with a body of the enemy in their front. On ascertaining
this fact, I moved back at once and found that my
regiment had repulsed the force opposed to them and
inflicted considerable loss on it. Hays' brigade under
Colonel Strong had fallen back in considerable confusion
about the time I commenced my movement, and passed
through the three regiments on my right, followed by a
considerable force of the enemy. The commanding officers
had very properly detained those regiments, as the
affair was entirely concealed from my view, and they
had received the enemy's onset with great coolness,
driving him back out of the woods.
Colonel Strong had attempted to change front when
the enemy were advancing on him, and, being entirely
inexperienced in the management of a brigade, he had
got it into such confusion that it was compelled to retire.
The 8th Louisiana Regiment, under Major Lewis, had
been halted and formed into line immediately in rear
of my regiments, and the remaining regiments were soon
rallied and brought back by their respective commanders.
After quite a severe action, in which the enemy lost two
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general officers, Kearney and Stevens, he was repulsed
at all points, and continued his retreat during the night.
After the close of the action, Jackson's division was
withdrawn from the left to the rear, and Ewell's division
covered the point previously covered by General Starke,
and Hays' and Trimble's brigades, and the men lay
on their arms during the night. While Trimble's brigade
was engaged, the gallant old Captain Brown, of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, in command of the brigade, was
killed, and Colonel James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia
Regiment was subsequently assigned to the command of
the brigade, as it had no field officer present.
On the morning of the 2nd it was discovered that the
enemy had retired from our front, and during that day
Pope made good his escape into the fortifications around
Washington. He had now seen the "rebels" in various
aspects and found that his lines of retreat would not
take care of themselves; and very soon he was shipped
and sent to the northwest to look after the Indians in
that quarter.
This affair at Ox Hill closed the series of engagements
with the enemy under Pope, and it was again the
old story of the "rebels in overwhelming numbers,"
opposed to a small army of "Union soldiers." According
to Pope's account, his army was wearied out and
broken down by the fatigues of the campaign on the
Rappahannock, and the incessant marching and manoeuvring
to confront Lee's army, and was short of rations
and ammunition. It does not seem to have occurred to
him that the soldiers of the army which thus wearied his
own were at all susceptible of fatigue or hunger, or that
when his own rations were short, their chances of supplying
themselves were slim.
Pope's army had at the time of the battles of the
27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of August, been reinforced by
Burnside's corps under Reno, one brigade of Sturgis'
division from Alexandria, and the following troops
from McClellan's army: Heintzelman's corps, Porter's
corps, and the division of Pennsylvania reserves commanded
Page 132
by Reynolds. At the time of the affair at Ox
Hill he had been further reinforced by Franklin's and
Sumner's corps of McClellan's army, leaving but one
corps of that army (Keyes') which had not reached him.
His consolidated report of the 31st of July showed a
strength of 46,858 before he was joined by any of those
reinforcements and in the letter of Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, Pope's army is stated to be
about 40,000. In a telegram from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 12th of August, Burnside's force is stated to be
nearly 13,000.
General Lee's army at the time of these battles near
Manassas consisted of Jackson's wing of the army in
which there were three divisions of infantry containing
fourteen brigades, Longstreet's wing in which there were
four divisions of infantry containing fifteen brigades, and
two brigades of cavalry under Stuart. There was about
one battery of artillery of four guns for each brigade
attached to the divisions, and there was a reserve force
of artillery which may have numbered some eight or ten
batteries, but perhaps not so many.
Longstreet's command consisted of his own division,
seven brigades; Hood's division, two brigades; Jones'
division, three brigades; and Anderson's division, three
brigades. The whole of those brigades, as well as the
force of Jackson, had been in the battles around Richmond,
except Evans' brigade--attached to Longstreet's
division,--and Drayton's brigade, attached to Jones'
division. Those two brigades had probably been brought
from the South since those battles, or they may have
been organized out of regiments attached to other
brigades at that time; but I think they were brought
from North and South Carolina, and if such was the
fact, they were the only reinforcements which I ever
heard of reaching General Lee after the battles around
Richmond or before or during the campaign against Pope
or the campaign in Maryland. D. H. Hill's division of
five brigades; McLaw's division of four brigades, composed
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of his own and Magruder's consolidated; and the
force of Holmes and Wise--all of which had constituted
part of the army at Richmond during the battles,--had
been left for the protection of that city until the whole
of McClellan's force moved from James River.
When that event was fully ascertained, Hill's and
McLaw's division and two of Holmes' brigades, under
Walker, had been ordered to move North, but Hill and
McLaws got up on the 2nd, the day after the affair at
Ox Hill, and Walker later, so that Pope had only to
confront the 29 brigades before mentioned. My brigade
was fully an average one, and my effective force did
not exceed 1,500. Some idea therefore may be formed
of the force with which General Lee fought the second
battle of Manassas; I don't think it could have exceeded
50,000 effective men in all, including artillery and
cavalry, and it was probably considerably under that
number.
The loss in Ewell's division, beginning with the artillery
fighting on the Rappahannock and ending, with the
affair at Ox Hill, was in killed 366, wounded 1,169, and
missing 32, the loss in my own brigade being 27 killed
and 181 wounded.
The main battle, which occurred on the 29th and 30th
of August, has been called the second battle of Manassas,
but I think the little village or hamlet of Groveton is
entitled to the honor of giving its name to that great
battle, as the fighting began there on the 28th, and was
all around it on the 29th and 30th.
The first battle near the same spot, on ground which
was again fought over, had been properly named, as
Manassas Junction was then the headquarters and central
position of our army, and was the objective point
of the enemy during the battle. Such was not the case
with either army at the last battle, and the Junction,
several miles off, had no more relation to the battle than
Bristow, Gainesville or Centreville.
Page 134
CHAPTER XV.
MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND.
ON the 2nd of September our army rested, while the
movements of the enemy were being ascertained.
Provisions were now very scarce, as the supply in the
wagons, with which we had started, was exhausted. The
rations obtained by Jackson's command from the enemy's
stores, at Manassas, which were confined to what could
be brought off in haversacks, were also exhausted, and
on this day boiled fresh beef, without salt or bread, was
issued to my brigade, which with an ear or two of green
corn roasted by a fire, constituted also my own supply
of food, at this time. Longstreet's wing of the army was
in a worse condition than Jackson's, as it had not participated
in the supply found at Manassas.
On the morning of the 3rd, Jackson's wing commenced
the march towards the Potomac, and moved to
the left over some country roads, crossing the Loudoun
& Hampshire Railroad at a station, above Vienna, until
we reached the turnpike from Georgetown to Leesburg
in Loudoun, and then along this road through Drainesville,
until we passed Leesburg on the afternoon of the
4th, and bivouacked near Big Springs, two or three miles
from the latter place, at night.
On the 5th we resumed the march and crossed the
Potomac at White's Ford, about seven miles above Leesburg,
into Maryland. This ford was an obscure one on
the road through the farm of Captain Elijah White, and
the banks of the river had to be dug down so that our
wagons and artillery might cross. On the Maryland side
of the river the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal runs along the
bank, and the canal had to be bridged over a lock to
enable our wagons to pass, as they could not get through
the culvert where the road ran. That night we bivouacked
near Three Springs in Maryland on the road leading
Page 135
towards Frederick City, and after my brigade had lain
down I received a message from General Jackson to let
my men get green corn for two days, but, I told the staff
officer bringing it, that they had already drawn their
rations in that article, which was all they had now to
eat. I will here say that green Indian corn and boiled
beef without salt are better than no food at all by a
good deal, but they constitute a very weakening diet for
troops on a long march, as they produce diarrhoea.
On the 6th we resumed the march and in the afternoon
occupied Frederick City and the Monocacy Junction
on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Jackson's division
took position near the city, and Hill's and Ewell's near
the Junction, which is about three miles from the city
in the direction of Washington. Ewell's division covered
the railroad and the approaches from the direction
of Baltimore, and Hill's those from the direction of
Washington. We were now able to get some flour and
salt, and our whole army was in a day or two concentrated
near the same points.
We remained in position until the 10th, and on that
day General Jackson's command moved through Frederick
westward, for the purpose of capturing Harper's
Ferry and Maryland Heights, where there was a considerable
force of the enemy. At the same time, McLaws,
with his own and Anderson's divisions, including three
brigades of Longstreet's attached to Anderson's division,
moved towards Maryland Heights, and Brigadier General
Walker with his two brigades moved towards
Loudoun Heights on the south of the Potomac, for the
purpose of surrounding Harper's Ferry and co-operating
with General Jackson in its capture.
On the night of the 10th, Ewell's division bivouacked
between Middletown and South Mountain. On the 11th,
we moved across the mountain at Boonsboro Gap, and
through Boonsboro to Williamsport, where we crossed
the Potomac; Hill's division moving from that place
directly for Martinsburg on the pike, and Ewell's and
Page 136
Jackson's divisions for North Mountain depot on the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, some miles west of Martinsburg,
near which they bivouacked. On the morning of
the 12th we moved for Martinsburg, and found that a
force of the enemy at that place under General White
had retired in the direction of Harper's Ferry on the
approach of Hill's division. We passed through the
town in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Ewell's
division bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.
On the morning of the 13th we resumed the march,
and reached the turnpike from Charlestown to Harper's
Ferry, one mile above Halltown, and bivouacked in
sight of the enemy's work on Bolivar Heights, covering
the town at the ferry, to wait until McLaws and Walker
should get in position on Maryland Heights and Loudon
Heights respectively, both of which overlooked and
commanded the enemy's position.
On the afternoon of the 14th, McLaws and Walker
having previously gotten in position and opened fire
with their artillery, General Jackson's force moved
forward to invest the enemy's works, Hill's division
moving on the right along the Shenandoah, Ewell's
division along the turnpike, and one brigade of Jackson's
division along the Potomac on the left, the rest of
the division moving in support. Ewell's division moved
along and on each side of the pike in three columns until
it passed Halltown, when it was formed in treble line of
battle with Trimble's and Hays' brigades on the front
line, and Lawton's and my brigade in their rear, Lawton's
forming the second line, and mine the third. In
this order we moved forward through some fields on
the right of the road until we reached a woods on a hill
called School House Hill, confronting the main works
on Bolivar Heights, and in easy range for artillery.
This was done without opposition, and Hays' brigade
was then moved to the left of the road and mine posted
in its rear, the right being occupied by Trimble's and
Lawton's brigades in the same order. It was now dark
Page 137
and the artillery firing from Maryland and Loudon
Heights, as well as that from the enemy's works, had
ceased. General Hill had had some skirmishing with the
enemy on our right, and had pushed some brigades close
to the enemy's left flank to favorable positions for
assaulting his works, and taking them on the flank and
rear, but night also closed his operations.
Early on the morning of the 15th, preparations were
made for the assault, and the batteries from Maryland
Heights, Loudon Heights, from a position across the
Shenandoah to which the guns belonging to Ewell's
division had been moved during the night, from Hill's
position, from each side of the pike in front of Ewell's
division, and from the left on the Potomac, opened on
the enemy. In front of the position occupied by Ewell's
division was a deep valley between School House Hill
and Bolivar Heights, the whole of which was cleared.
On the opposite side the ascent to the enemy's works
was steep and over thick brush that had been felled so
as to make a formidable abattis. It was over this ground
we would have had to move to the assault, and the prospect
was by no means comforting.
Very early in the morning, Lawton's brigade had
been moved to the right and then by flank to the upper
part of the valley in front of us, for the purpose of
supporting an attack to be made by Hill's division, and
the latter was moving to the assault, when the white flag
was hoisted on Bolivar Heights. This indication of the
enemy's surrender was received with very hearty and
sincere cheers all along the line, as we were thus saved
the necessity of an assault, which if stubbornly resisted
would have resulted in the loss of many lives to us.
Under the directions of General Jackson, General A.
P. Hill received the surrender of the enemy, then under
the command of Brigadier General White, Colonel Miles,
the commander of the forces at Harper's Ferry, having
been mortally wounded. About 11,000 prisoners were
surrendered and paroled, and we secured about 12,000
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small arms, 70 pieces of artillery, and a very large
amount of stores, provisions, wagons and horses.
The victory was really a bloodless one so far as General
Jackson's command was concerned, the only loss
being a very few killed and wounded in Hill's division,
but General McLaws had had heavy work in taking
Maryland Heights, and had been engaged severely with
the enemy coming up in his rear.
Page 139
CHAPTER XVI.
BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM.
LATE in the afternoon of the 15th, General Lawton
received an order from General Jackson to move the
division on the road to Boteler's Ford, on the Potomac
below Shepherdstown, and he at once put his own and
Trimble's brigade, which had gotten rations from
Harper's Ferry, in motion, and ordered me to follow
with my own and Hays' brigade as soon as they were
supplied likewise from the stores of the enemy. I was
detained until after night before the men of the two
brigades could be supplied, and I then followed General
Lawton, finding him just before morning bivouacked
about four miles from Boteler's Ford. Brigadier General
Hays, wounded at Port Republic while Colonel of
the 7th Louisiana, had returned to the brigade on the
15th after the surrender of Harper's Ferry and assumed
command of his brigade before we started on this march.
The division moved at dawn on the 16th, and, crossing
the Potomac, arrived in the vicinity of Sharpsburg
in the early part of the day, and stacked arms in a piece
of woods about a mile in rear of Sharpsburg, Jackson's
division having preceded it, and Hill's being left behind
to dispose of the prisoners and property captured at
Harper's Ferry.
After the different columns, which had been sent
against the latter place, had moved from the vicinity of
Frederick, the residue of General Lee's army had moved
across South Mountain in the direction of Hagerstown,
and the division of General D. H. Hill had been left to
defend Boonsboro Gap against the Federal Army, composed
of Pope's army and McClellan's army combined,
and heavy reinforcements which had arrived to their
assistance, now approaching under General McClellan.
General Hill had been attacked on the 14th, at Boonsboro
Page 140
Gap, by the main body of McClellan's army, and,
after a very obstinate resistance for many hours to the
vast forces brought against him, had, with the reinforcements
sent to his assistance in the latter part of the
day, retired late at night to Sharpsburg on the western
side of the Antietam.
A position had been taken on the morning of the 15th
by the force north of the Potomac, consisting of D. H.
Hill's division, five brigades; the three remaining
brigades of Longstreet's division; Hood's division, two
brigades; D. R. Jones' division, three brigades; and
Evans' brigade; fourteen brigades in all, covering
Sharpsburg on the north and east, with the right resting
on Antietam Creek, and the left extending to the
Hagerstown pike; and the enemy had gradually moved
his whole army up to the front of this position. This
was the condition of things when Jackson's two divisions
arrived on the 16th, and in the meantime there had been
some skirmishing and artillery firing.
After remaining in position in the rear for some
hours, General Lawton was ordered to move to the right
to cover a bridge over the Antietam, but after the movement
had commenced, it was countermanded and an
order received to follow Jackson's division to the left
through fields until we struck the turnpike from Sharpsburg
to Hagerstown, and proceeding along this we
reached a piece of woods on the west of the pike in which
there was a Dunkard or Quaker Church, and found, some
distance beyond the church, Jackson's division already
posted in a double line on the west of the pike, and
connecting on the right with the left of Hood's division.
General Jackson in person directed me to place my
brigade, which was at the head of the division, on the
left of his own so as to protect its flank, and to
communicate with Brigadier General J. R. Jones, then in
command of that division.
It was then getting near dark, and there was heavy
skirmishing between Hood's troops further to the right
Page 141
and the enemy, while shells were flying pretty thick. I
had some difficulty in finding General Jones or his left,
but after a while succeeded in doing so, and then posted
my brigade on the left of Starke's brigade, constituting,
as I was informed, Jones' left, which was formed on the
west of the pike extending into the woods.
My brigade was posted on a small road running
along the back of the woods past Starke's left, and
thrown back at right angles to his line. Lawton's and
Trimble's brigades had been halted near the church, but
General Hays, under orders from General Jackson, reported
to me with his brigade, and it was posted in rear
of mine. The artillery firing and the skirmishing except
occasional shots between the pickets was put to an end
by the darkness, and about ten or eleven o'clock Lawton's
and Trimble's brigades took the place, on the front line,
of Hood's two brigades, which were withdrawn to the
rear.
Very shortly after dawn on the morning of the 17th,
I was ordered by General Jackson in person to move
my brigade to the front and left, along a route pointed
out by him, for the purpose of supporting some pieces
of artillery which General Stuart had in position to
operate against the enemy's right, and Hays was ordered
to the support of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades.
Moving along the route designated by General Jackson,
I discovered a body of the enemy's skirmishers close
on my right pushing forward as if for the purpose of
getting around the left flank of our line, and I sent some
from my own brigade to hold them in check until I had
passed. I found General Stuart about a mile from the
position I had moved from, with several pieces of
artillery in position on a hill between the left of Jackson's
division and the Potomac which were engaging some of
the enemy's batteries. At his suggestion, I formed my
line in rear of this hill and remained there for about an
hour, when General Stuart discovered a body of the
enemy's infantry gradually making its way between us
Page 142
and the left of our main line, and determined to shift
his position to a hill further to the right and a little in
rear of the direction of our line.
This movement was executed by passing over a route
to the rear of the one I had taken in the morning, the
latter being in possession of the enemy, and, while I was
forming my brigade in a strip of woods running back in
an elbow from the northern extremity of the body of
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, General
Stuart informed me that General Lawton had been
wounded, and that General Jackson had sent for me to
return with my brigade and take command of the division.
Leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment, numbering less than
100 men, with General Stuart, I moved the rest of the
brigade across the angle made by the elbow with the
main body of the woods, through a field to the position
I had started from early in the morning.
The enemy had by this time pushed skirmishers into
the northern or further end of this woods, and was
moving up a very heavy force to turn our left flank.
When I got near my starting point, I found Colonel
Grigsby of the 27th Virginia Regiment, and Stafford
of the 9th Louisiana rallying some two or three hundred
men of Jackson's division at the point at which Starke's
brigade had been in position the night before. As I
came up I halted my brigade and formed line in rear of
Grigsby and Stafford, and they at once advanced against
the enemy's skirmishers, who had penetrated some
distance into the woods, driving them back.
My brigade was advanced in their rear until we came
up with Grigsby and Stafford, where I formed line on
the crest of a slight ridge running through the woods
and directed them to form on my left. Heavy bodies of
the enemy were now discovered in the field beyond the
woods moving up to it. I left my brigade under the
command of Colonel William Smith, of the 49th Virginia,
with directions to resist the enemy at all hazards, and
rode across the Hagerstown pike towards the right to
Page 143
find the brigades which had been engaged early in the
morning, but I found that they had been very badly cut
up and had gone to the rear, Hood having taken their
place with his two brigades. Jackson's division had
also been very badly used, and the whole of it, except
the few men rallied by Grigsby and Stafford, had retired
from the field.
The facts were, as I subsequently ascertained from
the brigade commanders, that, at light, after skirmishing
along the front of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades
in a piece of woods occupied by him, the enemy had
opened a very heavy enfilading fire from the batteries
on the opposite side of the Antietam, and then advanced
very heavy columns of infantry against them, at the
same time pouring a destructive fire of canister and
shells into their ranks from the front. Hays' brigade
had gone to the support of the others and this terrible
assault from the front with the flank fire from the
batteries across the Antietam, had been withstood for some
time with obstinacy, until General Lawton was severely
wounded; Colonel Douglas, commanding his brigade,
killed; Colonel Walker, commanding Trimble's brigade,
had had his horse killed under him, and himself been
disabled by a contusion from a piece of shell; all the
regimental commanders in the three brigades except two
had been killed or wounded; and Lawton's brigade had
sustained a loss of very nearly one-half, Hays' of more
than one-half, and Trimble's of more than a third. General
Hood then came to their relief and the shattered
remnants of these brigades, their ammunition being
exhausted, retired to the rear.
Jackson's division in the meantime had been very
heavily engaged, and had shared a like fate, all of it
that was left being what I found Grigsby and Stafford
rallying, after General Jones had retired from the field
stunned by the concussion of a shell bursting near him,
and General Starke, who had succeeded him, had been
killed.
Page 144
After having discovered that there was nothing of
the division left on the field for me to command except
my own brigade, and seeing that, what I supposed were
Hood's troops, were very hard pressed, and would probably
have to retire before overpowering numbers, I
sent Major J. P. Wilson, a volunteer aide who had been
serving with Generals Ewell and Lawton, to look after
the brigades which had gone to the rear, and I rode to
find General Jackson to inform him of the condition of
things in front, as well as to let him know that a very
heavy force was moving on the west of the pike against
our flank and rear, confronted by my brigade and the
small force under Grigsby and Stafford alone.
I found the General on a hill in rear of the Dunkard
Church, where some batteries were posted, and when I
informed him of the condition of things, he directed me
to return to my brigade and resist the enemy until he
could send me some reinforcements, which he promised
to do as soon as he could obtain them. I found my
brigade and Grigsby and Stafford's force at the point I
had left them, and the movement of the enemy in that
quarter was assuming very formidable proportions. The
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, ran
along the Hagerstown pike on the west side for about
a quarter of a mile until it came to a field on the same
side, about 150 or 200 yards wide. Then the woods fell
back to the left at right angles with the road, and then
ran parallel to it on the other side of the field for about
a quarter of a mile further, and then turned to the left
and ran some distance to the rear, making the elbow
before spoken of.
The field thus located between the pike and the woods
formed a plateau higher than the adjacent woods, and
the latter sloped towards a small road at the further
edge, which extended through the elbow, and was the
one on which I had been posted the night before, and
along which I had moved to the support of Stuart in
the early morning. The line formed by my brigade was
MAJOR SAMUEL HALE
Page 145
entirely in the woods, with its right flank opposite the
middle of the field or plateau, and its direction was a
right angle with the Hagerstown pike. In the woods
were limestone ledges which formed very good cover
for troops, and they extended back towards the church.
From my position the forces of both armies on my right,
or rather in my rear, as I now faced, were entirely
concealed from view, as the plateau on my right was
considerably higher than the ground on which my brigade
was formed.
After my return, the enemy continued to press up
towards the woods in which I was, in very heavy force,
and I sent Major Hale, my Assistant Adjutant General,
to let General Jackson know that the danger was imminent,
and he returned with the information that the
promised reinforcements would be sent immediately.
Just as Major Hale returned, a battery opened on the
Hagerstown pike where the field, or plateau, and woods
joined. This was in rear of my right flank and not more
than two hundred yards from it. I had been anxiously
looking to my front and left flank, not dreaming that
there was any immediate danger to my right, as I had
seen our troops on the eastern side of the pike, at an
advanced position, engaged with the enemy, and I took
it for granted that this was one of our batteries which
had opened on the enemy, but Major Hale's attention
was called to it by a soldier in our rear, who was standing
on the edge of the plateau, and informed him that it
was one of the enemy's batteries. Major Hale examined
it himself and immediately informed me of the fact, but
I doubted it until I rode to the edge of the woods and
saw for myself that it was really one of the enemy's
batteries, firing along the pike in the direction of the
Dunkard Church.
While I was looking at it for a minute to satisfy
myself, I saw a heavy column of infantry move up by its
side. This column consisted of Green's division of
Mansfield's corps. The fact was that Hood, after resisting
Page 146
with great obstinacy immensely superior numbers, had
fallen back to the vicinity of the Dunkard Church, and
the enemy had advanced to this position. My position
now was very critical, as there was nothing between Hood
and myself, thus leaving an interval of from a quarter to
a half mile between my command and the rest of the
army. Fortunately, however, my troops were concealed
from this body of the enemy, or their destruction would
have been inevitable, as it was nearly between them and
the rest of the army, and the body, moving up on the left
in my front, had now got into the woods. Hoping the
promised reinforcements would arrive in time, I quietly
threw back my right flank under cover of the woods to
prevent being taken in the rear.
The situation was most critical and the necessity
most pressing, as it was apparent that if the enemy
got possession of this woods, possession of the hills in
their rear would immediately follow, and then, across
to our rear on the road leading back to the Potomac,
would have been easy. In fact the possession of these
hills would have enabled him to take our whole line in
reverse, and a disastrous defeat must have followed. I
determined to hold on to the last moment, and I looked
anxiously to the rear to see the promised reinforcements
coming up, the column on my right and rear and that
coming up in front, with which my skirmishers were
already engaged, being watched with the most intense
interest.
While thus looking out, I saw the column on my
right and rear suddenly move into the woods in the
direction of the rear of the church. I could not now
remain still, and I at once put my brigade in motion by
the right flank on a line parallel to that of the enemy's
movements, directing Grigsby and Stafford to fall back
in line, skirmishing with the enemy coming up on the
left. The limestone ledges enabled my troops to keep
out of view of the enemy moving in the woods on my
right, and they moved rapidly so as to get up with them.
Page 147
On passing from behind one of these long ledges, we
discovered the enemy moving with flankers thrown out
on his right flank. I directed Colonel William Smith,
whose regiment, the 49th Virginia, was in the lead, to
open fire on the flankers, which was promptly done, and
they ran in on the main body, which was taken by surprise
by the fire from the unexpected quarter from which
it came.
I now saw two or three brigades moving in line to
our assistance, at the further end of the woods, and
my brigade was faced to the front as soon as the whole
of it had passed from behind the ledge, and opened fire
on the enemy, who commenced retiring towards the pike
in great confusion, after delivering one or two volleys.
I had not intended to move to the front in pursuit, as
I saw a brigade of the troops coming to our assistance
moving into the woods at its further end on my right so
as to come upon the flank of mine if it advanced, and I
was, therefore, afraid that both would be thrown into
confusion by the collision, and that mine would be
exposed to the fire of the other. Moreover the enemy's
other column was advancing on my left, held in check,
however, by Grigsby and Stafford with their men, aided
by the 31st Virginia Regiment, which was on that flank.
The brigade, however, without awaiting orders, dashed
after the retreating column, driving it entirely out of
the woods, and, notwithstanding my efforts to do so, I
did not succeed in stopping it until its flank and rear
had become exposed to the fire of the column on the left.
I then saw other troops of the enemy moving rapidly
across the plateau from the pike to the column, opposed
to Grigsby and Stafford, and I ordered my brigade to
retire a short distance, so as to change front and advance
against the enemy in that direction. Just as I was
reforming my line for that purpose, Semmes' brigade, and
two regiments of Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' division,
and Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones' division
came up, and the whole, including Grigsby's and Stafford's
Page 148
small command, advanced and swept the enemy
from the woods into the fields, and the enemy retreated in
great disorder to another body of woods beyond that
from which he had been thus driven. As soon as the
enemy had been thus repulsed, I recalled my regiments
and caused them to be re-formed, when they were again
posted in their former position on the small ridge before
mentioned. As soon as his infantry had retired the
enemy opened a tremendous fire with canister and shell
upon the woods occupied by us, which was continued for
some time.
The troops which had been opposed to us in this latter
affair consisted of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's
corps, which had not been previously engaged, supported
by Mansfield's corps, under Williams, and which moved
up for a fresh attack on our extreme left. During his
advance, the enemy's columns had received a galling fire
from the guns under General Stuart on a hill in the rear
of our left which contributed very materially to the repulse,
and General Stuart pursued the retreating force
on its flank for some distance, with his pieces of artillery
and the remnant of the 13th Virginia Regiment under
Captain Winston.*
*
McClellan says in reference to this affair on our left, his right:
"Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving the
enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry
and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill,
commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of
the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General
Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's
division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard was forced
the third time to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet
the column advancing on the left, but this line, now suffering from a
destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to
return, gave way towards the right and rear in considerable confusion,
and was soon followed by the first and second lines."
There was nothing in the shape of breastworks in the woods or
in its rear at that time, and the fight on our part was a stand up one
altogether. The slight works, made mostly of rails, which McClellan
saw after the battle, were made on the 18th when we were expecting
a renewal of the attack.
Page 149
My brigade at that time numbered less than 1,000
officers and men present, and Grigsby and Stafford had
between two and three hundred; yet with this small
force we confronted, for a long time, Sumner's formidable
column, and held it in check until reinforcements
arrived to our assistance. Had we retired from the fear
of being flanked or cut off, the enemy must have obtained
possession of the woods, where we were, and, as a necessary
consequence, of the hills in their rear, which would
have resulted in a decisive defeat to us, and a probable
destruction of our army.
While these operations on our extreme left were
going on, all of which transpired in the forenoon, two
other divisions of Sumner's corps, French's and
Richardson's, had been moving against our centre occupied
by General D. H. Hill, and were forcing it back after
a hard struggle, just about the time I was contending
with the two columns of the enemy in the woods. A
portion of this force moving against Hood near the
Dunkard Church, was met and repulsed by Kershaw's
and Cobb's brigades of McLaws' division, the portion of
Barksdale's brigade which had not come to my assistance,
and Ransom's brigade of Walker's division, at the
same time that the force opposed to me was repulsed.
Not long after my brigade had been re-formed and
placed in its former position, Colonel Hodges, in
command of Armistead's brigade of Anderson's division,
came up and took the place of my brigade, which latter
was then posted along the edge of the plateau on Hodges'
right, facing towards the Hagerstown pike. Subsequently
General McLaws posted Barksdale's brigade on
my right, and Kershaw's and Cobb's brigades on the
left of Hodges'. My line as established along the edge
of the woods and plateau after the repulse of the enemy,
extended beyond where the left of Jackson's division
rested at daylight, and embraced inside of it all of our
killed and wounded, and nearly the whole of that of the
enemy, in this last affair on our left.
Page 150
Major Wilson had by this time returned with the
information that he had been able to find only a part of
Hays' brigade, which was under General Hays, who was
with General Hood, and that it was in no condition to
render any service. He further stated that the remnants
of the other brigades had gone to the rear for the purpose
of re-forming and gathering up stragglers, but that
he had been unable to find them.
The enemy continued to shell the woods in which we
were for some time, doing, however, little or no damage,
as we were under cover, and his shot and shells went
over our heads. Some of our batteries, which had been
brought up to the hills in our rear, opened fire on the
woods where we were, on two occasions, under the
impression that they were occupied by the enemy, and I
had to send and have it stopped. Some pieces of our
artillery were moved into the angle of the plateau on
my right and opened on the enemy, but were soon compelled
to retire by the superior metal and number of
guns opposed to them.
We remained in position during the rest of the day,
as did the troops on my left, and those immediately
on my right. The enemy made no further attack on
us on this part of the line, but there were several
demonstrations as if for an attack, and from the top of a tree
on the edge of the woods a lookout reported three lines
of battle beyond the pike with a line of skirmishers
extending nearly up to the pike. There were, however,
some attempts against our line further to the right, and
late in the afternoon a fierce attack was made on our
extreme right by Burnside's corps, which drove some
of our troops from the bridge across the Antietam on
that flank, and was forcing back our right, when some of
A. P. Hill's brigades, which were just arriving from
Harper's Ferry, went to the assistance of the troops
engaged on that flank, and the enemy was driven back in
considerable confusion.
This affair, which terminated just before dark, closed
the fighting on the 16th, and after a most protracted and
Page 151
desperate struggle, our centre had been forced back to
some extent, but the positions on our flanks were maintained.
The attack on Jackson's command in the early morning
had been made by Hooker's and Mansfield's corps,
numbering, according to McClellan's statement, 24,982
men present and fit for duty, and this force had been
resisted by Jackson's division and the three brigades of
Ewell's, and subsequently by Hood's two brigades, aided
by those of D. H. Hill's brigades sent to the assistance
of Hood, until Sumner's corps, numbering 18,813 men,
came up about nine A.M. to the assistance of Hooker's
and Mansfield's. Hood was then compelled to retire to
the woods near the Dunkard Church, and Sumner, in
command now of the entire right wing of the enemy,
prepared for another attack with his corps supported
by Hooker's and Mansfield's. This attack was made
on our left by Sedgwick's division supported by Mansfield's
corps, and on the centre by French's and Richardson's
divisions supported by Hooker's corps, and was
repulsed as has been stated, Hill, however, losing ground
in the centre to some extent. Franklin's corps numbering
12,300 men was then carried to the support of Sumner,
arriving a little after twelve M., and a new attack
on the woods in which our left rested was projected, but
was arrested by General Sumner's orders.
Another attack, however, was made on Hill's position
in the centre, which met with some success by reason
of the removal of one of his brigades, by mistake, from
its position, but the enemy's progress was arrested by
Walker's brigades and a part of Anderson's division,
which had arrived to his support. The enemy had then
made the attack with Burnside's corps, numbering
13,819, on Longstreet's right, on the Antietam, held by
D. R. Jones' division, which was repulsed on the arrival
of Hill's brigades as stated. The above is a condensed
account of the main features of this battle taken from
the reports of both sides, and the figures in regard to the
strength of McClellan's corps are taken from his own
Page 152
report. Porter's corps of his army, numbering 12,930,
was held in reserve.*
Late in the afternoon, after it had become apparent
that no further attack on our left was to be made, I rode
to the rear in search of the missing brigades and found
about one hundred men of Lawton's brigade which had
been collected by Major Lowe, the ranking officer of the
brigade left, and I had them moved up to where my
own brigade was, and placed on its right. We lay on
our arms all night, and about light on the morning of
the 18th, General Hays brought up about ninety men of
his brigade, which were posted on my left. During the
morning Captain Feagins, the senior officer left of
Trimble's brigade, brought up about two hundred of that
brigade, and they were posted in my rear.
The enemy remained in our front during the whole
day without making any show of an attack on our left,
but there was some firing between the skirmish lines
farther to right. The enemy in my immediate front
showed a great anxiety to get possession of his dead
and wounded on that part of the ground, and several
flags of truce approached us, but, I believe, without
authority from the proper source. However, a sort of
informal truce prevailed for a time, and some of the
dead and very badly wounded of the enemy and of that
part of our army which had been engaged first on the
morning of the 17th, were exchanged even while the
skirmishers were firing at each other on the right. This
was finally stopped and the enemy informed that no flag
of truce could be recognized unless it came from the
headquarters of his army. We remained in position on
the 18th during the whole day, without any serious
demonstration by the enemy on any part of our line, and
after dark retired for the purpose of recrossing the
* Walker's division of two brigades (his own and Ransom's) had
reached the vicinity of the battlefield on the 16th and McLaws' division,
and Anderson's, including the three brigades of Longstreet's with
him, did not get up until after the battle had begun.
Page 153
Potomac. I held my position until my skirmishers in
front were relieved by a portion of Fitz. Lee's cavalry
and then retired in pursuance of orders previously
received from General Jackson, carrying with me Armistead's
brigade under Colonel Hodges, which had received
no orders from its division commander, and bringing
up, I believe, the rear of the infantry of our entire
army. We found a large number of wagons and troops
massed at Boteler's Ford, and the division now commanded
by me did not cross until after sunrise. After
getting over the river, the division was formed in line
of battle on the Virginia side, under direction of General
Longstreet, and remained in position several hours, until
the enemy appeared on the other bank and opened on us
with artillery.
I was subsequently ordered to leave Lawton's brigade,
now increased to about four hundred men under Colonel
Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment (who had returned
after the battle of the 17th), at Boteler's Ford, under
the command of Brigadier General Pendleton, who was
entrusted with the defence of the crossing, and I was
ordered to move with the rest of the division towards
Martinsburg.
Our whole army with its trains had been safely
recrossed and this terminated the operations properly
connected with the battle of Sharpsburg.
In that battle, Ewell's division had lost in killed 119,
in wounded 1,115, and in missing 38, being an aggregate
loss of 1,352 out of less than 3,400 men and officers carried
into action. The loss in my own brigade was in killed 18,
and in wounded 156, and among the latter were Colonel
Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Gibson of the 49th Virginia
Regiment, both severely, and the former receiving
three distinct wounds before the close of the fight, in
which he was engaged. The loss in our whole army was
heavy, but not so great as the estimate put upon it by
the enemy.
There has been very great misapprehension, both on
Page 154
the part of the enemy and many Confederates, not
familiar with the facts, about the strength of General
Lee's army at this battle. The whole of the troops then
constituting that army had belonged to the army which
opposed McClellan in the battles around Richmond, except
Evans' and Drayton's brigades, and such absentees
as had returned, and there had been troops then belonging
to the army, which had not left Richmond, exceeding
the number in the said two brigades. There had been
heavy losses in the battles around Richmond; and the
subsequent losses at Cedar Run, on the Rappahannock,
at Manassas and in the vicinity, at Maryland Heights
and in Pleasant Valley--where McLaws had been
severely engaged,--and at South Mountain, had very
materially weakened the strength of the army. Besides
all this, since crossing the Rappahannock we had been
without regular supplies of food, and had literally been
living from hand to mouth. Our troops were badly
shod and many of them became barefooted, and they were
but indifferently clothed and without protection against
the weather. Many of them had become exhausted from
the fatigues of the campaign, and the long and rapid
marches which they had made while living on short
rations and a weakening diet--and many were foot-sore
from want of shoes; so that the straggling from these
causes, independent of that incident to all armies, had
been frightful before we crossed the Potomac, and had
continued up to the time of the battle.
Some idea of the diminution from these various
causes may be found from the following facts: That
Christian gentleman, and brave, accomplished soldier,
General D. H. Hill, states that his division, which
numbered ten thousand at the beginning of the battles around
Richmond, had been reduced to less than five thousand
which he had at the battle of South Mountain. Yet he
had reached the army after all the fighting about Manassas,
and he states that on the morning of the 17th of
September he had but three thousand infantry. Ewell's
Page 155
division, with Lawton's brigade, which was attached to
it after the battle of Cedar Run, must have numbered, at
the time they reached McClellan's right, north of the
Chickahominy, eight or ten thousand, as Lawton's
brigade was then a very large one, which had never been
in action. Yet that division numbered less than three
thousand four hundred on the morning of the 17th.
General Lee says in his report: "This great battle
was fought by less than forty thousand men on our
side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and
hardships in the field and on the march." This certainly
covered our entire force of all descriptions, and I am
satisfied that he might have safely stated it at less than
thirty thousand. There were forty brigades of infantry
in all in the army, one of which, Thomas' of A. P. Hill's
division, did not cross the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry, and the nine brigades of Ewell's and D. H. Hill's
divisions, numbering in the aggregate less than 6,400
officers and men, were fully average ones.
General D. R. Jones states that his command, consisting
of his division of three brigades and three of
Longstreet's, in all six brigades, numbering on the
morning of the 17th, 2,430; General J. R. Jones states that
Jackson's division of four brigades numbered less than
1,600; General McLaws states that he carried into action
in his four brigades, 2,893; General A. P. Hill states
that his three brigades actually numbered less than
2,000; D. H. Hill's five brigades numbered 3,000; and
Ewell's four brigades numbered less than 3,400; which
gives 15,323 in these twenty-six brigades, leaving thirteen
other brigades on the field whose strength is not stated,
to-wit: the six brigades of his own division and Longstreet's
brought up by General Anderson; A. P. Hill's
other two brigades; Hood's two brigades, both very
small; Walker's two brigades; and Evans' brigade.
General Anderson was wounded, and there is no report
from his division or any of his brigades, but General
D. H. Hill says that Anderson came to his support, which
Page 156
was before Anderson's division became engaged, with
some three or four hundred men, and that force consisted
of five brigades, Armistead's having gone to the
left. Averaging the thirteen brigades from which no
estimate was given with the others and it would give a
strength of 7,670, which would make our whole infantry
force on the field, from the beginning to the end of the
battle, twenty-three thousand at the outside. Our cavalry
was not engaged, as it had merely watched the flanks,
but six thousand would fully cover the whole of the
cavalry and artillery which we had on that side of the
river.
McClellan states his whole force in action at 87,164
men present and fit for duty, and he estimates General
Lee's at 97,445. As this estimate is a very remarkable
one and contains some very amusing features, it is given
here in his own language. He says:
"An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee,
made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by
the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., previous to the battle
of Antietam, is as follows:
- General T. J. Jackson's corps. . . . . 24,778 men.
- General James Longstreet's corps. . . . . 23,342 men.
- General D. H. Hill's 2nd division. . . . . 15,525 men.
- General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry. . . . . 6,400 men.
- General Ransom's and Jenkins' brigades. . . . . 3,000 men.
- Forty-six regiments not included in above. . . . . 18,400 men.
- Artillery, estimated at 400 guns. . . . . 6,000 men.
- Total. . . . . 97,445 men.
It is to be presumed that this estimate was made by
Banks when General Jackson was figuring around
Pope's rear, as he did not have a command in McClellan's
army, and it is well known that Banks always saw things
with very largely magnifying glasses when "Stonewall"
Jackson was about.
That some of the affrighted civilians who magnified
Page 157
one small company of cavalry at the first battle of Manassas,
called the Black Horse Cavalry, into 20,000, might
be misled by this estimate of McClellan's, or Banks',
might well be believed, but that the Major General
commanding the "Grand Army of the Potomac," should
have so estimated the strength of General Lee's army at
Sharpsburg, is perfectly amazing.
Who commanded the "forty-six regiments not included
in above," or where were the 400 guns to come
from?
This estimate of the relative strength of the two
armies gives rise to some very curious reflections:
It must be recollected that Bragg and Kirby Smith
were at this time in Kentucky, moving north, and if the
newly established Government at Richmond had been
able to put in the field and send into Maryland from
the comparatively small population of the Confederacy
an army of nearly 100,000 men with 400 pieces of artillery,
it showed a wonderful energy on the part of that
government; while, the fact that the powerful Government
at Washington, with its immense resources and its
very large population to draw from, after a call for
300,000 more men, and after taking everything in the way
of troops from the Ohio to the Atlantic, had been able
to bring into the field, for the defence of the National
Capital and to oppose the large invading army of
"rebels," only a force numbering less than 90,000 men,
displayed a weakness not at all flattering to the energy
of the head of the War Department at Washington, or
to the wisdom of the occupant of the White House, and
a want of "patriotism" by no means complimentary to
the people of the North.
McClellan had stated that the troops in and about
Washington and on the Maryland shore of the Potomac
above and below, including those in Maryland and
Delaware, amounted, on the 1st of March, 1862, to 193,142
present for duty and an aggregate present and absent
of 221,987. This did not include the 13,000 brought by
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Burnside from North Carolina, nor the troops brought
by Cox from the Kanawha Valley, nor, is it presumed,
the forces of Fremont under Sigel, a large part of which
were probably brought from Missouri; and there had
since been at least one call, if not more, for an additional
levy of 300,000 men. Now the question very naturally
arises, as to what had become of all that immense force,
with the reinforcements and recruits, which had dwindled
down to 87,164 men on the morning of the 17th of
September, 1862.
It will be seen from the account previously given
that on the 15th and in the early part of the day of the
16th, McClellan's large army was confronted by a very
small force under Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Jackson
with two divisions numbering less than 5,000 men, and
Walker, with his two brigades arrived on the 16th, and
it was upon the force consisting of these reinforcements
and D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's troops, including in
the latter Hood's two brigades, and Evans' brigade, that
McClellan's army had been hurled on the morning of the
17th. McLaws with his own and Anderson's brigades,
ten in all, did not arrive until the action had been
progressing for some hours. McLaws arrived at sunrise,
and A. P. Hill, with his five brigades, did not come
up until late in the afternoon.
The 24,982 men under Hooker and Mansfield had
attacked Jackson's division and Lawton's, Trimble's and
Hays' brigades of Ewell's division, numbering in all
4,000 men. When they were compelled to retire, Hood
with his two brigades supported by Ripley's, Colquit's
and Garland's and D. H. Hill's division had withstood
the enemy until Sumner arrived with his 18,813 men,
and then Hood was also compelled to retire to the Dunkard
Church. Sumner then with his corps and what was
left of the other two, attacked my brigade of less than
1,000 men, a remnant of about two or three hundred of
Jackson's division, and what was left of D. H. Hill's
and Hood's divisions, when McLaws and Walker with
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their six brigades came to our assistance immediately
after the arrival of McLaws upon the field. Sumner was
repulsed and then Franklin with his 12,300 arrived to
his support, and the attack was renewed on Hill in the
centre, when Anderson with three or four hundred men
and one brigade of Walker's came to his assistance.
This force of 56,095 men was brought against a force
which with all its reinforcements, from first to last,
amounted to less than 18,000 men. How it had been
served will appear from the following extract from
McClellan's report. He says: "One division of Sumner's
corps, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after
fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered
by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and
much scattered; so that they were for the time somewhat
demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the
return made by General Meade, commanding, there were
but 6,729 men present on the 18th, whereas, on the morning
of the 22nd, there were 13,093 present for duty in
the same corps, showing that previous to and during the
battle 6,364 men were separated from their command."
McClellan was not able to renew the attack on the
18th, and, according to his own showing, had to wait for
reinforcements before doing so; yet he claims a great
victory at Antietam, alleging that he had accomplished
the object of the campaign, to-wit: "to preserve the
National Capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania
from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland."
This was a singular claim on the part of the General who,
scarce three months before, had boastingly stated that
the advance of his army was within five miles of the
Confederate Capital.
The truth is that the substantial victory was with us,
and if our army had been in reach of reinforcements, it
would have been a decisive one; but we were more than
200 miles from the point from which supplies of ammunition
were to be obtained, and any reinforcements
which could have been spared to us were much further
Page 160
off, while large reinforcements were marching to
McClellan's aid. We had, therefore, to recross the Potomac.
The question had been mooted as to the propriety of
the campaign into Maryland, and in regard thereto I will
say: General Lee, on assuming command of the army
at Richmond, had found that city, the seat of the
Confederate Government, beleaguered by a vast army, while
all Northern Virginia, including the best part of the
beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, was held by the
enemy. With a herculean effort, he had broken through
the cordon surrounding his army, and with inferior
numbers fallen upon the beleaguering enemy, and sent it
cowering to the banks of the lower James. He had then
moved north, and, after a series of hard fought battles,
had hurled the shattered remains of the army that had
been marauding through Northern Virginia, with all the
reinforcements sent from the lately besieging army, into
the fortifications around Washington. With the diminished
columns of the army with which he accomplished
all this, he had crossed the Potomac, captured an important
stronghold defended by a strong force, securing a
large amount of artillery, small arms, and stores of all
kinds, and had fought a great battle with the newly
reorganized and heavily reinforced and recruited army
of the enemy, which later was so badly crippled that it
was not able to resume the offensive for near two months.
He now stood defiantly on the southern banks of the
Potomac, the extreme northern limit of the Confederacy,
and the result of all these operations, of which the march
into Maryland was an important part, had been that not
only the Confederate Capital had been relieved from the
presence of the besieging army, a danger to which it was
not subjected again for two years; but the enemy's
Capital had been threatened, his territory invaded, and
the base of operations for a new movement on Richmond
had been transferred to the north banks of the Potomac
at Harper's Ferry, from which there was an overland
route of more than two hundred miles. When that movement
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did take place, General Lee was in a position to
interpose his army, and inflict a new defeat on the enemy,
as was verified by subsequent events.
The following extracts from McClellan's report will
give some idea of the results obtained. Speaking, as of
the morning of the 18th, he says:
"At that moment--Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland
invaded--the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. Our
battle lost, and almost all would have been lost." And he subsequently
says:
"The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated
in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a
part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the
enemy's territory, and an attack on his capital, but was defensive in
its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be
technically called a 'defensive--offensive' campaign."
"It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced
severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital and
Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania, and to drive the enemy out of
Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by
the battle of Antietam, which brought the Army of the Potomac into
what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac."*
It was a great deal gained to force the enemy into a
"defensive--offensive" campaign in his own territory
and place the "Army of the Potomac" in that accidental
position, though we did fail in arousing Maryland, or
getting any reinforcements from that State.
* In a
telegram to Halleck, dated September 22nd (Part II,
Conduct of the War, p. 495), McClellan said: "When I was assigned
to the command of this army in Washington, it was suffering under
the disheartening influence of defeat. It had been greatly reduced
by casualties in General Pope's campaign, and its efficiency had been
much impaired. The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam
Creek had resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers and
many regimental and company officers, besides a large number of
enlisted men. The army corps had been badly cut up and scattered
by the overwhelming numbers brought against them in the battle of
the 17th instant, and the entire army had been greatly exhausted by
unavoidable overwork, and want of sleep and rest." (See also his
testimony same volume, pages 439, 440 and 441.)
Page 162
CHAPTER XVII.
PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG.
ON the afternoon of the 19th, after leaving Lawton's brigade
at Boteler's Ford, I marched with the three other brigades on the
road towards Martinsburg, about six miles from Shepherdstown,
and bivouacked.
During the night the enemy had succeeded in crossing the
Potomac and capturing four of General Pendleton's guns near
Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the 20th I was ordered to
move back to Boteler's Ford. On arriving near there, by order of
General Jackson, my three brigades were formed in line of battle
in rear of General A. P. Hill's division which had preceded me,
and were moving against the force of the enemy which had
crossed over to the south bank. My three brigades were posted
in pieces of woods on each side of the road leading towards the
ford, and remained there within range of the enemy's guns on the
opposite side until late in the afternoon. In the meantime Hill's
division advanced, under a heavy fire of artillery from across the
river, and drove the enemy's infantry on the southern bank pell-mell
into the river, inflicting upon him a very severe punishment
for his rashness in undertaking to pursue us and making him pay
very dearly for the guns he had taken. One officer in my
command, Captain Frazier of the 15th Alabama Regiment,--the
only regimental commander in Trimble's brigade who had not
been killed or wounded at Sharpsburg,--was severely wounded
by a shell, which was all the damage I sustained.
Late in the afternoon, I was ordered to move back, and that
night we marched to the vicinity of the Opequon not far above
its mouth. We remained at this position until the 24th, when we
moved across the Opequon to the Williamsport pike, and on the
next day to the vicinity of Martinsburg. On the 27th, General
Jackson's whole
Page 163
command was moved to Bunker Hill on the road from
Martinsburg to Winchester, and went into camp in that vicinity.
By this time our baggage wagons, which had been sent from
Manassas to the valley, when we moved into Maryland, had
reached us.
We were now able to obtain supplies of flour, by threshing
wheat, of which there was a good supply in the valley, and
having it ground. While our camps were located at Bunker Hill,
Jackson's command destroyed the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
from North Mountain to within five miles of Harper's Ferry,
which latter place had been re-occupied by the enemy. More
than twenty miles of the road was thus destroyed, and it was
done effectively. The Winchester & Potomac Railroad was also
destroyed to within a short distance of the Ferry. Previous to this
there was a slight engagement between the Stonewall brigade of
Jackson's division and a small force of the enemy on the railroad
near Kearneysville, but the enemy did not make a serious effort
to molest us, either while we were engaged in destroying the
railroad or subsequently.
The Army of Northern Virginia was now organized
into two regular corps of four divisions each, General
Longstreet being assigned to the command of the first
corps, and General Jackson to the command of the second
corps, both with the rank of Lieutenant General. D. H.
Hill's division was attached to the second corps, and
two divisions were formed out of Longstreet's, D. R.
Jones' and Hood's divisions, under the command of
Generals Pickett and Hood respectively, they having been
promoted. The first corps consisted of the divisions of McLaws,
Anderson, Pickett and Hood, and the second corps of the
divisions of Ewell, D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill, and Jackson (Ewell's
division being under my command and Jackson's under J. R.
Jones).
For some time the second corps remained camped near
Bunker Hill, and the first corps was camped in the vicinity of
Winchester.
McClellan in the meantime had concentrated the
Page 164
main body of his army on the north bank of the Potomac
near Harper's Ferry, and was engaged in preparing for
a new campaign into Virginia, while Maryland and
Bolivar Heights were very strongly fortified by him.
A short time after the middle of October, General
Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, made a successful
expedition through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the
rear of and around McClellan's army.
Towards the last of October McClellan began to move
across the Potomac on the east side of the Blue Ridge,
with a view to another approach to Richmond. His army
had been largely recruited, and superbly equipped. The
army of General Lee had been considerably increased by
the return of stragglers and convalescents, but it continued
to be indifferently supplied with clothing and
shoes, of which articles there was a great deficiency.
As soon as McClellan's movement was ascertained,
Jackson's corps was moved towards the Shenandoah,
occupying positions between Charlestown and Berryville,
and one division of Longstreet's corps was sent
across the Blue Ridge to watch the enemy. When the
enemy began to move eastwardly from the mountain, the
whole of Longstreet's corps moved across the ridge for
the purpose of intercepting his march. D. H. Hill's
division of Jackson's corps was subsequently moved
across the ridge to watch the enemy's movements. A. P.
Hill's division had been put in position near Berryville,
covering the Shenandoah, at Snicker's or Castleman's
Ferry, where it had an engagement with a body of the
enemy that had crossed the ridge as McClellan was moving
on. Ewell's division (under my command) was at
first posted on A. P. Hill's left, near a church, while
Jackson's division was on the Berryville and Charlestown
pike in my rear, but as the enemy's covered our
front I moved above, first to Millwood, and then to
Stone Bridge, near White Post, and Jackson's division
moved to the vicinity of the Occoquon between the positions
of the other divisions and Winchester.
Page 165
After the enemy had left the vicinity of the Blue
Ridge, D. H. Hill's division recrossed the ridge and
moved up on the east side of the Shenandoah to the
vicinity of Front Royal. While my camp was at Stone
Bridge, my division destroyed the Manassas Gap Railroad
from Front Royal to Piedmont on the east side of
the Blue Ridge, a distance of twenty miles, and D. H.
Hill's division destroyed it from Front Royal to Strasburg.
In the meantime McClellan's army had been concentrated
in the vicinity of Warrenton, and McClellan had been
succeeded in the command by Burnside. Longstreet
had previously taken position at or near Culpeper
Court-House.
About the 15th of November Burnside began the
movement of his army towards the lower Rappahannock
opposite Fredericksburg. When this movement was discovered
Longstreet's corps was moved towards Fredericksburg
to dispute the enemy's crossing, and orders
were sent to General Jackson to move his corps across
the Blue Ridge. This movement of the latter corps
began about the 20th of November, and we moved up
the valley to New Market and then across Massanutten
Mountain, the Shenandoah and the Blue Ridge to the
vicinity of Madison Court-House. The weather had now
become quite cool, and our daily marches were long and
rapid, and very trying to the men. On this march I saw
a number of our men without shoes, and with bleeding
feet wrapped with rags. We remained in the vicinity
of Madison Court-House for two or three days, and it
was here that General Jackson wore, for the first time,
a new regulation coat with the wreath, and a hat, and
his appearance in them caused no little remark and
amusement among the men. His dress hitherto had
been a rusty grey coat, intended for a colonel, and a little
dingy cloth cap which lay flat on his head, or rather
forehead.
From Madison Court-House we moved past Orange
Page 166
Court-House and along the plank road to the vicinity
of Fredericksburg, arriving there on the 1st of December.
Longstreet's corps was found guarding the Rappahannock
against Burnside's army which had concentrated
on the opposite bank. My division was moved to
the vicinity of Guiney's depot on the R., F. & P. Railroad,
as was Jackson's. After remaining here two or three
days, I was ordered to move towards Port Royal to
support D. H. Hill, whose division had been ordered to
the vicinity of that place, to watch some gun-boats there
and prevent a crossing. Port Royal is some eighteen or
twenty miles below Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock.
I first took position some six or eight miles from
Port Royal on the road from Guiney's depot, but subsequently
moved to the vicinity of Buckner's Neck on
the Rappahannock a few miles above Port Royal, for the
purpose of watching the river and acting in concert with
General Hill. The latter, by the use of one Whitworth
gun and some other artillery, had driven the enemy's
gunboats from Port Royal, and in revenge they fired
into the houses in the little village of Port Royal and
some others below as they passed down the river.
While I was watching the river at Buckner's Neck,
which is in a bend of the river, and commanded by high
ground on the opposite side, so as to afford a good position
for forcing a passage, the enemy hauled some
timbers to a place called the Hop Yard on the northern
bank, as if for the purpose of constructing a bridge at
that place, but this proved a feint. Jackson's division
had been left near Guiney's depot, and A. P. Hill's had
been camped in rear of Hamilton's Crossing for the purpose
of supporting Longstreet's right, which rested at
the latter place. The different divisions of Jackson's
corps were thus posted, immediately preceding the battle
of Fredericksburg.
Page 167
CHAPTER XVIII.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
FREDERICKSBURG is located on the southern bank of
the Rappahannock River at the head of tide water, and
the river is navigable to that point for steamboats and
small vessels. On the northern bank, opposite, above
and below Fredericksburg, are what are called the Stafford
Heights, which are close to the river, and completely
command the southern bank. Fredericksburg's exact
location is on a narrow strip of low land between the
river and a range of hills in the rear. These hills leaving
the river opposite the small village of Falmouth,
which is a short distance above Fredericksburg and on
the northern bank, diverge from it below, and gradually
declining, extend nearly to the Massaponix Creek, which
empties into the river four or five miles below the town.
The river flats or bottoms immediately below Fredericksburg
widen out considerably and continue to widen
until they are from one and a half to two miles in width
at the lower end of the range of hills, where they unite
with similar but not so wide flats on the Massaponix,
which extend back for some distance in rear of the range
of hills mentioned. Below the mouth of the Massaponix
there are other hills which approach near to the bank of
the river, and extend down it for a considerable distance.
Hazel Run, rising southeast of Fredericksburg, runs
through the range of hills along a narrow valley, or
ravine rather, and passing close on the east of the town,
empties into the river. Deep Run rises below in the
range of hills, and runs across the wide bottoms through
a deep channel likewise into the river, something over
a mile below the town. The hills just in rear of the town
were, at the time of which I am speaking, nearly denuded
of growing timber, but below, to the end of the range,
they were for the most part covered with woods. The
Page 168
bottoms were entirely cleared and in cultivation, furnishing
several extensive farms, and up Deep Run to its
sources is a valley making a large re-entering angle in
the line of hills, which valley was then also cleared and
in cultivation.
From the town a road, called the Telegraph Road,
runs south, crossing Hazel Run and then ascending the
hills passes towards Richmond by the way of Hanover
Junction. Another road called the Plank Road ascends
the hills above Hazel Run and runs westward by Chancellorsville
to Orange Court-House. A third road, called the River Road,
runs from the lower end of the town, crossing Hazel Run
and Deep Run, and, passing through the bottoms about
half way from the river to the foot of the hills, in a direction
very nearly parallel to the river, it crosses the Massaponix not
far above its mouth, where it forks, one fork going to Port
Royal below and the other by Bowling Green in the
direction of Richmond. This is a wide road, and where it
passes through the bottoms there were on both sides high,
thick, and firm embankments thrown up for fences or
enclosures to the adjacent fields.
The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad,
leaving the Potomac at the mouth of Aquia Creek,
crosses the river into Fredericksburg and then runs
through the bottoms below the town between the river
road and the hills, which latter it approaches closely at
their lower end, and then passes around at their foot
to take the direction to Richmond. Just at the rear of
the foot of the lower end of the hills, a country road
leading from the Telegraph Road and passing along the
east of the ridge crosses the railroad to get into the
River Road, and this is called "Hamilton's Crossing,"
from a gentleman of that name formerly residing near
the place. A canal runs from the river along the foot of
the hills above the town to the rear of it, for the purpose
of supplying water to several mills and factories in it,
Page 169
and this canal connects by a drain ditch with Hazel Run,
over which ditch the Plank Road crosses.
What is called Marye's Heights or Hill lies between
Hazel Run and the Plank Road, and at the foot of it is
a stone wall, behind which and next to the hill, the Telegraph
Road runs. Above Marye's Hill on the east of
the Plank Road are what are called, respectively,
Cemetery, Stansbury's and Taylor's Hills, all overlooking
the canal. In rear of these hills and overlooking
and commanding them are higher eminences. On the
east of Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road is quite a
high hill farther back than Marye's Hill and overlooking
it and nearly the whole ground, to which the name of
Lee's Hill has been given, because it was the position
generally occupied by General Lee during the battle.
Burnside's army had taken position on and in rear
of Stafford Heights, and the heights themselves, from
Falmouth to a point very nearly opposite the mouth of
the Massaponix, were covered with numerous batteries
of heavy guns, while the nature of the ground was such
as to afford easy access to the river by his troops. Longstreet's
corps occupied the hills in rear of Fredericksburg
to Hamilton's Crossing, and positions for some
distance above, while strong pickets were established in
the town and on the river bank above and below to watch
the enemy and impede a crossing.
It was impossible to resist successfully a crossing,
as the river is only between two and three hundred
yards wide, and the banks are so deep, and the river so
accessible, on the north bank by means of ravines running
into it, that our artillery, posted on the hills occupied
by our troops, could not play upon the bridges either
during the progress of the construction or afterwards,
while the enemy's batteries were able, by a concentrated
fire, to drive off the small bodies watching the river, or
to prevent any aid being sent to them over the wide
open plains formed by the bottoms. In addition to all
Page 170
this, the bottoms towards the lower end of our lines were
so wide that we had no guns which would do effective
firing across them, while the enemy's heavy guns from
the north bank of the river completely swept the whole
of our front, and reached over beyond our line.
On the morning of the 11th of December the enemy
commenced his movement, and by the use of his artillery
drove the regiments which were guarding the river from
its banks after an obstinate resistance, and succeeded in
laying down their pontoon bridges, one at the mouth of
Deep Creek, and the other two at Fredericksburg. The
first was laid early in the afternoon, but the latter two
not until near night, and during night and the next day
the enemy crossed in heavy force.
On the afternoon of the 12th I received an order from
General Jackson to move at once to the vicinity of
Hamilton's Crossing, which I did by marching nearly
all night, and a short time before day I bivouacked
some two miles in rear of the crossing where the division
had a little time to rest. At light on the morning of the
13th I moved up to the crossing, and found our army in
position confronting the enemy. Longstreet's line had
been constructed from the right, and General A. P. Hill's
division, which was much the largest in Jackson's corps,
now occupied the right of the line which rested near the
crossing. He was in the front skirts of the woods which
covered the hills, and on his left was Hood's division.
On the right of Hill's line was a small hill cleared
on the side next the enemy, on which were posted some
fourteen pieces of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel
Walker, which were supported by Field's brigade, under
Colonel Brockenborough, while Archer's brigade was on
the left of the guns. On Archer's left there was an
interval of several hundred yards in front of which was
a low flat marshy piece of woodland extending across
the railroad out into the bottom which was supposed to
be impracticable, and was therefore not covered by any
body of troops, but Gregg's brigade was posted in
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reserve in rear of this interval, without, however, being
in the line of battle. On the left of the interval were
the other three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Lane's
brigade being next to it, but in advance of the general
line a considerable number of pieces of artillery were
posted along the left of Hill's line, but they were on
low and unfavorable ground, as there were no good
positions for guns on that part of the line.
On my arrival, my division was posted on a second
line several hundred yards in rear of A. P. Hill's, with
Jackson's, now under Brigadier General Taliaferro, on
my left. My right rested on the railroad at the crossing,
and extended along the ridge road, which here crossed
the railroad, for a short distance and then into the woods
on my left. Hays' brigade was on my right, with
Trimble's brigade under Colonel R. F. Hoke immediately
in its rear, Lawton's brigade under Colonel N. N. Atkinson
in the centre, and my own brigade under Colonel J.
A. Walker on the left. In this position there was a thick
woods intervening between my division and the enemy,
and the consequence was that he was entirely excluded
from our view as we were from his. D. H. Hill's division,
which had followed mine from below, was posted in a
third line in the open ground in my rear beyond the
hills.
The weak point in our position was on our right, as
there was the wide open plain in front of it extending
to the river and perfectly covered and swept by the
enemy's heavy batteries on the opposite heights, and to
the right, extending around to our rear, were the open
flats of the Massaponix, here quite wide and incapable
of being covered by any position we could take. There
was very great danger of our right being turned by the
enemy's pushing a heavy column down the river across
the Massaponix. The plains on that flank were watched
by Stuart with two brigades of cavalry and his horse
artillery.
A heavy fog had concealed the two armies from each
Page 172
other during the early morning, but about nine o'clock it
began to rise, and then the artillery fire opened, which
was just as my division was moving into position. The
enemy's fire at first was not directed towards the place
where my division was posted, but after a short interval
the shells began to fall in our vicinity, and the division
remained exposed to a random but quite galling cannonading
for two or three hours.
Shortly after noon we heard in our front a very heavy
musketry fire, and soon a courier from General Archer
came to the rear in search of General A. P. Hill, stating
that General Archer was very heavily pressed and wanted
reinforcements. Just at that moment, a staff officer
rode up with an order to me from General Jackson, to
hold my division in readiness to move to the right
promptly, as the enemy was making a demonstration
in that direction. This caused me to hesitate about sending
a brigade to Archer's assistance, but to be prepared
to send it if necessary, I ordered Colonel Atkinson to
get his brigade ready to advance, and the order had been
hardly given, before the adjutant of Walker's battalion
of artillery came galloping to the rear with the information
that the interval on Archer's left (an awful gulf as
he designated it) had been penetrated by heavy columns
of the enemy, and that Archer's brigade and all our
batteries on the right would inevitably be captured unless
there was instant relief. This was so serious an emergency
that I determined to act upon it at once notwithstanding
the previous directions from General Jackson
to hold my division in readiness for another purpose,
and I accordingly ordered Atkinson to advance with his
brigade.
I was then entirely unacquainted with the ground in
front, having been able when I first got up to take only
a hasty glance at the country to our right, and I asked
Lieutenant Chamberlain, Walker's adjutant, to show the
brigade the direction to advance. In reply he stated that
the column of the enemy which had penetrated our line
Page 173
was immediately in front of the brigade I had ordered
forward, and that by going right ahead there could be
no mistake. The brigade, with the exception of one regiment,
the 13th Georgia, which did not hear the order,
accordingly moved off in handsome style through the
woods, but as it did so, Lieutenant Chamberlain informed
me that it would not be sufficient to cover the entire gap
in our line, and I ordered Colonel Walker to advance
immediately with my own brigade on the left of Atkinson.
The enemy's column in penetrating the interval
mentioned had turned Archer's left and Lane's right,
while they were attacked in front, causing Archer's left
and Lane's entire brigade to give way, and one column
had encountered Gregg's brigade, which, being taken
somewhat by surprise, was thrown into partial confusion,
resulting in the death of General Gregg, but the brigade
was rallied and maintained its ground. Lawton's brigade
advancing rapidly and gallantly under Colonel Atkinson,
encountered that column of the enemy which had turned
Archer's left, in the woods on the hill in rear of the line,
and by a brilliant charge drove it back down the hill,
across the railroad, and out into the open plains beyond,
advancing so far as to cause a portion of one of the
enemy's batteries to be abandoned. The brigade, however,
on getting out into the open plain came under
the fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and the approach of
a fresh and heavy column on its right rendered it
necessary that it should retire, which it did under orders
from Colonel Evans, who had succeeded to the command
by reason of Atkinson's being severely wounded.
Two of Brockenborough's regiments from the right
participated in the repulse of the enemy. Colonel
Walker advanced, at a double quick, further to the left,
encountering one of the columns which had penetrated
the interval, and by a gallant and resolute charge he
drove it back out of the woods across the railroad into
the open plains beyond, when, seeing another column of
the enemy crossing the railroad on his left, he fell back
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to the line of the road, and then deployed the 13th
Virginia Regiment to the left, and ordered it to advance
under cover of the timbers to attack the advancing
column on its flank. This attack was promptly made
and Thomas' brigade, attacking in front at the same
time, the enemy was driven back with heavy loss.
As soon as Atkinson and Walker had been ordered
forward, Hoke was ordered to move his brigade to the
left of Hays, but before he got into position, I received
a message stating that Archer's brigade was giving way
and I ordered Hoke to move forward at once to Archer's
support, obliquing to the right as he moved. Just as
Hoke started, I received an order from General Jackson,
by a member of his staff, to advance to the front with
the whole division, and Hays' brigade was at once
ordered forward in support of Hoke. The 13th Georgia
Regiment which had been left behind on the advance of
Lawton's brigade was ordered to follow Hoke's brigade
and unite with it.
Hoke found a body of the enemy in the woods in rear
of Archer's line on the left, where the regiments on that
flank, which had been attacked in rear, had given way,
but Archer still held the right with great resolution,
though his ammunition was exhausted. Upon a gallant
charge, by the brigade under Hoke, the enemy was driven
out of the woods upon his reserves posted on the railroad
in front, and then by another charge, in which General
Archer participated, the railroad was cleared and the
enemy was pursued to a fence some distance beyond,
leaving in our hands a number of prisoners, and a large
number of small arms on the field.
The movements of the three brigades engaged have
been described separately from the necessity of the case,
but they were all engaged at the same time, though they
went into action separately and in the order in which
they have been mentioned, and Lawton's brigade had
advanced further out into the plains than either of the
others.
Page 175
On riding to the front, I directed Lawton's brigade,
which was retiring, to be re-formed in the woods--Colonel
Atkinson had been left in front severely wounded and
he fell into the enemy's hands. Captain E. P. Lawton,
Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, a most gallant
and efficient officer, had also been left in front at
the extreme point to which the brigade advanced, mortally
wounded, and he likewise fell into the enemy's
hands.
I discovered that Hoke had got too far to the front
where he was exposed to the enemy's artillery, and also
to a flank movement on his right, and I sent an order
for him to retire to the original line, which he did,
anticipating the order by commencing to retire before it
reached him. Two of his regiments and a small
battalion were left to occupy the line of the railroad where
there was cover for them and his other two regiments,
along with the 13th Georgia, which had not been engaged,
were put in the slight trenches previously occupied
by Archer's brigade. Walker continued to hold the position
on the railroad which he had taken after repulsing
the enemy. Lawton's brigade was sent to the rear for
the purpose of resting and replenishing its ammunition.
Hays' brigade, which had advanced in rear of Hoke, had
not become engaged, but in advancing to the front it
had been exposed to a severe shelling which the enemy
began, as his attacking columns were retiring in confusion
before my advancing brigades. Hays was posted in rear
of Hoke for the purpose of strengthening the right in
the event of another advance. When I had discovered
Lawton's brigade retiring, I sent to General D. H. Hill
for reinforcements for fear that the enemy might again
pass through the unprotected interval, and he sent me
two brigades, but before they arrived Brigadier General
Paxton, who occupied the right of Taliaferro's line, had
covered the interval by promptly moving his brigade
into it.
The enemy was very severely punished for this attack,
Page 176
which was made by Franklin's grand division, and he
made no further attack on our right. During this
engagement and subsequently there were demonstrations
against A. P. Hill's left and Hood's right which were
repulsed without difficulty. Beginning in the forenoon
and continuing until nearly dark, there were repeated
and desperate assaults made by the enemy from
Fredericksburg against the positions at Marye's Hill and
the one to our right of it, but they were repulsed with
terrible slaughter, mainly by the infantry from Longstreet's
corps posted behind the stone wall at the foot
of Mayre's Hill, and the artillery on that, and on the
neighboring heights. The loss to the enemy here was
much heavier than that on our right, while our own loss
at the same point was comparatively slight.
My two brigades, Trimble's under Hoke, and my own
under Walker, and the 13th Georgia Regiment held their
positions on the front until night, while Hays retained
his position immediately in rear of Hoke, but there was
no further attack made on that part of the line, or on
any part of Hill's front, except the demonstrations on
his left which have been mentioned and which resulted
in some skirmishing and artillery firing.
When my division was first put in position on the
second line as described, having no use for my artillery,
I ordered Captain J. W. Latimer, my acting chief of
artillery, to report to Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery
for the Corps, with the six batteries attached to the
division, to-wit: Carrington's, Brown's, Garber's,
D'Aquin's, Dement's, and his own. Of these Brown's
and Latimer's were posted on Hill's left, under the
immediate charge of Captain Latimer, and did most effective
service, and D'Aquin's and Garber's were sent to Major
Pelham, Stuart's Chief of Artillery, on the right, where
they likewise did good service, Captain D'Aquin losing
his life while taking part in the artillery firing in that
quarter. Just before sunset of the day of the battle,
after having seen that all was quiet in my front, I rode
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a little to the rear and discovered General D. H. Hill's
division moving to the front through the woods.
On my inquiring the meaning of the movement, General
Colquitt, in command of the front brigade, informed
me that orders had been given for the advance of the
whole line and that Hill's division was ordered to
advance in support. General D. H. Hill himself rode up
in a few minutes, and confirmed the information. This
was the first intimation I had received of the order, as it
had not reached me. While General Hill and myself
were speaking of the matter, Lieutenant Morrison,
aide-de-camp to General Jackson, rode up and stated that the
General's orders were that I should hold my command in
readiness to advance; and immediately afterwards one
of my own staff officers came to me with the information
that General Jackson wished me to take command of
all the troops on the right and advance, regulating the
distance to which I should go, by the effect produced
on the enemy by our artillery which was to open.
I rode immediately to where Hoke's brigade was
posted and found General Jackson himself, who repeated
in person the orders to me, stating that I was to advance
in support of some artillery which he was about to send
forward. I informed him of the condition of my
command, the separation of Walker from the rest, the fact
of Lawton's brigade being in the rear, and that Hoke's
and Hays' brigades and the 13th Georgia were the only
troops immediately available. He told me to advance
with the latter and that he would give me abundant
support; I accordingly prepared to advance with Hoke's
brigade and the 13th Georgia in front, followed by Hays
brigade. The programme was that a number of pieces
of artillery should be run out in front, and open on the
enemy's infantry, when I was to advance and the artillery
to be again moved forward, followed by my infantry.
The movement with the artillery was commenced, and
as soon as it left the woods the enemy opened with
numerous batteries from the plains and from behind the
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embankments on tile river road. This fire was terrific
and many shells went crashing past us into the woods in
our rear, where D. H. Hill's division was massed. Our
own guns opened and continued to fire for a brief space,
and a part of Hoke's brigade advanced to the railroad,
but General Jackson soon became satisfied that the
advance must be attended with great difficulties and perhaps
disastrous results, and abandoned it. It was well
that he did. The enemy had very heavy forces massed
behind the embankments on the river road, the one nearest
us being pierced with embrasures for numerous
pieces of artillery. We would have had to advance nearly
a mile, over an entirely bare plain swept by all this
artillery, as well as cannonaded by the heavy guns on
Stafford Heights, and if we had been able to force back
the bodies of infantry and the artillery occupying positions
on the plain between us and the woods, still when
we reached the road itself we would have found a vastly
superior force behind a double line of very strong breastworks.
Nothing could have lived while passing over that
plain under such circumstances, and I feel well assured
that, while we were all ready to obey the orders of our
heroic commander, there was not a man in the force
ordered to advance, whether in the front or in support,
who did not breathe freer when he heard the orders
countermanding the movement.
I have subsequently examined this ground with great
care, and this examination has strengthened the position
first entertained. It may perhaps be asked why our troops
had not occupied the line of this road, to which I will
reply that the road and the embankments on each side of
it were perfectly commanded by the batteries of Stafford
Heights, which rendered the position untenable for
us, and the retreat from it most hazardous, while it
afforded safe protection to the enemy from our guns.
Shortly after the termination of this effort to advance,
I received a notification from General Jackson to move
Page 179
my troops to the rear for the purpose of resting and
getting provisions as soon as they should be relieved by
the troops of A. P. Hill's division which had at first
occupied the positions now held by me, but no troops
came to my relief, and I therefore, remained in position.
Orders were received during the night for Taliaferro
to relieve Hill's troops in the front line beginning from
the left, and for me to occupy the remainder of the line
on the right which Taliaferro could not fill out. In
accordance with these directions, before dawn on the 14th,
Paxton relieved Walker, Hays took the position which
Paxton vacated, Hoke remained stationary, Lawton's
brigade under Colonel Evans. was posted on Hoke's
right, and Walker was moved from the left and placed
in reserve behind Hoke. The evening before, Carrington's
battery had relieved Latimer's and Brown's on the left,
and still remained in position, and on the morning of the
14th, Dement's battery relieved one of the batteries on
the right which had been engaged the day before.
During the 14th the enemy remained in position on
the plains and at Fredericksburg, an occasional shot
being exchanged by the artillery and some firing from
the skirmishers taking place on portions of the line, but
none in my front.
Before light on the morning of the 15th, D. H. Hill's
division relieved Taliaferro's and mine on the front line,
and we moved to the rear in reserve, A. P. Hill's division
occupying the second line.
There was quiet on the 15th, the enemy still retaining
his position, but early on the morning of the 16th, as I
was moving into position on the second line in accordance
with previous orders, it was discovered that the enemy had
re-crossed the river during the night, taking up his bridges,
and I was ordered to move at once to the vicinity of Port
Royal to guard against the possible contingency of the
enemy's attempting to turn our right by crossing the
river near that place; and I commenced the march immediately.
Page 180
The loss in the division under my command in this battle was in
killed 89 and wounded 639, to-wit: in Hays' brigade, 5 killed
and 40 wounded; Trimble's brigade (Hoke's), 8 killed and
98 wounded; Lawton's brigade, 55 killed and 369 wounded; my
own brigade (Walker's), 17 killed and 114 wounded; and in
the artillery of the division 3 killed and 18 wounded. Among
the killed were Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, and Captain D'Aquin of the artillery,
and among the wounded were Colonel Atkinson of the
26th Georgia Regiment (in the hands of the enemy),
Captain E. P. Lawton, A. A. G. Lawton's brigade (Lawton
mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy)
and Colonel Lamar, 61st Georgia Regiment.
General Lee's entire loss in the battle was in killed
458, and wounded, 3,743, to-wit: in Longstreet's corps,
130 killed, 1,276 wounded; in Jackson's corps, 328 killed
and 2,454 wounded; and 13 wounded in Stuart's cavalry.
The enemy's loss was very much heavier, and over
900 prisoners, more than 9,000 stand of arms and a large
quantity of ammunition fell into our hands.
The failure of General Lee to attempt to destroy the
enemy's army after its repulse has been much criticised,
and many speculations about the probable result of an
attempt to drive the enemy into the river have been
indulged in by a number of writers. In the first place,
it must be recollected that no man was more anxious to
inflict a decisive blow on the enemy than General Lee
himself, and none understood better the exact condition
of things, and the likelihood of success in any attempt
to press the enemy after his defeat on the 13th. That
defeat was a repulse with very heavy loss it is true,
but it was not a rout of the enemy's army; and candid
persons ought to presume that General Lee knew what
he was about and had very good and sufficient reasons
for not sallying from his line of defence, upon the exposed
plains below, to make the attempt to convert the repulse
into a rout.
Page 181
If attention is given to the previous description of
the ground on which the two armies were operating, it
must be seen that an attempt to pass over the wide
plain intervening between our line and the enemy's
position below the town, while exposed to the fire of
150 heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, and the numerous
field pieces securely masked in the River road,
would inevitably have resulted in disaster, unless the
enemy's forces had become so paralyzed as to be
incapable of an effort at defence. Burnside's army was
composed of about 150,000 men in the grand division
under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, respectively.
In none of the assaults on our lines were the whole
of these grand divisions engaged, but when columns of
attack were sent forward, there were always very heavy
reserves for the attacking columns to fall back upon in
case of repulse; Sumner's and Franklin's grand divisions
had been mainly engaged and Hooker's scarcely at
all. General Lee's army was not half as large as Burnside's
and if he had at any time made an attempt to
advance, any force that he could have massed for that
purpose without abandoning his line of defence entirely
would in all likelihood have still encountered a superior
force of infantry behind a strong line of defence, in
addition to the artillery.
As I have stated, General Jackson made the attempt
to advance on the right late in the day on the 13th, but
he was compelled to desist, very fortunately, before any
disaster happened. Above the town, the same canal, at
the foot of the range of hills, which had furnished an
insurmountable obstacle to any attack by the enemy on
our extreme left, likewise furnished the same obstacle
to an advance on our part. The only other quarter from
which the advance could have been made was from the
hills immediately in rear of the town upon the enemy in
the town, and there the difficulties were greater even
than below. Any attacking columns from that quarter
must either have moved down the rugged face of the
Page 182
base hills, or by flank along the Telegraph and Plank
roads, and then they would have been so much scattered
by the artillery from the north bank, which would
then have had a more effective range than even on the
plains, that it would not have required the reserves,
posted behind the houses and defences in the town, to
complete the repulse and disaster.
As to a night attack, that is a very easy thing to talk
about but a most hazardous experiment to try, especially
on dark nights such as we then had. Such attacks
cannot be ventured on with safety unless with the most
thoroughly trained troops, and then not in large bodies,
for fear of confusion and firing into each other, the very
dread of which often paralyzes very brave troops.
It has been said that General Lee might have inflicted
tremendous damage upon the enemy by forcing
hot shot and shell into Fredericksburg while the enemy's
troops were massed there. The heroic and patriotic
people of that town, when it was threatened with a
bombardment by Sumner, had not appealed to the
commander of their country's army to cause the danger to
be removed from them by not resisting its occupation
by the enemy, but had exhibited most commendable
unselfishness by, in most cases, abandoning their homes
without a murmur, while there were some too poor to
move elsewhere, and others who chose to remain and
share all the dangers of the approaching struggle; it
was not in the heart of the noble commander of the Army
of Northern Virginia to doom, by his own act, the
remaining few of that devoted people and the homes of
the absent to destruction, for the sake of killing and
wounding a few thousand of the enemy, and causing
dismay among the remainder.
Is this forbearance one to be criticised with severity
as a grievous military blunder?
It is probable that if General Lee had known that
the enemy was evacuating the town, his artillery might
have inflicted considerable damage, but the enemy had
Page 183
given no indication of such a purpose, and he took
advantage of the darkness of the night and the prevalence
of a storm and wind to make good his retreat, when the
noise attending the movement could not be heard.
General Lee accomplished all that was possible with
the means under his control, except, indeed, the useless
destruction of what the enemy had left of the town of
Fredericksburg.
There was a ridiculous story about General Jackson,
to which currency was given by the newspapers, which
represented that, at a council of war called by General
Lee on the night after the battle, General Jackson fell
into a doze while the very grave question of what ought
to be done under the circumstances was being discussed,
and after all the rest had given their opinion, General
Lee turned to General Jackson and asked, "Well, General,
what is your opinion?" to which the latter, waking
out of his nap, replied, "Drive 'em in the river, drive
'em in the river." This story is by no means creditable
to General Jackson, yet it obtained a wide circulation,
and the narrators of it seemed to think it was very
characteristic.
General Jackson was a most able commander and
heroic soldier, and it was not at all likely that he would
have acted so much like a besotted member of a council
of war called by his chief. I presume after the facts that
I have before stated, it is not necessary to assert that
no such incident occurred.
Had Burnside moved down the river to the Massaponix,
after crossing, or had thrown other bridges
across at or near the mouth of that stream, and crossed
one of his grand divisions there, he would inevitably
have forced us to abandon our line of defence, and
fight him on other ground.
Page 184
CHAPTER XIX.
OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63.
ON the 16th of December, as soon as it was discovered
that the enemy had recrossed the river, in accordance
with the orders received, I moved to the vicinity
of Port Royal, arriving by nightfall.
The enemy was content with the experiment he had
made, and did not attempt any further movement at
that time. I proceeded the next day to picket the river
from a place called the Stop-Cock, near the Rappahannock
Academy, to the vicinity of Port Tobacco, below
Port Royal, the river having been watched on this line
previous to my arrival by some of Brigadier General
Wm. H. F. Lee's cavalry, which I relieved.
My division was encamped in the vicinity of Port
Royal, on the hills back from the river, and when it
was ascertained that the enemy was not preparing for
a new movement in any short time, the different brigades
built permanent winter quarters at suitable places.
After a careful examination of the country, I proceeded
to fortify the banks of the river at points likely to
afford facilities for crossing, and I established a line
of defence also along the main road running parallel
with the river, where high embankments with cedar
hedges on them afforded good cover for troops and
excellent breastworks. This line commenced at the
upper end of the Hazelwood estate, the former residence
of that distinguished Virginian, John Taylor of
Caroline, and with the defences on the river extending
to Camden, the residence of Mr. Pratt, some distance
below Port Royal, passing in rear of that town, which
was now nearly abandoned on account of the depredations
of the enemy's gunboats and the fear of their
repetition. New roads were constructed in rear of the
line of defence out of reach of artillery from the
Page 185
opposite bank, for the purpose of facilitating communication
between the different positions, and two Whitworth
guns under Captain W. W. Hardwick were placed on a
high hill in rear of Port Royal, for the purpose of
preventing the gunboats which were below from ascending
the river; and subsequently torpedoes were placed
in the bed of the river some two or three miles below
Port Royal under the superintendence of some one sent
from headquarters.
The enemy established a line of cavalry pickets on
the opposite bank of the river as far down as ours
reached, and the two were in sight of each other. The
river at Port Royal is between six and eight hundred
yards wide, and immediately opposite Port Royal is
the small village of Port Conway, which was occupied
by the enemy's pickets.
We were compelled to haul our supplies in wagons
from Guiney's depot on the railroad, and as the winter
was a severe one with much snow and rain, the country
roads, which we had to use, became almost impassable
from the mud, and we were compelled to employ the
men for a considerable time in corduroying them at the
worst places.
In the month of January, 1863, I was promoted to
the rank of Major General and was assigned to the
permanent command of Ewell's division, the name of
which was now changed. Colonel R. F. Hoke of the
21st North Carolina Regiment, who had commanded
Trimble's brigade since the termination of the Maryland
campaign, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier
General and assigned to the brigade he already
commanded, and the name of that also was changed. The
brigade had previously consisted of the 21st North
Carolina, the 12th and 21st Georgia, and the 15th
Alabama Regiments, and a North Carolina battalion of
two companies. The 12th and 21st Georgia were now
transferred to a Georgia brigade in D. H. Hill's division,
and the 15th Alabama to a brigade in Hood's division,
Page 186
the 6th, 54th, and 57th North Carolina Regiments from
Hood's division, taking the place in Hoke's brigade of
those transferred from it.
The 25th and 44th Virginia Regiments were transferred
from my own brigade to that of J. R. Jones, in
Jackson's division, and subsequently Colonel William
Smith of the 49th Virginia, who had been so severely
wounded at Sharpsburg and had not yet returned, was
appointed Brigadier General and assigned to my old
brigade as it remained after the transfer of the two
regiments. The organization of the artillery was now
changed, and in the place of the batteries which had
heretofore been attached to brigades, battalions were
organized, which were to be under the general control
of the Chief of Artillery for the Corps, and a battalion
to be assigned to a division on an active campaign, or
when required for defence. In consequence of this
arrangement, a number of promotions took place among
the artillery officers, and Captain J. W. Latimer, a
youthful but most gallant and efficient officer, was made
a Major of Artillery, a promotion which he had richly
earned, though he was scarcely twenty-one years old.
All the batteries heretofore attached to the division,
except Latimer's, were sent to the rear of Bowling
Green to winter, in order to be more convenient to forage.
Latimer's battery was retained to be used in case of
need, and it became Tanner's by virtue of the promotion
of the first lieutenant.
My assistant adjutant general, while I was a
brigadier general, Captain F. Gardner, had resigned
the previous summer, and my aide, Lieutenant S. H
Early,*
had resigned while we were in the valley after
the Maryland campaign, as he was over fifty years of
age, and the condition of his family required his presence
*
Lieutenant Early, at General Early's request (and accompanied
by his young son, John Cabell Early, aged fifteen years), rejoined the
army in 1863 during its northern invasion, and was severely wounded
at the battle of Gettysburg.
CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY
Page 187
at home. I had had no regular personal staff since
then. I found no assistant adjutant general with
Ewell's division when I succeeded to the command at
Sharpsburg, and Major Samuel Hale, who held the
commission of a commissary, had been acting in that
capacity for me while I commanded the brigade and,
continued to do so while I commanded the division. I found
with the division Major J. P. Wilson and Mr. Henry
Heaton, who had been acting as volunteer aides to
General Ewell and then to General Lawton, and they
continued with me in that capacity until after my
promotion.
After I was assigned to the division as major general,
Major Hale received the commission of adjutant
general with the rank of major, and A. L. Pitzer and
Wm. G. Callaway were commissioned as aides with the
rank of first lieutenants.
My division staff as then organized consisted of the
following officers, all of whom except those above
designated had been with General Ewell as members of
his staff:
- Lieutenant Colonel J. M. JONES, Inspector
General.
- Major SAMUEL HALE, Assistant Adjutant
General.
- Lieutenant A. L. PITZER, Aide.
- Lieutenant Wm. G. CALLAWAY, Aide.
- Major C. E. SNODGRASS, Quartermaster.
- Major BEN H. GREEN, Commissary.
- Captain WILLIAM THORNTON, Assistant
Commissary.
- Captain C. W. CHRISTIE, Ordnance
Officer.
- Captain HENRY RICHARDSON, Engineer Officer.
Subsequently, in the spring, Major John W. Daniel,
who had been commissioned at my instance, was also
assigned to me as an assistant adjutant general. Lieutenant
Robert D. Early, who had been acting as aide
In one of the brigades in D. H. Hill's division, also reported
to me during the winter, as acting aide, and continued
in that capacity until he was made an assistant
adjutant general to a brigade in Jackson's old division.
Page 188
A company of mounted men organized as scouts,
couriers and guides by General Ewell, had remained attached
to the division under the command of Captain
W. F. Randolph, but it was transferred in the spring
to General Jackson's headquarters. My division, as it
remained after the changes above mentioned, was
composed of four brigades, to-wit: Hays' Louisiana brigade,
Hoke's North Carolina brigade, Lawton's Georgia
brigade (commanded by Colonel Evans), and Smith's
Virginia brigade, organized as follows:
Hays' brigade: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana
Regiments.
Hoke's brigade: 6th, 21st, 54th, and 57th North
Carolina Regiments and Wharton's North Carolina
battalion.
Lawton's brigade: 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, and
61st Georgia Regiments.
Smith's brigade: 13th, 31st, 49th, 52nd, and 58th
Virginia Regiments.
In a few days after the battle, the other divisions
of Jackson's corps were moved to positions above me,
covering the river from the mouth of Massaponix to my
left, Jackson's old division being on my immediate left,
then A. P. Hill's division, and then D. H. Hill's. In
January General Trimble, who had been severely
wounded near Groveton on the 29th of August previous,
was made a Major General and assigned to Jackson's
division, which had always heretofore remained without
a regular division commander, even while General Jackson
was a Major General, as his command had included
other troops.
The enemy made no demonstration whatever on my
front, and we had nothing to disturb our quiet during
the winter, except a little incident by which two officers
were captured by the enemy in rather a singular manner.
There were a considerable number of ducks on the river,
and Major Wharton, commander of the battalion in
Hoke's brigade, and Captain Adams, the assistant
MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL
Page 189
adjutant general of the brigade, took it into their heads
to go shooting. There were several boats at Port Royal
which I had directed to be hauled up on the bank with
orders to the pickets to keep watch over them and not
permit them to be launched.
On the day the Major and the Captain took for their
sport, the picket at Port Royal happened to be from
their brigade, and they easily induced the sentinel on
duty to let them have the use of one of the boats, to row
into the mouth of a creek above, on our side, where the
ducks were most numerous. The day was a very windy
one with the wind blowing across towards the enemy.
By keeping near the bank they avoided the effect of
the wind until they got opposite the mouth of the creek,
when it struck their boat and forced it out into the
stream. Not being expert boatmen, and moreover being
excited by the danger, they lost control of the boat and
were driven helplessly to the northern bank into the
hands of the enemy's pickets, and of course were made
prisoners. The Major having an old newspaper with him,
pulled it out when he reached the shore and proposed an
exchange, a practice sometimes prevailing with the
pickets in spite of all orders, but the Federal on post
was rather too shrewd to have that game played on
him, insisting that it was not exactly a case for exchange
of such civilities. This was a caution to all persons
disposed to sporting and to interfere with the orders
to the pickets; and we had no more duck shooting in
boats.
Burnside made an abortive effort in January to advance
again by flanking us on the left, but he stuck in
the mud, and we were not put to any inconvenience by
the movement. About the last of the month he was
relieved of his command, and a new commander for the
Federal Army was selected, in the person of Major General
Joseph Hooker, called "Fighting Joe."
Though we passed the winter without the excitement
attending an advance of the enemy, still we were not
Page 190
without some excitements of our own, and I may as well
relate the following occurrence to show how men who
had passed through the stirring scenes of the previous
year, who had fought with Jackson in the valley, around
Richmond, at Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg,
could amuse themselves in winter quarters.
We had several severe snow storms during the winter,
and after one of them, when the snow lay deep on the
ground, Hoke's brigade challenged Lawton's for a battle
with snow balls, which challenge was accepted. The two
brigades were marshalled under their respective commanders
--Hoke on the one side, and Colonel Evans on
the other. Evans stood on the defensive in front of his
camp and Hoke advanced against him. Evans' force
was much the larger, but being Georgians who had been
brought from Savannah in the beginning of the previous
summer, his men were not accustomed to the fleecy
element. Hoke's men were more experienced, and when
they made a bold dash at the Georgians, pelting them
most unmercifully with their well pressed balls, and
giving the usual Confederate yell, there was no withstanding
the shock of the onset. Evans' men gave way
in utter confusion and rout, and Hoke's men got possession
of their camp.
The Georgians seeing that their camp and all their
effects were in possession of the enemy, who seemed to
be inclined to act on the maxim that "to victors belong
the spoils," took courage, rallied, and came back with
such vim that Hoke's men in their turn were routed,
and retreated in utter dismay. No time was given for
them to rally, but they were pursued to their own camp,
their leader having been captured in the pursuit. Evans'
men did not deem it prudent to press their victory too
far, but retired, though in good order. They acted
magnanimously and released the leader of their opponents
on his parole of honor, not, however, without his having
been well wallowed in the snow.
There was no official report of this battle, but all the
Page 191
particulars were related at division headquarters by one
of the aides who happened to be present, and who was
himself captured under suspicious circumstances on
Hoke's retreat, but begged off on the ground that he was
a neutral and a mere spectator. He was much joked
by the other young men at headquarters, who charged
him with skulking on the occasion, and there was some
reason to suspect that he did not stand the storm of
snow balls as well as he did that of shot and shell on
many another occasion. Many, very many of the poor
fellows who shared in this pastime poured out their
life's blood on subsequent battlefields, and a small
remnant were surrendered at Appomattox Court-House with
arms in their hands, and tears rolling down their cheeks.
About the first of March my division was moved to
Hamilton's Crossing to take place of Hood's, which had
been sent with Longstreet south of James River, and
a body of cavalry took the place of my division on the
right. In my new position, it was my duty to picket
and watch the river from the mouth of Hazel Run at the
lower end of Fredericksburg to the mouth of Massaponix,
which was done with three regiments at a time, posted
at different positions on the bank. These pickets were
in full view of and in musket range of the enemy's
pickets on the opposite bank, and also under the fire of
the guns on Stafford Heights, but by a tacit arrangement
there was never any firing from either side on
ordinary occasions, but the picketing detachments on
both sides were moved into position and regularly
relieved without molestation.
In the month of April the 31st Virginia Regiment
of Smith's brigade, in company with the 25th Virginia
of Jones' brigade, Trimble's division, was sent to the
valley for the purpose of accompanying an expedition
into Northwestern Virginia under General Imboden, and
did not return until late in May.
The growing timber on the range of hills which had
constituted our line of defence at the battle of Fredericksburg
Page 192
had been almost entirely cut down during the
winter to construct tents, and furnish firewood for
Hood's division, and there were left only a few scattering
trees on the hills and a thin skirt in front. Shortly after
my removal, General Jackson, whose headquarters had
been below, near Moss Neck, removed also to the vicinity
of Hamilton's Crossing.
Brigadier General J. B. Gordon, who had been Colonel
of the 6th Alabama Regiment in Rodes' brigade, D. H.
Hill's division, and very severely wounded at Sharpsburg,
was assigned in April to the command of Lawton's
brigade, which took his name.
There was perfect quiet along the river front until
the night of the 28th of April, though Fitz. Lee's brigade
of Stuart's cavalry had a fight with the enemy at Kelley's
Ford in Culpeper in March, and there was another affair
with the cavalry in April.
Page 193
CHAPTER XX.
BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.
BEFORE light on the morning of the 29th of April, the
enemy, having moved three corps of his army up during
the night, by taking advantage of a heavy fog that overhung
the river, threw a brigade across in boats, just
below the mouth of Deep Run, and the 54th North
Carolina Regiment on picket at that point, being unable
to cope with the force brought against it, was forced
to retire, which it did without loss. The movement had
been conducted with so much secrecy, the boats being
brought to the river by hand, that the first intimation
of it, to the regiment on picket, was the landing of the
force. Bridges were then rapidly laid down at the same
crossing used by Burnside at this point and a division
of infantry with some artillery was crossed over.
About a mile lower down below the house of Mr. Pratt,
a similar crossing was attempted, but that was discovered,
and resisted by the 13th Georgia Regiment under
Colonel Smith until after sunrise, when that regiment
was relieved by the 6th Louisiana under Colonel Monaghan
going on picket in its regular time. The latter
regiment continued to resist the crossing successfully
until the fog had risen, when the enemy's guns were
brought to bear, and by a concentrated fire that regiment
was compelled to retire, not, however, without sustaining
a considerable loss in killed and wounded as well as
prisoners, the latter being captured in rifle pits at points
below the crossing, which was effected by the enemy's
coming up in their rear before they had received notice
of his being across. The 13th Georgia had also sustained
some loss in killed and wounded, and prisoners captured
in the same way, who had not been relieved. The
resistance made at this point delayed the enemy so that
the bridges there were not laid until after 10 o'clock A.M.
Page 194
A little after light, information reached me of the
crossing at Deep Run, and I sent notice of it at once to
General Jackson. Without, however, waiting for orders,
I ordered my division to the front, and as soon as it was
possible put it in line along the railroad, with my right
resting near Hamilton's Crossing and my left extending
to Deep Run. Three regiments were sent to the front
and deployed along the River road as skirmishers. The
13th Virginia Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Terrill,
on picket between the mouths of Hazel and Deep
Runs, was drawn back to the line of the River road
above Deep Run, and remained there until relieved by
McLaws' division, when it was brought up.
As soon as the enemy had laid down his bridges at
the lower crossing, a division of infantry and some
artillery were crossed over at that point. When the
fog rose, the slopes of the opposite hills were
semi-covered with troops the whole distance from opposite
Fredericksburg to a point nearly opposite the mouth
of the Massaponix. The question was whether they
were ostentatiously displayed as a feint, or whether they
were massed for crossing. The troops which had crossed
were seen throwing up breastworks covering the bridges
and also epaulments for artillery; but it was impossible
to discover the strength of the force already across, as
below the deep banks of the river there was ample space
for massing a large body of troops out of our sight.
There appeared no attempt to make a crossing at
Fredericksburg, or to move up towards the town.
Some artillery was put in position on the hill near
Hamilton's Crossing on my right, and in rear of my
left. D. H. Hill's division, now under command of
Brigadier General Rodes, was soon brought up, and put
in position on my right, extending across the Massaponix,
one brigade being placed below that creek across
the River road, so as to guard the ford. A Whitworth
gun, of very long range, was also posted below the
Page 195
Massaponix out of range of the enemy's guns across
the river and in position to partially enfilade them.
The remaining divisions of Jackson's corps were
brought up during the day, and A. P. Hill's was put in
position in a second line in rear of mine. Trimble's
division under the command of Brigadier General
Colston arrived very late in the afternoon and was placed
in reserve in the rear. Barksdale's brigade already
occupied the town of Fredericksburg, and the remaining
brigades of McLaws' division were brought up and
placed in position on the left of my line, one of his
brigades connecting with my left, which was now drawn
back from the railroad, and a shorter line made across
to Deep Run, to connect it with McLaws' right. For
the greater part of the way the railroad track furnished
a very good protection, and it was strengthened by
throwing up embankments, the line being advanced a
little in front on the left of my centre where there was
a rise in the ground above the level of the road. In
order to occupy the whole of the line my brigades had
to be extended out, as the division was not strong enough
to man it fully.
During the day the enemy made no attempt to advance
against us in force with his infantry, and his
skirmishers were effectually kept from the River road
by mine, and on the right Rodes' skirmishers, which extended
from the right of mine around to the river above
the Massaponix, prevented any movement in that direction.
There was some artillery firing, and one Whitworth
gun from across the Massaponix played with very
considerable effect on the bottoms on the enemy's left.
Large bodies of the infantry on the opposite slopes
occasionally moved down towards the river, where they
were concealed from our view by the bank on the south
side, which is the highest.
I retained my position on the front line during the
night, which passed quietly. The next day there was
Page 196
very little change in the appearances in front. The
enemy had made strong tetes du pont covering his
bridges, and was constructing a line of entrenchments
connecting the two, passing in front of the Pratt and
Bernard houses, and extending below the lower bridge.
There was this day some apparent diminution of the
infantry in view on the opposite slopes, but there were
many heavy guns in battery on the heights and a very
large force of infantry still visible. There were some
demonstrations with the infantry on the north bank,
some skirmish firing, and some artillery firing also, but
the enemy on the south bank did not appear at all
enterprising, and rather contracted his lines on his left,
his skirmishers retiring before ours which were pushed
forward on that flank. The indications were that it was
a mere demonstration on our front, to cloak a more
serious move in some other quarter, and so it turned
out to be. When this was discovered, it is quite probable
that we might have destroyed the comparatively
small force on the south bank by a movement against it
from our line, but this would not have compensated us
for the loss we would, in all probability, have sustained
from the enemy's heavy guns.
General Lee had ascertained that by far the largest
portion of Hooker's army had crossed the Rappahannock
and Rapidan Rivers above their junction, and were moving
down on his left. He therefore determined to move
up with the greater part of his own army to meet that
force, which was watched by Anderson's division of
Longstreet's corps and a portion of Stuart's cavalry.
Accordingly late on the afternoon of the 30th I was
instructed by General Jackson to retain my position on
the line, and, with my division and some other troops to
be placed at my disposal, to watch the enemy confronting
me while the remainder of the army was absent. Barksdale's
brigade occupying Fredericksburg and the heights
in rear, was directed to retain his position, as was also
a portion of General Pendleton's reserve artillery, which
Page 197
occupied positions on Marye's and Lee's Hills, and the
whole was placed under my command. In addition,
Graham's battery of artillery of four guns, two twenty
pounders and two ten pounders, Parrots, posted on the
hill on my right, was left with me, and Lieutenant Colonel
Andrews was ordered to report to me with his battalion
of four batteries with twelve pieces, to-wit: six
Napoleons, four three-inch rifles, and two ten pounder
Parrots. A Whitworth gun under Lieutenant Tunis was
also left at my disposal and posted on the right across
the Massaponix. With the rest of the army near
Fredericksburg comprising the other three divisions of
Jackson's corps, and three brigades of McLaws' division,
General Lee moved on the night of the 30th and the
morning of the 1st of May towards Chancellorsville to
meet Hooker.
Before leaving, General Lee instructed me to watch
the enemy and try to hold him; to conceal the weakness
of my force, and if compelled to yield before overpowering
numbers, to fall back towards Guiney's depot
where our supplies were, protecting them and the railroad;
and I was further instructed to join the main body
of the army in the event that the enemy disappeared
from my front, or so diminished his force as to render
it prudent to do so, leaving at Fredericksburg only such
force as might be necessary to protect the town against
any force the enemy might leave behind.
The force which had made the demonstration on our
front consisted at first of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th corps of
Hooker's army, under the command of Major General
Sedgwick. The 3rd corps moved to join Hooker during
the 30th, but the 1st and 6th remained in my front still
demonstrating. In his testimony before the Congressional
Committee on the war, Hooker stated that the
6th corps, according to the returns of the 30th of April,
1863, numbered 26,233 present for duty. Sedgwick says
that the 6th corps numbered only 22,000 when it crossed
the river. Taking the medium between them, the
Page 198
effective strength may be put down at 24,000, which
General A. P. Howe, commanding one of the divisions,
says he was informed, at headquarters of the corps, it
was. The first corps must have numbered at least 16,000
and perhaps more, so that I must have been left confronting
at least 40,000 men in these two corps, besides
the stationary batteries on Stafford Heights and Gibbon's
division of the 2nd corps which was just above,
near Falmouth, and, according to Hooker's statement,
numbered over 6,000 for duty on the 30th.
My division by the last tri-monthly field return which
was made on the 20th of April, and is now before me, had
present for duty 548 officers and 7,331 enlisted men,
making a total of 7,879. It had increased none, and I
could not have carried into action 7,500 in all, officers and
men, and not more than 7,000 muskets, as in camp when
everything was quiet, a number of men reported for duty,
who were not actually able to take the field. I had already
lost about 150 men in the resistance which was made at
the lower crossing. Barksdale's brigade did not probably
exceed 1,500 men for duty, if it reached that number.
I had, therefore, not exceeding 9,000 infantry officers
and men in all, being very little over 8,000 muskets; and
in addition I had Anderson's battalion with twelve guns;
Graham's four guns; Tunis', Whitworths, and portions
of Watson's; Cabell's and Cutt's battalions under General
Pendleton, not numbering probably thirty guns. I
think 45 guns must have covered all my artillery, and
these were nothing to compare with the enemy's in weight
of metal.
The foregoing constituted the means I had for occupying
and holding a line of at least six miles in length,
against the enemy's heavy force of infantry, and his far
more numerous and heavier and better appointed artillery.
It was impossible to occupy the whole line, and
the interval between Deep Run and the foot of Lee's Hill
had to be left vacant, watched by skirmishers, protected
only by a cross fire of artillery. I could spare no infantry
Page 199
from the right, as that was much the weakest
point of the line, and the force which had crossed, and
which exceeded my whole strength, was below Deep Run,
and confronting my own division. Andrews' artillery
was placed in position on the morning of the 1st as follows:
four Napoleons and two rifles were placed under
Major Latimer, near the left of the line occupied by my
division, behind some epaulments that had been made on
that part of the line; two Parrots were placed with Graham's
guns on the hill on my right, and two Napoleons
and two rifles were posted to the right of Hamilton's
Crossing, near a grove of pines, the Whitworth gun
being posted on a height across the Massaponix so as
to have a flank fire on the enemy if he advanced, and it
was without support. Colonel Andrews had charge of
all of the artillery on this part of the line, that on
Marye's and Lee's Hills was under the immediate
superintendence of General Pendleton, and some of the
batteries were so posted as to have a cross fire on the upper
part of the valley of Deep Run.
The enemy remained quiet on the 1st, except in
demonstrating by manoeuvres of his troops, and there
was no firing on that day. His line of entrenchments,
covering the two bridges, had been completed, and he
still displayed a heavy force of infantry, consisting of
the two corps under Sedgwick. The ensuing night also
passed quietly, and during it a battery of four Napoleons
was sent by General Pendleton to report to Colonel
Andrews, and was posted with the four guns near the
pines on the right of the crossing.
The morning of the 2nd opened with appearances
pretty much the same as they had been the day before;
if anything there was more infantry in view on the north
bank than had appeared the previous day. Colonel
Andrews was ordered early in the day to feel the enemy
with his guns, and accordingly Latimer opened with his
two rifle guns on the enemy's position near Deep Run,
and Graham's and Brown's Parrots opened on the infantry
Page 200
and batteries below and near the Pratt house.
Latimer's fire was not returned, but Graham's and
Brown's was responded to by two of the batteries on
the north bank and some guns on the south side. Shortly
afterwards the infantry and artillery at the lower crossing
disappeared behind the bank of the river, and that
crossing was abandoned.
During the morning I rode to Lee's Hill for the purpose
of observing the enemy's movements from that
point, and I observed a considerable portion of his
infantry in motion up the opposite river bank. While I
was, in company with Generals Barksdale and Pendleton,
observing the enemy's manoeuvre and trying to ascertain
what it meant, at about 11 o'clock A.M., Colonel R.
H. Chilton, of General Lee's staff, came to me with a
verbal order to move up immediately towards
Chancellorsville with my whole force, except a brigade of infantry
and Pendleton's reserve artillery, and to leave at Fredericksburg
the brigade of infantry and a part of the
reserve artillery to be selected by General Pendleton,
with instructions to the commander of this force to watch
the enemy's movements, and keep him in check if possible,
but if he advanced with too heavy a force to retire
on the road to Spottsylvania Court-House--General
Pendleton being required to send the greater part of his
reserve artillery to the rear at once.
This order took me very much by surprise, and I
remarked to Colonel Chilton that I could not retire my
troops without their being seen by the enemy, whose
position on Stafford Heights not only overlooked ours,
but who had one or two balloons which he was constantly
sending up from the heights to make observations, and
stated that he would inevitably move over and take
possession of Fredericksburg and the surrounding
Heights. The Colonel said he presumed General Lee
understood all this, but that it was much more important
for him to have troops where he was, than at Fredericksburg,
and if he defeated the enemy there he could easily
Page 201
retake Fredericksburg; he called my attention to the
fact, which was apparent to us all, that there was a very
heavy force of infantry massed on the slopes near
Falmouth which had moved up from below, and stated that
he had no doubt the greater portion of the force on the
other side was in motion to reinforce Hooker. He repeated
his orders with great distinctness in the presence
of General Pendleton, and in reply to questions from us,
said that there could be no mistake in his orders.
This was very astounding to us, as we were satisfied
that we were then keeping away from the army, opposed
to General Lee, a much larger body of troops than my
force could engage or neutralize if united to the army
near Chancellorsville. It is true that there was the force
massed near Falmouth and the indications were that it
was moving above, but still there was a much larger force
of infantry stationed below, which evinced no disposition
to move. While we were conversing, information
was brought me that the enemy had abandoned his lower
crossing, and that our skirmishers had advanced to the
Pratt house, but he still, however, maintained his position
at the mouth of Deep Creek with a division of infantry
and a number of guns on our side of the river.
The orders as delivered to me left me no discretion,
and believing that General Lee understood his own
necessities better than I possibly could, I did not feel justified
in acting on my own judgment, and I therefore determined
to move as directed. It subsequently turned
out that Colonel Chilton had misunderstood General
Lee's orders, which were that I should make the
movement indicated if the enemy did not have a sufficient
force in my front to detain the whole of mine, and it
was to be left to me to judge of that, the orders, in fact,
being similar to those given me at first. It also turned
out that the troops seen massed near Falmouth were the
1st corps under Reynolds, moving up to reinforce Hooker,
and that the 6th corps, Sedgwick's own, remained behind.
When Colonel Chilton arrived, General Pendleton was
Page 202
making arrangements to move some artillery to the left
to open on the columns massed near Falmouth, but the
order brought rendered it necessary to desist from that
attempt in order to make preparations for the withdrawal.
My division occupied a line which was in full view
from the opposite hills except where it ran through the
small strip of woods projecting beyond the railroad,
and the withdrawal had to be made with the probability
of its being discovered by the enemy. I determined to
leave Hays' brigade to occupy the hills in rear of
Fredericksburg with one regiment deployed as skirmishers
on the River road confronting the force at the mouth
of Deep Run, and also to leave one of Barksdale's
regiments, which was already in Fredericksburg and along
the bank of the river, picketing from Falmouth to the
lower end of the town.
The orders were given at once and the withdrawal
commenced, but it had to be made with great caution so
as to attract as little attention as possible and therefore
required much time. General Pendleton was to remain
at Fredericksburg, according to the order's, and the
withdrawal of such of his artillery as was to be sent to the
rear was entrusted to him and executed under his directions.
The Whitworth gun was ordered to the rear
with the reserve artillery and Andrews' battalion and
Graham's battery were ordered to follow my column,
Richardson's battery, which was on the right, being
returned to General Pendleton's control. When the
withdrawal commenced, the enemy sent up a balloon and I
felt sure that he had discovered the movement, but it
turned out that he did not.* It was late in the afternoon
before my column was in readiness to move, and
Barksdale was ordered to bring up the rear with the three
regiments left after detaching the one on picket, as soon
* Professor Lowe's balloon reconnaissances so signally failed on
this occasion and in the operations at Chancellorsville, that they were
abandoned for the rest of the war.
Page 203
as he was relieved by Hays. As soon as the troops were
in readiness the three brigades of my division moved
along the Ridge road from Hamilton's Crossing to the
Telegraph road, and then along a cross-road leading into
the Plank road, Barksdale going out on the Telegraph
road to join the column. Upon getting near the Plank
road, a little before dark, I received a note from General
Lee which informed me that he did not expect me to
join him unless, in my judgment, the withdrawal of my
troops could be made with safety, and I think he used
the expression that if by remaining I could neutralize
and hold in check a large force of the enemy, I could do
as much or perhaps more service than by joining him.
I had proceeded so far that I determined to go on,
as the probability was that if the enemy had discovered
my movement, the mischief would be done before I could
get back, and that I would not be able to recover the
lost ground, but might deprive General Lee entirely of
the use of my troops. When the head of my column had
reached the Plank road and moved up it about a mile, a
courier came to me from General Barksdale, stating that
the enemy had advanced against Hays with a very large
force, and that the latter and General Pendleton had
sent word that all of the artillery would be captured
unless they had immediate relief. The courier also stated
that General Barksdale had started back with his own
regiments.
I determined to return at once to my former position,
and accordingly halted the column, faced it about and
moved back, sending my Adjutant General, Major Hale,
to inform General Lee of the fact. The fact turned out
to be that just before dark Sedgwick had crossed the
remainder of his corps and moved towards the River
road below, called also the Bowling Green road, forcing
from it the 7th Louisiana Regiment, under Colonel Penn,
which occupied that road and fell back to the line on
the railroad after skirmishing sharply with the enemy.
There had been no advance against Hays at Fredericksburg,
Page 204
and Sedgwick had halted with his whole force
and formed line on the river, occupying with his advance
force the road from which Colonel Penn had been driven.
We regained our former lines without trouble about
ten or eleven o'clock at night, throwing out skirmishers
towards the River road. Barksdale occupied his old
position and Hays' returned during the night to the
right of my line. The night passed quietly on the right
after my return except some picket firing on the front,
but, just before daybreak on the morning of the 3rd, I
was informed by General Barksdale that the enemy had
thrown a bridge across at Fredericksburg and was moving
into the town. The General had ridden to see me
in person to request reinforcements, and I ordered Hays'
brigade to return to the left as soon as possible, directing
General Barksdale to post the brigade where it was
needed, as he understood the ground thoroughly. In
reply to a question from me, he informed me that the
crossing had not been resisted by his regiment, which
had retired skirmishing on the approach of the enemy,
as the struggle was deemed useless, and it undoubtedly
would have been. This was a mistake about the bridge
being laid at that time, but it was a very natural one,
as Sedgwick moved a portion of his force up the river
into the town, while doubtless preparations were making
for laying down the bridge early in the morning.
Barksdale's brigade was then posted as follows:
the 21st Mississippi Regiment occupied the trenches on
Marye's Hill between Marye's house and the Plank
road; the 18th, the stone wall at the foot of the hill,
where it was subsequently reinforced by three companies
from the 21st; the 17th, the trenches on the front slope
of Lee's Hill; and the 13th, the trenches further to the
right. Squires' battery of the Washington Artillery was
posted in the works on Marye's Hill, and the rest of
Pendleton's guns on Lee's Hill on the front crest and
at positions further to the right, so as to cover the
interval between the hills and the upper part of Deep
Page 205
Run. There were no troops on the left of the Plank
road along the crest overlooking the canal. Very soon
after daylight, the head of Sedgwick's column, which
had moved up during the night from below, emerged from
the town and advanced against the defences at Marye's
Hill, but was repulsed by the fire of Barksdale's infantry
and the artillery posted there.
When it became sufficiently light to see, it was
discovered by us that the opposite bank of the river was
bare of troops and it was very apparent that the enemy's
whole force lately confronting us on that side was across
for the purpose of a serious move, and the question was
as to where it would be made. The heaviest force in
view was in front of the crossing below the mouth of
Deep Run, and there were at that point a number of
pieces of artillery. The enemy, however, was also
demonstrating against Marye's Hill with both infantry and
artillery, but the mass of his infantry there was
concealed from our view, and there were indications also
as if he might attempt to pass up the valley of Deep Run
on the left bank. The fact was that there was one
division covering the bridge, one between Deep Run and
Hazel Run, and one masked in Fredericksburg. The
skirmishers from my division succeeded in getting to the
River road on the right, but the position next Deep Run
was held by too strong a force to be dislodged.
Very shortly after light the enemy commenced
demonstrating at Deep Run as if to turn the left of my
division held by Hoke's brigade, and threw bodies of
troops up the ravine formed by the high banks of the
run, while there were demonstrations also on the
left bank of the run. Latimer opened with his guns on
the ravine and the advancing bodies of infantry where
they could be seen; but a considerable body succeeded
in getting up to that part of the railroad next to the run
and took position behind it, where they were protected
against the fire of our artillery. The enemy opened with
two or three batteries on Latimer's guns, and there ensued a
Page 206
brisk artillery duel. Andrews brought Graham's and
Brown's guns from the right to replace Latimer's
Napoleons, and also Carpenter's two rifles to take position
with Latimer's two, and the firing was continued
for some time, as well against the enemy's infantry as
against his artillery. Finally Smith's brigade, which was
on the right of Hoke's, moved out and dislodged the
infantry which had taken position behind the railroad
embankment, and as it retired the artillery played on
it. This ended the demonstrations at Deep Run, and
soon heavy bodies of infantry were seen passing up
towards Fredericksburg, upon which Andrews' batteries
opened.
I had remained on the right with my division, as I
knew that that was the weakest part of our line, and I
was very apprehensive that the enemy would attempt to
cut my force in two by moving up Deep Run, which
would have been the most dangerous move to us he could
have made. I, however, kept a lookout upon the
movements above and was in constant communication with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, from whom I received
several reports that they had repulsed all the attacks
upon their position, and thought they could hold it.
Shortly after sunrise, and after the repulse of the first
attack on Barksdale's position, Gibbon's division, of the
enemy's 2nd corps, was crossed over into Fredericksburg
on the bridge which had been laid there, and it was then
moved above the town for the purpose of turning the
position on that flank, but this effort was balked by the
canal, over which there was no bridge; it then attempted
to effect the movement by repairing a bridge over the
canal, the planking from which had been torn up, but
Hays' brigade had arrived by that time, and four of his
regiments filed into the trenches on the left of the Plank
road just in time to thwart this attempt, and another
made shortly afterwards to cross the canal at the upper
end of the same division.
Hays' brigade had had a long distance to march in
order to avoid the enemy, and when it arrived General
WALL (ON THE LEFT OF ROAD) AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND FREDERICKSBURG BATTLEFIELDS
Page 207
Barksdale placed one of the regiments, the 6th Louisiana,
Colonel Monaghan, on his right in the trenches near
what was known as the Howison house, and the other
four were sent to man the trenches along the crest of the
hills on the left of the Plank road, where they arrived just
in time to thwart the attempt to cross the canal as
before stated. The enemy's guns from the north side
of the river, as well as from positions on the south side
above and below the town, continued to fire upon the
positions occupied by Barksdale's men and our artillery,
but the latter generally reserved its fire for the infantry.
An attempt to turn the right of the position by the
right bank of Hazel Run was repulsed by Pendleton's
artillery and every effort to get possession of the heights
was baffled and repulsed until after 11 A.M., when two
large attacking columns of a division each were formed,
one of the divisions from below being brought up for
that purpose. One of these columns moved against
Marye's Hill and the other against Lee's Hill, both at
the same time, while Gibbon's division demonstrated
against the heights above with storming parties in front.
The column that moved against Marye's Hill, consisting
of Newton's division, made its attack on the famous stone
wall defended by a regiment and three companies, and
its storming parties were twice broken and driven back
in disorder by the gallant little band that held that
position, but constantly returning to the attack with
overwhelming numbers the enemy finally succeeded in
carrying the work, after having sustained terrible
slaughter.* Then passing around the foot of the hill a
* Sedgwick, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee
oil the War, says: " I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes'
time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."
General Barksdale informed me that just before this final attack
was made the enemy sent a flag of truce to Colonel Griffin, commanding
the force behind the stone wall, asking permission to take care of his
wounded lying in front under our fire, which permission was
imprudently granted by Colonel Griffin, without his knowledge, and that
the weakness of the force at that point was thus discovered, and
immediately afterwards the assaulting columns advanced.
Page 208
portion of the attacking column came up in the rear,
capturing Squires' guns (which had been fought to the
last minute), and along with them the Captain and his
company.
The column sent against Lee's Hill did not succeed in
carrying it by assault, but was kept at bay until Marye's
Hill had fallen, when the position being untenable, the
regiments defending it were withdrawn up the hill, and
the enemy was thus able to take possession of that also.
The artillery on both hills had done good service in aiding
to repel all the previous assaults and to resist this.
The companies of the 21st Mississippi in the trenches
on the left of Marye's Hill were compelled to retire to
prevent being surrounded and captured, as were also
Hays' regiments in the trenches further to the left, the
latter being compelled to cross the Plank road higher up,
as their retreat on the Telegraph road was cut off. The
enemy got on Hays' flank and rear before he was aware
the hill on his right was taken, and the consequence was
that he lost a few prisoners. He succeeded, however, in
making good his retreat.
General Barksdale partially rallied his regiments and
made obstinate resistance to the enemy's advance on the
Telegraph road, falling back gradually before the large
force opposing him. The greater portion of the guns
on Lee's Hill were carried off, but some were lost
because the horses belonging to them had been carried to
the rear to be out of reach of the enemy's shells, and
could not be got up in time to carry off the pieces. Ten
guns were lost in all, including those taken at Marye's
Hill, but two were subsequently recovered, making our
final loss in that respect eight pieces.
Wilcox's brigade was above at Banks' Ford, but not
under my command, and was about to move up to
Chancellorsville, but hearing that the enemy was
advancing up the river, General Wilcox hurried to the
vicinity of Taylor's house at the extreme left of the line
with two pieces of artillery and sixty men, and putting
his guns
Page 209
in position, opened with effect on a portion of Gibbon's
division when it was trying to effect a crossing of the
canal at the upper end. He then detained his brigade,
and subsequently started a regiment to Barksdale's
assistance at his request, but before it arrived Marye's
Hill had been taken and it therefore retired. General
Wilcox subsequently did good service in resisting the
enemy's advance up the Plank road.
While these events were transpiring above, I was
near the left of the line occupied by my division, and in a
position from which I could observe a good deal of the
movements, but could not see Marye's Hill very well.
After what was supposed to be the enemy's effort to
move up Deep Run and thus break our lines had been
thwarted, and when I saw the infantry moving up
towards Fredericksburg, I sent one of my aides,
Lieutenant Callaway, to Lee's Hill, to give notice to Generals
Barksdale and Pendleton and to ascertain how they were
getting on. After he had been gone some time, I became
uneasy and determined to ride up myself.
While I was on my way some one came galloping up
in my rear and stated that some person below had seen
the enemy's troops and flag go up on Marye's Hill. I
did not think this could be so, but rode on rapidly, hoping
that the statement was untrue. I soon met a courier from
General Pendleton with a note stating that they had so
far repulsed any attack and could hold their position.
This relieved me for an instant, but in a few minutes
Lieutenant Callaway came galloping with the information
that the enemy certainly had carried the heights,
and that he had seen his attacking column ascending them
at Marye's house, a very few minutes after parting with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, who were on Lee's
Hill and who had just stated to him that they thought
they could hold the position.
I at once sent an order to General Gordon, who occupied
my right, to move up as soon as possible with three
of his regiments over the road I was following, which was
Page 210
the nearest practicable one. I then galloped to the
Telegraph road, and soon met Pendleton's artillery going
rapidly to the rear, and ordered it to be halted. Going
on I found General Barksdale on the ridge immediately
in rear of Lee's Hill rallying his men and skirmishing
with the enemy who had ascended the hill, and before
whom they were retiring gradually but obstinately.
Barksdale's men were rather scattered, but the 6th
Louisiana had retired in good order and I directed it to
form a line, and Barksdale to halt and get his men in
line, which he did. I also ordered a battery of artillery
to be brought forward into action and soon one was by
my side and unlimbered but did not fire.
There was a line of the enemy in front a few hundred
yards on the crest of the hill, and I turned to the officer
commanding the battery and asked him why he did not
fire, to which he replied, "I have no ammunition, sir."
I ordered another to be brought forward, and a battery
of Howitzers, from Cabell's battalion, was brought up
and opened with canister. The enemy's advance had been
checked by the demonstration, but he soon brought up
some artillery and opened on us at short range with
shrapnel and canister, and I ordered the line to retire
a short distance, which it did in good order, taking up
another position. In this manner we continued to retire
along the Telegraph road from point to point, taking
advantage of favorable portions of the ground to make a
stand until the enemy ceased to pursue. I then ordered
General Barksdale to take position at Cox's house, about
two miles in rear of Lee's Hill, where the first cross-road
leaves the Telegraph road to get into the Plank road,
and to establish Hays (to whom I had sent a message
to come around to the Telegraph road) on the line,
as well as Gordon's regiments, when they arrived.
By obtaining possession of Lee's Hill, the enemy bad
obtained a position from which he could completely
enfilade my line on the right, and as soon as the
foregoing arrangements were made, I rode rapidly to the
Page 211
right and threw back the troops there into a second line
which had been previously prepared in the rear, and
which was not enfiladed; and Colonel Andrews was
ordered to take position with all of his guns on the
ridge at the head of the Deep Run valley, so as to protect
the left flank of my division and the right of Barksdale's
line.
All these movements were made without molestation
from the enemy. Of course I did not know what the
purposes of the enemy were, and took my measures to
provide as well as I could for any emergency that might
present itself. I had met Gordon with his three
regiments immediately after leaving Barksdale, and directed
him to join the latter. After making the dispositions on
the right, I rode back to Barksdale's position and found
his line established with Hays and Gordon in position.
It had been now ascertained that the enemy was
moving up the Plank road, and I rode out to a position
across Hazel Run, from which I could see the moving
columns and discovered that it was moving very slowly,
and that it finally halted. Lieutenant Pitzer, one of
my aides, had been at Lee's Hill when the heights were
carried, and knowing the importance of the affair to
General Lee, had gone at once to give him the information,
as he knew that it would be some time before I
could be informed so as to send a messenger myself, and
thus judiciously anticipated me in putting General Lee
on his guard.
While the events thus detailed were transpiring on
the line occupied by me, a great battle had been fought
between General Lee's forces and the main body of,
Hooker's army. Hooker had crossed the river above and
concentrated four corps at Chancellorsville in a strong
position, and Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps,
Longstreet himself being still absent with two of his
divisions, had watched the movement of the enemy and
resisted his advance column, taking position on the Plank
road at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division and the
Page 212
three divisions of Jackson's corps had moved up during
the night of the 30th of April and the morning of the
1st of May and united with Anderson. Our troops had
thus moved forward on the Plank road and the stone
turnpike, Anderson's and McLaws' divisions in front,
and Jackson's divisions following Anderson's on the
Plank road, and had driven an advanced line of the
enemy back to within a mile of Chancellorsville upon his
main force.
Early on the morning of the 2nd, Anderson's and
McLaws' divisions, with the exception of Wilcox's
brigade of Anderson's division, which had been sent back
to Banks' Ford, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws'
division which was at Fredericksburg, were left to confront
the enemy on the side next to Fredericksburg, and
Jackson moved with his three divisions, by a circuitous
route to the left, to gain the rear of the enemy's right.
Late in the afternoon, General Jackson reached the rear
of the enemy's right flank about three miles beyond
Chancellorsville, and with Rodes in front--followed by
Colston with Trimble's division, and A. P. Hill,--advanced
at once with great vigor, driving the enemy before
him, carrying position after position, routing entirely
one corps, and capturing a number of guns and prisoners,
until his advance was arrested by the abattis in front
of the central position near Chancellorsville. Night had
come on by this time, and General Jackson ordered A. P.
Hill's division, which was following in rear of the other
two, to the front to take the place of the latter. He
himself went to the front to reconnoitre for the purpose
of ordering another advance, and, having sent an order
to Hill to press on, while returning in the darkness was
shot and dangerously wounded * under an unfortunate
mistake, by a part of Hill's advancing troops. General
* Captain R. E. WELBOURNE:
Some conflicting accounts of the manner in which General Jackson
was shot have been published, and as you were with him, I will be
very much obliged, if you will give me all the details of the affair.
With pleasant recollections of your official connection with me,
Yrs. very truly
LYNCHBURG, Feb. 12, 1873. J. A.
EARLY.
General J. A.
EARLY:
I give you the facts relating to the wounding of General T. J.
Jackson. As the details of the battle are familiar to you, I will begin
with Jackson's movements after the battle was over, and all seemed
quiet, the enemy having disappeared from our immediate front, and
all firing consequently having ceased. Jackson took advantage of this
lull in the storm to relieve Rodes' troops (who had been fighting and
steadily advancing and making repeated charges from the time the
fight began), and had ordered General Hill to the front to relieve
Rodes with his fresh troops, directing the change to be made as
quickly as possible. We were within a half mile of the open fields
near Chancellorsville, where the enemy was supposed to be strongly
entrenched. While the change was being made Jackson manifested
great impatience to get Hill's troops into line and ready to move
promptly, and to accomplish this he sent the members of his staff
with orders to Hill and other general officers to hurry up the movement.
From the orders sent to General Stuart it was evident that
his intention was to storm the enemy's works at Chancellorsville as
soon as the lines were formed, and before the enemy recovered from
the shock and confusion of the previous fighting, and to place the left
of his army between Hooker and the river. While these orders were
being issued Jackson sat on his horse just in front of the line on the
pike. From this point he sent me with an order to General Hill. I
galloped back and met Hill, in about 50 yards, riding along the pike
towards General Jackson. I turned and rode with him to his lines, he
stopping within a few feet of their front. I then rode immediately
on to General Jackson, who was in sight, and only a few paces in
front of Hill, just in the position I had left him. As I reached him,
he sent off the only staff officer present, with orders to Hill to move
forward as soon as possible, and then started slowly along the pike
towards the enemy. I rode at his left side, two of my signal men
just behind us, followed by couriers, etc., in columns of twos. General
Jackson thought, while awaiting Hill's movements, that he would ride
to the front, as far as the skirmish line, or pickets, and ascertain what
could be seen or heard of the enemy and his movements,--supposing
there was certainly a line of skirmishers in front, as his orders were
always very imperative to keep a skirmish line in front of the line of
battle. When we had ridden only a few rods and reached a point
nearly opposite an old dismantled house in the woods (near the road
to our right) and while I was delivering to him General Hill's reply
to his order--given a few moments before,--to our great surprise our
little party was fired upon by about a battalion or probably less of
our troops, a little to our right and to the right of the pike, the balls
passing diagonally across the pike and apparently aimed at us. There
seemed to be one gun discharged, followed almost instantly by this
volley. The single gun may have been discharged accidentally, but
seemed to have been taken as a signal by the troops, to announce the
approach of the enemy. I hardly think the troops saw us, though
they could hear our horses' feet on the pike and probably fired at
random in the supposed direction of the enemy. However, the origin
of the firing is mere conjecture, but it came as above stated, and many
of the escorts and their horses were shot down. At the firing our
horses wheeled suddenly to the left and General Jackson, at whose
side I rode, galloped away--followed by the few who were not dismounted
by the first firing,--into the woods to get out of range of
the bullets, and approached our line a little obliquely, but had not gone
over 20 steps beyond the edge of the pike, into the thicket, ere the
brigade just to the left of the turnpike (on our right as we approached
from the direction of the enemy), drawn up within 30 yards of us,
fired a volley in their turn, kneeling on the right knee, as shown by the
flash of their guns, as though prepared to guard against cavalry. By
this fire General Jackson was wounded. These troops evidently
mistook us for the enemy's cavalry. We could distinctly hear General
Hill calling, at the top of his voice, to his troops to make them cease
firing. He knew that we had just passed in front of him, as did the
troops immediately on the pike, and I don't think these latter fired.
I was alongside of Jackson, and saw his arm fall at his side, loosing
the rein, when the volley came from the left. His horse wheeled
suddenly and ran through the bushes toward the enemy. The limb of a
tree took off his cap and threw him flat on the back on his horse. I
rode after him, passing under the same limb, which took off my hat
also, but Jackson soon regained his seat, caught the bridle in his right
hand, and turning his horse towards the pike and our men, somewhat
checked his speed. As he turned to the pike, it gave me the inside
track, and I caught his horse as he reached the pike, which he was
approaching at an acute angle. Just as I caught the reins, Captain
Wynn rode up on the opposite side of him and caught hold of the
reins on that side, almost simultaneously. By this time the confusion
was over and all was quiet, and looking up and down the pike in every
direction, no living creature could be seen save us three.
As soon as I could check Jackson's horse, I dismounted, and seeing
that he was faint, I asked him what I could do for him, or if he
felt able to ride as far as into our lines. He answered, "You had best
take me down," leaning, as he spoke, toward me and then falling,
partially fainting from loss of blood.
I was on the side of the broken arm, while his horse had his head
turned towards the enemy and about where we were when first fired
upon, and would not be kept still, as he was frightened and suffering
from his own wounds. As General Jackson fell over on me, I caught
him in my arms, and held him until Captain Wynn could get his feet
out of the stirrups, then we carried him in our arms some 10 or 15
steps north of the pike, where he was laid on the ground, resting his
head in my lap, while I proceeded to dress his wounds, cutting off his
coat sleeves, and binding a handkerchief tightly above and below his
wound and putting his arm in a sling. Wynn went for Dr. McGuire
and an ambulance, and I was left alone with him until General Hill
came up. Just before Hill reached us, Jackson revived a little and
asked me to have a skilful surgeon attend him. When I told him
what had been done he said "Very good."
The enemy evidently thought the firing had thrown our men into
confusion and resolved to take advantage of it by making a determined
attack at this time, so in a few minutes, it was announced by Lieutenant
Morrison, who had joined Jackson while he was lying on the
ground, and now ran up in a very excited manner, crying out, "The
enemy is within 50 yards and advancing. Let us take the General
away." Jackson was still lying with his head in my lap, I had finished
tying up his arm where it was broken, and asked him where his other
wound was, and what I should do for that, when he replied, "In my
right hand, but never mind that, it is a mere trifle." He said nothing
about the wound in his left wrist, and did not seem aware of it,
doubtless owing to the fact that the arm was broken above. Upon
hearing Morrison's warning, I sprang up, and said, "Let us take the
General in our arms, and carry him back," to which he replied, "No,
if you will help me up, I can walk." He had only gone a few steps, when
we met a litter and placed him on it. He was being borne off on foot,
supported by Captain Lee and one or two others, I walking between
them and the pike, and leading three horses, trying to keep the troops,
then moving down the pike, from seeing who it was, but found this
impossible, and we met some men with this litter before we had gone
ten steps. While placing Jackson on it, the enemy opened fire on us
at short range, from a battery planted on the pike and with infantry;
a terrific fire of grape, shell, minie balls, etc., and advancing at a
rapid rate. Everything seemed to be seized with a panic, and taken
by surprise, our line was thrown into confusion. It recoiled and for
awhile continued to give way, and the enemy pressed forward. Such
was the disorder that I thought that General Jackson and party would
certainly fall into the hands of the enemy. The horses jerked loose,
and ran in every direction, and before we proceeded far one of the
litter bearers was shot, having both of his arms broken, and General
Jackson fell to the ground. As he lay there he grew faint from loss
of blood, having fallen on his wounded side, and his arm began to
bleed afresh. I rode away to try to get some whiskey for the purpose
of reviving him, and at a short distance met Dr. McGuire and Colonel
Pendleton, to whom I told what had happened, as we rode towards
the place where I left Jackson. The ambulance came up; we hurried
it to the front, and, reaching Jackson, placed him in it. As soon as
the ambulance left, I was ordered by Colonel Pendleton, after consultation
with General Rodes, to go to General Lee as quickly as possible
and communicate the intelligence to him, explaining our position, what
had been accomplished, who had taken command; and ask him to
come to that place.
During the attack on our forces so many of our men had gone
past us that we seemed to be left with no troops between us and the
enemy, and I made up my mind to remain with the General to nurse
him, as it seemed we should soon be in their hands. However, the
gallant Pender--in command after the wounding of General Hill--
soon rallied his line and pressed forward, driving the enemy back to
his works, at which quiet was restored for the night, the fight having
ended as suddenly as it began.
Many people have thought it strange that Jackson should give an
order to troops to fire at everything, especially cavalry approaching
from the direction of the enemy, and then place himself in a situation
to have himself fired upon. I heard of no such order, and feel sure
that none such was given. If such had been the order it would have
been given to the skirmish line, and there could have been no necessity
for such an order to them, as they would do this anyway.
R. E. WELBOURN.
(Chief Signal Officer, 2nd Army Corps, 1863, Lieutenant General
Jackson, commanding.)
Page 213
A. P. Hill was soon after disabled and the advance was
thus arrested.
When Jackson's guns opened, our troops on the right
pressed the enemy's left heavily to prevent any troops
being sent from that flank against Jackson, but no attack
in front was made then and night put an end to the
operations in that quarter. Hooker had been joined
during the day by the 1st corps brought up from opposite
Page 214
Fredericksburg, but at the close of the fight his lines had
been very much contracted, and his troops on his right
greatly scattered; and early in the night he telegraphed
to Sedgwick to cross the river and move up to Chancellorsville
on the Plank road, which dispatch found
Sedgwick already across.
General Jackson had been entirely disabled by his
wound, and General A. P. Hill was so injured as to be
unable to command in the field. Brigadier General Rodes
Page 215
was the officer next in rank, but having a very natural
hesitation to assume the responsibility of so large and
important a command, Major General Stuart of the
cavalry, who was operating in connection with General
Jackson, was requested to assume command, which he
did. During the night the enemy strengthened his contracted
line with breastworks and abattis, and strongly
fortified other positions in his rear nearer the
Rappahannock.
Page 216
Early in the morning of the 3rd, Stuart renewed the
attack with Jackson's division on the left, while Anderson
pressed forward with his right resting on the Plank
road, and McLaws demonstrated on the right. The enemy
was forced back from numerous strongholds until Anderson's
left connected with Stuart's right, when the whole
line attacked with irresistible force, driving the enemy
from all his fortified positions around Chancellorsville
with very heavy loss, and forcing him to retreat to the
Page 217
new fortifications nearer the Rappahannock. By ten
o'clock A.M. General Lee was in full possession of Chancellorsville
and the field of battle. He then proceeded to
reorganize his troops for an advance against the enemy's
new position, to which the latter had been able to retreat
under shelter of the dense woods, which covered all the
ground, and also rendered an advance by our troops in
line of battle very difficult and hazardous.
General Lee had just completed his arrangements to
renew the attack, when he received the intelligence
of the capture of Marye's Hill by Sedgwick's force and the
Page 218
advance of his column; and he found it necessary to look
after the new opponent. Sedgwick had moved up the
Plank road held by Wilcox's brigade, which gradually
retired, and finally made a stand at Salem Church on the
Plank road, about five miles from Fredericksburg, when,
by a gallant resistance, the head of the column was held
at bay until the arrival of McLaws with four brigades,
and the further advance of the enemy was effectually
opposed.*
It will be thus seen of what importance to General
Lee's own movements were those below at Fredericksburg,
and how the capture of the heights in rear of the
two affected him. A force of at least 30,000 men had
been detained from Hooker's army by considerably less
than 10,000 on our side. It is true that Sedgwick had
finally broken through the force opposed to him and
commenced an advance up towards the rear of General
Lee's army, but he had not done so until the latter had
had time to gain a brilliant victory, and drive Hooker
to a position of defence from which he could not advance
except under great disadvantages.
Sedgwick's column had thus been detained by Wilcox
until a force was brought down to arrest its progress
entirely, and time was given to make arrangements to
fall upon Sedgwick while separated from the rest of
Hooker's army. Barksdale's brigade and the artillery
posted with it had resisted all assaults upon their
position for at least six hours, thus giving General Lee the
requisite time to gain his victory, and in being finally
*
In this condition of things, Lincoln telegraphed to General
Hooker's Chief of Staff, who was on the north bank near Falmouth,
as follows:
"WAR
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, May 3, 1863.
"MAJOR GENERAL BUTTERFIELD:
"Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? Where is
Stoneman?
A. LINCOLN.
"Sent
4.35 P.M." (See report Committee on the War.)
Page 219
compelled to succumb to overwhelming numbers that
brigade had lost no honor. It was impossible for me to
reinforce Barksdale with a larger force than I sent to
him, and I then weakened very much the defences on the
right. Had Sedgwick communicated his purposes to me
and informed me that he would assault Marye's and
Lee's Hills and those positions alone, then I would have
moved my whole force to those points and held them
against his entire force.
As it was, a division of Sedgwick's corps larger than
my own immediately confronted the position occupied
by the three brigades of my division left after Hays
had been sent to Barksdale, and if that position had been
abandoned and the brigades defending it moved to the
left, the division confronting it, and which was constantly
demonstrating towards it, would have moved up,
taken possession of the line, and then moved upon my
rear, compelling me to abandon the works on the left
practically without a struggle, or submit to a much
greater disaster than that which occurred. Sedgwick
would hardly have been so blind as to rush his troops
up against the strong positions at Marye's and Lee's
Hill's while defended by a force sufficiently large to hold
them, when there would have been an easy way open
to him for their capture and that of the whole force
defending them by simply moving a portion of troops
to the rear. Marye's Hill would have fallen much sooner
than it did, if it had been occupied by my whole force,
or if a force sufficiently strong to prevent the position
from being turned had not been retained on the right.
By holding the position on the right, therefore, the fall
of Marye's Hill and the consequent advance of Sedgwick's
column above were both very considerably retarded,
and when the catastrophe did happen there was
left a considerable force to threaten and fall upon
Sedgwick's rear. I think I may claim that the force entrusted
to my command had accomplished all that could reasonably
Page 220
have been expected of it under the circumstances
in which it was placed.
I will now return to my own position. Just as I
was returning from observing Sedgwick's column I
encountered, at Hazel Run, one of General McLaws' staff
officers, Major Costin, coming down under an escort of
cavalry, and he informed me that General McLaws had
moved down the Plank road to meet the enemy, and
that General Lee wished him and myself to attack Sedgwick
in conjunction and endeavor to overwhelm him, and
there was a note or message from General McLaws
requesting information as to my position and that of the
enemy, and asking what place I proposed, for attacking
the enemy.
I think there was a note received later from General
Lee communicating his wishes in regard to the proposed
attack, similar to information brought by Major Costin--
at any rate the information of his views and wishes was
brought by Lieutenant Pitzer on his return. It was about
an hour before sunset when Major Costin reached me, and
that part of my division on the right was more than three
miles from the position at Cox's, so that it was impossible
to accomplish anything that night. I immediately
sent a note to General McLaws informing him
that I would concentrate all my force that night and
move against the enemy very early next morning, drive
him from Lee's and Marye's Hills, and extend my left
while advancing so as to connect with his (McLaws')
right, and continue to move against the enemy above,
after his connection with Fredericksburg was severed;
and I asked General McLaws' co-operation in this plan.
During the night, I received a note from him assenting
to my plan and containing General Lee's approval of
it also.
As soon as the first communication had been received
from General McLaws, my troops from the right were
ordered up, but it was after night before they were all
concentrated. Andrews' artillery was brought up before
Page 221
night, one battery being left on the ridge so as to cover
my right flank on the line across the Telegraph road,
and a regiment of infantry being posted so as to guard
against a surprise on that flank, if the enemy should
move around Lee's Hill up the left of Deep Run. Just
before dark, we discovered a piece of artillery advancing
along the Telegraph road in our front, followed by a few
wagons. The men in charge of the piece of artillery
came on so deliberately, though in full view of our line,
that we took it for granted that it must be one of the
pieces supposed to be captured, with a forge or two, that
had been probably able to elude the vigilance of the
enemy by concealment in some of the ravines.
The approaching darkness rendered objects very indistinct,
and we therefore watched the approaching piece
until it got within a few hundred yards of us, when the
drivers suddenly discovered who we were, wheeled
rapidly and dashed to the rear, and we became then
aware that it was one of the enemy's pieces. Some of
Andrews' guns which were ready opened fire, but the
piece of artillery got off, though some of the mules to
a wagon and to a forge were killed, and we found and
secured the latter the next day with several fine mules.
The night passed quietly with us, and at light on the
morning of the 4th I prepared to advance. My plan
was to advance along the Telegraph road with Gordon's
brigade in line in front, followed by Andrews' battalion
of artillery and Graham's battery, with Smith's and
Barksdale's brigades following in the rear, forming a
second line, and to throw Hays' and Hoke's brigades
across Hazel Run opposite my present position so as to
move down the left bank, as the column moved along
the Telegraph road against the heights, both of which I
took it for granted the enemy held, as the affair just at
dusk the evening before must have given him notice of
my presence.
It was my purpose, as soon as the heights were taken
and the enemy's connection with Fredericksburg cut, to
Page 222
advance with Gordon's and Smith's brigades up the
Plank road and river, and for Hays and Hoke to advance
across towards the Plank road extending to the left
to connect with McLaws, while Barksdale's brigade and
some of Pendleton's artillery should be posted to hold
Marye's and Lee's Hills and protect my rear from the
direction of Fredericksburg. The ravine of Hazel Run is
so rugged that it was impossible to cross it except where
there were roads, and therefore it was necessary to pass
Hays' and Hoke's brigades over at the ford on my left.
Gordon's brigade was placed in line at light, and
Andrews' artillery immediately in its rear, while Smith
and Barksdale were ordered to take their positions and
be in readiness to follow. I then went with General Hays
and Hoke, whose brigades were put in motion, across
Hazel Run to point out to them the positions they were
to take and how they were to move. After doing this,
I rode back and found to my surprise that Gordon had
moved off under a misapprehension of my order, as he
was to have waited until all was ready, and I designed
accompanying him. Andrews had followed him and I
immediately put Smith and Barksdale in motion, the
former along the road by flank, and Barksdale in line of
battle on the right.
The line of hills composed of Marye's, Cemetery,
Stansbury's, and Taylor's Hills descends towards the
Marye's Hill, which is the lowest, Taylor's, bordering
on the river at the upper end of the canal, being much
the highest. Stansbury's, Cemetery, and Marye's Hills
are separated from a higher range on the southwest
by a very small stream which rises between Taylor's
Hill and the Plank road and runs across that road into
Hazel Run, some distance above the crossing of the
Telegraph road over that run. Cemetery and Marye's
Hills slope back gradually to the little stream, and from
the latter, on the southwest, rise steep hills terminating
in a high, wide ridge, along which the Plank road runs;
and the face of these hills fronting towards Cemetery
Page 223
and Marye's Hills is intersected by a number of deep
ravines, up one of which the Plank road ascends to get
on the main ridge. On the south side of the road and
a little distance from it the main ridge terminates in a
high hill which descends abruptly to Hazel Run, the face
towards the run being wooded. At the lower front of
the base of this hill is a mill called the Alum Spring
Mill. Just at the upper part of the base of the hill a
branch of Hazel Run comes in, uniting with the main
stream. This branch rises some distance above near
the Plank road, and runs nearly parallel to it, through
a deep valley to its junction with the main stream.
On the south of this valley is another long wide ridge
which extends for some distance parallel to that along
which the Plank road runs and also terminates with an
abrupt descent to Hazel Run. On the south of the Plank
road, and on the same ridge with it, is situated Mr.
Guest's house some two or three miles from Fredericksburg,
and nearly opposite to it on the other ridge is Mr.
Downman's house. On the extremities of the lesser
ridges, projecting out from that on which the Plank
road is located, was a line of small works and epaulments
for artillery, extending from the river at Taylor's Hill
to and across the Plank road, which had been previously
made by our troops, and this line completely commanded
the crests and rear slopes of Marye's, Cemetery and
Stansbury's Hills, being much higher.
The Plank road crosses the little stream, with a
high embankment extending for some distance on both
sides, the stream passing through a culvert. The Telegraph
road passes towards Fredericksburg from Cox's
house, where I was, along a ridge to Lee's Hill and
descends the hill on the side of the slope next to Hazel
Run.
Gordon, when he started, advanced rapidly along the
Telegraph road, and when he reached Lee's Hill, it was
found unoccupied, but a body of infantry was moving
along the Plank road from the town between Marye's
Page 224
Hill and the ridge above, which halted and took position
behind the embankment of the road. In the valley between
Guest's and Downman's houses, was observed a
considerable body of infantry, and at Downman's house a
battery of artillery. Gordon threw out his skirmishers
and made preparations to descend the hill and cross over
Hazel Run above Marye's Hill. Andrews placed Graham's
battery in position on the road and opened on the
infantry in the valley, which moved out of the way.
Two large bodies of infantry, supposed to be brigades,
each then moved over the ridge just beyond the Alum
Spring Mill, threatening Gordon's left, as he was advancing.
Graham turned his guns on them and soon
drove them off up the ridge. Gordon then made a dash
across the run and after a sharp engagement drove off
the infantry behind the road embankment, capturing
some prisoners and securing several baggage and
subsistence wagons, a battery wagon, and a forge--with
their teams,--which were passing up the road with the
infantry he encountered.
This gave us the possession of Marye's and Cemetery
Hills again, and cut the enemy's connection with
Fredericksburg. Arriving soon after with Smith's brigade I
threw it across Hazel Run to the support of Gordon,
the batteries from the Stafford Heights opening a heavy
fire on it as it descended Lee's Hill. Barksdale's brigade,
which had halted in the rear without orders, was then
sent for, to occupy the stone wall at the foot of Marye's
Hill, and General Barksdale was ordered to move rapidly
into the town if not held by too large a force, get possession
of the bridge, and secure a camp of wagons seen
at the lower part of the town. When Graham's guns
were operating upon the bodies of infantry in the valley
between Guest's and Downman's houses and those
threatening Gordon's flank, the enemy's battery--at
Downman's house,--opened fire on them, but as soon as the
infantry was disposed of, Graham turned his two 20
pounder Parrots on the enemy's guns, which returned
Page 225
across the valley and took position near Guest's house
where they were out of reach.
Seeing the enemy's wagons moving off from the
town and not hearing Barksdale's rifles, I sent a staff
officer to repeat the orders, and received a reply that he
was preparing to send forward his skirmishers; a second
messenger sent to him returned with the information that
his skirmishers reported a heavy force holding the town,
entrenched within rifle pits. The enemy's wagon trains
had thus made their escape, and I sent orders to Barksdale
to desist from the attack on the town and to dispose
of his brigade so as to resist any advance from that
direction. It turned out that the town was held by
Gibbon's division which had been left behind.
I had listened anxiously to hear the sound of McLaws'
guns or some
indication of his being engaged, but heard
nothing. The enemy had not expected us in this direction,
and he was therefore evidently taken by surprise,
but Gordon's advance, which was so handsomely made,
being sooner than I had intended, had given the enemy
time to form his troops in line, to meet any further
advance I could make after my arrival; and as the
character of the ground was such that considerable bodies of
troops could be concealed from my view from any point
that was accessible to me, I could not tell what force I
would have to encounter on ascending the hills above.
I could see that all the little works on the heights
were occupied by infantry, making a line extending across
from Taylor's Hill to the brow of the hill beyond and
above the Alum Spring Mill. Gordon's and Smith's
brigades had taken position in the trenches along the
crests from the Plank road towards Taylor's Hill, facing
towards the enemy above and with their backs towards
Fredericksburg. The enemy did not open then with
artillery, and as they were very much exposed, I thought
possibly he did not have any on that flank, and I therefore
determined to feel him and make him develop what
he had.
Page 226
Smith was ordered to advance his brigade towards
the heights occupied by the enemy above; two regiments,
the 13th and 58th Virginia, advanced against one of the
positions which appeared to be occupied by the strongest
force, and the 49th and 52nd separately against other
points. The regiments advanced to the base of the hills
and commenced ascending, when the enemy appeared
in force on their crests, and also opened with artillery
from the neighborhood of Taylor's house. The 13th and
58th Regiments became heavily engaged, and the 49th
and 52nd slightly.
It was now apparent that the hills were held in strong
force, and as an attempt to carry them from that direction,
as my troops were then located, would have been
under great disadvantage and attended with great
difficulty, I ordered the regiments to be withdrawn. The
49th and 52nd were withdrawn without difficulty and
with but slight loss, the 13th and 58th being on the right
and more exposed to the enemy's guns were withdrawn
with more difficulty and heavier loss. The 13th lost 17
prisoners and 58th 71, including the color bearer of
the latter with his colors, the most of the men captured,
including the color bearer of the 58th, taking refuge in
a house at the foot of the hill, under the fire of the
enemy's guns as well as his infantry, and declining to
fall back over the plain while exposed to the fire of the
artillery.
They were thus captured by their own misconduct,
the enemy sending to take possession of them, which I
could not prevent without bringing on a heavy engagement
under disadvantageous circumstances, and thus
incurring a much heavier loss of men. The brigade
resumed its position after this affair, and I sent Lieutenant
Pitzer to General McLaws to apprise him of what had
been done and my position, with a request for him to
begin his attack on the enemy and the information that
I could move two brigades, Hays' and Hoke's, across
towards the Plank road extending to the left as they
Page 227
advanced to connect with his right, and, as soon as the
enemy was engaged so as to make it practicable, I would
move up from below with my other two brigades,
Gordon's and Smith's; Hays' and Hoke's brigades had
moved down the left bank of Hazel Run and were put in
position to co-operate with McLaws' attack, when made,
by moving across the ridge on which Downman's house
was located, and orders were given them accordingly.
General McLaws did not make the attack, and Lieutenant
Pitzer returned with the information that Anderson's
division was coming down, and with instruction for me
to wait until he was in position, when at a signal given
by firing three guns rapidly in succession, a simultaneous
attack should be made by the whole force.
When Anderson's force began to arrive, I was able
to draw Hays and Hoke nearer to my right, and I therefore
brought Hays' brigade across the branch of Hazel
Run, which has been mentioned, and put his brigade in
line at the foot of the hill near Alum Spring Mill, so that
it might move up the wooded face of the hill on to the
plain above, which was occupied by a part of the enemy's
force. Hoke's brigade was placed in line just in the edge
of the woods on the rear slope of the lower end of the
ridge on which Downman's house was, facing towards
the Plank road, concealed from the view of the enemy,
as was Hays'.
General Lee came down himself before the signal was
given, and sent for me to meet him towards my left. We
examined the position of the enemy together, as well as
we could, and I explained to him my plan of attacking
with my force, which was, for Hays to move up the hill
at foot of which he was and directly forward, which
would carry him to the Plank road, and up on the right
side; for Hoke to move over the ridge below Downman's
house and across the valley to the other ridge, as far as
the Plank road, where he was to change direction so as
to move up on the left of the road; and when the signal
was heard, Gordon was to move rapidly by the flank to
Page 228
the ravine up which the Plank road runs, and then
diagonally towards Taylor's house so as to sweep all the
crests in front of him and Smith as they were then
posted, and turn the enemy's left which rested near the
river. Smith was to remain stationary so as to
reinforce the brigades engaged, or Barksdale as might be
necessary. General Lee approved my plan and directed
me to carry it out as soon as the signal should be given,
and then left me.
Sedgwick's line covered the Plank road for some
distance on the south side; being in the centre along
the ridge or plateau on which the road is located, and
bending back across it with both flanks which rested
near the river, above and below. Guest's house was in
his line and some artillery was posted near it, while
Downman's house, and the ridge on which it was located
were occupied by his skirmishers. In advance of the
part of the line facing towards me, which was his left
wing, there was an advanced line occupying the crests
of the hills towards me, extending across from Taylor's
Hill to the lower end of the valley which has been
mentioned, with artillery posted near the left of this
advanced line.
The plateau, on the ridge where Downman's house was
located, was entirely cleared of timber below the house,
as was the valley between the two ridges. The ridge
along which the Plank road runs was cleared on the
south side of it, and from the direction of Fredericksburg
up to within a short distance below Guest's house,
from which point bodies of woodland extended up the
road for some distance and across towards Taylor's
house, with occasional intervals of cleared land.
We waited for the signal, but it was not given until
a short time before sunset. When it was heard, Hoke
moved at once across the plateau in his front between
Downman's house and Hazel Run, then down the slope,
across the valley, and up the steep ascent of the next
ridge towards the Plank road, driving the enemy's
Page 229
skirmishers before him, while the guns at Guest's house
played upon his advancing line without disturbing his
beautiful order. Hays rapidly ascended the hill in front,
immediately encountering the right of the enemy's front
line, which he swept before him, and continued his
advance without a halt. It was a splendid sight to see
the rapid and orderly advance, of these two brigades,
with the enemy flying before them. The officers and
men manning the artillery which had been posted on
eminences along the Telegraph road and on the right
bank of Hazel Run so as to protect the infantry retreat
in case of disaster, debarred from an active participation
in the action, could not refrain from enthusiastically
cheering the infantry, as it so handsomely swept
everything in front.
In the meantime Gordon, as soon as the signal was
heard, moved his brigade by flank rapidly to the Plank
road, formed in line up the ravine and swept on towards
Taylor's house, clearing the crests of the enemy,
compelling his artillery on that flank to retire rapidly and
driving the enemy's extreme left from its position back
towards Banks' Ford. On getting near the point of
woods below Guest's house, Hays' and Hoke's brigades
approached each other. The artillery at Guest's house
had been compelled to fly in order to prevent capture,
and the enemy was retiring in confusion on all parts
of the line confronting them and Gordon, but just then
Hoke fell from his horse, with his arm badly shattered
by a ball near the shoulder joint.
The brigade thus losing its commander, to whom
alone the instruction had been given, and without any
one to direct its movement at that particular crisis,
pushed on across the Plank road, encountered Hays'
brigade in the woods still advancing, and the two
commingling together were thrown into confusion. They
crossed each other's paths in this condition, but still
continued to advance, getting far into the woods. Hays'
brigade pressed on in its proper direction, but Hoke's,
Page 230
now under the command of Colonel Avery of the 6th
North Carolina, had got to its right. The regiments
of both brigades had lost their organization, and in the
woods it was impossible to restore it. Portions of both
brigades penetrated a considerable distance into the
woods, still driving the enemy before them, but when
scattered they came across a portion of the retiring force
which had been rallied, and the advance parties were
compelled to retire themselves, leaving some prisoners
in the enemy's hands, many of whom had become so
exhausted by their rapid advance that they were unable
to get out of the way, and were picked up after the
fighting was over. Other portions of the brigades, hearing
Gordon's firing on the right and not aware of his
movements, thought the enemy was in their rear and
retired also. The brigades were then rallied and
reformed on the Plank road just below Guest's house. I
had taken my position on the heights near the Telegraph
road opposite the Alum Spring Mill, from which point
I could see the movement of all three brigades, and
when I discovered them all in motion and driving the
enemy as described, I rode across Hazel Run in the
direction taken by Hays' brigade.
I arrived just as the first men of that brigade were
emerging from the woods, and directed the re-formation
of the two brigades. Two regiments of Smith's brigade,
the 49th and 52nd, were ordered up, but when they
arrived and the two brigades had been reorganized it
had become too dark to make any further advance, and
I did not hear either of the other two divisions engaged.
Gordon's progress was also arrested by the approach
of night, and he halted and assumed a position above
Taylor's house confronting the enemy's left, which he
had driven back very considerably. Hays' and Hoke's
brigades were put in line of battle across the Plank
road, at the point where they had been rallied, with
Smith's two regiments advanced to the front.
McLaws' division had not advanced at all. Anderson's
Page 231
division had advanced on Hoke's left, driving the
enemy's skirmishers, fronting his centre, from Downman's
house and the upper part of the ridge, but it
did not cross to the Plank road until dark, when I saw
Posey's brigade moving up the hill on my, then, left
from the direction of Downman's house, and it took
position above me on the Plank road, the enemy having
retired from that road. Wright's brigade was subsequently
moved across to the Plank road at eight or
nine o'clock and took position on Posey's left. The main
attack had been made by my three brigades.*
* The force which I encountered in front in this action was
Howe's division. Brigadier General Howe testified before the
Committee on the Conduct of The War.
After speaking of the battle of Chancellorsville as a sharp
skirmish, and claiming all the credit for capturing Marye's Hill, though
his division advanced against Lee's Hill alone, and further claiming
to have done all the fighting on the 4th, he says:
"The prisoners taken all agreed that it was Early's, Anderson's,
and McLaws' divisions that attacked my division, and that the movement
was led by General Lee, who told them that it would be a good
thing to destroy the 6th corps, or capture it; that it would not get out
the Chancellorsville way, and that the movements in our rear would
cut us off."
It was my three brigades alone that attacked him, McLaws' division
being above confronting Sedgwick's right, and Anderson's advancing
against the centre. Again he says:
"Some time after this movement, after we had returned to our
old camps, I met General Hooker, and spoke to him of the movements
we had made and the positions we held. I stated to him that after the
fight on the 4th of May, I could have gone with my division on to the
heights at Fredericksburg, and held them, or, if necessary, could have
recrossed that way. He was surprised that those heights could have
been held the night of the 4th, and said: 'If I had known that you
could have gone on those heights and held them, and would have held
them, I would have reinforced you with the whole army.' That was the
key of the position, and there was no difficulty in holding it. I told
him that if I had not received orders to go back to Banks' Ford, but
had been allowed to go to the Fredericksburg heights, I could have
marched there uninterruptedly after nine o'clock that night; for after
the fight we had had, the rebels abandoned the heights, and there was
nothing to be seen of them. There was a bright moon that night, and
we could see an object of the size of a man or a horse at a great
distance."
Verily General Howe had accomplished wonders according to his
own showing. He had with his solitary division routed the greater
part of Lee's army, notwithstanding the rough handling it had been
able to give Hooker's five corps above. Perhaps if he had made the
attempt to march to the heights, he might have encountered the brigades
of Gordon and Hoke which occupied a line extending from above
Taylor's house towards the Plank road at Guest's house, and which had
escaped his observation notwithstanding the light of the "bright moon
that night." He might also have encountered Barksdale's, Hays', and
Smith's brigades holding the heights, and disturbed my own
headquarters on the left of Lee's Hill, which had been assumed at 12 at
night after I had ridden along his whole front with my staff at a late
hour, posting Hoke's brigade on Gordon's left and examining the
position of the latter. General Howe was either mistaken or he was
star gazing.
Hooker, in his examination before the Congressional Committee in
regard to the battle, made the following statement:
"Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as
was also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not
necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and
file mostly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army
has, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and
efficiency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We
have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation
to it in the other rebel armies."
Their artillery certainly surpassed ours far in numbers of guns,
weight of metal, and the quality of the ammunition, and at long range
their firing was admirable, while ours was defective from the defect
in the ammunition, but when we came to close range so that our guns
could tell, their gunners lost their coolness and ours surpassed them in
the accuracy of the firing, always getting the advantage under such
circumstances unless the odds were too great.
Hooker did not complain that he was overpowered by numbers,
and he was the first of the commanders of that army who had not made
that complaint.
Page 232
After dark General Lee sent for me to go to him at
Downman's house, where he had established his
headquarters for the night. After informing him of the
condition of things on my front, he directed me to leave
two of my brigades in line on the north of the road, at
right angles with it and facing the enemy, and to reinforce
Page 233
Barksdale at Fredericksburg with the other two.
Hoke's brigade was moved to the right and placed on
line with Gordon's on its left, and Hays' brigade was
moved back and placed in the trenches at Lee's Hill on
Barksdale's right, and Smith's two regiments rejoined
the others and took position in the trenches on the left
of the Plank road overlooking the canal.
During the night General Barksdale reported to me,
once by his aide and once in person, that the enemy was
crossing troops and artillery into the town, and asked for
more reinforcements. I told him I had no doubt the
enemy was recrossing and would be gone in the morning,
and that I had no more reinforcements to give him.
When it became light the enemy was gone from the
town and his bridge was taken up. Sedgwick had also
recrossed during the night his whole force on bridges
laid at Banks' Ford and nothing remained on the south
bank but Hooker's force above. Some of McLaws'
brigades had advanced toward Banks' Ford during the
night, picking up some prisoners, and some pieces of
artillery had opened on the enemy's bridge as he was
recrossing. Posey's and Wright's brigades had also
advanced towards Banks' Ford, picking up some
prisoners. Next morning a number of prisoners were
gathered who had been left behind when the main force
crossed, some of them being taken on the river by
detachments from Gordon's brigade.
On the 5th, after it had been ascertained that all of
Sedgwick's force was gone, I was ordered to move up
the Plank road towards Chancellorsville, leaving Barksdale
at Fredericksburg. I moved up to the vicinity of
Salem Church, and was halted, remaining there some
time, when I was ordered to return to my old position.
In doing so my brigades were heavily shelled by the
enemy's batteries from across the river, as they were
crossing Hazel Run to the Telegraph road. Smith's
brigade was left with Barksdale in the position it had
occupied the night before, and the others moved to their
Page 234
former positions, which they regained in the morning, in
a tremendous storm of rain.
General Lee had moved all his troops back to oppose
Hooker, who had been confronted during the operations
against Sedgwick by Jackson's three divisions alone,
but on the morning of the 6th, he was found gone also,
having recrossed under cover of the storm and darkness
of the previous night. The whole army then returned
to its former camps, and Hooker resumed his
position opposite Fredericksburg.
My loss in the different actions around Fredericksburg
at this time was, in my own division, 125 killed and
721 wounded, total 846; in Andrews' artillery 7 killed
and 21 wounded, total 28; in Barksdale's brigade 45
killed and 181 wounded, total 226.
A little over 500 prisoners were lost in my division,
more than half of which were lost in resisting the
crossing at the enemy's lower bridge; from Hays' brigade
at the time of the fall of Marye's Hill; and from Smith's
brigade in forcing the enemy's position on the morning
of the 4th; and the residue from Hays' and Hoke's
brigades in the attack on Sedgwick above Fredericksburg.
Barksdale's brigade lost a little over 300 prisoners
captured from the 17th and 21st Mississippi Regiments
at Marye's Hill. General Lee's entire loss in
killed and wounded was 1,581 killed and 8,700 wounded.
Hooker's loss far exceeded it in killed and wounded, and
we secured several thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of
artillery, over twenty thousand stand of arms, besides a
large amount of ammunition, accoutrements, etc.
Hooker's army was more than double General Lee's,
which did not exceed, including my force, 50,000 muskets
and including all arms was under 60,000; yet Hooker,
on returning to his camps, issued a general order
congratulating his troops on their achievements, and
stating that they had added new laurels to their former
renown, though on first crossing the river he had issued
an address to his troops intimating that General Lee's
Page 235
army was then in his power and that he would proceed
to destroy it.
During the operations at Chancellorsville and
Fredericksburg, the enemy's cavalry in large force under
Stoneman, having crossed the rivers higher up, made a
raid in the direction of Richmond which accomplished
nothing of consequence, but merely frightened and
depredated upon the unarmed country people. Stoneman's
force was glad to make its escape back to its former
position.
On our part, our rejoicings over the brilliant and
important victory that had been gained were soon dampened
by the sad news of the death of General Jackson.
Page 236
CHAPTER XXI.
INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
UPON returning to our camps after Hooker had
recrossed the Rappahannock, the old positions were
resumed, General A. P. Hill, as senior major general, being
now in command of the corps.
Nothing of consequence occurred in our front during
the month of May. On the 30th of the month, a general
order was issued, organizing the army of Northern
Virginia into three corps of three divisions each. General
James Longstreet, who had returned from the south
of James River, retained command of the 1st corps, now
composed of McLaws', Hood's, and Pickett's divisions.
General Richard S. Ewell was made a lieutenant general
and assigned to the command of the 2nd corps, now
composed of my division, and those of Rodes and Johnson
--Brigadier General Robert E. Rodes having been
promoted and assigned to the command of D. H. Hill's
division,--and Brigadier General Edward Johnson
having been promoted and assigned to the command of
Trimble's division, formerly Jackson's.
A third corps was formed, composed of the division
of Anderson (taken from the 1st corps), Heth's and
Pender's; and General A. P. Hill was made lieutenant
general and assigned to the command of it, and two
divisions of four brigades each were formed out of it
and two brigades, one of which was brought from North
Carolina and the other formed of Mississippi regiments
taken from other brigades, to the command of which
division Brigadier Generals Heth and Pender were
promoted, respectively.
My inspector general, Lieutenant Colonel John M.
Jones, and Colonel James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia
Regiment were made brigadier generals, and the former
was assigned to J. R. Jones' brigade in Johnson's division,
Page 237
and the latter to Rodes' (the old Stonewall brigade),
in the same division, both promotions well deserved.
General Lee now determined to make a campaign
across the Potomac by turning the enemy's right flank,
so as to transfer the war into the enemy's country and
compel his army to withdraw from Virginia. Longstreet's
corps was moved to Culpeper in advance of the
others, the two divisions which had been south of the
James having moved from Richmond by the way of
Gordonsville on the railroad.
On the 4th of June, Ewell's corps took up its line
of march towards Culpeper Court-House--my division
moving by the way of Spottsylvania Court-House,
followed by Johnson's and Rodes' by the way of
Chancellorsville. A. P. Hill's corps was left to watch and amuse
Hooker's army. The first day of the march I passed
Spottsylvania Court-House and camped beyond it. On
the second day, during the march, I received an order
to halt and wait for further orders, as the enemy had
crossed a force at Fredericksburg in front of Hill. I
accordingly went into camp after crossing the Catharpin
Creek and remained stationary until the next day (the
6th of June). In the afternoon of the 6th, I received
orders to move on, and did so, continuing the march to
Culpeper Court-House by the way of Verdierville, and
Somerville Ford on the Rapidan, and, passing the
Court-House on the 8th, camped three or four miles west of
that place. We remained stationary near the Court-House
for two days. On the afternoon of the 9th, my
division was moved to the vicinity of Brandy Station
during a fight between our cavalry and that of the enemy,
but not being needed, it returned to its camps at night.
The 31st Virginia had returned just before our march
from Fredericksburg. The official tri-monthly report
of my division of the 10th of June, made at this place,
shows present for duty 610 officers and 6,616 enlisted
men, total 7,226. The brigade inspection reports of the
same date show about the same number of effectives
Page 238
present. Lieutenant Colonel Hilary P. Jones' battalion
of artillery of four batteries, numbering in all thirteen
guns, had been assigned to duty with my division just
before starting.
My division was fully an average one for the whole
army, and perhaps more than an average one. Sixty-five
thousand officers and men may therefore be set down
as covering the whole of General Lee's infantry with
which he commenced the campaign, perhaps sixty
thousand would cover the effective strength. Ten thousand
men would fully cover the artillery and cavalry and perhaps
considerably overgo it--(The return for the 31st
of May, just four days before the commencement of the
movement, shows the infantry to have been 54,356 for
duty, cavalry 9,536, and artillery 4,460, total 68,352. This
return was not accessible to me when the within was
written.)--150 guns would cover all of our artillery,
and they consisted of field pieces, the most of which had
been captured from the enemy. The largest guns we
had were a very few twenty pounder Parrots. The
brigade inspection reports in my division show that
about one-third of the men were without bayonets, and
this deficiency existed in the rest of the army, owing
in a great measure to the fact that nearly all of our small
arms had been taken from the enemy on the various
battlefields. There was a very great deficiency in shoes
for the infantry, a large number of the men being
indifferently shod, and some barefooted. A like deficiency
existed in regard to the equipment of the men in other
respects, the supply of clothing, blankets, etc., being
very limited.
On the 11th of June, Ewell's corps resumed the
march, taking the road from the lower Shenandoah Valley
across the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap. Johnson's
division, followed by mine, moved on the road by Sperryville,
and Little Washington through the gap, and Rodes'
division on a road further to the right through the same
gap. Late in the day of the 12th, my division reached
Page 239
Front Royal, Rodes' and Johnson's having preceded it,
crossing both forks of the Shenandoah near that place.
Two of my brigades, Hoke's and Smith's, were crossed
over both of the forks that night. Hays' and Gordon's
and Jones' artillery with the division trains remained
on the east side of the South Branch.
Page 240
CHAPTER XXII.
CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER.
VERY early in the morning of the 13th, the remainder
of my division crossed over the Shenandoah, and I
received orders from General Ewell to move to the Valley
pike at Newtown, and along that road against the
enemy then occupying Winchester, while Johnson moved
along the direct road from Front Royal to the town,
Rodes being sent to the right to Berryville, where there
was also a force. Milroy occupied the town of Winchester
with a considerable force in strong fortifications,
and my orders were to move along the pike to Kernstown,
and then to the left, so as to get a position on the
northwest of Winchester from which the main work of
the enemy could be attacked with advantage.
This main work was on a hill a little outside of the
town on the northwest, being an enclosed fort, with
embrasures for artillery, and I was informed that there
was a high hill on the northwest which commanded it,
and of which I was directed to get possession, if I could.
Six main roads centre at Winchester, to-wit: the Front
Royal road on which we were, coming in from the
southeast and uniting with the Millwood road a mile or two
before it reaches town; the Valley pike coming in on the
south and uniting with the Cedar Creek pike between
Kernstown and Winchester, Kernstown being about two
miles from the town; the Romney or Northwestern pike
coming in on the west side; the Pughtown road coming
in on the northwest; the Martinsburg pike coming in
on the north, and uniting with the direct Charlestown
and Harper's Ferry roads, three or four miles from
town; and the Berryville road coming in on the east.
Lieutenant Barton of the 2nd Virginia Regiment,
Walker's brigade, Johnson's division, who had been
raised in the neighborhood, was furnished me as a guide,
Page 241
and Brown's battalion of reserve artillery, under Captain
Dance, was ordered to accompany my division in addition
to Jones'.
Having received my orders, and leaving all my
wagons, except the regimental ordnance and medical
wagons, at Cedarville on the Front Royal road, I
diverged from that road at a little place called Ninevah
and reached the Valley pike at Newtown. On moving
along the latter road past Bartonsville towards Kernstown,
I found Lieutenant Colonel Herbert of the Maryland
line occupying a ridge between the two places
with his battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery and
a part of a battalion of Maryland cavalry, and engaged
in occasional skirmishing with a body of the enemy's
troops which had taken position in and near Kernstown.
This force of the enemy covered the road which I
had to take to get to the west of Winchester, and it was
therefore necessary to dislodge it to enable me to get
into that road, and to drive it back upon the main body
in order that my movement should be unobserved.
Colonel Herbert could not inform me of the strength
of the force in his immediate front, and I therefore halted
my division and formed it in line across the pike, and
proceeded to reconnoitre. The only force in sight when
I arrived was a cavalry force, but I was informed that
a strong infantry picket occupied the town, and the
supposition was that a stronger force was in the
neighborhood. Just beyond Kernstown and Pritchard's Hill and
a ridge extending from it to our left, which was covered
with trees, being the position occupied by Shields' troops
when General Jackson attacked him on the 23rd of
March, 1862. It was a position on which a considerable
body of troops might be posted out of our view, and I
soon discovered a battery of artillery on Pritchard's Hill
which opened on us.
I then reconnoitred the ground carefully, and, after
doing so, I moved Hays' brigade to the left, through
a skirt of woods and a meadow, to a small road coming
Page 242
in from Bartonsville towards the Cedar Creek pike, and
then along that to a suitable position for advancing
against the artillery on Pritchard's Hill; and ordered it
to advance and get possession of the hill. Whilst advancing
General Hays sent me word that the enemy had
a considerable infantry force on the ridge to his left.
I immediately moved Gordon's brigade over the same
route Hays' brigade had taken, and ordered him to
advance and clear the ridge on Hays' left, sending an
order to the latter, who had advanced to Pritchard's
Hill, compelling the artillery and the force supporting it
to retire, to wait until Gordon had got up and cleared
the ridge on his left. Gordon advanced handsomely, as
directed, encountering a considerable force of infantry,
which, in conjunction with a body of skirmishers sent
out by Hays, he drove from behind a stone fence, and
then swept over the fields beyond the ridge, inclining, as
he moved, to the Valley pike, and forcing the enemy
across the Cedar Creek pike and Abraham's Creek, which
here crosses the Valley pike, to Bower's Hill on the
north of the creek under Burton's Mill, where there
were some reserves. Hays, in the meantime, advanced
to the front, thus coming up on Gordon's left after the
latter had reached the Valley pike. As soon as Hays
and Gordon were both in motion, Hoke's and Smith's
brigades were advanced to the front on each side of the
Valley pike past Kernstown.
The enemy had strong position on Bower's Hill,
held by infantry and artillery, and it was difficult of
access, from the nature of Abraham's Creek, a boggy
stream, running at its base, and the steep ascent to the
hill on the other side. Gordon formed his brigade in line
across the Valley pike. Hays was posted on his left
along a ridge between Cedar Creek pike and Abraham's
Creek, and Hoke's and Smith's brigades were brought
up and the latter placed on Hays' left, with a view to
further operations against the enemy, in order to drive
him from Bower's Hill; Hoke's brigade, under Colonel
Page 243
Avery of the 6th North Carolina being held in reserve.
During these arrangements the enemy shelled my
brigades heavily from his guns on Bower's Hill; and
by the time they were made it became too dark to
proceed farther. Colonel Avery was then ordered back to
Kernstown, with his brigade, where it was placed in
position to protect the ambulances, ordnance and medical
wagons, and the artillery from any movement around
our left, and Colonel Herbert was ordered to take
position with his battalion of infantry on Gordon's right,
which extended across the Valley pike. The troops then
lay down on their arms and spent the night in a
drenching rain.
General Ewell had moved with Johnson's division on
the Front Royal road to the vicinity of Winchester, and,
after I had arranged my troops, I endeavored to reach
him by riding across the country, but the storm was so
violent and the night so dark that I was compelled to
desist and return.
During the night, the enemy withdrew his artillery
and the main body of his infantry from Bower's Hill to
the town, leaving only a body of skirmishers confronting
us. Very early on the morning of the 14th, I ordered
Hays and Gordon to advance each a regiment across the
creek to drive the enemy's skirmishers from Bower's
Hill, which was done after some sharp skirmishing. At
the same time Smith's skirmishers were advanced across
the creek on the left, and we got possession of the works
on the hill. While these operations were going on at
Bower's Hill, Major Goldsborough, with the skirmishers
of the Maryland battalion, advanced on the right into
the outskirts of Winchester, but fearing that the enemy,
whose principal force had taken position in and near the
main fort, might shell the town, I ordered him to retire.
General Ewell came up immediately after my skirmishers
had advanced to Bower's Hill, and together we
proceeded to reconnoitre from that point, from which we
had a very distinct view of the works about Winchester.
Page 244
We discovered that the hill on the northwest, which I
had been ordered to occupy, had been fortified with
works facing in the direction from which I would have
to approach it, and that they were occupied. It became
necessary then to take this hill, which was the key to
the position, by assault, and having discovered a ridge
back of it from which it might be attacked, I was ordered
to leave a brigade and some artillery, where I then was,
to amuse the enemy in front, while I moved the rest of
my command around by the left to the point from which
I could make the assault, taking care to conduct my
movement with secrecy so that the enemy would not
discover it. I accordingly left Gordon to occupy Bower's
Hill, and I left with him besides his own brigade the
Maryland battalion and battery, and another battery
(Hupp's) of Brown's battalion, and with the other three
brigades and the rest of the artillery I moved to the
left, following the Cedar Creek pike for a mile or two
and then passing through fields and the woods, which
latter was here sufficiently open to admit of the passage
of the artillery, and crossing the Romney road at
Lupton's house, about three miles west of Winchester, and
half a mile from a point at which I was informed by Mr.
Lupton that the enemy had had a picket the night before,
and probably had one then.
Leaving the 54th North Carolina Regiment of Hoke's
brigade at the point where I crossed the Romney road,
to watch my rear, I moved on along a small obscure road
to the rear of the position from which I wished to assault
the enemy's works, and I found it a very favorable one
for the purpose. My route had been a very circuitous
one, in order to check the enemy's vigilance, and I was
conducted over it by a very intelligent and patriotic
citizen, Mr. James C. Baker, who had a son in the service,
and who had been made to feel the tyranny of Milroy.
Mr. Baker thoroughly understood the object in view, and
fully appreciated the advantage of the position I was
seeking to reach; and it was mainly owing to the intelligent
Page 245
and skilful manner in which he guided me that I
was able to got there without attracting the slightest
attention from the enemy.
Having conducted me to the desired point, he thought
it prudent to retire, as he was of no further use as a
guide, and his residence was in the immediate
neighborhood of the town. On the route we had not seen a
solitary man from the enemy's force, whether straggler,
scout or picket. We had met two very ordinary looking
men in the roads, and from prudential motives they
were carried with us and left at Lupton's with injunctions
to keep them.
After that the only person we saw was a young girl
of about thirteen years of age whom we met on
horseback with her young brother behind her. She was
carrying before her a large bundle of clothes tied up in
a sheet, and when she unexpectedly came upon us she
was at first very much frightened, but soon discovering
that we were Confederates, she pulled off her bonnet,
waved it over her head and "hurrahed," and then burst
into tears. She told us that the enemy had been shelling
the woods all around, firing occasionally into her father's
house, and that she had been sent from home by her
father and mother to get out of the way. She said that
they had not been able to imagine what the shelling
meant, as they did not know that any of "our soldiers,"
as she called us, were anywhere in the neighborhood.
It was not necessary to use any precaution as to her,
and she was permitted to pass on, feeling much happier
for the encounter.
To return from this digression:--the position which
I reached proved to be a long ridge bordering, at the
further end, on the Pughtown road and immediately
confronting the fortified hill which I wished to carry, and
within easy range of it for our pieces. Where it immediately
confronted the enemy's work it was wooded, the
trees having been partially cut down, and we found
posted at different points notices to the following
Page 246
effect: "General Milroy orders all of the timber east
of this point to be cleared off." Enough, however,
remained to conceal our movements and enabled me to
push forward a brigade under cover to within a short
distance of the base of the hill on which was the enemy's
work.
On the left of this woods, near the Pughtown road,
was a cornfield on Mr. Brinly's land, facing towards
the enemy's position and affording an excellent position
for posting artillery in the edge of the woods bearing
on the enemy. On the right of the woods, on the crest
of the ridge, was an old orchard and the remains of an
old house, called "Folk's old house," with the slope in
front cleared, which furnished another good position
for artillery to bear on the other flank of the enemy. I
reached this position about four o'clock P.M., and as the
day was exceedingly hot, and the men had marched a
circuit of eight or ten miles without meeting with water
to drink, and were very much exhausted, I massed them
in the woods in the rear of the position and gave them
time to rest.
In the meantime I proceeded to reconnoitre the
enemy's position and the ground over which I would
have to move. The enemy had no pickets thrown out
in the direction where I was, and did not seem to be
keeping any lookout that way. The main work on the
hill presented a bastion front towards us, and appeared
as if it might be an enclosed work. It was on the south
of the Pughtown road, and there was a line of works
running across that road from the flank of the main
one along a ridge, a small redoubt which, about 150
yards from the main work, was occupied by two guns
supported by infantry. On the other flank were rifle
pits on the slope of the hill. The men constituting the
force occupying the works in our front did not seem to
apprehend any danger in their immediate neighborhood,
but were looking intently in the direction of Gordon's
position, against which a gradual advance was
Page 247
being made with skirmishers supported by a body of
infantry and some pieces of artillery, which were firing
in that direction.
Colonel Jones, who had been entrusted with the
command of all the artillery, had been quietly getting it
into position out of sight, so as to be pushed by hand
rapidly to the front when the time arrived to open on
the enemy. When the men had become sufficiently
refreshed, Hays' brigade, which was selected to make the
assault, was moved to the front near to the edge of the
woods next the enemy's position, with directions to
General Hays to keep his men under cover until the artillery
opened, and then to advance to the assault across the
field and up the hill to the enemy's works, as soon as he
should discover that the force occupying them was
demoralized by the artillery fire. The artillery under
Jones had been posted, with twelve pieces on the right
of the woods, near Folk's old house, and right on the
left in rear of the cornfield the 57th North Carolina
Regiment of Hoke's brigade was posted so as to protect
the pieces on the left from an attack in the direction
of the Pughtown road. The rest of Hoke's brigade,
except the 54th North Carolina Regiment, still on picket
on the Romney road, and the whole of Smith's, were
placed in line in the woods about a quarter of a mile in
rear of Hays', so as to be ready to support him.
About an hour before sunset, everything being ready,
Jones caused his pieces to be run by hand to the front,
and opened almost simultaneously with the whole twenty
pieces upon the enemy, who thus received the first
indication of our presence in that quarter. Of course he
was taken by surprise and thrown into confusion. Our
fire continued for about three-fourths of an hour very
rapidly, being replied to, after the first consternation
was over, by the enemy's guns, but in a very wild
manner. Hays then advanced to the assault as directed,
crossing the field in his front, ascending the hill--the
slope of which was covered with abattis made by cutting
Page 248
the brush wood growing on it,--and carrying the main
work on the crest in handsome style, capturing some
prisoners and six pieces of artillery, including those in
the small redoubt, two of which were immediately turned
on a body of the enemy's infantry seen approaching
from the main fort to the assistance of these outer
works.
The greater portion of the force occupying the
captured works was enabled to make its escape towards
the town, as it proved that this main work was open in
the rear with wings thrown back from the two flanks
of the bastion front presented to us. As soon as I saw
Hays' men entering the works, I ordered Smith's brigade
forward to their support, and directed Colonel Jones,
whose guns had ceased firing when Hays advanced, to
move the pieces on the left to the captured hill, those on
the right being left under the protection of three regiments
of Hoke's brigade. Riding on myself in advance
of the supports ordered to Hays I discovered him in
secure possession of the captured works, and ascertained
that the attempt to advance against him had been abandoned,
the force that commenced advancing having been
repulsed by the fire from the captured guns which had
been turned on it.
The force which had been advancing upon Gordon
in the direction of Bower's Hill had retired precipitately,
and the enemy's whole force seemed to be in great
commotion. He had turned all his guns from the main fort,
and from a square redoubt on a ridge north of it, upon
the position now occupied by us, and as soon as Jones'
guns arrived they replied to the enemy's, firing into
both forts, which were completely commanded by the
one in our possession, and upon the masses of infantry
near them. The enemy's force occupying the works,
and around them, was quite large, and deep and rugged
ravines interposed between us and the two occupied
works, which rendered an assault upon them from that
direction very difficult.
Page 249
By the time Smith's brigade and the artillery arrived,
it was too late to accomplish anything further before
night, and the capture of the other works by assault
would evidently require the co-operation of the other
troops around Winchester. The artillery fire upon the
enemy's position and his masses of infantry was
continued until a stop was put to it by the approach of
darkness. Hays' brigade was formed in line on the crest
of the ridge behind the captured works, with Smith's in
rear. The 57th North Carolina, Colonel Godwin, was
sent for, to occupy a portion of the works on the north
of the Pughtown road, Colonel Avery being left with
two regiments, to protect the artillery which had not been
brought forward and guard against a surprise in our
rear, the 54th North Carolina Regiment being still left
on picket on the Romney road, and the front and flanks
of our main position being watched by pickets thrown
out. The men then lay down on their arms to rest
from the fatigues of the day.
During my operations on the northwest, Johnson's
division had demonstrated and skirmished heavily with
the enemy on the east of the town, while Gordon
demonstrated and skirmished with him from the direction of
Bower's Hill, his attention being thus diverted entirely
from the point of real attack, which enabled us to effect
a surprise with artillery in open day upon a fortified
position. It was very apparent that the enemy's position
was now untenable, and that he must either submit
to a surrender of his whole force or attempt to escape
during the night.
I was of opinion that he would attempt an evacuation
during the night, and I sent a courier to General Ewell
with information of what I had accomplished, stating
my opinion of the probability of the attempt to escape,
but also informing him that I would renew the attack at
light if the enemy was not gone. I had been given to
understand that Johnson's division would be so moved
as to cut off the enemy's retreat in the event I succeeded
Page 250
in capturing the position commanding his works, and I
took it for granted this would be done.
In order to prepare for any emergency that might
exist, I sent my aide, Lieutenant Callaway, with orders
to General Gordon, to move direct from Bower's Hill
against the main force at light next morning, and I set
my pioneer party at work during the night to turn the
captured works for my artillery, so that it might have
some protection from the enemy's guns, if it should be
necessary to open fire in the morning. As soon as it
was light enough to see it was discovered that the enemy
had evacuated his works and the town of Winchester
during the night, taking the Martinsburg road, and some
artillery was heard on the road which proved to be
Johnson's guns near Stephenson's depot firing on the
retiring enemy, whose retreat had been cut off by his
division.
The brigades with me, including the detached regiments
of Hoke's, were immediately ordered forward to
the Martinsburg road for the purpose of taking up the
pursuit. Gordon had advanced at light, as ordered, and
finding the main fort unoccupied had pulled down the
large garrison flag still left floating over that work. The
13th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Terrill was
immediately detailed by me as a guard for a large number
of loaded wagons found standing outside of the town,
and a considerable amount of stores left in the town
by the enemy, and the rest of my command, as soon as
Avery came up with Hoke's brigade, advanced in
pursuit along the Martinsburg road, Gordon's brigade
having preceded the others. On getting near Stephenson's
depot, five or six miles from Winchester, I found that
General Johnson's division had captured the greater
part of Milroy's force, Milroy himself having made his
escape with a small fraction of his command, principally
mounted on the mules and horses taken from the
wagons and artillery that had been left behind, and I
therefore desisted from further pursuit.
Page 251
An enemy flying for safety cannot be overtaken by
a force on foot moving with arms in their hands, and
as we had but a very small battalion of cavalry (that
belonging to Herbert's command, which did capture
some prisoners), nothing was accomplished by the
attempts made at further pursuit of Milroy, and he
succeeded in getting in safety to Harper's Ferry.
During the operations against Winchester, Rodes had
moved to Berryville, but the enemy fled from that place
before him; he then moved on to Martinsburg in
conjunction with Jenkins' brigade of cavalry, and there
captured several hundred prisoners, several pieces of
artillery, and some stores. My division bivouacked near
Stephenson's depot, and I was ordered by General Ewell
into Winchester to make arrangements for securing the
stores and sending off the prisoners.
The enemy had abandoned the whole of his artillery,
wagon trains, camp equipage, baggage, and stores, and
twenty-five pieces of artillery with all their equipments
complete, including those captured by Hays' brigade at
the storming of the outer work, a very large number of
horses and mules, and a quantity of ammunition, though
in a damaged state, which fell into our hands. In the
hurry of the movement after Milroy was found to have
evacuated, I made such arrangements as I could to secure
the abandoned property by detailing a regiment to guard
it, but as usual on such occasions the contents of the
wagons and the stores in town were considerably
plundered by stragglers and followers of our trains, before
they could be secured, and even after our quartermasters
and commissaries got possession of them, there was great
waste, and perhaps misappropriation of much of them,
as always seemed unavoidable on such occasions.
On getting into town I endeavored to rectify the
abuses as well as I could, but much was lost to the army
of what was of real value, because there was no means
of holding such agents to a strict responsibility. I sent
off to Richmond, under guard, by the way of Staunton,
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108 commissioned officers and 3,250 enlisted men as
prisoners, much the larger portion of which had been
captured by Johnson's division. Besides these there were
left in Winchester several hundred sick and wounded
prisoners.
My loss in the operations around Winchester was
slight, consisting of 30 killed and 144 wounded, total 174,
all but one killed and six wounded being from Hays'
and Gordon's brigades.
Page 253
CHAPTER XXIII.
AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE.
I REMAINED in Winchester until the afternoon of the
18th, General Ewell having moved in the meantime to
Shepherdstown on the Potomac, to which place Johnson's
division, and Gordon's brigade, Hays' brigade and three
regiments of Smith's brigade of my own division had
also moved. The 54th North Carolina Regiment of
Hoke's brigade, and the 58th Virginia of Smith's brigade
had been sent to Staunton in charge of the prisoners,
and leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment in Winchester,
I proceeded on the afternoon of the 18th with the residue
of Hoke's brigade, and Jones' battalion of artillery, to
Shepherdstown, which place I reached on the 19th.
By this time Longstreet's corps had begun to arrive
in the valley, and Hill's was following. The crossing
of the river at Fredericksburg by a portion of Hooker's
army had been for the purpose of ascertaining whether
our army had left the vicinity of that place, and when
ascertained that we were concentrating near Culpeper
Court-House, he withdrew his force from across the
river and moved his army north to defend Washington.
I remained at Shepherdstown until the 22nd. The
field return of my division at this place on the 20th
showed 487 officers and 5,124 men present for duty,
making a total of 5,611, and the brigade inspection
reports for the same day showed the number of efficient
present to be about the same number, the reduction
since the last reports being caused by the absence of the
three regiments before mentioned and which did not
rejoin until the campaign was over, the permanent
detaching of Wharton's battalion of Hoke's brigade as a
provost guard for the corps, the loss sustained at
Winchester, and the sick and exhausted men left behind.
It is as well to state here that we had no hired men
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for teamsters, or in any other capacity, but all the
duties usually assigned to such men with an army had
to be performed by men detailed from the ranks, as were
all our pioneer and engineer parties.
On the 22nd of June I crossed the Potomac with my
division and Jones' battalion of artillery at Boteler's
Ford below Shepherdstown and marched through
Sharpsburg and Boonsboro, camping three miles beyond
Boonsboro on the pike to Hagerstown. The 17th
Virginia Regiment of cavalry, under Colonel French, from
Jenkins' brigade, joined me on the march this day to
accompany my division by orders of General Ewell.
Rodes had moved through Hagerstown towards
Chambersburg, and Johnson's division, which had crossed the
Potomac ahead of me, moved in the same direction. I
was ordered to proceed along the western base of the
South Mountain. Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry
were both strongly fortified, and were occupied by a
heavy force of the enemy, which we left behind us,
without making any effort to dislodge it, as it would have
been attended with a loss disproportionate to any good
to be obtained. Our movements through and from
Sharpsburg were in full view of the enemy from the
heights.
On the 23rd, I moved through Cavetown, Smithtown,
and Ringgold (or Ridgeville as it is now usually called)
to Waynesboro in Pennsylvania. On the 24th I moved
through Quincy and Altodale to Greenwood, at the
western base of the South Mountain, on the pike from
Chambersburg to Gettysburg. There were no indications of
any enemy near us and the march was entirely without
molestation. We were now in the enemy's country, and
were getting our supplies entirely from the country
people. These supplies were taken from mills, storehouses,
and the farmers, under a regular system ordered
by General Lee, and with a due regard to the wants of
the inhabitants themselves, certificates being given in all
cases. There was no marauding, or indiscriminate plundering,
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but all such acts were expressly forbidden and
prohibited effectually. On the 25th my command
remained stationary at Greenwood, and I visited General
Ewell, by his request, at Chambersburg, where Rodes'
and Johnson's divisions had concentrated.
In accordance with instructions received from General
Lee, General Ewell ordered me to move with my
command across the South Mountain, and through
Gettysburg to York, for the purpose of cutting the Northern
Central Railroad (running from Baltimore to Harrisburg),
and destroying the bridge across the Susquehanna
at Wrightsville and Columbia on the branch railroad
from York to Philadelphia. Lieutenant Colonel Elijah
White's battalion of cavalry was ordered to report to
me for the expedition in addition to French's regiment,
and I was ordered to leave the greater portion of my
trains behind to accompany the reserve ordnance and
subsistence trains of the camps. I was also ordered to
rejoin the other divisions at Carlisle by the way of
Dillstown from York, after I had accomplished the task
assigned me.
I returned to Greenwood on the afternoon of the
25th, and directed all my trains--except the ambulances,
one medical wagon, one ordnance wagon, and one wagon
with cooking utensils, for each regiment, and fifteen
empty wagons for getting supplies,--to be sent to
Chambersburg. No baggage whatever was allowed for
officers, except what they could carry on their backs or
horses, not excepting division headquarters, and with
my command and the trains thus reduced, I moved across
South Mountain on the morning of the 26th, and we
saw no more of our trains until we crossed the Potomac
three weeks later.
As we were leaving, I caused the iron works of Mr.
Thaddeus Stevens near Greenwood, consisting of a
furnace, a forge, a rolling mill--with a saw mill and
storehouse attached,--to be burnt by my pioneer party.
The enemy had destroyed a number of similar works,
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as well as manufacturing establishments of different
kinds, in those parts of the Southern States to which
he had been able to penetrate, upon the plea that they
furnished us the means of carrying on the war, besides
burning many private houses and destroying a vast deal
of private property which could be employed in no way
in supporting the war on our part; and finding in my
way these works of Mr. Stevens, who--as a member of
the Federal Congress--had been advocating the most
vindictive measures of confiscation and devastation, I
determined to destroy them. This I did on my own
responsibility, as neither General Lee nor General Ewell
knew I would encounter these works. A quantity of
provisions found in store at the furnace was appropriated
to the use of my command, but the houses and
private property of the employees were not molested.
On getting to the eastern slope of the South Mountain,
where the road forks about one and a half miles
from Cashtown, I heard that there was probably a force
in Gettysburg, and the pike leading through Cashtown
was found to be slightly obstructed by trees felled across
the road. I determined, therefore, to move a portion
of my force along the pike, which was the direct road
to Gettysburg, in order to skirmish with and amuse
the enemy in front, while I moved with the rest on the
road to the left, by the way of Hilltown and
Mummasburg, so as to cut off the retreat of such force as
might be at Gettysburg. Accordingly, Gordon was sent
on the pike directly towards the town with his brigade
and White's battalion of cavalry, and I moved with the
rest of the command on the other road. There had been
a heavy rain the night before, and it was now raining
slightly but constantly, in consequence of which the
dirt road, over which the left column moved, was very
muddy.
Gordon moving along the pike, with about forty men
of White's cavalry in front, as an advance guard,
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encountered a militia regiment a mile or two from
Gettysburg, which fled across the fields at the first sight of
White's advance party without waiting to see what was
in the rear, and Gordon moved on without resistance
into the town.
On reaching Mummasburg with French's cavalry in
advance of the infantry, I was informed that there was
but a comparatively small force at Gettysburg, and I
halted to wait for the infantry, whose march was
impeded by the mud, sending out one of French's
companies towards the latter place to reconnoitre. In a
short time this company encountered some of the fleeing
militia and captured a few prisoners, and being informed
of this fact and that the command to which they
belonged was retreating through the fields between
Mummasburg and Gettysburg, I sent the rest of
French's cavalry in pursuit. Hays' brigade, arriving
soon after, was ordered to move towards Gettysburg,
while the rest of this column was ordered into the camp
near Mummasburg.
I then rode to Gettysburg, and finding Gordon in
possession of the town, Hays was halted and encamped
within a mile of it, and two of his regiments were sent
to help French in catching the frightened militia, but
could not get up with it. French caught about two
hundred, but the rest succeeded in getting off through
enclosed fields and the woods. The regiment proved to
be the 26th Pennsylvania Militia, eight or nine hundred
strong. It was newly clad with the regular United States
uniform, and was well armed and equipped. It had
arrived in Gettysburg the night before and moved out
that morning on the Cashtown road. This was a part
of Governor Curtin's contingent for the defence of the
State, and seemed to belong to that class of men who
regard "discretion as the better part of valor." It was
well that the regiment took to its heels so quickly, or
some of its members might have been hurt, and all
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would have been captured. The men and officers taken
were paroled next day and sent about their business,
rejoicing at this termination of their campaign.
On entering Gettysburg myself I called for the town
authorities in order to make a requisition on them for a
sum of money and some supplies. The principal
municipal officer was absent, but I saw one of the
authorities, who informed me that the town could furnish
no supplies, as they were not there, and the people were
too poor to afford them. I caused the stores in town to
be searched and succeeded in finding only a small
quantity of articles suited for commissary supplies, which
were taken. It was then late and I had to move early
in the morning towards York, so that I did not have
time to enforce my demands. Two thousand rations
were found in a train of cars which had been brought
with the militia, and these were taken and issued to
Gordon's brigade. The cars, ten or twelve in number,
and also a railroad bridge near the place were burnt,
there being no railroad buildings of any consequence. I
then ordered Colonel White to proceed with his
battalion early the next morning along the railroad from
Gettysburg to Hanover Junction on the Northern Central
road, and to burn all the bridges on the former road,
also the railroad buildings at the Junction and a bridge
or two south of it on the Northern Central, and then
move along that road to York, burning all the bridges.
Gordon was ordered to move at the same time along the
macadamized road to York, and during the night I sent
him a company of French's cavalry and Tanner's
battery of artillery to accompany him.
With the rest of the command I moved at light next
day (the 27th) from Mummasburg towards York by the
way of Hunterstown, New Chester, Hampton, and East
Berlin, halting and bivouacking for the night after
passing the latter place a few miles. I then rode across to
the York pike to Gordon's camp to arrange with him
the means of moving against the town next day in the
Page 259
event that it should be defended. The information which
Gordon had received was that there were no troops in
York, and I directed him, in the event the town should
be unoccupied, to move on through to the Wrightsville
and Columbia bridge and get possession of it at both
ends and hold it until I came up.
On the next day (the 28th) both columns moved at
daylight, and a deputation consisting of the Mayor and
other citizens of York came out to meet Gordon and
surrender the town, which he entered early in the day
without opposition. Moving by the way of Weiglestown
into the Harrisburg and York road with the other
column, I entered the town shortly afterwards, and
repeated my instructions to Gordon about the bridge over
the Susquehanna, cautioning him to prevent the bridge
from being burned if possible. At Weiglestown French
had been sent with the greater part of his cavalry to the
mouth of the Conewago to burn two railroad bridges at
that point and all others between there and York.
Before reaching town Hays' and Smith's brigades were
ordered into camp about two miles on the north of it
at some mills near the railroad. Hoke's brigade under
Colonel Avery was moved into town to occupy it, and
preserve order, being quartered in some extensive
hospital buildings erected by the United States Government.
I then levied a contribution on the town for 100,000
dollars in money, 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 hats, 1,000
pairs of socks, and three days' rations of all kinds for
my troops, for which a requisition was made on the
authorities.
Gordon moved promptly towards Wrightsville, and
on reaching the vicinity of that place found the western
end of the bridge defended by a force, which proved to
be twelve or fifteen hundred Pennsylvania militia,
entrenched around Wrightsville. He immediately took
measures to dislodge the enemy, and, finding it
impracticable to turn the works so as to cut off the retreat of
the enemy, opened with his artillery and advanced in
Page 260
front, the militia taking to its heels after a few shots
from the artillery and outrunning Gordon's men, who
had then marched a little over twenty miles. Gordon
pursued as rapidly as possible, but, on getting half way
across the bridge, he found it on fire, inflammable
materials having previously been prepared for the
purpose. He endeavored to extinguish the flames, but his
men had nothing but their muskets, and before buckets,
which were sent for, could be procured, the fire had
progressed so far as to render the effort hopeless, as
the superstructure of the bridge was of wood, it being
a covered one of more than a mile in length with a track
for the railroad, another for wagons, and a third as a
tow-path for the canal which here crossed the river. He
had therefore to desist, and retire to Wrightsville with
his men.
The bridge was entirely consumed, and as one or two
houses were adjoining it, at the Wrightsville end, they
were also consumed. When these houses caught fire
Gordon formed his brigade around them and by the
exertions of his men, then much exhausted, arrested the
flames and saved the town of Wrightsville from a
conflagration, though the houses immediately adjoining the
bridge could not be saved. The brigade which did this,
and thus saved from a disastrous fire, kindled by their
own defenders, one of the enemy's towns, was composed
of Georgians, in whose State, just a short time before,
the town of Darien had been fired and entirely destroyed
by a regular expedition of Federal troops.
As soon as I had made the necessary arrangements
for establishing order in the town of York, and
preventing any molestation of the citizens, and had made
the requisitions on the authorities for what I had
determined to levy on the town, I rode in the
direction of Wrightsville. By the time I got outside of
the town I saw the smoke arising from the burning
bridge, and when I reached Wrightsville I found the
bridge entirely destroyed. I regretted this very much,
Page 261
as, notwithstanding my orders to destroy the bridge, I
had found the country so defenceless, and the militia
which Curtin had called into service so utterly inefficient,
that I determined to cross the Susquehanna, levy a
contribution on the rich town of Lancaster, cut the Central
Railroad, and then move up in rear of Harrisburg while
General Ewell was advancing against that city from the
other side, relying upon being able, in any event that
might happen, to mount my division on the horses which
had been accumulated in large numbers on the east side
of the river, by the farmers who had fled before us, and
make my escape by moving to the west of the army,
after damaging the railroads and canals on my route
as much as possible.
This scheme, in which I think I could have been
successful, was, however, thwarted by the destruction of
the bridge, as there was no other means of crossing the
river. Gordon was therefore ordered to return to York
early the next day, and I rode back that night. The
affair at Wrightsville had been almost bloodless; Gordon
had one man wounded, and he found one dead militiaman,
and captured twenty prisoners.
Colonel White succeeded in reaching Hanover Junction
and destroying the depot at that place and one or
two bridges in the vicinity, but he did not destroy all the
bridges between there and York, as one or two of them,
as reported by him, were defended by a force of
infantry. Colonel French succeeded in destroying the
bridges over the Conewago at its mouth, and all
between there and York, and on the 29th he was sent to
complete the destruction of the bridges south of the
town, over the Codorus, which he succeeded in doing,
as the force defending them had retired.
In compliance with my requisition some twelve or
fifteen hundred pairs of shoes, all the hats, socks, and
rations called for, and $28,600 in money were furnished
by the town authorities. The number of shoes required
could not be found in the place, and the Mayor assured
Page 262
me that the money paid over was all that could be raised,
as the banks and moneyed men had run off their funds to
Philadelphia. I believed that he had made an honest
effort to raise the money, and I did not, therefore, take
any stringent measures to enforce the demand, but left
the town indebted to me for the remainder. The shoes,
hats, and socks were issued to the men, who stood very
much in need of them. A portion of the money was
subsequently used in buying beef cattle, which could be
found much more readily when they were to be paid for
than when certificates were to be given, and the residue
was paid into the hands of the quartermaster of the army,
to be used for public purposes. No public stores were
found.
A few prisoners taken in the hospitals and those
captured at Wrightsville by Gordon were paroled. Some
cars found in the town were burned. There were two
large car factories, and two depots and other railroad
buildings which I would have destroyed but for the fact
that the burning of them would set fire to some private
dwellings and perhaps consume a large part of the town,
and I therefore determined not to run the risk of entailing
so much mischief on non-combatants, notwithstanding
the barbarous policy that had been pursued by the
enemy in numerous similar cases. Neither were the
hospitals burned or injured in any way. I think the
people of York were very well satisfied and much
surprised to get out of my hands as well as they did.*
Certainly any Southern town into which the enemy went
would have considered itself exceedingly fortunate to
* TO THE CITIZENS OF YORK:
I have abstained from burning the railroad buildings and car
shops in your town, because, after examination, I am satisfied the
safety of the town would be endangered; and, acting in the spirit of
humanity which has ever characterized my government and its military
authorities, I do not desire to involve the innocent in the same
punishment with the guilty. Had I applied the torch without regard to
consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been
fully vindicated as an act of just retaliation for the many authorized
acts of barbarity perpetrated by your own army upon our soil. But
we do not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment
you have met with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to
the monstrous iniquity of the war waged by your government upon
the people of the Confederate States, and that you will make an
effort to shake off the revolting tyranny under which it is apparent
to all you are yourselves groaning,
J.A. EARLY, Major General, C.S.A.
Page 263
have got off so well. Our forbearance, however, was
not at all appreciated by the enemy generally, for not
only did they not follow the example set them, but some
of the presses actually charged Gordon's brigade with
firing the town of Wrightsville.
During my movement to York, General Ewell had
moved towards Harrisburg and reached Carlisle with
Rodes' division and Jenkins' cavalry, Johnson's division
going to Shippensburg;--Longstreet's and Hill's corps
had also moved into Pennsylvania and reached the
vicinity of Chambersburg, while the Federal Army had
moved north on the East side of South Mountain,
interposing between ours and Washington.
Late on the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Elliot
Johnson, aide to General Ewell, came to me with a copy
of a note from General Lee to General Ewell stating the
enemy's army was moving north and directing a
concentration of the corps on the west side of the South
Mountain; and also verbal instructions from General
Ewell to move back so as to rejoin the rest of the corps,
and information of his purpose to move back to unite
with Johnson.
In accordance with these instructions, I put my whole
command in motion at daylight on the morning of the
30th, taking the route by the way of Weiglestown and
East Berlin towards Heidlersburg, so as to be able to
move from that point to Shippensburg or Greenwood by
the way of Aaronsburg, as circumstances might require,
Colonel White being directed to move his battalion of
Page 264
cavalry on the pike from York towards Gettysburg, to
ascertain if any force of the enemy was on that road.
At East Berlin, a small squad of the enemy's cavalry
was seen and pursued by my cavalry advance, and I
received at that place information, by a courier from
Colonel White, that a cavalry and infantry force had
been at Abbotstown on the York and Gettysburg road,
but had moved south towards Hanover Junction. A
courier also reached me here with a dispatch from General
Ewell, informing me that he was moving with Rodes'
division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and
directing me to march for the same place.
I marched to within three miles of Heidlersburg and
bivouacked my command, and then rode to see General
Ewell at Heidlersburg, where I found him with Rodes'
division. I was informed by him that the object was to
concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown at the eastern
base of the mountain, and I was directed to move to
that point the next day by the way of Hunterstown and
Mummasburg, while Rodes would take the route by
Middletown and Arendtsville.
My march so far, to the bank of the Susquehanna and
back, had been without resistance, the performances of
the militia force at Gettysburg and Wrightsville amounting
in fact to no resistance at all, but being merely a
source of amusement to my troops. The country maps
were so thorough and accurate that I had no necessity
for a guide in any direction. There had been no
depredations upon the people, except the taking of such
supplies as were needed in an orderly and regular
manner as allowed by the most liberal and intelligent rules
of war. No houses had been burned or pillaged, no
indignities offered to the inhabitants, who were
themselves amazed at the forbearance of our troops; not
even a rail had been taken from the fences for firewood.
I had returned over a large portion of the route taken
in going to York, and I was myself surprised to see so
little evidence of the march of an invading army. It
Page 265
furnished a most striking contrast to the track of the
Federal army, as I had witnessed the latter on many
occasions in my own state.
What was the case with my command, was the case
with all the rest of our army, and I venture to say that
the invasion of Pennsylvania by General Lee's army, for
the forbearance shown to the invaded country, is
without a parallel in the history of war in any age. Yet this
invasion was made by an army composed of men many
of whose own houses had been destroyed by a most
ruthless enemy, into the country of that very enemy, and
many of the houses thus spared were those of the very
men who had applied the torch to and ransacked the
houses of the men now so forbearing: yet those who
have left their mark indelibly all over the South charge
the invaders of Pennsylvania and their countrymen with
being barbarous, and with maltreating prisoners.
As we moved through the country, a number of people
made mysterious signs to us, and on inquiring we
ascertained that some enterprising Yankees had passed along
a short time before, initiating the people into certain
signs, for a consideration, which they were told would
prevent the "rebels" from molesting them or their
property, when they appeared. These things were all
new to us, and the purchasers of the mysteries had been
badly sold.*
*
The "mysterious signs" referred to were supposed by the
Confederates to be made by Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret
organization said to sympathize with the South, but of which our
soldiers knew nothing.
Page 266
CHAPTER XXIV.
BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
HAVING ascertained, after I left General Ewell on
the night of the 30th, that the road from my camp to
Hunterstown was a very circuitous and rough one, on
the morning of the 1st of July I moved to Heidlersburg,
for the purpose of following the road from that point
to Gettysburg until I reached the Mummasburg road.
After moving a short distance for Heidlersburg on the
Gettysburg road, I received a dispatch from General
Ewell, informing me that Hill, who had crossed the
mountain, was moving towards Gettysburg against a
force of the enemy, which had arrived at that place and
pushed out on the Cashtown road, and that Rodes'
division had turned off from Middletown towards
Gettysburg by the way of Mummasburg, and ordering me to
move on the direct road from Heidlersburg to the same
place. I therefore moved on until I came in sight of
Gettysburg.
Hooker had been supplanted in the command of the
Federal Army by Major General Meade, and the advance
of that army, consisting of the 1st corps under Reynolds,
the 11th corps under Howard, and Buford's division of
cavalry, had reached Gettysburg; the cavalry on the
30th of June, and the infantry early on the morning of
the 1st of July. The cavalry had moved, on the morning
of the 1st, out on the Cashtown road and was there
encountered by Hill's troops, two of his divisions only
having as yet crossed the mountain. The enemy's infantry
then moved out to support his cavalry, and a heavy
engagement ensued between it and Hill's two divisions.
While this was progressing Rodes' division came up on
the left of Hill, on the Mummasburg road, and immediately
engaged the enemy.
When I arrived in sight of Gettysburg I found the
Page 267
engagement in progress on the Cashtown and Mummasburg
roads, the enemy's troops being advanced out from
that town on both roads for about a mile. Rodes had
opposed to him a very large force which overlapped
his left, and seemed to be pressing back that flank. On
the hill in rear of Gettysburg, known as Cemetery Hill,
was posted some artillery so as to sweep all the ground
on the enemy's right flank, including the Heidlershurg
or Harrisburg road, and the York pike. I could not
discover whether there was any infantry supporting this
artillery, as the hill was much higher than the ground
on which I then was.
Moving on the Heidlersburg road and on Rodes' left,
I came up on the enemy's right flank. I immediately
ordered the artillery forward and the brigades into line.
Gordon's brigade being in front formed first in line on
the right of the road, then Hays', with Smith's in rear
of Hoke's, and thrown back so as to present a line
towards the York pike. Jones' battalion was posted in
a field immediately in front of Hoke's brigade, so as to
open on the enemy's flank, which it did at once with
effect, attracting the fire of the enemy's artillery on
Cemetery Hill and that in front of the town on the
enemy's right flank. Between us and the enemy on the
northeast of the town ran a small stream, called Rock
Creek, with abrupt and rugged banks.
On the opposite bank of this creek in front of Gordon
was a heavy force of the enemy, on a low ridge
partially wooded, with a part of it in line moving against
the left of Rodes' division held by Doles' brigade, so
as to compel it to fall back, while the right flank of this
advancing line was protected and supported by another
in position along the crest of the ridge. While the
brigades of Hays and Hoke were being formed, as
Doles' brigade was getting in a critical condition, Gordon
charged rapidly to the front, passing over the fences
and Rock Creek and up the side of the hill, and engaged
the enemy's line on the crest, which, after a short but
Page 268
obstinate and bloody conflict, was broken and routed.
The right flank of the force advancing against Doles
became thus exposed to Gordon's fire, and that force
endeavored to change front, but Gordon immediately
attacked it and drove it from the field with heavy
slaughter, pursuing towards the town and capturing a
number of prisoners, among them being General Barlow,
commanding a division of the 11th corps, severely
wounded.
While Gordon was engaged, Hays' and Hoke's
brigades were advanced in line to Rock Creek, Smith's
brigade being ordered to follow, supporting the artillery
as it advanced in rear of the other brigades. By
the time Hays and Avery had reached Rock Creek,
Gordon had encountered a second line just outside of the
town in a strong position behind some houses, and
halted his brigade behind the crest of a low ridge in
the open field. I then rode to Gordon's position and,
finding that the line confronting him extended beyond
his left across the Heidlersburg road, I ordered him to
remain stationary while Hays and Avery advanced on
his left. The latter were then ordered forward, and
advancing while exposed to a heavy artillery fire of
shell and canister, encountered the second line and drove
it back in great confusion into the town, capturing two
pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners.
Hays encountered a portion of the force falling back
on his right, on which he turned some of his regiments
and entered the town fighting his way, along the left
end of a street running through the middle of the town.
Avery, after reaching the outskirts of the town, moved
to the left, and crossed the railroad into the open fields,
on the left of the town, while exposed to a heavy fire
from the batteries on Cemetery Hill, and took a position
confronting the rugged ascent to the hill, his men being
placed in a depression under cover of a low ridge, so as
to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery.
A very large number of prisoners were taken in the
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town, where they were crowded in confusion, the number
being so great as really to embarrass us and stop all
further movement for the present.
While Hays and Avery were driving the enemy so
handsomely, I saw a large force to the right of Gordon,
falling back in comparatively good order, before Rodes'
advancing brigades, around the right of the town,
towards the hills in the rear, and I sent for a battery of
artillery to be brought up so as to open on this force,
and on the town from which a fire was being poured on
Hays' and Avery's then advancing brigades, but before
the battery reached me, Hays had entered the town and
the enemy's retreating columns had got out of reach,
their speed being very much accelerated and their order
considerably disturbed by Rodes' rapid advance. At
the same time I had sent for the battery, an order had
been sent for the advance of Smith's brigade to the
support of Hays and Avery, but, a report having been
brought to General Smith that a large force of the
enemy was advancing on the York road on our then rear,
he thought proper to detain his brigade to watch that
road.
As soon as I saw my men entering the town, I rode
forward into it myself, having sent to repeat the order
to Smith to advance, and when I had ascertained the
condition of things, I rode to the right of it to find either
General Ewell, General Rodes, or General Hill, for the
purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy,
before he could recover from his evident dismay and
confusion. Rodes' troops were then entering the town
on the right and all plains on that flank had been cleared
of the enemy. The enemy, however, held the houses
in the edge of the town on the slope of Cemetery Hill
with sharpshooters, from which they were pointing an
annoying fire into Hays' left, and along the streets
running towards the hill.
The ascent to the hill in front of Avery was very
rugged, and was much obstructed by plank and stone
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fences on the side of it, while an advance through the
town would have had to be made along the streets by
flank or in columns so narrow as to have been subjected
to a destructive fire from the batteries on the crest of the
hill, which enfiladed the streets. I, therefore, could not
make an advance from my front with advantage, and
thought it ought to be made on the right.
General Hill's troops had not advanced to the town,
but remained on or beyond Seminary ridge, more than
a mile distant, and before I could find either General
Ewell or General Rodes, General Smith's aide came to
me with a message from the General that the enemy
was advancing a large force of infantry, artillery, and
cavalry on the York road, menacing our left flank and
rear. Though I believed this an unfounded report, as
it proved to be, yet I thought it best to send General
Gordon with his brigade out on that road, to take
command of both brigades, and to stop all further alarms
from that direction.
Meeting with a staff officer of General Pender's I
requested him to go and inform General Hill that if he
would send a division forward we could take the hill
to which the enemy had retreated. Finding General
Ewell shortly afterwards in the town, I communicated
to him my views, and he informed me that Johnson's
division, which had moved from Shippensburg, by the
way of Greenwood Gap, was coming up, and he
determined to move it to a wooded hill on the left of
Cemetery Hill, which seemed to command the latter
hill and to be the key to the position on that flank. This
hill was on the right or southwestern side of Rock Creek,
and seemed to be occupied by the enemy.
Johnson's division was late in arriving and when it
came, it was further delayed by a false report that the
enemy was advancing on the York road, so that it became
dark in the meantime, and the effort to get possession
of the wooded hill was postponed until morning,
by which time it had been occupied and fortified
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by the enemy. My division went into this action about
three o'clock P.M. and at the close of the day a brilliant
victory had been achieved, between six and seven
thousand prisoners and two pieces of artillery falling into
our hands, a considerable portion of which had been
captured by Rodes' division.
Perhaps that victory might have been made decisive,
so far as Gettysburg was concerned, by a prompt
advance of all the troops that had been engaged on our
side against the hill upon and behind which the enemy
had taken refuge, but a common superior did not happen
to be present, and the opportunity was lost. The
only troops engaged on our side were Hill's two
divisions and Ewell's two divisions, the rest of the army
not being up.
Late in the evening, when it had become too dark to
do anything further, General Lee came to General
Ewell's headquarters, and after conferring with General
Ewell, General Rodes and myself, we were given
to understand that, if the rest of the troops could be got
up, there would be an attack very early in the morning
on the enemy's left flank, and also on the right, at the
wooded hill before named.
During the night, Hays' brigade was moved to the
left into the open ground on that side, and placed in
front of the left end of the town, under cover from the
artillery and in a position to advance upon Cemetery
Hill when a favorable opportunity should offer, his line
connecting with Avery's right. In this position the two
brigades were behind a low ridge close to the base of
Cemetery Hill.
Gordon was still retained on the York road with his
own and Smith's brigades, as constant rumors were
reaching us that the enemy was advancing on that road.
Johnson's division had been moved to the left and
posted in the valley of Rock Creek, confronting the
wooded hill.
During the night a large portion of Meade's army
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came up and the rest arrived in the course of the next
day before the battle opened.
The general attack was not made in the morning of
the 2nd because there was great delay in the arrival of
Longstreet's corps, and on the left Rodes' and my divisions
remained in position until late in the afternoon,
waiting for the preparations on the right. Johnson,
however, had some heavy skirmishing during the day.
During the morning General Ewell and myself rode
to a ridge in rear of Johnson's position for the purpose
of posting some artillery and several batteries
were placed in position there to fire upon Cemetery
Hill and the wooded hill.
I made an attempt to get possession of the wooded
hill in the morning, but found it occupied by the enemy
in force behind breastworks of felled trees.
The enemy's position consisted of a low range of
hills extending off to the southwest from Cemetery Hill
to what was called Round Top Mountain, and on the
right of it, confronting Johnson's division and my two
brigades, was an elbow almost at right angles with the
other part of the line, and terminating with the wooded
hill or range of hills in Johnson's front, which extended
beyond his left, the town of Gettysburg being located
just in front of the salient angle at the elbow.
For some distance on the right of Gettysburg the
ground in front of the line was open and ascended to
the crest of the ridge by a gradual slope. On the left
of the town, the ascent was very steep and rough, and
this was much the strongest part of the line and the most
difficult of approach.
The enemy had during the previous night and the
fore part of this day strengthened their position by
entrenchments.
Having been informed that the attack would begin
on the enemy's left at four o'clock P.M., I directed General
Gordon to move his brigade to the railroad on the
left of the town, and take position on it in rear of Hays
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and Avery, Smith's brigade being left with General
Stuart's cavalry to guard the York road. At or a
little after four o'clock P.M. our guns on the right opened
on the enemy's left, and those on the ridge in rear of
Johnson's division opened on that part of the line
confronting them, and a very heavy cannonading ensued.
After this cannonading had continued for some time the
attack was begun by Longstreet on the right, two of whose
divisions had only arrived, and during its progress
I was ordered by General Ewell, a little before sunset,
to advance to the assault of the hills in front of me as
soon as Johnson should become engaged on my left,
being informed at the same time that the attack would
be general, Rodes advancing on my right and Hill's
division on his right.
I ordered Hays and Avery to advance, as soon as
Johnson was heard engaged, immediately up the hill in
their front, and Gordon to advance to the position
then occupied by them in order to support them.
Before Johnson was heard fairly engaged it was after
sunset, and Hays and Avery then moved forward on the
low ridge in their front and across a hollow beyond to
the base of the hill, while exposed to a severe fire from
the enemy's batteries. They then commenced ascending
the steep side of the hill in gallant style, going over
fences and encountering bodies of infantry posted in
front of the main line on the slope of the hill behind
stone fences which they dislodged, and continuing their
advance to the crest of the hill, when by a dash upon
the enemy's works Hays' brigade and a portion of
Hoke's succeeded in entering them and compelling the
enemy to abandon his batteries.
In the meantime Johnson was heavily engaged on the
left, but no fire was heard on the right, Rodes' division
had not advanced nor had the left division of Hill.
Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, had fallen
mortally wounded near the crest of the hill, and the
portion of the force that had engaged the enemy's works
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found itself unsupported, and paused for a moment, it
being now nearly dark.
During the attack on the left of the enemy's line, a
portion of his troops had been withdrawn from this part
of the line, but that attack had now ceased and in a few
minutes a heavy force in several lines was concentrated
on Hays' brigade, and that part of Hoke's which had
entered the enemy's works, and finding themselves
unsupported and about to be overwhelmed by numbers,
they were compelled to retire, which they did with
comparatively slight loss, considering the nature of the
ground, and the difficulties by which they were surrounded.
Hoke's brigade fell back to the position from
which it had advanced to bring off its wounded commander,
and was then re-formed by Colonel Godwin of
the 57th North Carolina. Hays' brigade fell back to a
position on the slope of the hill, where it remained for
some time awaiting a further advance, and was then
drawn back, bringing off four battle flags captured on
Cemetery Hill. Gordon's brigade had advanced to the
position from which the two brigades had moved, for
the purpose of following up their attack when the divisions
on the right moved, but finding that they did not
advance, it was not ordered forward, as it would have
been a useless sacrifice, but was retained as a support
for the other brigades to fall back upon.
During the advance of my two brigades I had
ascertained that Rodes was not advancing, and I rode to
urge him forward. I found him getting his brigades
into position so as to be ready to advance, but he
informed me that there was no preparation to move on
his right, and that General Lane, in command of Pender's
division, on his immediate right, had sent him word that
he had no orders to advance, which had delayed his own
movement. He, however, expressed a readiness to go
forward if I thought it proper, but by this time I had been
informed that my two brigades were retiring, and I told
him it was then too late. He did not advance, and the
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fighting for the day closed--Johnson's attack on the
left having been ended by the darkness, leaving him
possession of part of the enemy's works in the woods.
Before light next morning Hays and Godwin, who
had taken position on Gordon's left and right, respectively,
were withdrawn to the rear and subsequently
formed in line on the street first occupied by Hays,
Gordon being left to hold the position in front. During
the night, by directions of General Ewell, Smith was
ordered to report by daylight next day to General
Johnson on the left and did so. Longstreet, supported by a
part of the right of Hill's corps, had been very heavily
engaged with the enemy's left, in the afternoon of the
2nd, gaining some advantages, and driving a part of
the enemy's force from an advanced line, but at the close
of the fight the enemy retained his main positions.
On the morning of the 3rd, the enemy made an attack
on Johnson to dislodge him from that part of the works
which he had gained the morning before, and very heavy
fighting ensued, continuing at intervals throughout the
day, in which Smith's three regiments were engaged
under General Johnson's orders, the enemy finally
regaining his works. The rest of my command did not
become at all engaged on this day.
On the right, Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps
having arrived, the attack on the enemy was renewed
in the afternoon after a very heavy cannonading of all
parts of his line, and a very sanguinary fight ensued
during which the enemy's line was penetrated by
Pickett's division, but it was finally repulsed, as were the
supporting forces, with very heavy loss on both sides.
This closed the fighting at the battle of Gettysburg.
Meade retained his position on the heights, and our army
held the position it had assumed for the attack, while
both armies had sustained very heavy losses in killed
and wounded, as well as prisoners.
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CHAPTER XXV.
RETREAT TO VIRGINIA.
DURING the night of July 3rd Ewell's corps was withdrawn
from its position in and to the left of Gettysburg, and moved to
the right, to the Cashtown road, where it took position on Seminary
Hill, the other corps retaining their positions. My brigades
were withdrawn from Gettysburg to the new position at two
o'clock in the morning of the 4th and were formed in line in rear
of Seminary Hill, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions occupying the
front line on the crest of the hill across the road.
During the battle our line had encircled that of the enemy,
thus extending our army, which was much smaller than his own,
over a very long line.
We remained in position confronting the enemy during the
whole of the 4th, being subjected in the afternoon to a very
heavy shower of rain. The enemy showed no disposition to come
out, but hugged his defences on the hills very closely.
General Lee sent a flag of truce on the morning of this day to
General Meade proposing an exchange of prisoners, but he
declined to accede to the proposition.
Before day on the morning of the 5th our army commenced
retiring from before Gettysburg.
The loss in my division in the battle, beginning with the first
and ending with the last day, was in killed 154, wounded 799,
and missing 227, total 1,180, of which Hays' and Hoke's brigades
lost in the assault at the close of the day of the 2nd, in killed 39,
wounded 246, and missing 149, total 434. 194 of my command
were left in hospitals near Gettysburg, the rest being carried off.
The loss of our army was heavy, as was that of the enemy.
I have before stated the size of General Lee's army
when this campaign was commenced. The army had
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received no accessions, but had been diminished by the march,
from straggling, exhaustion, and sickness. My own division had
been reduced from 7,226, its strength when it left Culpeper, to
5,611 when I crossed the Potomac, those numbers representing
the strength in officers and men, and not muskets. A similar loss
extended to the whole army, and I can venture to affirm that it
was as small in my division as in any other. Besides this we were
in the enemy's country, and our large trains had necessarily to be
guarded. I think it may be assumed, therefore, that General Lee's
infantry at this battle did not exceed 55,000 officers and men, and
that his whole force engaged, and in support of that part engaged,
was smartly under 60,000, the cavalry not being employed at all
except in watching the flanks and rear. His artillery numbered
less than 150 guns.
Meade, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee,
states that his strength, in all arms, was a little under 100,000,
about 95,000, making a greater reduction from Hooker's force
than I have allowed for General Lee's for similar cause, and that
he had but little under three hundred guns. The odds, therefore,
were not very far from two to one. Hooker had conceded the
fact that he outnumbered our army, yet Meade, who succeeded
Hooker, taking up the old idea of superior numbers, thinks
General Lee now outnumbered him by some 10,000 or 15,000
men. The figures which I give I think fully cover our force, and
the probability is that it was less.
It will be seen, therefore, what difficulties we had to
encounter in attacking the enemy in his strong position. That
position fought the battle for him. It is exceedingly probable that,
if we had moved promptly upon Cemetery Hill after the defeat of
the enemy on the 1st, we would have gained the position, and
thereby avoided the battle at that point. What might have been
the result afterwards it is impossible to conjecture. The battle
would have had to be fought
Page 278
somewhere else, and it may or may not have resulted differently.
The fight on the 1st had not been contemplated by General
Lee, and he was not, therefore, on the ground until it was over,
and the time had passed for accomplishing anything further when
he arrived. This fight had been brought on by the movement of
Buford's cavalry in the direction of Cashtown and the attack on it
by Hill's two divisions, which brought up the two corps of the
enemy. General Ewell had moved to the support of Hill, but there
was no communication between them during the engagement, as
they were on separate roads, and each force went into action
under its own commander, without there being a common
superior to direct the whole. This want of concert existed after
the defeat of the enemy, and the consequence was that the
opportunity was not improved.
This battle of Gettysburg has been much criticised, and will
continue to be criticised. Errors were undoubtedly committed, but
these errors were not attributable to General Lee. I know that he
was exceedingly anxious to attack the enemy at a very early
hour on the morning of the 2nd, for I heard him earnestly express
that wish on the evening previous, but his troops did not arrive in
time to make the attack. Why it was so I cannot tell. In the
assaults which were made on the enemy's position, there was not
concert of action, but that was not General Lee's fault.
Without commenting on the assault from right of our line,
which I did not witness, for that part of the battle was entirely
excluded from my view, I will say that I believe that if the attack
which was made by Johnson on the extreme left, and my two
brigades on his right, at the close of the second day, had been
supported by an attack by the divisions to the right of us,
Johnson would have gained all of the enemy's works in front of
him, Cemetery Hill would have been carried, and the victory
would have been ours.
Page 279
So far as the fighting itself was concerned, the battle
of Gettysburg was a drawn battle, but under the circumstances a drawn
battle was a failure on our part and a success for the enemy. We
were far away from our supplies of ammunition, and he was in
his own country and in easy communication with his depots of
supplies of all kinds. We were then in a part of the country by no
means abounding in provisions and there was a mountain at our
back, which limited the area from which we could draw food for
our men, a most difficult task always, under the most favorable
circumstances, in a hostile country, and rendered doubly so by the
immediate presence of a large army in our front, with its
numerous cavalry to aid the citizens in resisting the demands of
our foraging parties.
We were, therefore, under the necessity of retreating, not
because our army had been demoralized by a defeat, but because
our supply of ammunition had become short, and it was difficult to
subsist our troops. That retreat was made deliberately and in
perfect order, and the enemy did not venture to attack us, but was
content to follow us with a corps of observation at a respectable
distance. We carried off a very large proportion of our wounded,
but many were left because their condition would not admit of
their transportation. We carried off some captured guns, and a
large number of prisoners, after having paroled some three or
four thousand. The enemy had none of our guns and he had in his
hands fewer prisoners than we had taken.
My division with the rest of Ewell's corps was moved from
its position on the Cashtown road at two o'clock on the morning
of the 5th, arriving at the Fairfield road after sunrise. The
withdrawal of the other corps was then progressing, and Ewell's
corps, being ordered to bring up the rear, was here halted for
several hours, waiting for the others to clear the road, and
confronting the enemy's position, which was still in our view, by
a line of battle.
Page 280
The enemy seemed to be very cautious about coming out,
but finally ran out a few pieces of artillery and opened at long
range, without doing any damage. My division was ordered to
constitute the rear guard of the army, and White's battalion of
cavalry was ordered to accompany me. I waited on the Fairfield
road until it had been cleared by the rest of the army, including
the other two divisions of Ewell's corps, and then in the afternoon
moved off slowly in rear of the army and all the trains, Gordon,
followed by White's battalion, bringing up my rear.
On arriving in sight of Fairfield, which is situated near the
eastern base of South Mountain on a wide low plain or valley
surrounded by commanding hills, I found the wagon trains blocked
up at the village. While waiting for the road to be cleared of the
wagons in front, Colonel White sent me information that a force
of the enemy was advancing in my rear, and being on the plain
where I would be exposed to a fire of artillery from the
surrounding hills, I sent to hasten forward the trains, but as they
did not move off I was preparing to fire a blank cartridge or two
for the purpose of quickening their speed, when the advance of
the pursuing column of the enemy appeared on a hill in my rear
with a battery of artillery supported by infantry, and I opened with
shell on it. The enemy's battery replied to mine, and Fairfield was
soon cleared of wagons, as the teamsters and wagon masters
found it more convenient to comply with this inducement to travel
than my orders and solicitations.
Gordon deployed his brigade and sent out the 26th Georgia
Regiment as skirmishers to dislodge the enemy's advance, which
it did after a sharp skirmish, and a loss of seven wounded. This
regiment was then ordered to be withdrawn, and I moved the
division in line gradually through Fairfield to a favorable position
for making a defence, and here waited the enemy's advance, but
he moved very cautiously, sending forward only a party of
skirmishers, which kept at a respectful distance.
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It was now night, and my division was formed in line, a little
nearer the base of the mountain, so as to cover our trains that
were packed on its side and at its base. In this position my men
lay on their arms all night without molestation from the enemy.
At light on the morning of the 6th, the trains moved
forward, and General Rodes, whose division was to constitute
the rear guard that day, relieved my skirmishers in front, his
division being formed in line just at the base of the mountain, and
I moved past him to take the front of the corps; when, pursuing
the road over South Mountain past Monterey Springs, I
descended to the western base near Waynesboro, and
bivouacked a little beyond the town, covering it on the north and
west with my brigades. The other corps were found already on
this side near the base of the mountain, and the rest of Ewell's
corps reached the same vicinity with mine. The force following
us proved to be the 6th corps under Sedgwick, acting as a corps
of observation. It gave Rodes no trouble and did not come
beyond Fairfield.
A body of the enemy's cavalry had previously come upon that
part of our trains that had preceded the army in the retreat, but
was repulsed by a few guards accompanying the trains without
being able to accomplish any damage of consequence. Early on
the morning of the 7th we moved towards Hagerstown by the
way of Leitersburg, my division following Rodes' and Johnson's
bringing up the rear. The corps was established on the north and
northeast of Hagerstown, and my division took position on the
Chambersburg pike about a mile north of Hagerstown. In this
position we remained until the 10th, when the corps was moved
to the south of Hagerstown, the other corps being already there.
The enemy's troops had now commenced arriving on the
western side of the mountain, and we took position on the south
and southeast of Hagerstown to await his attack--Longstreet's
corps being on the right, Ewell's on the left and Hill in the centre,
and our line covering the road to the Potomac at
Williamsport and Falling
Page 282
Waters, a few miles below, where a pontoon bridge was being
constructed in the place of one previously destroyed by the
enemy's cavalry. The advance of the enemy resulted in a sharp
engagement between a portion of our cavalry and a part of his
troops on the Boonsboro road.
In the position near Hagerstown, my division was posted
across the Cumberland road on the southwest of the town, but
on the next day it was moved further to the right so as to rest its
right on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, where it
remained until just before dark on the 12th. In the meantime
Meade's army, now reinforced by some twelve or fifteen
thousand fresh troops, according to his own statement, had
moved up and taken position in our front, but did not attack.
Two of my absent regiments, the 54th North Carolina and
58th Virginia, had returned by this time, after having been
engaged in repelling an attack, made by the enemy's cavalry at
Williamsport on the 6th, on an ordnance train coming up with a
supply of ammunition. Besides these, General Lee received no
other reinforcements, but our army was not at all demoralized,
and calmly awaited the attack of the enemy. My own division
was buoyant and defiant, for it felt that it had sustained no defeat,
and though diminished in numbers it was as ready to fight the
enemy as at Gettysburg.
As night was setting in, on the 12th, my division was taken
out of the line and moved to the right, to the rear of Hill's
position, for the purpose of supporting his corps, in front of which
a very large force of the enemy had accumulated. In this position
it remained during the 13th, but no attack was made. The
Potomac had been very much swollen by the previous rains, and
after subsiding a little was again threatened with another rise
from a rain that commenced on the 13th, and it was therefore
determined to recross that river so as not to have an impassable
stream at our back, when we had but one bridge and that not
yet fully completed, and which,
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being laid on pontoons, hastily constructed by our pioneer and
engineer parties, was liable to be washed away. Accordingly our
army commenced retiring after dusk on the night of the 13th,
Longstreet's and Hill's corps going to Falling Waters and Ewell's
to Williamsport to ford the river.
My division brought up the rear of Ewell's corps, and the river
being found too high for the passage of artillery, Jones' battalion,
under the escort of Hays' brigade, was moved down the river to
Falling Waters, where it crossed during the morning of the 14th.
The rest of the division forded the river, in rear of the other two
divisions, after sunrise on the morning of the 14th to a little above
Williamsport, with the water nearly up to the armpits of the men,
who had to hold their guns and cartridge boxes above their heads
to keep them out of the water. The regular ford was too swift to
allow of a crossing there, and we had therefore to cross in the
deeper water above.
The crossing at Williamsport was effected without any
molestation whatever, but at Falling Waters there was
considerable delay because of the greater number of troops
crossing there and the passage of the artillery at that point, where
there was but one bridge. The enemy's cavalry came by surprise
upon a portion of Hill's corps covering the bridge, and succeeded
in capturing some prisoners and in getting two pieces of artillery
which were stuck in the mud, the surprise being caused by a
mistaken opinion that the front was watched by some of our
cavalry.
Our army remained in the neighborhood of Haynesville that
night, near which place my division camped, and now for the first
time since I moved from Greenwood, on the 26th of June, we
had the benefit of our baggage wagons. On the next day we
moved through Martinsburg, and on the 16th my division reached
Darkville, where it went into camp and remained until the 20th,
in which neighborhood the whole of Ewell's corps
Page 284
was concentrated, the other corps taking positions further up
towards and covering Winchester. In the meantime, Meade
made preparations for crossing the Potomac below
Harper's Ferry, and threw his army into Loudoun, while
General Lee prepared to intercept his march by crossing
his army over the Blue Ridge into Culpeper.
It having been ascertained that a force had moved from
Cumberland in Maryland to the mouth of Back Creek west of
Martinsburg, on the afternoon of the 20th, my division was ordered
to move across North Mountain and then down Back Creek for
the purpose of intercepting that force, while another division
should hold it in front. We moved that night to the foot of the
mountain at Guardstown, and crossing early next morning (the
21st) through Mills' Gap, marched down Back Creek to the rear of
Hedgeville, where we found that the force had made its escape by
retiring the night before. The division was then moved across the
mountain through Hedgesville and camped. During the night I
received orders to move up the valley for the purpose of crossing
the Blue Ridge, and next day (the 22nd) I marched to Bunker Hill.
On the 23rd I passed through Winchester to the
Opequon on the Front Royal road, being joined that
day by the 13th Virginia Regiment. General Ewell,
who had preceded me with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions,
had that day been engaged with a heavy force
which came through Manassas Gap, which he moved
out to meet, near the Gap, as he was moving past Front
Royal, and he sent at night to inform me that he would
retire up the Luray Valley for the purpose of crossing
at Thornton's Gap, and to order me to cross to the Valley
pike so as to move up by the way of New Market, and
across from there to Madison Court-House, as the enemy
was in very heavy force in Manassas Gap. The Shenandoah was
then high and a pontoon bridge had been laid near
Front Royal below the forks, which he ordered
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to be taken up during the night, and to be transported up the
Valley pike under my protection.
Accordingly I moved by the way of Cedarville next day to get
the pontoon train, and then crossed to the Valley pike, following
the route taken by General Jackson's corps the fall before and
arriving at Madison Court-House on the 28th, in the neighborhood
of which I found the other divisions which had come through
Thornton's Gap and by the way of Sperryville. I had to use the
pontoon train for crossing the Shenandoah, as that river was up,
and I then sent it up the Valley to Staunton.
After remaining near Madison Court-House until the 31st I
moved to the vicinity of the Robinson River, near the road from
Liberty Mills to Culpeper Court-House, and the next day I
crossed the Robinson just above its mouth into Culpeper and then
the Rapidan at the railroad station, and encamped near Pisgah
Church about four miles from the station, the other divisions
moving to the same neighborhood.
Longstreet's and Hill's corps had preceded Ewell's corps
across the Blue Ridge through Chester Gap, and while Meade
was moving his army up into Manassas Gap to attack Ewell, they
moved into Culpeper and waited until Meade's army had moved
to the vicinity of Warrenton and the Rappahannock and halted
without indicating any purpose to advance further; when, after a
body of the enemy's cavalry had been driven back, these two
corps moved to the south of the Rapidan and took position near
Orange Court-House, leaving Stuart's cavalry to occupy the
county of Culpeper.
This was the close of all the operations resulting from the
campaign into Pennsylvania.
There have been various opinions as to the utility of this
campaign into Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly we did not accomplish
all that we desired, but still I cannot regard the campaign in the
light of a failure. If we had remained on the Rappahannock
confronting Hooker's
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army, we would have been compelled to fight one or more
battles, and perhaps a series of them, during the summer, which
would probably have resulted in a much heavier loss to us than
we sustained at Gettysburg, though the enemy might have been repulsed.
Situated as we were, it was simply a matter of impossibility for us to have
attacked the opposing army in its then position, for we did not
have the means of forcing a passage of the river--the advantage
in that respect being all on the other side. We should, therefore,
have been compelled to await the enemy's attack, which could
only have resulted in his repulse, in the most favorable aspect for
us.
We were in a country entirely devoid of supplies and of
forage, for Fredericksburg had been occupied the previous
summer by a Federal army, and no crops of any consequence
had been made in all that region. By moving into Pennsylvania,
we transferred the theatre of the war for a time into the enemy's
country. Our army was supplied from that country and from
stores captured from the enemy for more than a month and this
gave a breathing spell to our commissary department, which had
been put to great straits. We had been living the previous winter
on very limited rations of meat, only 1/4 of a pound of bacon to
the ration, with few or no vegetables, and a change of diet was
actually necessary for our men.
When we came back, though we had lost many valuable
lives, our army was reinvigorated in health, and the transfer of
the two armies to the upper waters of the Rappahannock and the
Rapidan was a decided advantage to us. The campaign into,
Pennsylvania certainly defeated any further attempt to move
against Richmond that summer and postponed the war over into
the next year. Could the most brilliant victories which it was in
our power to gain in Virginia have accomplished more? I think
not.
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CHAPTER XXVI.
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND DEAD.
IT was from the close of this campaign that the difficulties in
regard to the exchange of prisoners, and the consequent
complaints about the maltreatment of those in our hands, dated.
The fall of Vicksburg simultaneously with the battle of
Gettysburg, gave to the enemy the excess of prisoners, which had
hitherto been on our side, and he now began to discover that we
would be more damaged by a cessation in the exchange than he
would:--our men when they came back would go into our army
for the war, and we had no means of supplying their places while
they remained prisoners. Many of his prisoners in our hands had
but limited terms to serve out, and the places of those whose
terms were longer could be readily supplied by new drafts, while
his high bounties, national, state and local, opened to him the
whole civilized world as a recruiting ground. He had no
inducement, therefore, to continue the exchange as a matter of
policy affecting the strength of his army, while a failure to do so
would very much cripple us, by detaining from our army the men
held as prisoners, by imposing on our already overtaxed resources
the support of the prisoners themselves, as well as the diminution
of the strength of our army by the detail of a force to guard them.
While we were in Pennsylvania, President Lincoln had issued
an order, declaring that no paroles given, unless at some of the
places specified for the exchange of prisoners in the cartel which
had been adopted, or in cases of stipulation to that effect by a
commanding officer in surrendering his forces, would be
recognized. I think the date of that order was the 1st of July, and
it was evidently intended to embarrass us while in Pennsylvania,
with the guarding and sustenance of such prisoners
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as should fall into our hands. This order found
us in possession of more than 6,000 prisoners taken on the 1st at
Gettysburg.
About 3,000 of them were paroled, but their paroles were not
recognized and they subsequently returned to
the army without being exchanged, including some officers who
solemnly pledged their honor to surrender themselves as
prisoners in the event their paroles were not recognized by their
government. The rest declined to give paroles because of the
order before mentioned, and they were carried to Virginia and
held in custody. In addition to our willingness to parole these
men, General Lee proposed to make an exchange of prisoners
after the battle, but it was declined. Now if the prisoners brought
off by us from Gettysburg subsequently suffered in prison, who
was responsible for that suffering?
The order in regard to the recognition of paroles was in
violation of the well recognized principles of modern warfare. In
the most ancient times, a captive taken in battle was held to have
forfeited his life to his captors and it was always taken. After a
time this was changed, and from motives of humanity the
prisoner's life was spared and he became by the laws of war,
even among the most civilized nations, the slave of his captor--
his enslavement being justified on the ground that it was a boon
to him to spare his life at the expense of his liberty. The justice
of this rule is recognized in Holy Writ itself, and the rule
continued to prevail long after the commencement of the
Christian era.
In the age of chivalry a modification of the rule prevailed,
and a prisoner was allowed to ransom himself, when he could
raise the means of doing so. In more modern times the system of
paroles was adopted, and the prisoner was allowed to go at
large upon pledging his honor not to take up arms against his
captors until regularly exchanged, the penalty of a forfeiture of
his parole being death if again captured. This is a contract
between the prisoner and his captors, which his government
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is bound to respect in the interests of humanity, by the
recognition of all civilized nations. It is not necessary for him to
receive the permission of his government or his leader to give his
parole. When he is a captive, he is beyond the power and
protection of either and has a right to stipulate for his individual
safety against the penalties of death, slavery, or imprisonment by
neutralizing his services for the time being. If his contract is not
respected by his government, what must be the consequence?
When two nations or parties are at war, the object of each is
to destroy the physical power of the other,
in order to obtain peace, or accomplish the object for which the
war is undertaken. If one party is so situated
that it cannot hold, or cannot support its prisoners, and the other
will neither exchange nor recognize the validity of paroles, is it to
be expected that the prisoners shall be turned loose to return
again to augment the force of the antagonistic party, and thus
perhaps insure the destruction of that party liberating them?
The very principle which justifies killing in battle,
that is the universal principle of self-preservation, will justify the
taking of no prisoners or the destruction of all those that may be
taken, if they can be neutralized in no other way. It was on this
principle that the great Napoleon, in his Egyptian campaign, killed
a number of prisoners whom he did not have the means of
feeding, and who would not recognize the validity of a parole. If he
turned them loose they would have gone immediately
into the ranks of his opponents, if he kept them he would
have had to take the food from the mouths of his own soldiers to
feed them, and the only way of getting rid of them was by killing
them. It is true a clamor was raised by his enemies, whose interest
it was to make him appear as a barbarian devoid of humanity, but now
that the feelings of that day have subsided, impartial men do not
doubt the conformity of the act to the principles of war.
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So when Mr. Lincoln's order appeared, if the safety of
General Lee's army, or the success of his campaign had been
jeopardized by the necessity of feeding and guarding the
prisoners in our hands, he would have been justified in putting
them to death, and the responsibility for the act would have
rested on the shoulders of the man who issued the inhuman
order. So too the latter was responsible for all the sufferings to
which those prisoners who were carried off were afterwards
subjected, if they suffered.
The alleged reason for stopping the exchange was the fact
that the Confederate Government would not parole or exchange
negro slaves belonging to Southern citizens who were captured
in the Federal ranks. But it cannot be doubted that this was the
mere pretext and not the real reason. That is to be found in the
belief existing on the part of the Federal authorities that the
failure to exchange would cripple us. The constitution of the
United States, then unchanged in any respect, recognized the
right of property in slaves, and guaranteed the return of such as
should flee from service.
The constitution of the Confederate States contained the
same guaranty, and the institution of slavery was recognized by
the laws and constitutions of all the States composing the
Confederacy, from which States alone the Confederate
Government derived its delegated powers. That government was
bound to respect the laws of the States and the rights of the
citizens under those laws, and to protect them. Granting, for the
sake of the argument, that the United States may have had the
right to employ as soldiers the captured or fugitive slaves, as it
had to take into its armies deserters from ours, still it took them
subject to all the rights of the owners and of the Confederate
Government, in the event of their recapture, just as deserters
taken in arms in the opposite camp were liable to all the penalties
for their crime without any infraction of the rules of war.
Many of the slaves put into the ranks of the Federal
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Army were put there by force, but whether their service was
enforced or voluntary, the Confederate Government would have
been recreant to its trust, and grossly neglectful of its rights and
interests, to have allowed so large a proportion of its own
population to be used by its enemy for the purpose of
strengthening his armies, by recognizing the claim set up on the
part of these slaves to the benefit of the rules of war. Most
nations have denied the right of its citizens even to expatriate
themselves, so as to be competent to serve in the ranks of its
enemies. None permit that expatriation to take place after the
commencement of hostilities, and it would be the blindest folly to
do so. In the case of the recaptured slaves, our government did
not propose to punish the slaves themselves, though those that
had voluntarily entered the enemy's service had justly forfeited
their lives, but merely returned them to their owners, to the great
gratification of the negroes themselves in most cases.
It was a case in which the Federal Government had no rights
whatever, any more than it could have had in the case of
deserters. The claim therefore set up to have these slaves
treated as other soldiers taken in battle was without the slightest
foundation in the principles of international law, or the rules of
civilized war; and the cessation of the exchange on that pretence
was a most atrocious act of cruelty to its own prisoners by the
Federal Government.
A great clamor was raised on this specious pretext in
order to reconcile the soldiers and the people of the North to the
discontinuance of the exchange, and blind their eyes as to the real
reason. Not denying the right of the Federal Government to refuse to
exchange prisoners, if it was its interest to do so, and the war could
not be terminated favorably to itself in any other way, still it had no
right to violate the faith pledged to the exchange by the cartel;
and least of all did it have the right to deprive its own soldiers in
our hands of the
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right to release themselves from prison by giving their paroles. If
it thought proper not only to adopt the extreme harsh measure of
non-exchange from motives of policy, but to go further and adopt
a new rule upon the subject of paroles, then it had no right
whatever to complain of any measures of harshness towards its
prisoners which the necessities or the interests of our
government and our army rendered necessary.
So much for the question of rights; and now for the facts as
to the actual treatment which the prisoners in our hands received.
I think I can safely deny that they were ever subjected to any
maltreatment, suffering, or neglect, which it was in our power to
avoid. We did not resort to the extreme measures which perhaps
the laws of war and our own necessities would have justified, but
the prisoners were treated with all the humanity possible under
the circumstances in which we were placed. Doubtless there
may have been rare individual acts of maltreatment, but until
human nature is a very different thing from what it is, there can
be no body of men in which there are not some who act unjustly
and oppressively.
Such is the case everywhere over the world, in the church, in
government, in society, and in all the relations which men bear to
each other, it has been the case, and will continue to be the case
until the end of all things that some will do wrong, and we of the
South cannot claim an exemption from the common lot. What I
maintain is that no harsh treatment to the prisoners was
authorized or tolerated, and if there were individual cases of the
kind they were exceedingly rare.
The condition of a prisoner is by no means a desirable one
under any circumstances, and he who is captured in war must
expect to suffer inconveniences. The soldiers of the Federal
Army were supplied with an abundance of everything necessary
for their comfort and even luxury, to which many of them,
including some officers, had never been accustomed before,
and to which but few
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of them perhaps, except those who enriched themselves by the
plunder of our people, returned again after the war. No army that
ever took the field was so well supplied in all that was necessary,
and much that was superfluous.
The easy communication always kept up with the positions of
that army by railway and steamboat supplied it abundantly not
only with ample and comfortable clothing of every kind and the
government ration of everything, but with most of the delicacies
incident to city life. They had not only bread, meat, vegetables,
coffee and sugar in abundance, but the enormous horde of sutlers
following the army supplied it with wines, liquors, fruits, oysters,
canned meats and in fact everything that could be desired; and
which high pay and high bounties enabled both officers and men
to purchase. When such men, therefore, fell into our hands and
were subjected to the scanty fare to which Confederate soldiers
were reduced, it was very natural for them to complain of their
treatment.
Our ports were blockaded and we were cut off from the
commerce of the world. The enemy made not only provisions, but
medicines, contraband of war. He had devastated the portions of
our country to which he had penetrated, destroying crops and
farming utensils, and burning barns, mills, factories of cloth and
stuffs of all kinds, and tanneries, and in fact committing every
possible waste and devastation which could cripple our army or
pinch the non-combatants who remained at home. Coffee, tea and
sugar had disappeared early in 1862 as a part of the ration to
our men, and if there was any at all, it was to be found
in rare quantities and at the most enormous prices.
The scanty supplies of provisions to which our own. men
were reduced can hardly be conceived of by one who was not
present to know the actual state of the case.
On the night after the second victory at Manassas,
thousands of our men lay down to rest without having
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had a mouthful to eat all day. I was then in command of a
brigade, and I was very well content, after the fight at Ox Hill or
Chantilly, to make my supper on two very small ears of green
corn, which I roasted in the ashes. On the next day and for a
day or two afterwards, all that I had to eat was a piece of cold
boiled fresh beef without either salt or bread, which I carried in a
haversack. This was the strait to which a Brigadier General was
reduced in our army.
I have many a time on the march, while a division and corps
commander, been glad to get a hard cracker and a very small
piece of uncooked bacon for my dinner, and I have been often
thankful on the road to a soldier for a biscuit from his haversack
which he himself had baked, after mixing up the flour on an India
rubber cloth, which he had secured on some battlefield. When
our money became so depreciated as to be worth only from five
to ten cents on the dollar, many of the company officers were
compelled from necessity to eat with their men of the scanty
food furnished them.
I have seen commissioned officers often, marching on foot
with their pantaloons out behind, their coats out at the elbow and
their toes sticking out of their shoes, with but a pretence for a
sole, while they had but the shirt that was on their backs as their
whole supply of linen. I have seen this the case with gentlemen
of refinement whose means before the war had enabled them to live
with every desirable comfort, yet they submitted cheerfully not
only to this, but to actual hunger; and I have seen them go into
battle with the proud tread of heroes, encouraging their men,
cheering over the victory, or bravely meeting death in defence of
a country which could treat them no better.
What these men were content with, the prisoners taken by
their valor, and who had been so well pampered in their own
country, thought proper to regard, when furnished them, as
evidence of a disposition to starve them. Not only was our army
so meagrely supplied with
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what was necessary not only to its comfort, but to its very
existence, but our people everywhere were pinched for the
necessaries of life. Gentlemen, ladies, and children, who had
been accustomed to every indulgence and luxury, were very
often put to the utmost straits for clothes to wear and meat and
bread to eat, and while this was the case with them there was a
long, long list of the wives and the children of the privates in the
ranks fighting for their homes and their altars, who were on the
very brink of actual starvation.
Now, I ask, in the name of all that is sacred, did they expect
that the men who had come down to make war upon a people so
reduced by their barbarous acts to the very verge of starvation
and nakedness should, when taken in battle, be fed and clothed
better than the men who, sacrificing all mere personal
considerations, were so bravely meeting their foes in deadly
strife, while their wives, children, mothers and sisters were
starving?
There is talk about the food furnished the sick and wounded
as being unsuited for their condition. I will mention an incident
that occurred under my own observation. While we were at
Spottsylvania Court-House in May, 1864, battling with such
immense odds, I was in command of a corps, and I received a
message to come to General Lee's headquarters at night on one
occasion for the purpose of receiving some instructions from him.
General Lee was then himself suffering with a dysentery which
had reduced him very much, and rendered all of us who were
aware of his condition exceedingly uneasy, for we knew that if he
failed all was gone.
When I arrived his dinner and supper, both in one, were just
ready and I was invited in to partake of the meal, and I found it to
consist of, what to me was most acceptable, a scant supply of
hard crackers, fried fat bacon, and a beverage made as a
substitute for coffee out of parched wheat, without sugar, and
this was all. This was what the foremost commander of the age
was reduced to in the then critical condition of his health.
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Such fare, if furnished to a sick or wounded Federal soldier,
would have been regarded as evidence of a barbarous purpose to
cause his death. To inflame the minds of the Northern people and
prejudice the civilized world against us, an investigation was had
before a committee of the Federal Congress who made a
report upon "rebel atrocities," founded on the testimony of
men who swore to some things they had seen, many that they had
heard, and a great many more that they had neither seen nor heard.
The press was flooded with stories of cruel treatment,
illustrated by pictures, and during the war every device was
resorted to, to fix upon us the stigma of barbarous treatment of
the prisoners in our hands. After the close of the war a poor
feeble foreigner, Captain Wirz, who had been in our service, and
was then on the very verge of the grave from wounds received
in battle, was selected as a victim to be sacrificed to the demands
of the North for more blood, and, after a farce of a trial, was
hung for alleged cruelty to prisoners. As a specimen of the
evidence given on his trial, it is only necessary to mention that of
Boston Corbet, the man who killed Booth, while the latter, with a
fractured leg, was in a house in flames and surrounded by a large
party of Federal cavalry, by slipping up to the side of the house
and firing his revolver through a crack.
Boston Corbet testified on the trial of Wirz, stating
that he was a prisoner at Andersonville, and among
other atrocities testified to, by him, he mentioned the
fact that bloodhounds were kept to pursue escaped prisoners,
and he said that he himself with some others
made an escape, and the bloodhounds were put on the
track; that while he was concealed in the bushes, one of
the bloodhounds came up and rubbed its nose against
his. When asked why the hound did not do any mischief
to him, he said that he served the same Lord that Daniel
served when in the lions' den.
There were many other witnesses in whose stories
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there was as little truth as in that of Boston Corbet, and
"rebel"
witnesses were denounced as unworthy of credit unless they
would prove renegades and endeavor to propitiate their masters
by turning against their comrades. Even poor Wirz himself was
offered his life if he would testify against the high officials of the
Confederate Government, but he was too true a man and
Christian to attempt to save himself from his unjust sentence by
perjuring his soul; and he, therefore, suffered on the gallows.
To appreciate at its proper worth the evidence of the
witnesses who have tried to fix upon the Confederate authorities
this iniquitous charge of maltreatment of prisoners, it is only
necessary to refer to the evidence of the general officers of the
Federal Army before the Congressional Committee on the War.
Let any candid man read, for instance, the evidence contained in
that part of the report which refers to the battle of Gettysburg
and the operations of the Army of the Potomac under Meade,
where there is such palpable conflict, not as to opinions merely,
but as to facts; and when he has determined in his mind which of
those general officers tell the truth and which do not, let him say
how much credence is to be given to the stories of those men
who testified as to the horrors of Andersonville, and other
Confederate prisons. When the general officers of the army were
so loose in their testimony as to important facts affecting each
other, what was to be expected of the subordinates and the
privates, when testifying against their enemies?
It is very easy to raise the cry of "rebel" when any
statement is
put forth on the part of the Confederate authorities; and that is
conceded a sufficient answer. The same cry would invalidate the
testimony of General Lee or "Stonewall" Jackson. If such
atrocities were committed as those alleged, why is it that poor Wirz
is the solitary victim offered up in expiation of the thousands of
victims who, it is said, died from the effects of the
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atrocities? The popular heart at the time of his sacrifice thirsted
for blood, notwithstanding the oceans that flowed during the war,
but when the first frenzy was over the more cautious panderers
to the tastes of their countrymen felt that there was danger of
shocking the minds of the civilized world, and desisted.
If poor Wirz was guilty, he was the least guilty of all those
charged with the same crime, and was but a mere instrument in
the hands of others. His executioners owed it to themselves and
to the cause of truth and justice to bring the others to trial in order
to vindicate their action in his case, and failing in this, they must
stand before the world as his murderers. Sufferings there were
doubtless at Andersonville and other prisons, but how could they
be avoided?
Our men in the army were suffering, and our women at home
were suffering. Could the men who came down to kill and
plunder us expect a better fate than that which befell our own
soldiers and people? Many perhaps died from the want of proper
medicines, but thousands upon thousands of our own wounded
and sick died from the same cause. Who deprived us of the
means of getting medicines? When we could not feed, clothe, and
provide for these prisoners in such a manner as would satisfy
them, whose fault was it that they were not released to be cared
for by their own friends? Who issued the order forbidding their
being paroled? Who put a stop to the exchange? Was it to be
expected that we would turn those men loose to come back again
to kill and plunder our people?
Kindred to this is another charge of plundering and disfiguring
the dead. Now as to the question of plundering, I cannot but think
that it is more cruel to plunder the living than the dead, especially
if the living be helpless women and children. I presume it is not
necessary to state the reasons why I entertain this opinion.
It is to me a little strange that the men who applauded
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Butler, Banks, Milroy, Sherman, and Sheridan, for plundering and
rendering utterly desolate the houses of thousands of woman and
children, should complain that our barefooted soldiers took the
shoes from the feet of some of the men who had been engaged
in this plunder and were killed in order that they might not be
able to follow and fight the rest.
I have myself but too often seen in the track of the Federal
armies the evidence of how they plundered and destroyed the
property of our people. Not content with taking provisions, cattle,
horses, sheep and other things which they might use, they often
took what was of no earthly use to them as soldiers, and
destroyed what they could not carry away. I have seen where
they had torn up the clothes of the women and children, hacked
to pieces furniture, pianos, and other articles, destroying valuable
papers and books, burned besides houses, plows, carts and a
variety of such things. This I have seen in not a few instances,
but I have seen whole communities rendered destitute in this
way.
They also burned all our factories and tanneries which they
could reach, taking the hides out of the vats in the latter and
cutting them to pieces. When a man is naked and barefooted, is
he to be blamed for taking such articles as he needs from the
dead body of his enemy who has thus treated him or his
comrades, in order that he may still continue to fight the
despoilers of his home and his country? Let the man who is
disposed to condemn him put the case to himself. He is plundered
and robbed, and perhaps some of his family or friends killed, he
pursues his plunderers and succeeds in killing one of them, but he
finds himself faint and sorefooted from the want of shoes, and is
therefore unable to continue the pursuit. Will he hesitate to strip
the shoes from the feet of his fallen enemy to enable him to
resume the task of recovering his own and chastising his other
enemies?
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On one occasion, a very worthy chaplain in our army on riding
over a battlefield found a soldier pulling the shoes from the feet
of a dead Federal soldier, and this being new to him, his feelings
were rather shocked. Speaking to the soldier he said: "My friend,
if were in your place, I would have more respect for the dead,
and not do that." The soldier, looking at the comfortable pair of
boots which the chaplain by good luck was able to sport, said:
"Sir, I have as much respect for the dead as you or any other
man, but if you had marched as long as I have without any shoes,
and your feet were as sore as mine, you would not think it so
wrong to take these shoes which can't do this man any good now,
and will do me a great deal." The chaplain was silenced, and that
was the whole question in a few words.
As to the other part of the charge, about disfiguring the
bodies, I do not presume our enemies themselves believe it,
though it was their policy to show that we were barbarous, and
this was set forth in the report of a Congressional Committee. I
was on many battlefields beginning with first Manassas, both
during and after the battles, and I slept on some, with the enemy's
dead lying all around me. I never in a solitary case saw any
evidence of any such treatment, and I never heard of any except
from the reports put in circulation.
As I have passed along over the ground when we were
fighting I have had some of the wounded appeal to me, saying
they were informed by their officers that we killed all the
wounded, and I have ordered them to be carried off and cared
for. It was the policy to circulate such reports in regard to the
treatment of prisoners, the wounded, and the dead, not only to
inflame the minds of the Northern people in order to induce them
to give a hearty support to the war, but to make the soldiers in
the army fight more obstinately; and there were not wanting
witnesses to aid the authorities by their testimony.
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The appeal may be safely made to the world to decide these
charges against the comrades of General Robert E. Lee and
"Stonewall" Jackson, and now that the war is over, it would seem
that we might even "appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober," but
it will seem as if such critics had not allowed those passions to
subside, by which they were intoxicated during the existence of
active hostilities.
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CHAPTER XXVII.
ON THE RAPIDAN.
WE remained in camp during the month of August, and the
forepart of September, resting our men from their late fatigues,
and recruiting our strength by the return of the sick and wounded
who had recovered. General Hoke having recovered from his
wound, now returned to his brigade, but was soon sent off with
one of his regiments to North Carolina on special duty. In the last
of August, or first part of September, Longstreet's corps was
detached from our army, leaving only Ewell's and Hill's.
The enemy's cavalry had been constantly increasing in
amount, and he had now a much larger force of that arm than we
had. He was able to keep his cavalry well mounted, while horses
were becoming very scarce with us. On the 13th of September, a
large force of the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry,
advanced into Culpeper, and Stuart's cavalry was compelled to
retire. My division, followed by Rodes', was advanced to the
Rapidan to prevent the enemy from crossing, and we had some
sharp skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry which came up to
Somerville and Raccoon Fords, and we had some brisk artillery
firing also.
My division took position covering the two fords named, and
Rodes' went to Morton's Ford on my right and took position
covering that; some of Hill's troops covering the fords above.
The demonstrations by the enemy's cavalry and the skirmishing
continued a day or two on the river, and a portion of Meade's
infantry, all of which had moved into Culpeper, came up and
relieved the cavalry, when the pickets were again established in
sight of each other. We then proceeded to strengthen our position
by rifle pits and epaulments for artillery, and continued in position
until the 8th of October, there
Page 303
being occasional reconnaissances to the right and left by the
enemy's cavalry, and demonstrations with his infantry by
manoeuvring in our view, his camps being distinctly
visible to us from a signal station on Clark's Mountain,
at the base of which, on the north, the Rapidan runs.
Meade had now sent off two of his corps, the 11th and
12th, to reinforce Rosecrans at Chattanooga, Longstreet having
reinforced Bragg with two of his divisions; and
General Lee determined to move around Meade's right and
attack him, this movement commencing on the night
of the 8th. One of Rodes' brigades, and Fitz. Lee's brigade of
cavalry, were left to hold the line of the river on the right of
Rapidan Station until the enemy had disappeared
from the front, and my pickets having been relieved, my
division was concentrated that night in rear of my position,
for the purpose of moving early next morning. The movement
was to be made by the way of Madison Courthouse so as to avoid
the observation of the enemy, Hill taking the lead, Ewell following.
I moved early on the morning of the 9th, taking the road by
Orange Court-House and crossing the Rapidan at a ford
a little above the mouth of the Robinson River, camping a mile or
two beyond. On the morning of the 10th I moved by the way
of Madison Court-House, following the rest of the army,
and crossing Robinson River, camped again three or four
miles from it. Just before night there was a sharp fight
in the advance with a portion of the enemy's cavalry. On the
11th we continued to move to the left and then in direction of
Culpeper Court-House to Stone-House Mountain, when it was found
that the enemy had fallen back across the Rappahannock with his
infantry, but there was fighting with the cavalry in the direction of
the Court-House.
On the 12th we turned off in the direction of Fauquier
Springs, and our advance drove a body of the enemy's cavalry
from the river and crossed over, a portion of the troops, including
my division, remaining on the south
Page 304
side. On the 13th we crossed and proceeded to Warrenton,
and Meade's army, which was on the Rappahannock below,
commenced its retreat on both sides of the railroad towards
Manassas. We took position that night around Warrenton, Hill's
corps being advanced out on the road towards Centreville.
Stuart, with a part of his cavalry, had crossed the river and
got in between two of the enemy's columns, where he spent the
night of the 13th in imminent danger of capture. We moved
before daybreak on the morning of the 14th, as well for the
purpose of relieving Stuart as for attacking the enemy, Ewell's
corps taking the road by Auburn towards Greenwich and
Bristow Station, and Hill's, a route further to the left. About
light, a considerable force of the enemy, composed of both
infantry and cavalry, was found at Auburn, on Cedar Creek,
occupying the opposite banks of the stream, where a mill pond
rendered the advance against him very difficult. Rodes' division
formed line in front, and some skirmishing and cannonading
ensued, while I moved with my division and Jones' battalion of
artillery to the left across the creek above the mill, and around
to get in the enemy's rear.
After I had started Rodes, having been replaced by
Johnson, moved to the right to cross the stream below.
The enemy's infantry in the meantime had moved off,
leaving only a cavalry force and some horse artillery to
dispute the passage, and as I was moving up to attack
this force in the rear and Rodes was coming up from
the right, it rapidly made its escape towards the railroad,
passing between us.
We then moved towards Greenwich, and near that place
Ewell's corps turned off through some farms in the direction of
the bridge over Kettle Run, while Hill's corps preceded us on
the direct road to Bristow. At this latter place, the 2nd corps of
Meade's army, under Warren, was found, and two of Hill's
brigades which were
Page 305
in the advance moved against it while behind the railroad
embankment, and were repulsed with some loss, a battery of
artillery, which was advanced to the front at the same time,
falling into the hands of the enemy. About this time my division,
in the lead of Ewell's corps, came up on the right near Kettle
Run Bridge, and was ordered to move forward against some
troops and wagon trains said to be moving on the road across
the run in the direction of Bristow. Gordon's brigade being in
front was formed in line facing the run and he was directed to
wait until the other brigades came up and were formed.
While I was hurrying these brigades up, Gordon seeing
some cavalry on the opposite hills made a rapid advance across
the run and up the hills on the other side, driving the cavalry
from the road to Bristow and pursuing it towards Brentsville.
When the other brigades were brought up, I found Gordon
unexpectedly gone, and I moved to the run, expecting to find
him there, but he was nowhere to be seen. Warren's corps
constituted the rear of Meade's army, and the troops and trains
seen across Kettle Run proved only a rear guard of cavalry with
some ambulances, the main wagon trains moving on the east of
the railroad by Brentsville. When I found there was no enemy to
attack in the direction I had been ordered to move, I then
formed my brigades in line across the railroad facing towards
Bristow Station, and sent to find Gordon, for the purpose of
moving against the force behind the railroad at the station,
according to instructions I had received from General Lee.
After a time one of Gordon's staff officers came up with the
information that he was facing a heavy cavalry force
immediately in his front from which he could not retire easily,
and that there was a very large train of wagons about
Brentsville. Gordon's brigade was more than one-third of my
division, and with the other brigades I was not strong enough to
advance against the enemy's position, especially as there was a
very dense thicket of
Page 306
young pines intervening between my position and that of the
enemy which rendered an advance in line almost impossible.
It was now getting late, it being very nearly dark, and though
Johnson's division was ordered up to my assistance, before it
could reach me it became entirely dark, so as to put a stop to all
further operations that night. Very early next morning I advanced
towards the station, but the enemy was found to have made good
his retreat during the night. I then halted my division, and moved
on to Manassas Junction with a regiment, in order to reconnoitre,
picking up some stragglers on the way. The enemy was found to
have crossed Bull Run and taken position behind it. Our cavalry
advanced up to the Run and had some skirmishing with the
enemy, but our army did not make any further movement
forward.
We then proceeded to destroy the bridge over Broad Run
and Kettle Run and to tear up the railroad, burning the cross-ties
and bending the rails by heating them.
On the march from Rapidan, Brigadier General Pegram, who
had been assigned to the command of Smith's brigade, joined us,
General Smith, who had been elected Governor of Virginia,
having resigned at the close of the Pennsylvania campaign.
Page 307
CHAPTER XXVIII.
DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY.
WE remained near Bristow two or three days, but were
unable to supply our army in this position, and as the enemy had
destroyed the bridge over the Rappahannock on his retreat, we
crossed the river on a pontoon bridge. Our army then occupied
the line of the Rappahannock, and remained there until the 7th of
November, my division after several moves finally going into
camp in rear of Brandy Station, Rodes covering Kelly's Ford on
the right, with Johnson between us, while Hill was on the left.
We still held the crossing of the Rappahannock at the railroad
bridge with a pontoon bridge across the river and a
tete du pont
covering it.
Meade in the meantime had gradually moved his army up to
the vicinity of Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, and we had
sent forward, on several occasions, wagons strongly guarded by
infantry to bring back the rails that had been torn up from the
railroad between Bealton and the river. On the last of these
expeditions, which was protected by my division, a considerable force
of the enemy's cavalry was encountered at Bealton and driven off.
The tete du pont
in front of the Rappahannock was
occupied by a brigade detailed alternately from my division and
Johnson's with a battery of artillery detailed from the artillery of the
corps.
On the morning of the 9th of November, his position was
occupied by Hays' brigade under the command of Colonel
Penn of the 7th Louisiana Regiment, and Green's
battery of artillery of four guns, while some works on
the south bank, immediately in rear of the
tete
du pont, were
occupied by Graham's and Dance's batteries of artillery.
The tete du pont itself consisted of a line of rifle
Page 308
trenches encircling the bridge and resting on the river above and
below, near the right of which were two small redoubts
embraced in the circle of works, one of which had been
constructed in the spring of 1862 when our troops fell back from
Manassas to face to the north, and the other had been
constructed by the enemy subsequently to face to the north, both
being remodelled for the use of artillery. The rifle pits were
slight, affording in themselves no obstacle to the passage of a
force over them unless held by an opposing force, and the
redoubts were imperfectly remodelled--while there was no
obstruction in front, in the way of ditches, abattis or otherwise.
The work was completely commanded by higher positions in
front, on ridges behind which a cover for the advance of troops
from that direction was afforded, while, on the immediate right of
the point at which the rifle pits touched the river, on that flank, the
railroad approached to the bank of the stream by a high
embankment of earth, with a walled opening in it for the passage
of a road just in front of that part of the work. In rear of the tete
du pont the river was rendered impassable except over the
bridge, which was near the right, by a mill dam which backed up
the water, making a pond extending along the entire rear of the
work, the bridge being across this pond.
The works in rear of the bridge occupied by Graham's and
Dance's batteries consisted of a redoubt that been constructed by
the enemy on that side and which had been turned, and some
sunken pits for guns on the left of it, the ground occupied by these
works being lower than the tete du pont in front. Some sunken
pits for artillery had been made on the south side of the river on
the right of the railroad in low, flat ground so as to sweep
the east side of the railroad embankment that was on the north,
but was unoccupied; there were also rifle trenches connected
with this epaulment, and lower down to cover a point at which
the enemy had had a bridge. The works which were occupied on
the south bank really
Page 309
afforded no protection to those on the north, but merely
served to command the bridge itself in the event of the
tete du pont being carried, as the fire from the guns posted
in them would be over the latter, in order to reach an
advancing enemy.
Early in the day of the 7th, a small force of infantry appeared
in front of the tete du pont, beyond the range of the artillery
there posted, passing down the river, and a little before
noon a heavy force of infantry was developed in
front of the works, forming a line of battle encircling
them, but still out of range of our artillery; and still later a large
force was seen passing down the river, that in front still
remaining in line of battle.
The enemy confronting this position, subsequently ascertained
to be two corps, the 5th and 6th, under Sedgwick, then
commenced advancing by gradual steps, coming up a little nearer
each time and forming a new line of battle; and Colonel Penn,
who had three of his regiments advanced to the front and on the
flanks, so as to cover the main position with a line of pickets while
one was in reserve in the trenches, and the other was on picket on
the river on the south bank, was compelled to retire his advanced
regiments gradually, until they were withdrawn into the woods,
leaving only a line of skirmishers in front as far as their safety
would permit. On the first appearance of the enemy in force,
Colonel Penn had sent me a dispatch informing me of the fact, but
as my camp was fully five miles off it did not reach me until a
little before 2 P.M.
I immediately signalled the information to General Lee and
General Ewell, and ordered my other brigades, then engaged in
constructing huts for quarters, to be moved to the front as soon as
they could be got together. As this required some time, I rode in
advance towards the position occupied by my brigade on picket,
and at Brandy Station received another dispatch from Colonel
Penn informing me that the enemy still remained in his front in line
of battle with a very heavy force. For fear
Page 310
that the information by signal had not reached General Ewell, as I
understood he was coming up towards Brandy Station, I sent my
Adjutant General, Major John W. Daniel, to meet him and
communicate the contents of the two dispatches to him.
Before reaching the river I encountered General Lee, who
had not received my dispatch, and together we proceeded to the
river, where we arrived a little after three o'clock. I immediately
crossed over to Penn's position and going out in front of the
skirmish line, then considerably advanced, I discovered a very
heavy force which was gradually but very slowly and cautiously
moving up, encircling the whole position. Penn's regiments had
been drawn in, including the one on picket below, except one
company still left on picket at that point, and now occupied the
trenches, which they could not fully man, while the guns of
Green's battery were posted in the works on the right.
After fully reconnoitring in front I rode back across the river
and communicated the state of the case to General Lee. Shortly
after I recrossed the river, the enemy commenced forcing back
our skirmishers, who were compelled to retire towards the works,
and having got possession of the hills in front he opened with a
battery of artillery, his guns being replied to by Graham's and
Dance's with little or no effect, as the distance was too great.
The enemy's skirmishers in very heavy line continued to advance,
forcing ours back to the protection of the line of works,
and a portion of his getting to the river bank about half a mile
below the right of the tete du pont. An attempt was then
made to send one of Dance's guns to the pits on the right of
the railroad, but the advance of the enemy's skirmishers
up the opposite bank of the river caused it to be abandoned, for
fear of losing the horses.
At four o'clock, General Hays, who had been detained from
his brigade by his duties as a member of a court martial,
arrived and assumed command of the tete du pont.
Page 311
In a short time afterwards the three regiments of Hoke's
brigade, forming the advance of the rest of the division, came up,
and I sent them across the river, under command of Colonel
Godwin, to the support of Hays. General Lee directed me to send
no more troops across the river, but retain the others on the south
side, and Gordon was moved to the right to occupy a hill further
down the river, while Pegram's brigade was formed in line in rear
of the hill occupied by Graham's and Dance's batteries, the 31st
Virginia being sent to occupy the rifle trenches at the gun pits on
the right of the railroad.
The enemy now opened from a battery on our left and
soon from another on our right, and the fire of these batteries,
which crossed in rear of our works, and that from the front
rendered the bridge very unsafe. The fire from Graham's and
Dance's guns seemed to be doing no good, as they could not be
used to advantage by reason of having to fire over the works in
front, and it was therefore stopped by General Lee's orders.
Green's battery, however, under the command of Lieutenant
Moore, continued the fire in front, but was greatly overmatched.
On crossing the river, which was under the enemy's artillery
fire, Godwin's three brigades were put in the trenches covering
the river above the bridge--three regiments of Hays' brigade, the
6th, 9th and 8th, being on the right and the 5th and 7th on the
extreme left. The portion of the trenches occupied by the 6th, 9th
and 8th regiments of Hays' brigade covered the bridge and to the
right of it and on this part of the works were the four guns of
Green's battery.
The enemy continued his artillery fire vigorously and rapidly
until dark, his skirmishers in the meantime advancing in such
heavy force as to drive ours into the works, and themselves
coming up to within easy rifle range of the trenches. Just at dark
the enemy's force advanced in heavy columns immediately in
front of the position occupied by Hays' three regiments and our
artillery, one of the columns moving up to within a short
Page 312
distance under cover of the railroad embankment and then
suddenly debouching through the opening made for the passage
of the road, before mentioned.
This assault was resolutely met by Hays' men and Green's
guns, who poured a destructive fire into the advancing masses
of the enemy, breaking the heavy line of skirmishers preceding
the columns, but these columns came on in such strong force
and such rapid succession that after a brief but obstinate
resistance, Hays' men were literally overpowered by numbers in
the trenches, which they held to the last, without attempting to
leave them. The enemy also rushed upon the guns at the same
time and, meeting with little or no obstacle from the works
themselves, overpowered the gunners at their posts.
When the guns were taken General Hays made an attempt to
recapture them, but the enemy coming up in still further force in
front rendered the attempt abortive. The part of the line now
taken was within a hundred yards of the northern end of the
bridge and completely commanded it, so that all the force on the
left was completely cut off from retreat.
An attack made on Godwin's front simultaneously with that
on Hays' right, but not in as strong force, had been repulsed by
the 54th North Carolina Regiment, and when Godwin learned that
Hays' line was broken, be endeavored to move to his assistance,
but the enemy had now got between the trenches and the river
and commenced moving up a strong force against Godwin's right,
at the same time that another advanced against him in front. He
was therefore compelled to abandon a part of the trenches on his
right and present front, as well as he could in the darkness, to the
two forces, thus assailing him in different directions, so as to try
to cut his way to the bridge.
He made a resolute struggle, but the enemy threw
such a force between him and the bridge that the attempt
to reach it was hopeless, and the rest of his men were
Page 313
forced to abandon the trenches on the left. His three regiments
and the two Louisiana regiments on his left were now completely
surrounded, the enemy encircling them in front and on the flanks,
while an impassable river was in their rear. Nevertheless, Colonel
Godwin continued to struggle, rallying and encouraging his men
as he retired from point to point towards the river, until he
himself, with only about seventy men still remaining to him, was
overpowered and taken by an irresistible force, without
surrendering himself or his command. A like fate befell the 5th
and 7th Louisiana Regiments.
I had remained with General Lee, by his direction, on the hill
in rear near Dance's guns, where he had taken his position,
observing the enemy's movements as well as we could, until very
nearly or about dark. When the enemy's artillery fire ceased, we
had discovered some movement of his infantry, but we could see
so indistinctly that we could not tell what it meant. We saw the
flashes of the rifles from our trenches and from the guns on the
side of the river, but a very heavy wind was blowing, so that we
could hear no sounds, not even that of our guns, which were not
more than three or four hundred yards from us.
After this firing had continued some minutes, perhaps twenty
or thirty, it slackened, and not hearing from it, we were of the
opinion that it was at the enemy's skirmishers. General Lee then,
expressing the opinion that the movement of the enemy in our
front at this point was probably intended merely as a
reconnoissance or feint, and that it was too late for him to
attempt anything serious that night, concluded to retire, leaving
with me two dispatches for General Ewell.
A short time before we saw the last firing, I had sent my
Inspector General, Major Hale, on foot across the bridge to
direct General Hays and Colonel Godwin to send and have
rations brought up for their men, and just as I was preparing to
send off the two dispatches left with me for General Ewell,
Major Hale returned
Page 314
and informed me that when he saw General Hays the enemy
was advancing against him, but he and his men were all right and
in good spirits and that he then went to Colonel Godwin, whom he
found all right, but as he was returning across the bridge he saw
one or two of Hays' men coming off, who said the enemy had
just broken through the line, the Major himself expressing the
opinion that the statement was entirely false. It was now very
dark and objects could not be seen at a very short distance.
General Lee could not have then gone more than a few hundred
yards since he left me.
Though I did not think the information brought could be true,
as what I had witnessed did not indicate such a result, yet I sent
Major Daniel to ascertain the truth, and ordered Pegram to
move his brigade to the bridge immediately and Graham and
Dance to man their guns. I then started to the bridge and soon
met Major Daniel, who informed me he had just seen General
Hays, who had made his escape, and that the greater part of his
brigade was captured, the enemy in possession of the works, and
Godwin cut off from the bridge.
Pegram's brigade was then hurried up to the bridge to
prevent the enemy from crossing and Gordon's was sent for,
information of the disaster being sent to General Lee at once.
Godwin's regiments had not yet been captured, and I had the
mortification of seeing the flashes of their rifles, and hearing their
capture without being able to render them the slightest
assistance, as it would have been folly to attempt to cross the
bridge, and I could not open with the guns on the south side, as it
was so very dark that nothing was visible, and we would have
been as apt to fire into our own men as into the enemy.
A number of Hays' officers and men had been able to effect their
escape by slipping off in the dark, after the works were
in possession of the enemy, many swimming the river
and others getting over the bridge. Some of Godwin's
officers and men also effected their escape by swimming
the river, and others by slipping down the
Page 315
banks of it to the bridge, while the enemy was engaged in
securing the rest. General Hays had effected his escape after he
was entirely surrounded by the enemy, and was in their power,
by his horse's taking fright at a musket fired near him and dashing
off, when a number of shots were fired at him, and finding that
he had to run the gauntlet anyhow, he made for the bridge and
escaped unhurt.
A regiment from Pegram's brigade had been sent to the end
of the bridge and the rest of the brigade formed in line in rear of
it. To have attempted to cross the rest of my command over the
bridge would have but added to the disaster, and therefore, after
waiting for some time to give an opportunity to all the men to
escape who could, and ascertaining definitely the capture of the
regiments on the left, and that the enemy had a guard at the
further end, the bridge was fired at the end next us, and so
destroyed that it could not be used by the enemy.
Receiving orders from General Lee to move back to my
camp, I did so at three o'clock in the morning, after having sent
off Graham's and Dance's batteries.
The loss in my division in this affair was 5 killed, 35 wounded,
and 1593 missing, making a total of 1630. The loss in Green's
battery was 1 killed and 41 missing, total 42, making the loss
altogether 1672, besides the four guns and the small arms. The
killed are those who were known to be killed, and the wounded
were those who got off. Doubtless there were a number killed
and wounded who were put down in the missing, but the enemy
came up to the works firing but very little, and therefore the loss
in that respect was comparatively slight.
Nearly three hundred of Hays' officers and men, between
one hundred and one hundred and fifty from the three regiments
under Godwin, and twenty men of Green's battery made their
escape. A considerable number of the men in both brigades
were engaged in getting timber for building huts at the time and
were not present with their brigades, thus escaping capture.
Page 316
The total force occupying the works was a little over two
thousand, and the force which attacked them consisted of two
corps, numbering probably over thirty thousand men. The result
of the attack was unavoidable, and I fully exempted my officers
and men from all blame. If the enemy chose to make the attack
his success was inevitable. The works were of too slight a
character to enable a body of troops to hold them against such
overwhelming numbers. When the enemy reached the works he
had no trouble in walking over them, as there were no ditches or
obstructions in front.
In constructing these works too great reliance had been
placed in the want of enterprise on the part of the enemy, and
there was but one mode of approach to or retreat from them, so
that when the works were carried in front of the only bridge
there was, the fate of the rest of the command was sealed. The
enemy on this occasion had more enterprise than had been
presumed on, and hence the disaster.
This was the first serious disaster that had befallen any of my
immediate commands, either as a brigade or division commander,
since the commencement of the war, and I felt that I was not
responsible for it, though I bitterly regretted it.
The same afternoon three corps of the enemy had attacked
Rodes at Kelly's and forced a passage there, inflicting on his
division some loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
On the next morning, the 8th we formed a line of battle, a
mile or two in rear of Brandy Station, Ewell's corps occupying
the right, with its left, my division, resting on the road to Culpeper
Court-House, and Hill's corps occupying the left, with his right
connecting with my left. In this position we awaited the advance of
the enemy all day, but he made no attack on us, though there
was some fighting on Hill's left with the enemy's cavalry. Being now in a
very unfavorable position, and having no good line to occupy in
Culpeper, we fell back that night to the
Page 317
Rapidan, and next morning crossed over and occupied our old
positions. Meade's army also occupied very much the same
positions it had previously occupied, and the line of pickets on the
Rapidan was re-established.
While we were in Culpeper on this occasion we discovered
that Meade's army had almost entirely devastated that county.
Many beautiful residences of gentlemen had been pulled down,
and some within sight of Meade's own headquarters, for the
purpose of making huts for the soldiers and chimneys to the
officers' tents. It was a scene of desolation, and the population
was almost gone. I had been on the track of this army under all
the other commanders, but I think it committed more
depredations under Meade than under any of the rest, not
excepting Pope himself.
After resuming our positions on the Rapidan, the condition of
things was pretty much as it had been before, the enemy making
some demonstrations but no serious movement until the last of
the month.
A little after the middle of the month, General Ewell's health
had been impaired, and I succeeded temporarily to the command
of the corps.
There had been some demonstrations with the enemy's
cavalry force, and General Lee, apprehending that the enemy
might attempt to turn our right by moving across some of the
lower fords, directed me to examine all the country on our right
as far as Mine Run, and ascertain if a line could be formed there,
extending towards Verdierville on the Plank road, which we could
occupy in the event of an advance in that quarter; and to make
myself familiar with all the roads. Our right, then held by Rodes'
division, covered Morton's Ford and extended around to the river
above the mouth of Mountain Run--the extreme right flank being
unfavorably located, and liable to be turned, not only by a
movement across at Germana Ford, but also at Jacob's Ford
higher up, and from our right, as well as at some other points in
the neighborhood.
Page 318
After a careful examination of the country, I selected a line
to be connected with Rodes' right, by throwing the latter back
from the river and then running the new line in its prolongation
across Mountain Run, and a road leading past Rodes' rear to
Bartlett's Mill, to Locust Grove, to Black Walnut Run above
Bartlett's Mill, from which point the line could be still further
prolonged past Zoar Church to Verdierville, if necessary, on a
dividing ridge between the waters of Black Walnut and Mine
Runs, which streams united just above Bartlett's Mill. Johnson's
division which had been camped in the rear was then moved up
to construct and occupy the right of the line extending from
Mountain Run to Black Walnut.
While we were engaged in constructing this new line, with a
view to its further prolongation if necessary, so as to cover all the
roads coming in from the right between the Plank road and the
river, on the 26th of November, Meade's army was discovered to
be in motion towards the fords below on our right, and
preparations were at once made to meet it.
Fitz. Lee's cavalry was ordered to relieve our pickets, and
late in the afternoon of that day Rodes' division was moved
across Black Walnut to the right of Johnson on the ridge
extending towards Zoar Church, and my own division under the
command of General Hays was withdrawn from its position and
concentrated with a view of moving next morning on the old
stone pike leading from Orange Court-House to Fredericksburg
by the way of Locust Grove or Robertson's Tavern, and the old
Wilderness Tavern so as to get on Rodes' right in prolongation
of the line.
Page 319
CHAPTER XXIX.
SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN
GENERAL LEE had discovered that the enemy was
crossing some of his troops as low down as Germana Ford, and
to prevent him from getting too far to his rear, he determined to
move forward, and not await the advance against this new line;
and during the night I was ordered to advance at daylight next
morning as far as Locust Grove on the three roads leading to that
point, to wit: the stone pike, the road by Zoar Church, and the
one by Bartlett's Mill.
In accordance with General Lee's instructions, the three
divisions of the corps were advanced at light on the morning of
the 27th, as follows: my own division under Hays on the stone
pike on the right, Rodes' on the road by Zoar Church, and
Johnson's on the road by Bartlett's Mill; and while the troops
were moving forward I rode to meet General Lee at Verdierville,
in accordance with a request from him to that effect.
Rodes' was a little in advance of the other divisions, and as
the advance of his column came in view of the open ground
around Locust Grove (Robertson's Tavern) a very large force of
the enemy was discovered moving up and occupying the high
ground at that point. General Rodes then formed his division in
line across the road on which he was advancing, in a body of
woods, and the point at which that road united with the one by
Bartlett's Mill on which Johnson was. In a short time Hays came
up from Bartlett's Mill and finding Rodes in position in possession
of Locust Grove, formed his line across that load confronting him--
Johnson in the meantime coming up from Bartlett's Mill and
finding Rodes in positon in front of him, halted his division along
the road with his advance a short distance in rear of Rodes' line,
and his division extending back towards Bartlett's Mill, so as to
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make his position nearly at right angles with the line occupied by
Rodes. The enemy opened with artillery on both Rodes and
Hays, and some skirmishing ensued.
While I was in consultation with General Lee at
Verdierville, the information that the enemy had been
encountered at Locust Grove, reached me in the afternoon,
and I rode to the front to Hays' position. I found the
enemy occupied commanding ground in front and around
Locust Grove, while the position Hays had been
compelled to assume was low and very unfavorable. The
enemy's guns raked the road as far as they could reach,
and each side of it the ground, ascending towards the
enemy, was very rough and so obstructed with young
pines and underbrush as to make an advance very difficult.
Causing Hays to connect his left with Rodes' right and
so post his troops as to render them as secure as possible,
I rode to Rodes' position, which I found equally disadvantageous
for defence or attack. General Rodes informed
me that the force seen entering the plains around
Locust Grove was very heavy and that it was evident
other troops were moving up to that position.
After reconnoitring I was fully satisfied that I could not
make an attack upon the enemy with advantage, and that he had
decidedly the advantage of the ground for attacking me. An
examination of the ground on Hays' right had caused me to
suppose that an attack might be made on the enemy's left by a
force coming up on that flank from the Plank road, and
information of that fact had been sent to General Lee.
While we were endeavoring to find out all we could about
the enemy's position and strength, a little before sunset, General
Johnson sent me word (to the point of intersection of the Bartlett's
Mill and Zoar Church roads where I then was, just in Rodes'
rear) that a party of the enemy had fired on his ambulances, on
the road from Bartlett's Mill. I had received information that a
body of the enemy's cavalry had crossed in front of Fitz. Lee at
Morton's Ford, and had been cautioned by General
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Fitz. Lee to look out for my left flank against molestation of the
enemy's cavalry, and supposing the party firing on Johnson's train
might be a body of cavalry that had crossed at some of the fords
below Morton's, I sent word to General Johnson that such was
my opinion and directed him to attack and drive off the cavalry.
He at once formed his division and moved forward to the attack,
soon encountering, instead of a cavalry force, a very heavy force
of infantry advancing towards the Bartlett's Mill road.
A very heavy engagement with both artillery and infantry
ensued, in which Johnson's division encountered the enemy's 3rd
corps under French, supported by the 6th corps under Sedgwick,
and, after a very obstinate fight lasting until after dark, Johnson
effectually checked the enemy's advance, driving his troops back,
and maintaining full occupation of the road. His brigades behaved
with great gallantry, encountering many times their own numbers,
and by the check thus given to the enemy in this quarter saved
the whole corps from a very serious disaster, for if the enemy
had got possession of this road, he would have been able to come
up in rear of the other division, while they were confronting the
large force at Locust Grove.
During the engagement one of Rodes' brigades was taken
from his left and sent to Johnson's assistance, but before it
arrived the action had closed. Johnson's division did not then
exceed 4,000 men, if it reached that number. The two corps
moving against it numbered not less than 30,000 men, though
French's corps, the 3rd, was the only one which became actually
engaged.
This affair satisfied me that the enemy's whole army was in
the immediate neighborhood, and as Ewell's corps, under my
command, was then in a most unfavorable position, I determined
to fall back across Mine Run about two miles in our rear, where I
had observed a good position as I passed on. Accordingly after
Johnson's fight was over, and all his wounded and dead had been
collected
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as far as practicable, in the darkness, the divisions were
withdrawn across Mine Run, my own and Rodes' on the stone
pike, and Johnson's on the road to Zoar Church. Division
commanders were directed to place their divisions in position at
light next morning, on the west side of the run, Hays' left and
Rodes' right resting on the stone pike, and Johnson's division
across the Zoar Church road so as to connect with Rodes' left.
Anderson's division of Hill's corps had been sent from the Plank
road to my assistance, by General Lee, arriving about dark in rear
of Hays' right, and before withdrawing my own troops I
communicated to General Anderson my purpose, and he also
withdrew across the run, so as to take position on Hays' right next
morning. A strong line of pickets having been posted in front, the
troops lay down on their arms a short time before day to rest
from their fatigue.
In the affair between Johnson's division and the enemy's 3rd
corps, there was some loss of valuable officers and men in killed
and wounded, among the former being Randolph of the Stonewall
Brigade, and among the latter Brigadier General J. M. Jones; but
a much heavier loss was inflicted on the enemy.
After light on the morning of the 28th I rode to see General
Lee at Verdierville for the purpose of advising him fully of the
condition of things and receiving his further instructions. After
being there a short time, information was sent me that the enemy
was advancing on the stone pike from Locust Grove, and on
riding to the front I found his skirmishers on the hills beyond Mine
Run. The line on the west bank was now taken and the men
commenced strengthening it with rifle trenches. Previous to this
time not a spade of earth had been thrown up on the whole line.
In the course of the day the enemy moved up his whole force in
our front; Hill's corps, which had come up, having taken position
on my right extending across to the Plank road, and covering that
also.
Some skirmish firing ensued between the advance line
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of skirmishers, but no serious move was made by the enemy.
Our position was a very good one and it was rapidly
strengthened with the ordinary rifle trenches and some
epaulments for artillery. The enemy's position on the opposite
banks of Mine Run was also a strong one for defence, the
ground there being a little higher than that occupied by us; and he
proceeded to throw up strong epaulments for his artillery in
numerous favorable positions. A direct attack from either side
would have been attended with great difficulties, on account of
the necessity of having to descend the slopes to Mine Run and
then after crossing that stream to ascend the opposite slopes
under the fire of artillery as well as infantry.
As the enemy had crossed the river to attack us, we calmly
awaited his assault for several days, with full confidence that we
would be able to punish him severely for disturbance of us at this
inclement season.
The weakest part of the line occupied by me was on the left,
where Mine Run made a turn somewhat around that flank, so as
to afford the enemy an opportunity of placing guns in position to
partially enfilade the line. He was slow, however, to take
advantage of this, and our lines at the exposed parts were
protected in some measure by traverses hastily made. On the
30th, he was observed moving troops to his right beyond our left,
and dispositions were made to meet him by extending Johnson's
line to the rear around towards Zoar Church. There had been
occasional artillery firing by the enemy, and on this day he opened
quite heavily for a time, our fire being generally reserved for the
attack when it should be made. Andrews' battalion of artillery,
however, near Johnson's left, supported by some guns from the
reserve artillery, replied to the enemy's for a time.
A force of infantry crossing Mine Run in front of my division,
under cover of some woods on the bank of the stream,
came up to an imperfect line of trenches in front,
which had been abandoned for a better and shorter line
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in their rear and were then only held by a line of skirmishers, but
was soon compelled to retire.
The enemy had possession of Bartlett's Mill road which ran
on our left towards the fords above, and connected with a road
from Bartlett's Mill to Zoar Church in our rear; and as there was
great danger of our left being turned in this direction, a watch
was kept by videttes and pickets on that flank, so as to advise us
of any movement, and enable us to move the line in prolongation
until it connected with the one on the river.
The enemy made no such movement, however, and though
on the 30th there were indications as if he were going to attack
our left, yet he did not do so.
At the same time there had been indications of a purpose to
attack our right beyond the Plank road, and corresponding
movements were made to meet an attack there.
We remained in position awaiting the enemy's movements
until December, when, all purpose to attack on his part being
apparently abandoned, General Lee determined to attack him on
his left flank, and for that purpose drew out two of Hill's divisions
on the right to make the attack early next morning, the other
division being moved to occupy their positions and my divisions
being extended out to the right to occupy the part of the line
evacuated by Hill's left division (Anderson's). During the night,
however, the enemy withdrew from our front, and next morning
he was found gone.
As soon as this was discovered I moved forward with the
whole corps on the stone pike and then towards Germana Ford,
capturing some two or three hundred prisoners, but the enemy's
main force had crossed the river early in the morning. [* After
going to within a short distance
](note18)
*
Though Meade's performance on this occasion was somewhat
like that of a King of France on a certain occasion, yet he had not
failed to accomplish something towards the "suppression of the
rebellion." There was a little tanyard near Locust Grove, in sight of
his headquarters, which belonged to and was operated by a poor man
who took in hides to tan on shares for the neighbors, but who was in no
wise engaged in tanning for the government or the soldiers. The
community around was very poor, and this was the sole dependence
for shoes for the women and children of that neighborhood. The
tannery building and the house of the owner were burned, the leather
all destroyed, and the hides in the vats taken out and cut to pieces so
as to be worthless. In addition to this, all the plows and farming
utensils, and wheeled vehicles, including old ox-carts and dilapidated
buggies, in the neighborhood and on the road to Germana Ford were
burned, and the houses of a number of citizens ransacked and the
furniture destroyed. In the very few cases where there were pianos or
libraries, the former were hacked to pieces with axes, and the books in
the latter torn up and scattered over the ground, private papers
sharing the same fate. I saw the evidences of these things myself. The
women and children around Locust Grove had no new shoes that winter,
and the people in all that country were deprived of the means of
properly cultivating their crops next season, to say nothing of those
who lost what little source of amusement, recreation or mental
employment there was left to them.
Can it be doubted that this was
calculated to break the spirit of the
"rebellion"? Meade's expedition to Mine Run accomplished this
much if no
more.
Page 325
of Germana Ford, and finding that there was no prospect
of accomplishing anything further, I returned that night
across Mine Run and encamped. The next day we returned to
our former positions and the old state of things was
resumed.
During our absence a division of the enemy's cavalry had
crossed at Morton's Ford, and after some fighting, had been
compelled by Fitz. Lee's cavalry to retire.
The loss in the corps during this affair was slight, nearly the
whole of it being sustained by Johnson's division in the fight of
the 27th.
Page 326
CHAPTER XXX.
AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
A FEW days after our return from Mine Run, General Ewell
came back to the command of the corps, and I returned to my
division, all remaining quiet on the Rapidan.
About the middle of December a force of cavalry and infantry
moved from New Creek on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
up the south branch of the Potomac, under General Averill of the
Federal Army, apparently threatening Staunton in the Valley,
while at the same time another force under Colonel Wells moved
up the Valley from Martinsburg to Strasburg. General Imboden
commanding in the Valley, having only a small brigade of cavalry
and a battery of artillery, applied to General Lee for
reinforcements, and two brigades of Hill's corps, Thomas' and H.
H. Walker's, were sent to Staunton over the railroad, Fitz. Lee's
brigade of cavalry being ordered to move to the Valley also.
General Lee then ordered me to proceed to the Valley and take
command of all the troops there.
I started at once, leaving Orange Court-House by rail and,
reaching Staunton, by reason of some delay on the railroad, after
the middle of the night. I found Thomas' brigade in Staunton, it
having arrived the evening before, ahead of me, and Walker's
had moved out to Buffalo Gap, ten miles beyond Staunton on the
road to McDowell, at or near which place the enemy under
Averill was reported to be.
Very early next morning General Imboden came into town,
and I rode with him to his camp across the mountain from
Buffalo Gap near the Calf Pasture River. He reported that the
enemy's force was about five thousand strong and still
confronted him behind Bull Pasture River, on the other side of
the intervening mountains, where it was watched by a
detachment of his cavalry, and
Page 327
such was the report we found at his camp. After I had been at his
camp but a very short time, a courier came to me with a
telegraphic dispatch from General Lee, who was then in
Richmond, stating that Averill had left the Sweet Springs on the
morning of the day before on the road towards Salem. I then
started back to Buffalo Gap, and on the way I received another
telegraphic dispatch from General Lee, informing me that Averill
had entered Salem on the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad the
morning of that day, and directing me to make arrangements to
capture him.
It turned out that Averill with his cavalry had left the front of
General Imboden at least two days before I started from Orange,
leaving the small infantry force with him, under Colonel Thoburn,
to amuse Imboden's pickets, and that Thoburn had also started
back to the valley of the South Branch before I arrived. Imboden
was ordered to bring his brigade back to Buffalo Gap, that night,
for the purpose of being sent after Averill.
The question was how to cut off Averill's retreat, as he had
several ways of getting back to a safe position. He might return
the way he went--go up the railroad and then by the way of
Blacksburg in Montgomery--come back by the way of Fincastle to
Covington--or by the way of Buchanan and Lexington through the
Valley, there being numerous intervening roads between these
main routes which afforded him ample facilities for escape if he
had good guides. After consultation with General Imboden, who
was very familiar with the country, I determined to send his
brigade to Covington next day, where it would be in a position to
intercept Averill's retreat on the road by that place or move to the
right and intercept him at Callahan's if he returned the same way
he went.
During the night it rained in perfect torrents--such a rain as I
have rarely seen--and by the next morning all the streams were
very high. The direct route to Covington was down the valley of
the Little Calf Pasture crossing that stream many times, across
Big Calf Pasture
Page 328
and Cow Pasture Rivers. Little Calf Pasture itself, it was evident
from the condition of the very small streams at Buffalo, would be
impassable where there were no bridges, and there was no bridge
over the Cow Pasture, quite a large river, on this route. It was,
therefore, impossible for him to go the direct road, but being
informed by him that there was a bridge over the Cow Pasture
not far above its junction with Jackson's River, which could be
reached by going through Rockbridge, and avoiding the other
streams, I ordered him to take that route, which was by the way
of Brownsburg.
The infantry brigades I determined to move back to Staunton,
to be used for the defence of that place in the event of Averill's
moving that way, as it was useless to be sending them after
cavalry over such a track of country. Colonel Wm. L. Jackson
was at Jackson's River Depot at the termination of the Central
Railroad, with about five hundred men of his brigade dismounted,
and that covered a route by Clifton Forge from Fincastle up the
river to Covington. Railroad communication with him was cut by
the previous destruction of the bridge over Cow Pasture, but there
was telegraphic communication with him, and he was ordered to
keep a lookout and make disposition to stop Averill if he came
that way. I expected to find Fitz. Lee in the valley by this time,
either at Staunton or farther down, and I rode to that place to
order him to such point as might be advisable after I heard what
route Averill had taken.
On arriving at Staunton, I found General Fitz. Lee himself,
who had come in advance of his brigade, which had crossed the
mountain at Swift Run Gap. I was now in telegraphic
communication with General Nichols at Lynchburg, and from him
I received information that Averill had started back on the same
route he came, but was stopped by high water at Craig's Creek
some twelve or fifteen miles from Salem. I, therefore, determined
to order Fitz. Lee to Covington by the way of Lexington and
Colliertown, at which latter place Imboden was ordered
Page 329
to unite with him. His brigade passed through Staunton late that
afternoon, and General Lee followed very early next morning,
with instructions to make all necessary arrangements to capture
the raiding force, and with directions to move to any point that
might be necessary according to the information which he might
receive either at Lexington or elsewhere.
About the middle of the day I received a telegraphic dispatch
from General Nichols covering one from an operator, stating that
he had gone on the railroad that morning to within a mile of
Salem, and that Averill was returning to that place, having been
unable to cross Craig's Creek. If this was true, Averill must then
attempt to make his escape by the way of the western route by
Blacksburg, or the northern route by the way of Buchanan, and
taking it for granted that it was true, I at once sent a copy by a
courier to General Lee for his information, stating to him at the
same time that as he was much nearer to Averill than I was, he
might have other information on which to act, and leaving it to his
discretion to move to Buchanan or to Covington as his
information might justify.
When my dispatch reached General Lee he had united with
Imboden at Colliertown, and after consultation with the latter he
determined to move to Buchanan, as he had no information
which warranted him in supposing that the dispatch from
Lynchburg was not true.
During the night after I had received the dispatch informing
me of Averill's return to Salem, I received another from General
Nichols informing me that the information sent was not true and
that Averill had succeeded after some delay in crossing Craig's
Creek and moving on. It was now too late to reach Fitz. Lee by
courier and I hoped that he might have had some accurate
information.
I now determined to try to reach Jackson's position with one
of the brigades of infantry, and Thomas' was sent next morning
on the railroad, to endeavor to get
Page 330
across Cow Pasture in boats and so reach Jackson. The running
stock of the railroad was in such bad condition, and the grades
beyond Millboro were so heavy, having a temporary track with
inclined planes at an unfinished part of the road beyond that point,
that Thomas' brigade could not get any further. I ran down on the
road myself to see if the brigade could not be thrown to some
point to intercept the enemy. Arriving just at night I found
General Thomas in telegraphic communication with Jackson, and
the information was soon received that Averill's advance had
made its appearance on an obscure road across the mountains
into the Jackson's River Valley, and that a small part of Jackson's
men were skirmishing with the enemy. This road came in above
Jackson's main position, and the party watching it was soon
forced back, and Averill's force got into the road between
Jackson and the bridge above him, which bridge was guarded by
a party of some eight or ten reserves, who abandoned their post.
The enemy thus got possession of the bridge and commenced
crossing rapidly. Jackson, in the meantime, moved up and
attacked the enemy's rear, which he threw into great confusion,
capturing over two hundred prisoners. In his alarm the enemy set
fire to the bridge, thus cutting off all of his wagons, and some two
or three hundred of his men. The wagons were burned and the
men left behind subsequently moved up the river and forded by
swimming.
All this information was communicated to me that night and
next morning by telegram, and I knew that it was useless to
make any further attempt to cut the enemy off with my infantry,
as he was beyond pursuit of any kind.
When Fitz. Lee reached Buchanan and found Averill was not
coming that way, he moved by the way of Fincastle in pursuit,
and ascertaining what route Averill had taken, he then went to
Covington and from there followed to Callahan's, but the greater
part of the raiding party
Page 331
had made its escape, so he desisted from what was then a
useless effort. The facts were that on going back on the route he
had come, from the Sweet Springs, Averill found his retreat cut
off that way by Echol's brigade of General Sam Jones' force from
Southwestern Virginia, which was posted on what is called Potts'
or Middle Mountain, and he then turned across toward Covington over
Rich Patch Mountain, being compelled to come into the valley of
Jackson's River at the point he did to reach the bridge on the road
from Clifton Forge to Covington, as there was no bridge on the
direct road to that place. He thus succeeded in making his escape
by the stupidity or treachery of a telegraph operator, but the
amount of damage he had been able to do did not compensate for
the loss of men and horses which he sustained, and the sufferings
the others endured. He had been able to burn a small depot at
Salem with a few supplies in it and one or two small bridges in
the neighborhood, which were rebuilt in a few days. His raid
really amounted to very little except the name of it.
The same night that Averill made his escape by Jackson, I
received a dispatch from General Walker at Staunton informing
me that the force that had been at Strasburg was moving up the
valley, and had passed New Market. I telegraphed to him to
move to the North River at Mount Crawford at once, which he
did early next day. Thomas' brigade was moved back to Staunton,
starting early in the morning, but on account of the condition of
the road, did not reach there until nearly night. On arriving at
Staunton myself, I rode out to Walker's position eighteen miles
beyond, leaving orders for Thomas to march up during the night.
On reaching Walker I found that the enemy was in Harrisonburg,
and I ordered an advance early next morning.
At light next day, Thomas came up, both brigades
moving forward. The enemy was found to have retired
during the night, leaving a small cavalry rear guard,
which retreated as we came up. I had no cavalry except
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a few stragglers from different cavalry commands, which I could
employ only as scouts to observe the movements of the enemy,
but I pushed on in pursuit. After passing Harrisonburg, a
battalion of mounted men exempt from regular service by age or
otherwise, called the Augusta Raid Guards, came up, and were
ordered forward in pursuit, but accomplished nothing. According
to the organization of the command, the men were not bound to
go beyond the limits of any adjoining county, and when they
reached the Shenandoah line they halted, standing upon their
legal rights, though it may be doubted if they would have stood
upon them if the enemy had turned back.
This force of the enemy had now got beyond reach, and
Thomas' brigade was halted at Lacy's Springs after having
marched thirty-six miles since after nightfall the evening before.
Walker's moved on to New Market and halted there, having then
marched twenty-eight miles.
The movement in this direction had been made to divert
some of the troops from the pursuit of Averill, so as to aid his
escape; and the force making it now retreated rapidly to
Martinsburg. Thomas being moved up to New Market, I rested
the men a few days, and I then received directions from General
Lee to send a cavalry expedition into the counties of Hardy and
Hampshire to get some cattle and meat for his men. Our army
was now very much straitened for provisions, especially for
meat, of which they were sometimes devoid for days at a time.
As soon as Fitz. Lee had returned from the pursuit of Averill I
ordered him up to the vicinity of New Market, and when his men
and horses had rested a few days he was ordered to cross the
Great North Mountain into Hardy, try and dislodge an infantry
force at Petersburg, cut the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at the
mouth of the South Branch of the Potomac, and of Patterson's
Creek, gather all the beef cattle he could, and likewise get what
of value was to be had.
By the last of December he was ready to move, and
Page 333
started, accompanied by McNeil's company of partisan rangers
and Gilmor's Maryland battalion, crossing the mountain over a
rugged road near Orkney Springs. I started McClanahan's
battery of artillery of Imboden's command with him and some
wagons, but it was now the 1st of January and the weather had
become excessively cold, the thermometer being near zero, and
when the artillery got to the top of the mountain, it was found
that the roads on the other side, which were very steep, were
sheeted with ice, rendering it impracticable to get the artillery
down in safety. The cavalry succeeded in getting down, by the
men being dismounted to lead their horses, but the artillery and
wagons had to be sent back.
To attract attention from this expedition I moved at the same
time down the Valley pike to Fisher's Hill with Thomas' brigade,
preceded by Imboden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, and
remained there until Fitz. Lee's return, Smith being sent beyond
Strasburg to demonstrate towards Winchester. Walker's brigade
had been left at Mount Jackson. While we were at Fisher's Hill,
there were two heavy snows, and there was very hard freezing
weather all the time. The men had no tents and their only shelter
consisted of rude open sheds made of split wood, yet, though
Thomas' was a Georgia brigade, they stood the weather
remarkably well and seemed to take a pleasure in the expedition,
regretting when the time came to fall back.
In the meantime Fitz. Lee had reached Hardy,
attacked a guarded train moving from New Creek to
Petersburg for the supply of that post, captured more
than twenty wagons and some prisoners, invested the
post at Petersburg, which he found strongly fortified, but
having no artillery he abandoned the attempt to dislodge
the enemy without making an attack. He then moved
down to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, destroyed the
bridge over Patterson's Creek and that over the South
Branch partially, collected a large number of cattle, and
came off with the captured wagons, and prisoners, and
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some eight hundred or one thousand head of beef cattle. His
men had been exposed to the same severe weather to which
those at Fisher's Hill had been, and the feet of a few of them had
been frosted. As soon as I heard of his safe return, I moved
back up the valley, and the cattle brought off were sent to the
army.
Not long afterwards, Fitz. Lee's cavalry returned to
the eastern side of the ridge, but its place was taken by
Rosser's brigade, which had come into the valley.
About the last of January I undertook another expedition into
the Hardy Valley for the same objects for which the first had
been made. This I determined to make with Rosser's brigade of
cavalry and one of the brigades of infantry, accompanied by
McClanahan's battery, that being the only artillery there was in
the valley.
Rosser with his brigade, McNeil's company, a part of Gilmor's
battalion, the battery and some wagons passed through Brock's
Gap into the valley of Lost River, while Thomas' brigade moved
over the mountains, at the Orkney Springs pass, to the same
valley. Imboden was left with Walker's brigade of infantry at
Mount Jackson, and his own brigade of cavalry advanced down
the Valley pike towards Winchester, to demonstrate in that
direction. Passing over the mountain to Matthews' on Lost River
in advance of Thomas' brigade I found Rosser at that place,
where we spent the night. From this point the road to Moorefield
ascends to the summit of Branch Mountain and then along that
for several miles, through a wild, mountainous and desolate
looking region, until it comes to the point of descent into the
Moorefield Valley, which latter, a most beautiful and fertile valley
surrounded by high mountains, is reached at the western base of
the mountain on the South Fork of the South Branch.
Starting early in the morning we reached the South Fork
with the cavalry and artillery early in the day, and
leaving the main force there, behind the mountain
intervening between the two forks, McNeil's company was
Page 335
thrown forward to Moorefield and the North Fork, to cover our
front and prevent the enemy, who occupied the fortified
fort at Petersburg eight or ten miles above Moorefield
on the North Fork, from discovering our presence in force;
McNeil's company being composed mainly of men from that
section, and being in the habit of making frequent
raids into the valley.
We had ascertained that a large loaded wagon train
was on the point of starting from New Creek for Petersburg, and
some very trusty scouts perfectly familiar with
the country were watching it. During the night, we were
informed by the scouts that the train of about one hundred
wagons had started, guarded by a force of infantry,
and that it would be on the Patterson Creek road across
Patterson Mountain from Moorefield at an early hour
next day. Rosser immediately made preparations to move with
his brigade and the battery of artillery before light in the morning.
Crossing over Patterson Mountain, he found the road obstructed
with trees felled across it, extending some distance on each side,
and the obstructions defended by a force of infantry.
Dismounting a part of his men, he attacked and drove
the enemy from the obstructions, and clearing the road,
he passed through and soon encountered the train.
The infantry guard was very strong, and McClanahan's guns
were brought into action, when by a vigorous charge the guard
was dispersed, taking refuge in the mountains and over ninety
loaded wagons with their teams, and more than one hundred
prisoners were captured. Fifty of the wagons were sent back
with their teams and loads, but the rest were so badly smashed in
the confusion resulting from the attack, that they could not be
moved; and securing the teams and such of the contents as could
be brought off, the injured wagons were burned.
Rosser had been ordered to move around and take position
on the road north and west of Petersburg, so as to cut off the
retreat of the enemy from that place,
Page 336
against which I proposed moving at light next day, as the infantry
would be up at night, and he proceeded to obey the orders.
Thomas' Georgians, moving along the summit of Branch
Mountain with nothing but wild inaccessible mountains and deep
ravines on each side as far as the eye could reach, could not
understand why they were carried over such a route at this
season and inquired of each other: "What can General Early
mean by bringing us into such a country as this in the midst of
winter?" But when they came suddenly in view of the beautiful
valley of Moorefield and saw spread out before them what
Johnson might have taken as the original of his ideas of the
"Happy Valley" in Rasselas, they burst into wild enthusiasm at the
unexpected scene, so beautiful and inviting even in the midst of
winter and with the tread of an invading enemy upon it.
They were no longer disposed to murmur, and reaching the
vicinity of Moorefield late in the afternoon, their spirits were still
further cheered by the sight of a large number of beautiful girls
rushing out to see and welcome "our" infantry, as they fondly
called it, a sight that had not met the eyes of those warm-hearted
beings since a portion of the force constituting Garnett's ill-starred
expedition had retreated that way early in the war. The Georgians
were ready then to go anywhere. Not discontinuing their march
they were thrown across the North Fork just at dark on the road
to Petersburg, by felling trees from each side so as to interlap,
and enable them to crawl over.
The road to Petersburg passed through a narrow defile
above, just wide enough for a wagon way, with the river on one
side and a very high vertical precipice of rock on the other side,
so as to make it impracticable to pass through the file if held by
any force at all, and it was then strongly picketed by the enemy,
whose main force was in reach. The men bivouacked and kept
as quiet as possible during the night so as not to alarm the enemy
Page 337
and at light next morning I moved with them over the mountain,
on a mere pathway lately unused and nearly grown up with
underbrush, so as to avoid the defile spoken of and get in its rear,
being guided by Captain McNeil with his company.
A thick fog overspread the mountains and the valley, as it was
moist, mild weather, and when we reached the open ground on the
other side where we were within easy artillery range of the
enemy's works, nothing could be seen of them or the town of
Petersburg. We heard some drums beating and an occasional
cheer, and having sent a small force to get in rear of the defile
while I made disposition to advance upon the point where I was
told the enemy's works were, information reached me that Rosser
was in possession of the enemy's works, the force of the latter
consisting of two regiments and some artillery, having evacuated
during the night and taken a rough obscure road to the west
through the mountains of which Rosser had not known.
Some provisions and forage were found in the works which
were appropriated, and Rosser was ordered to move at once
down Patterson Creek, cut the railroad, and gather all the cattle
and sheep he could by sending detachments through the country.
After demolishing the works, which contained several
bomb-proof shelters for men and magazines for ammunition and other
stores, Thomas' brigade was moved back towards Moorefield,
and next day posted so as to cover the approaches from the
direction of Winchester.
The men now had an abundance of provisions, and the
luxury of a little coffee taken from the enemy; and the kind
hospitality of the good people of Moorefield and the vicinity
rendered this winter campaign into the mountains a most pleasant
episode in their army experiences.
Rosser succeeded in cutting the railroad at the mouths of
Patterson Creek and the South Branch where it had been
previously cut by Fitz. Lee, dislodging a guard from
Page 338
the latter place, and also in collecting a considerable number of
cattle and sheep, with which he returned to Moorefield in two or
three days. The enemy, however, had moved from Cumberland
with a large force of infantry and cavalry, and also a brigade of
cavalry from Martinsburg to intercept, but he succeeded in
passing in safety between the columns sent against him.
McNeil's company and part of Gilmor's battalion had been sent
west to the Allegheny Mountains to collect cattle and were now
returning by the way of Petersburg with a good lot of them.
The morning after Rosser's return I made preparations to
retire with the prisoners, plunder, cattle, and sheep in our
possession, and as we were moving out of Moorefield, the
enemy's force consisting of Kelly's command from Cumberland
and Averill's brigade of cavalry came in view on the opposite
banks of the river, and opened with artillery. Thomas' brigade,
which had moved across to the valley of the South Fork, and
commenced retiring, was brought back a short distance and
formed in line across the valley with the artillery in position, while
Rosser's cavalry retiring through Moorefield took position below
Thomas, sending out some skirmishers to encounter those of the
enemy.
The object of this was to enable Captain McNeil to get in
rear with his cattle, with which he was coming up on a road
around our left flank, as we were then faced, and give time to
the wagons and cattle and sheep to get well up the sides of the
mountain, so that they might be protected against the enemy. As
soon as this was done, and we could see the wagons, cattle and
sheep slowly moving up the road on the side of the mountain,
extending over a distance of some two or three miles, we
withdrew gradually, but a small force of the enemy's cavalry
followed at a most respectful distance, to the base of the
mountains, where it halted.
Rosser's brigade took an obscure road to the left
Page 339
across the mountain, so as to come into the valley of Lost River
below Matthews', and Thomas followed the trains. The enemy
did not attempt to molest us further, and he had the mortification
of seeing all the plunder we had obtained marched off in a long
winding train, visible to him for several miles, without being able
to interfere with us. It was not in accordance with the object of
my expedition to give him battle at this time, and I therefore
contented myself with securing what I had.
Everything reached the valley in safety, Rosser taking the
route through Brock's Gap with the wagons, etc., and Thomas
moving across the mountain the same way we had gone. Riding
ahead of the infantry the day after we left Moorefield, I
understood, on the road, there was a report at Mount Jackson
that the enemy was moving up from below in strong force, and
quickening my force I reached Mount Jackson just after the
report had been ascertained to be false, and the commotion had
been allayed. The whole report had originated in the foolish fright
of a small cavalry picket at Columbia Furnace, below, where a
road comes in across the mountain from the valley of Lost River,
which was caused by the approach on that road of a company of
Rosser's men whose homes were in that immediate
neighborhood, they having been allowed to go to them for a day
or two.
When discharged, after crossing the mountain, without
knowing that a picket was near, the men, who had been out in a
rain, commenced discharging their arms, and the picket made off,
not stopping to hear the calls of the men at whose appearance it
had become frightened, but continuing to retreat the faster,
magnifying the force, in imagination, at every step, until, when the
commander of the picket reached General Imboden, with his
horse panting and foaming, it had swelled to two or three thousand
men.
Those things will happen sometimes to the bravest of men.
We were again able to send General Lee's army
Page 340
about a thousand beef cattle, and some few other supplies
which served to keep up the spirits of our much enduring men.
The weather we had had for this expedition was unusually
mild and favorable for that season when, in the section into which
we went, the climate is usually as harsh among the mountains as
it is in that part of Canada bordering on the Lakes.
Shortly after our return, the troops were moved further up the
valley, the two infantry brigades going into camp near
Harrisonburg, and the cavalry going to Rockbridge and the
railroad west of Staunton where forage could be obtained, a small
force being left to picket down the valley.
Major Gilmor subsequently made a raid down the valley, and
captured a train on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.
After the troops had been located, in company with Captain
Hotchkiss, topographical engineer for Ewell's corps, I made a
reconnoissance of the country and mountain passes west of
Staunton and extending across Jackson's River to the mountains
beyond, and selected a line to be fortified so as to prevent raids.
Captain Hotchkiss made a sketch of this line and the country,
which being sent to General Lee, he ordered the necessary
works to be constructed, which I believe was subsequently done.
About the last of February, my services being no longer
necessary in the valley, I left for the purpose of returning to my
division, after a leave of absence of two weeks granted me. In
reaching Gordonsville by the railroad, I ascertained that some
movement was being made by the enemy, and I therefore ran
down to Orange Court-House to be present with my command if
anything serious was going on.
It turned out that the enemy's movement was for the purpose
of a cavalry raid against Richmond. A force being moved
towards Charlottesville on our left, while the main raiding party,
under Kilpatrick, went towards
Page 341
Richmond for the purpose of capturing and burning the city,
releasing the Federal prisoners, and bringing off or killing the
Confederate authorities. This raid proved a ridiculous failure, its
approach to Richmond being prevented by some home guards
and local troops composed of employees in the departments,
while Hampton dispersed a part of it with a few of his cavalry
hastily gotten up. The force moving on Charlottesville retired
from before a few pieces of artillery which had no support.
After this affair was settled I took the benefit of my short
leave--the only indulgence of the kind asked for or received by me
during the whole war.
I returned to my division about the middle of March, and
assumed command, finding it in its old position, nothing serious
having occurred during the winter.
What was left of Hoke's brigade had been detached and sent
under General Hoke to North Carolina, where it participated in
some movements, including the capture of the town of Plymouth,
with its garrison, by Hoke. It did not return to the division until
after the commencement of the subsequent campaign, though it
took part in the defence of Petersburg and the attack on Butler
by General Beauregard.
We remained in position in our old place until the opening of
the spring campaign. In the meantime Major General U. S. Grant
had been assigned to the command of all the armies of the United
States, with the rank of Lieutenant General, and had come to
take immediate command of the army confronting us, which
army was being very greatly strengthened by recruits, drafted
men, and other troops.
The Army of the Potomac under Meade had been
consolidated into three corps instead of five, to-wit: the 2nd,
and 6th, and 9th corps under Burnside, which had been
very greatly increased, was added to the force in our
front. The Army of the Potomac, and the 9th corps,
with the artillery and cavalry, the latter having been
largely increased, constituted Grant's immediate
Page 342
command, though he had a general control of all the forces.
By the last of May it was very evident that the enemy was making
very formidable preparations for a campaign against us, and
to meet them we had but what remained of the army with
which we had fought the year before, recruited since the
close of active operations, only by such men as had recovered
from wounds and sickness, and a few young men who had
just arrived at the age of military service. Longstreet had
returned from his expedition into Tennessee with two of his
divisions, McLaws' and Field's (formerly Hood's), Pickett's
being absent and south of James River.
Page 343
CHAPTER XXXI.
FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES.
ON the 3rd of May, 1864, the positions of the Confederate
Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army under
Lieutenant General Grant in Virginia, were as follows: General
Lee held the southern bank of the Rapidan River, in Orange
County, with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run, and his
left extending to Liberty Mills on the road from Gordonsville (via
Madison Court-House) to the Shenandoah Valley; while the
crossings of the river on the right, and the roads on the left, were
watched by cavalry: Ewell's corps was on the right, Hill's on the
left, and two divisions of Longstreet's corps were encamped in
the rear, near Gordonsville. Grant's army (composed of the Army
of the Potomac under Meade, and the 9th corps under Burnside)
occupied the north banks of the Rapidan and Robinson rivers;
the main body being encamped in Culpeper County and on the
Rappahannock River.
I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed 50,000
effective men of all arms. The report of the Federal Secretary of
War, Stanton, shows that the "available force present for duty,
May 1st, 1864," in Grant's army, was 141,166, to-wit: In the
Army of the Potomac 120,386, and in the 9th corps 20,780. The
draft in the United States was being energetically enforced, and
volunteering had been greatly stimulated by high bounties. The
Northwestern States had tendered large bodies of troops to serve
one hundred days, in order to relieve other troops on garrison and
local duty, and this enabled Grant to put in the field a large
number of troops which had been employed on that kind of duty.
It was known that he was receiving heavy reinforcements up to
the very time of his movement on the 4th of May, and
afterwards; so that the statement of his force on the 1st of
May, by
Page 344
Stanton, does not cover the whole force with which he
commenced the campaign. Moreover, Secretary Stanton's report
shows that there were in the Department of Washington and the
Middle Department, 47,751 available men for duty, the chief part
of which, he says, was called to the front, after the campaign
began, "in order to repair the losses of the Army of the
Potomac;"
and Grant says that, at Spottsylvania Court-House, "the 13th,
14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th (of May) were consumed in
manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from
Washington." His army, therefore, must have numbered very
nearly, if not quite, 200,000 men, before a junction was effected
with Butler.
On the 4th of May, it was discovered that Grant's army was
moving towards Germana Ford on the Rapidan, which was ten or
twelve miles from our right. This movement had begun on the
night of the 3rd, and the enemy succeeded in seizing the ford and
effecting a crossing, as the river was guarded at that point by only
a small cavalry picket. The direct road from Germana Ford to
Richmond passes by Spottsylvania Court-House and when Grant
had effected his crossing, he was nearer to Richmond than
General Lee was. From Orange Court-House, near which were
General Lee's headquarters, there are two nearly parallel roads
running eastwardly to Fredericksburg--the one which is nearest to
the river being called "The old Stone Pike," and the other "The
Plank Road." The road from Germana Ford to Spottsylvania
Court-House crosses the old Stone Pike at the "Old Wilderness
Tavern," and two or three miles farther on it crosses the Plank
road.
As soon as it was ascertained that Grant's movement was a
serious one, preparations were made to meet him, and the troops
of General Lee's army were put in motion--Ewell's corps moving
on the old Stone Pike, and Hill's corps on the Plank Road; into
which latter road Longstreet's force also came, from his camp
near Gordonsville.
Ewell's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed
Page 345
Mine Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, on
the afternoon of the 4th. When the rest of the corps moved, my
division and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division were left to
watch the fords of the Rapidan, until relieved by cavalry. As soon
as this was done, I moved to the position occupied by the rest of
the corps, carrying Ramseur with me.
Ewell's corps contained three divisions of infantry, to wit:
Johnson's, Rodes' and my own (Early's). At this time one of my
brigades (Hoke's) was absent, having been with Hoke in North
Carolina; and I had only three present, to wit: Hays', Pegram's
and Gordon's. One of Rodes' brigades (R. D. Johnston's) was at
Hanover Junction. I had about 4,000 muskets for duty; Johnson
about the same number; and Rodes (including Johnston's brigade)
about 6,000.
Page 346
CHAPTER XXXII.
BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS.
ON the morning of the 5th, Ewell's corps was put in motion,
my division bringing up the rear. A short distance from the Old
Wilderness Tavern, and just in advance of the place where a road
diverges to the left from the old Stone Pike to the Germana Ford
road, the enemy, in heavy force, was encountered, and Jones'
brigade, of Johnson's division, and Battle's brigade, of Rodes'
division, were driven back in some confusion. My division was
ordered up, and formed across the pike, Gordon's brigade being
on the right of the road. This brigade, as soon as it was brought
into line, was ordered forward, and advanced through a dense
pine thicket in gallant style. In conjunction with Daniel's, Doles'
and Ramseur's brigades, of Rodes' division, it drove the enemy
back with heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners, and
gaining a commanding position on the right. Johnson,
at the same time, was heavily engaged in his front, his division
being on the left of the pike and extending across the road to the
Germana Ford road, which has been mentioned. After the enemy
had been repulsed, Hays' brigade was sent to Johnson's left, in
order to participate in a forward movement; and it did move forward
some half a mile or so, encountering the enemy in force; but from
some mistake, not meeting with the expected co-operation,
except from one regiment of Jones' brigade (the 25th Virginia),
the most of which was captured, it was drawn back to Johnson's
line, and took position on his left.
Pegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take position
on Hays' left; and, just before night, a very heavy attack was
made on its front, which was repulsed with severe loss to the
enemy. In this affair, General Pegram received a severe wound
in the leg, which disabled him for the field for some months.
Page 347
During the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing along the
whole line, several attempts having been made by the enemy,
without success, to regain the position from which he had been
driven; and the fighting extended to General Lee's right on the
Plank road. Gordon occupied the position which he had gained,
on the right, until after dark, when he was withdrawn to the
extreme left, and his place occupied by part of Rodes' division.
The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight,
consisted of the 5th corps, under Warren; but other troops were
brought to his assistance. At the close of the day, Ewell's corps
had captured over a thousand prisoners, besides inflicting on the
enemy very heavy losses in killed and wounded. Two pieces of
artillery had been abandoned by the enemy, just in front of the
point at which Johnson's right and Rodes' left joined, and were
subsequently secured by our troops.
After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the right, the
whole of my division was on the left of the road diverging from
the pike, in extension of Johnson's line. All of my brigades had
behaved handsomely; and Gordon's advance, at the time of the
confusion in the beginning of the fight, was made with great
energy and dispatch, and was just in time to prevent a serious
disaster.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was resumed,
and a very heavy attack was made on the front occupied by
Pegram's brigade (now under the command of Colonel Hoffman
of the 31st Virginia Regiment); but it was handsomely repulsed,
as were several subsequent attacks on the same point.
These attacks were so persistent, that two regiments of
Johnson's division were moved to the rear of Pegram's brigade,
for the purpose of supporting it; and when an offer was made to
relieve it, under the apprehension that its ammunition might be
exhausted, the men of that gallant brigade begged that they might
be allowed to retain
Page 348
their position, stating that they were getting along very well
indeed and wanted no help.
During the morning, the fact was communicated to
General Ewell, by our cavalry scouts, that a column of
the enemy's infantry was moving between our left and the
river, with the apparent purpose of turning our left
flank; and information was also received that Burnside's
corps had crossed the river, and was in rear of the
enemy's right. I received directions to watch this column,
and take steps to prevent its getting to our rear; and
Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' division, which had just
arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent to me for that
purpose. This brigade, with some artillery, was put in
position, some distance to my left, so as to command some
by-roads coming in from the river. In the meantime
General Gordon had sent out a scouting party on foot,
which discovered what was supposed to be the enemy's
right flank resting in the woods, in front of my division;
and, during my absence while posting Johnston's brigade,
he reported the fact to General Ewell, and suggested the
propriety of attacking this flank of the enemy with his
brigade, which was not engaged. On my return, the subject
was mentioned to me by General Ewell, and I stated
to him the danger and risk of making the attack under the
circumstances, as a column was threatening our left flank
and Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's flank,
on which the attack was suggested. General Ewell
concurred with me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the
attempt at that time was obvious, as we had no reserves,
and, if it failed, and the enemy showed any enterprise, a
serious disaster would befall, not only our corps, but
General Lee's whole army. In the afternoon, when the
column threatening our left had been withdrawn, and it
had been ascertained that Burnside had gone to Grant's
left, on account of the heavy fighting on that flank, at my
suggestion, General Ewell ordered the movement which
Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it with Gordon's
brigade supported by Johnston's and to follow
LEE'S HEADQUARTERS--THE WILDERNESS
Page 349
it up, if successful, with the rest of my division. Gordon's brigade
was accordingly formed in line near the edge of the woods in
which the enemy's right rested, and Johnston's in the rear, with
orders to follow Gordon and obey his orders.
I posted my adjutant general, Major John W. Daniel, with a
courier, in a position to be communicated with by Gordon, so as to
inform me of the success attending the movement, and enable me
to put in the other brigades at the right time. As soon as Gordon
started, which was a very short time before sunset, I rode to my
line and threw forward Pegram's brigade in a position to move
when required. In the meantime Gordon had become engaged,
and, while Pegram's brigade was being formed in line, I saw
some of Gordon's men coming back in confusion, and Colonel
Evans, of the 31st Georgia Regiment, endeavoring to rally them.
Colonel Evans informed me that his regiment which was on
Gordon's right had struck the enemy's breastworks and had given
way. I immediately ordered Pegram's brigade forward and
directed Colonel Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a
dense thicket of underbrush, but it crossed the road running
through Johnson's line, and struck the enemy's works, and one of
the regiments, the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Terrill, got
possession of part of the line, when Colonel Hoffman ordered the
brigade to retire, as it was getting dark, and there was much
confusion produced by the difficulties of advance. Gordon had
struck the enemy's right flank behind breastworks, and a part of
his brigade was thrown into disorder. In going through the woods,
Johnston had obliqued too much and passed to Gordon's left,
getting in rear of the enemy.
Major Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeavored to
get to him, when, finding the condition of things, he attempted to
lead one of Pegram's regiments to his assistance, and was shot
down while behaving with great gallantry, receiving a wound in
the leg which has permanently disabled him. Notwithstanding the
confusion
Page 350
in part of his brigade, Gordon succeeded in throwing the enemy's
right flank into great confusion, capturing two brigadier generals
(Seymour and Shaler), and several hundred prisoners, all of the
6th corps, under Sedgwick. The advance of Pegram's brigade,
and the demonstration of Johnston's brigade in the rear, where it
encountered a part of the enemy's force and captured some
prisoners, contributed materially to the result. It was fortunate,
however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy, if
he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might have
brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our condition. As it
was, doubtless, the lateness of the hour caused him to be
surprised, and the approaching darkness increased the confusion
in his ranks, as he could not see the strength of the attacking
force, and probably imagined it to be much more formidable than
it really was. All of the brigades engaged in the attack were
drawn back, and formed on a new line in front of the old one, and
obliquely to it.
At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made,
which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line of
works in front of my whole line and a good portion of Johnston's.
Between the lines a large number of his dead had been left, and
at his breastworks, a large number of muskets and knapsacks had
been abandoned, and there was every indication of great
confusion. It was not till then that we ascertained the full extent
of the success attending the movement of the evening before.
The enemy had entirely abandoned the left side of the road,
across which Johnston's line extended, and my division and a part
of his were thrown forward, occupying a part of the abandoned
works on the right of the road, and leaving all those on the left in
our rear. This rendered our line straight, the left having been
previously thrown back, making a curve.
During the day there was some skirmishing, but no serious
fighting in my front. The loss in my division during the fighting in
the Wilderness was comparatively light.
Page 351
On the morning of the 8th, it was discovered that the enemy
was leaving our front and moving towards Spottsylvania
Court-House. General Lee's army was also put in motion, Ewell's corps
moving along the line occupied by our troops on the day before,
until it reached the Plank road, where it struck across to Shady
Grove, which is on the road from Orange Court-House to
Spottsylvania Court-House.
On reaching the Plank road, I received through General A. P.
Hill, who was sick and unable to remain on duty, an order from
General Lee, transferring Hays' brigade from my division to
Johnson's, in order that it might be consolidated with another
Louisiana brigade in that division, whose brigadier general had
been killed in the Wilderness, and Johnston's brigade from Rodes'
division to mine; and assigning me to the temporary command of
Hill's corps, which was still in position across the Plank road, and
was to bring up the rear. I accordingly turned over the command
of my division to Gordon, the senior brigadier left with it, and
assumed command of Hill's corps.[*
](note19)
*
Grant says General Lee had the advantage of position. As the latter had
to move from his lines on the Rapidan and attack Grant in the Wilderness,
how
happened it that he was enabled to get the advantage of position, after
the two
days' fighting? He also says that General Lee was enabled to reach
Spottsylvania Court-House first, because he had the shorter line. The
fact is,
that, as the two armies lay in their positions at the Wilderness, their
lines were
parallel to the road to Spottsylvania Court-House. Grant had the
possession of
the direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had to
move on
the circuitous route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled to arrive there
first with part of his infantry, because his cavalry held Grant's advance
in check for
nearly an entire day.
Page 352
CHAPTER XXXIII.
BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA.
HILL'S CORPS was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's and
Mahone's (formerly Anderson's) division of infantry and three
battalions of artillery under Colonel Walker. When I took
command of it, the infantry numbered about 13,000 muskets for
duty.
General Lee's orders to me were to move by Todd's Tavern
along the Brock road to Spottsylvania Court-House as soon as our
front was clear of the enemy. In order to get into that road, it was
necessary to reopen an old one leading from Hill's right, by which I
was enabled to take a cross-road leading into the road from Shady
Grove to Todd's Tavern. The wagon trains and all the artillery,
except one battalion, were sent around by Shady Grove. About a
mile from the road from Shady Grove to Todd's Tavern, the
enemy's cavalry videttes were encountered, and Mahone's division
was thrown forward to develop the enemy's force and position.
Mahone encountered a force of infantry which had moved up from
Todd's Tavern toward Shady Grove and had quite a brisk
engagement with it, causing it to fall back rapidly towards the
former place. At the same time General Hampton, who had
communicated with me, after I left the Plank Road, moved with his
cavalry on my right and struck the enemy on the flank and rear;
but on account of want of knowledge of the country on our part,
and the approach of darkness, the enemy was enabled to make his
escape. This affair developed the fact that the enemy was in
possession of Todd's Tavern and the Brock road, and a
continuation of my march would have led through his
entire army. We bivouacked for the night, at the place from
which Mahone had driven the enemy, and a force was thrown out
towards Todd's Tavern, which was about a mile distant.
Page 353
Very early next morning (the 9th), I received an order from
General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the Shady Grove
road towards Spottsylvania Court-House, which I did, crossing a
small river called the Po twice. After reaching the rear of the
position occupied by the other two corps, I was ordered to
Spottsylvania Court-House, to take position on the right, and cover
the road from that place to Fredericksburg. No enemy appeared
in my front on this day, except at a distance on the
Fredericksburg road.
Early on the morning of the 10th I was ordered to move one
of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of the Po on the Shady
Grove road; and to move with another division to the rear and left,
by the way of Spottsylvania Old Court-House, and drive back a
column of the enemy which had crossed the Po and taken
possession of the Shady Grove road, thus threatening our rear and
endangering our trains which were on the road leading by the Old
Court-House to Louisa Court-House.
Our line was then north of the Po, with its left, Fields' division
of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream, just above the
crossing of the Shady Grove road. The whole of the enemy's
force was also north of the Po, prior to this movement of his.
Mahone's division was sent to occupy the banks of the Po on
Fields' left, while with Heth's division and a battalion of artillery I
moved to the rear, crossing the Po on the Louisa Court-House
road, and then following that road until we reached one coming in
from Waite's Shop on the Shady Grove road. After moving about
a mile on this road, we met Hampton gradually falling back before
the enemy, who had pushed out a column of infantry considerably
to the rear of our line. This column was in turn forced back to the
position on Shady Grove road which was occupied by what was
reported to be Hancock's corps. Following up and crossing a small
stream just below a mill pond, we succeeded in reaching Waite's
Shop, from whence an attack was made on the enemy, and the
entire force, which had
Page 354
crossed the Po, was driven back with a loss of one piece of
artillery, which fell into our hands, and a considerable number in
killed and wounded. This relieved us from a very threatening
danger, as the position the enemy had attained would have
enabled him to completely enfilade Fields' position and get
possession of the line of our communications to the rear, within a
very short distance of which he was, when met by the force
which drove him back. In this affair Heth's division behaved very
handsomely, all of the brigades (Cook's, Davis', Kirkland's and
Walker's) being engaged in the attack. General H. H. Walker had
the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the foot, which
rendered amputation necessary, but otherwise our loss was slight.
As soon as the road was cleared, Mahone's division crossed the
Po, but it was not practicable to pursue the affair further, as the
north bank of the stream at this point was covered by a heavily
entrenched line, with a number of batteries, and night was
approaching.
On the morning of the 11th, Heth was moved back to
Spottsylvania Court-House and Mahone was left to occupy the
position on the Shady Grove road from which the enemy had
been driven.*
My line on the right had been connected with Ewell's right,
and covered the Fredericksburg road, as also the road leading
from Spottsylvania Court-House across the Ny into the road
from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Wilcox was on my
left, uniting with Ewell, and Heth joined him. The enemy had
extended his lines across the Fredericksburg road, but there was
no fighting on this front on the 10th or 11th, except some artillery
firing.
* It
will be seen that after this affair I held, for a time, both of General
Lee's flanks, which was rather an anomaly, but it could not be avoided, as
we
had no reserves and the two other corps being immediately in front of the
enemy in line of battle, and almost constantly engaged, could not be moved
without great risk. It was absolutely necessary to occupy the position,
held on
the left by Mahone, to avoid a renewal of the danger from which we had
escaped.
Page 355
On the afternoon of the 11th, the enemy was demonstrating
to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession of Shady Grove and
the road from thence to Louisa Court-House. General Hampton
reported a column of infantry moving up the Po, and I was
ordered by General Lee to take possession of Shady Grove, by
light next morning, and hold it against the enemy. To aid in that
purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's division (Thomas' and Scales')
were moved from the right, and Mahone was ordered to move
before light to Shady Grove; but during the night it was
discovered that the movement to our left was a feint and that
there was a real movement of the enemy towards our right.
Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's
brigades were returned to him, and at dawn Mahone's division
was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that division
to cover the crossing of the Po on Field's left. On
this morning, the enemy made a very heavy attack on
Ewell's front, and the line where it was occupied by Johnson's
division. A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's
line to Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on
the part of Brigadier General Lane, who was on that flank. As
soon as the firing was heard, General Wilcox sent Thomas' and
Scales' brigades to Lane's assistance and they arrived just as
Lane's brigade had repulsed this body of the enemy, and they
pursued it for a short distance. As soon as Mahone's division
arrived from the left, Perrin's and Harris' brigades of that division
and, subsequently, McGowan's brigade of Wilcox's division were
sent to General Ewell's assistance, and were carried into action
under his orders. Brigadier General Perrin was killed and
Brigadier General McGowan severely wounded, while gallantly
leading their respective brigades into action; and all the brigades
sent to Ewell's assistance suffered severely.
Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from General
Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division and
Page 356
Mahone's own brigade (under Colonel Weisiger) were thrown to
the front, for the purpose of moving to the left, and attacking the
flank of the column of the enemy which had broken Ewell's line,
to relieve the pressure on him, and, if possible, recover the part of
the line which had been lost. Lane's brigade commenced the
movement and had not proceeded far, when it encountered and
attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my line, the 9th corps,
under Burnside, moving up to attack a salient on my front. Lane
captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle flags, and
his attack on the enemy's flank taking him by surprise, no doubt
contributed materially to his repulse. Mahone's brigade did not
become seriously engaged. The attacking column which Lane
encountered got up to within a very short distance of a salient
defended by Walker's brigade of Heth's division, under Colonel
Mayo, before it was discovered, as there was a pine thicket in
front, under cover of which the advance was made.
A heavy fire of musketry from Walker's brigade and Thomas'
which was on his left, and a fire of artillery from a considerable
number of guns on Heth's line, were opened with tremendous
effect upon the attacking column, and it was driven back with
heavy loss, leaving its dead in front of our works. This affair took
place under the eye of General Lee himself. In the afternoon
another attempt was made to carry out the contemplated flank
movement with Mahone's brigade, and Cook's brigade of Heth's
division, to be followed up by the other troops under my
command; but it was discovered that the enemy had one or more
entrenched lines in our front, to the fire from which our flanking
column would have been exposed. Moreover the ground between
the lines was very rough, being full of ragged ravines and covered
with thick pines and other growth; and it was thought advisable to
desist from the attempt. The two brigades which were to have
commenced the movement were then thrown to the front
Page 357
on both sides of the Fredericksburg road, and passing over two
lines of breastworks, defended by a strong force of skirmishers,
developed the existence of a third and much stronger line in rear,
which would have afforded an almost insuperable obstacle to the
proposed flank movement. This closed the operations of the
corps under my command on the memorable 12th of May.
Between that day and the 19th, there was no serious attack
on my front, but much manoeuvring by the enemy. General
Mahone made two or three reconnaissances to the front, which
disclosed the fact that the enemy was gradually moving to our
right. In making one of them, he encountered a body of the
enemy which had got possession of Gayle's house, on the left of
the road leading from our right towards the Fredericksburg and
Hanover Junction road, at which a portion of our cavalry, under
Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previously posted, and
drove it back across the Ny.*
Another reconnaissance, handsomely made by Brigadier
General Wright, who had been brought from the left, ascertained
that a heavy force of the enemy was between the Ny and the
Po, in front of my right, which was held by Mahone, and was
along the road towards Hanover Junction. To meet this
movement of the enemy Field's division was brought from the left
and placed on my right.
On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against the
enemy's right, and to create a diversion in his favor, Thomas'
brigade was thrown forward, and drove the enemy into his works
in front of the salient, against which
* The Matapony River, which, by its juncture with the Pamunkey forms
York River, is formed by the confluence of four streams, called respectively,
the "Mat," "Ta," "Po" and "Ny." The Ny is north and east of Spottsylvania
Court-House, and behind it the enemy did most of his manoeuvring in my
front. It unites with the Po, a few miles to the east and south of Spottsylvania
Court-House, and both streams are difficult to cross except where there are
bridges.
Page 358
Burnside's attack had been made on the 12th, while the whole
corps was held in readiness to co-operate with Ewell, should his
attack prove successful; but as he was compelled to retire,
Thomas was withdrawn.
Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and Wilcox's
fronts; and on the afternoon of the 21st Wilcox was sent out on
the road leading from Mahone's front across the Ny with two of
his brigades to feel the enemy, and found him still in force behind
entrenched lines, and had a brisk engagement with that force.
While Wilcox was absent, an order was received by me, from
General Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command of his
corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once and thus
terminated my connection with this corps, which I had
commanded during all the trying scenes around Spottsylvania
Court-House. The officers and men of the corps had all behaved
well, and contributed in no small degree to the result by which
Grant was compelled to wait six days for reinforcements from
Washington, before he could resume the offensive or make
another of his flank movements to get between General Lee's
army and Richmond.
Page 359
CHAPTER XXXIV.
OPERATIONS NEAR HANOVER JUNCTION.
THE movement of the enemy to get between our army and
Richmond had been discovered, and on the afternoon of the 21st
Ewell's corps was put in motion towards Hanover Junction. [*
After turning over to General Hill the command of his corps, I
rode in the direction taken by Ewell's corps, and overtook it, a
short time before day on the morning of the 22nd. Hoke's brigade,
under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis, this day joined us from
Petersburg, and an order was issued, transferring Gordon's
brigade, now under the command of Brigadier General Evans, to
Johnson's division, which was placed under the command of
General Gordon, who had been made a major general. This left
me in command of three brigades, to wit: Pegram's, Hoke's and
Johnston's, all of which were very much reduced in strength. My
Adjutant General, Major Daniel, had been disabled for life by a
wound received at the Wilderness, and my Inspector General,
Major Samuel Hale, had been mortally wounded at Spottsylvania
Court-House on the 12th while serving with the division and
acting with great gallantry during the disorder which ensued after
Ewell's line was broken. Both were serious losses to me.
](note22) On this day (the 22nd) we moved to Hanover Junction, and,
next day, my division was posted on the extreme right, covering
a ferry two or three miles below the railroad bridge across the
North Anna. While at
*
Hanover Junction is about 22 miles from Richmond and is at the
intersection of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad with the
Central Railroad from Richmond west, via Gordonsville and Staunton. It is on
the direct road, both from Spottsylvania Court-House and Fredericksburg, to
Richmond. The North Anna River is north of the Junction about two miles and
the South Anna about three miles south of it. These two streams unite south of
east, and a few miles from the Junction, and form the Pamunkey River.
Page 360
Hanover Junction my division was not engaged. At one time it
was moved towards our left, for the purpose of supporting a part
of the line on which an attack was expected, and moved back
again without being required. It was subsequently placed
temporarily on the left of the corps, relieving Rodes' division and
a part of Fields' while the line was being remodelled, and then
took position on the right again. During the night of the 26th, the
enemy again withdrew from our front.*
*
At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of
Longstreet's corps, and Breckenridge with two small brigades of infantry, and a
battalion of artillery. These, with Hoke's brigade, were the first and
only
reinforcements received by General Lee since the opening of the campaign. Yet
Grant's immense army, notwithstanding the advantage gained by it on the 12th
of May, had been so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days at
Spottsylvania Court-House for reinforcements from Washington, before it could
resume the offensive. Breckenridge's infantry numbered less than 3,000
muskets. Grant puts it at 15,000 and says, "The army sent to operate against
Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy
was enabled to bring the most, if not all the reinforcements brought from the
South by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac." He therefore
determined to try another flank movement, and to get more reinforcements from
the army at Bermuda Hundreds.
Page 361
CHAPTER XXXV.
BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR.
ON the 27th, the enemy having withdrawn to the north bank of
the North Anna, and commenced another flank movement by
moving down the north bank of the Pamunkey, Ewell's corps, now
under my command, by reason of General Ewell's sickness, was
moved across the South Anna over the bridge of the Central
Railroad, and by a place called "Merry Oaks," leaving Ashland on
the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad to the right,
and bivouacked for the night at Hughes' cross-road, the
intersection of the road from Ashland to Atlee's Station on the
Central Railroad with the road from the Merry Oaks to Richmond.
Next morning I moved by Atlee's Station to Hundley's Corner, at
the intersection of the road from Hanover Town (the point at
which Grant crossed the Pamunkey), by Pole Green Church to
Richmond, with the road from Atlee's Station, by Old Church in
Hanover County, to the White House on the Pamunkey. This is
the point from which General Jackson commenced his famous
attack on McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862, and it was very
important that it should be occupied, as it intercepted Grant's
direct march towards Richmond. All of these movements were
made under orders from General Lee.
My troops were placed in position, covering the road by Pole
Green Church, and also the road to Old Church, with my right
resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running towards
Mechanicsville and into the Chickahominy. Brigadier General
Ramseur of Rodes' division was this day assigned to the
command of my division. Ewell's corps, the 2nd of the Army of
Northern Virginia, now numbered less than 9,000 muskets for
duty, its loss, on the 12th of May, having been very heavy.
Page 362
On the 29th, the enemy having crossed the Tottopotomoy (a
creek running just north of Pole Green Church, and eastward to the
Pamunkey), appeared in my front on both roads, and there was
some skirmishing but no heavy fighting.
On the afternoon of the 30th, in accordance with orders from
General Lee, I moved to the right across Beaver Dam, to the road
from Old Church to Mechanicsville, and thence along that road
towards Old Church, until we reached Bethesda Church. At this
point the enemy was encountered, and his troops, which occupied
the road, were driven by Rodes' division towards the road from
Hundley's Corner, which unites with the road from
Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Church. Pegram's brigade,
under the command of Colonel Edward Willis of the 12th Georgia
Regiment, was sent forward with one of Rodes' brigades on its
right, to feel the enemy, and ascertain his strength; but meeting
with a heavy force behind breastworks, it was compelled to retire,
with the loss of some valuable officers and men, and among them
were Colonel Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel Terrill of the
13th Virginia Regiment, killed. This movement showed that the
enemy was moving to our right flank, and at night I withdrew a
short distance on the Mechanicsville road, covering it with my force.
When I made the movement from Hundley's Corner, my position
at that place was occupied by a part of Longstreet's corps,
under Anderson.
On the next morning, my troops were placed in position on
the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to Mechanicsville,
but Rodes was subsequently moved to the west side of the
creek. Grant's movement to our right, towards Cold Harbor, was
continued on the 31st, and the 1st of June, and corresponding
movements were made by General Lee to meet him, my
command retaining its position with a heavy force in its front.
Page 363
On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, except Heth's division
of Hill's corps, had moved to the right, and in the afternoon of that
day, Rodes' division moved forward, along the road from
Hundley's Corner towards Old Church, and drove the enemy
from his entrenchments, now occupied with heavy skirmish lines,
and forced back his left towards Bethesda Church, where there
was a heavy force. Gordon swung round so as to keep pace with
Rodes, and Heth co-operated, following Rodes and taking position
on his left flank. In this movement there was some heavy fighting
and several hundred prisoners were taken by us. Brigadier
General Doles, a gallant officer of Rodes' division, was killed, but
otherwise our loss was not severe.
On the next day (the 3rd), when Grant made an attack at
Cold Harbor in which he suffered very heavily, there were
repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those on Cook's
brigade, of Heth's division, being especially heavy, but all of them
were repulsed. There was also heavy skirmishing on Gordon's
front. During the day, Heth's left was threatened by the enemy's
cavalry, but it was kept off by Walker's brigade under Colonel
Fry, which covered that flank, and also repulsed an effort of the
enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As it was necessary that
Heth's division should join its corps on the right, and my flank in
this position was very much exposed, I withdrew, at the close of
the day, to the line previously occupied, and next morning Heth
moved to the right.
My right now connected with the left of Longstreet's corps
under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently evacuated his
position at Bethesda Church and his lines in my front, and having
no opposing force to keep my troops in their lines, I made two
efforts to attack the enemy on his right flank and rear. The first
was made on the 6th, when I crossed the Matadaquean (a small
Page 364
stream, running through wide swamps in the enemy's rear), and
got in rear of his right flank, driving in his skirmishers until we
came to a swamp, which could be crossed only on a narrow
causeway defended by an entrenched line with artillery. General
Anderson was to have co-operated with me, by moving down the
other side of the Matadaquean, but the division sent for that
purpose did not reach the position from which I started until near
night, and I was therefore compelled to retire, as my position was
too much exposed.
On the next day (the 7th), a reconnaissance made in front of
Anderson's line showed that the greater part of it was uncovered,
and, in accordance with instructions from General Lee, I moved
in front of, and between it and the Matadaquean, until my
progress was arrested by a ravine and swamp which prevented
any further advance, but a number of pieces of artillery were
opened upon the enemy's position in flank and reverse, so as to
favor a movement from Anderson's front, which had been
ordered but was not made; and at night I retired from this position
to the rear of our lines.
Since the fighting at the Wilderness, Grant had made it an
invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear with a
perfect network of entrenchments, and all his movements were
made under cover of such works. It was therefore very difficult
to get at him.
On the 11th, my command was moved to the rear of Hill's
line, near Gaines' Mill; and on the 12th, I received orders to
move, with the 2nd corps, to the Shenandoah Valley to meet
Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection with the campaign
from the Rapidan to James River.
When I moved on the morning of the 13th, Grant had already
put his army in motion to join Butler, on James River, a position
which he could have reached, from his camp on the north of the
Rapidan, by railroad transports,
Page 365
without the loss of a man. In attempting to force his way
by land, he had already lost, in killed and wounded, more men
than were in General Lee's entire army; and he was compelled to
give up, in despair, the attempt to reach Richmond in that way.*
* Grant, in describing his movement from Spottsylvania Court-House to
Hanover Junction, says: "But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being
in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in
advance of us, and took position behind it." And, when he speaks of his final
determination to join Butler, he says: "After the battle of the Wilderness it was
evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risk with the
army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or,
feebly, on the offensive, immediately in front of them, and where, in case of
repulse, he could retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was
willing to make all could not be accomplished that I designed north of
Richmond."
He has made some observations, in his report, about the advantages of
interior lines of communication, supposed to be possessed by the Confederate
commanders, which are more specious than sound. The Mississippi River
divided the Confederacy into two parts, and the immense naval power of the
enemy enabled him to render communication across that river, after the loss of
New Orleans and Memphis, always difficult. The Ohio River, in the West, and
the Potomac, in the East, with the mountains of Western Virginia, rendered it
impossible for an invading army to march into the enemy's country, except at
one or two fords of the Potomac, just east of the Blue Ridge, and two or three
fords above Harper's Ferry. The possession of the seas, and the blockade of our
ports, as well as the possession of the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Potomac
Rivers, with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee, enabled the
enemy to transport troops, from the most remote points, with more ease and
rapidity than they could be transported over the railroads under the control of
the Confederate Government, all of which were in bad condition. The enemy,
therefore, in fact, had all the advantages of interior lines; that is, rapidity of
communication and concentration, with the advantage, also, of unrestricted
communication with all the world, which his naval power gave him.
Page 366
CHAPTER XXXVI.
CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND
VIRGINIA.
THE Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces all that
country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany Mountains,
which unite at its southwestern end.
The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley of
Virginia, embraces the counties of Augusta, Rockingham,
Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jefferson and
Berkeley. This valley is bounded on the north by the Potomac, on
the south by the county of Rockbridge, on the east by the Blue
Ridge and on the west by the Great North Mountain and its
ranges.
The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches, called,
respectively, the "North Fork" and the "South Fork," which
unite near Front Royal in Warren County. The North Fork rises in
the Great North Mountain, and runs eastwardly to within a short
distance of New Market in Shenandoah County, and thence
northeast by Mount Jackson and Strasburg, where it turns east to
Front Royal. The South Fork is formed by the union of North,
Middle and South Rivers. North River and Middle River, running
from the west, unite near Mount Meridian in Augusta County.
South River rises in the southeastern part of Augusta, and runs
by Waynesboro, along the western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port
Republic in Rockingham, where it unites with the stream formed
by the junction of the North and Middle Rivers, a few miles
above. From Port Republic, the South Fork of the Shenandoah
runs northeast, through the eastern border of Rockingham and the
county of Page, to Front Royal in Warren County.
The North Fork and South Fork are separated by the
Massanutten Mountain, which is connected with no other
mountain but terminates abruptly at both ends. Its
northern end is washed at its base, just below Strasburg,
Page 367
by the North Fork. Its southern end terminates near the
road between Harrisonburg and Conrad's Store on the South
Fork, at which latter place the road through Swift Run Gap in the
Blue Ridge crosses that stream. Two valleys are thus formed, the
one on the North Fork being called "The Main Valley," and the
other on the South Fork, and embracing the county of Page and
part of the county of Warren, being usually known by the
name of "The Luray Valley." The Luray Valley unites
with the Main Valley at both ends of the mountain. There
is a good road across Massanutten Mountain from one
valley to the other through a gap near New Market. South
of this gap, there is no road across the mountain, and
north of it the roads are very rugged and not practicable
for the march of a large army with its trains. At the
northern or lower end of Massanutten Mountain, and
between two branches of it, is a valley called "Powell's
Fort Valley," or more commonly "The Fort." This
valley is accessible only by the very rugged roads over
the mountain which have been mentioned, and through a
ravine at its lower end. From its isolated position, it
was not the theatre of military operations of any
consequence, but merely furnished a refuge for deserters,
stragglers and fugitives from the battlefields.
From Front Royal, the Shenandoah River runs along the
western base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's Ferry, where
it unites with the Potomac, which here bursts through the
mountains. The mountain, in extension of the Blue Ridge
from this point through Maryland and Pennsylvania, is
called "South Mountain."
Strictly speaking, the county of Berkeley and the greater
part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the Shenandoah.
The Opequon, rising southwest of Winchester, and crossing the
Valley Pike four or five miles south of that place, turns to
the north and empties into the Potomac some distance above its
junction with the Shenandoah; the greater part of Frederick
and nearly the
Page 368
whole of Berkeley being on the western side of the Opequon.
Little North Mountain,
called in the lower valley "North
Mountain," runs northeast, through the western portion of
Shenandoah, Frederick and Berkeley Counties, to the Potomac. At
its northern end, where it is called North Mountain, it
separates the waters of the Opequon from those of Back Creek.
Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of Little
North Mountain, and running northeast along its western base,
passes through that mountain, four or five miles from Strasburg,
and, then making a circuit, empties into the North Fork of the
Shenandoah, about two miles below Strasburg.
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac at
Harper's Ferry, and passing through Martinsburg in Berkeley
County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs up the
Potomac, crossing the South Branch of that river near its mouth,
and then the North Branch to Cumberland in Maryland. From this
place it runs into Virginia again and, passing through
Northwestern Virginia, strikes the Ohio River by two stems,
terminating at Wheeling and Parkersburg respectively.
There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, called
"Winchester & Potomac Railroad," and also one from Manassas
Junction on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, through
Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge, by Front Royal and Strasburg
to Mount Jackson, called "The Manassas Gap Railroad," but both
of these roads were torn up and rendered unserviceable in the
year 1862, under the orders of General Jackson.
From Staunton, in Augusta County, there is a fine
macadamized road called "The Valley Pike," running through
Mount Sidney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg, New Market,
Mount Jackson, Edinburg, Woodstock, Strasburg, Middletown,
Newtown, Bartonsville and Kernstown to Winchester in
Frederick County, and crossing Middle River seven miles from
Staunton; North River at Mount
Page 369
Crawford, eighteen miles from Staunton; the North Fork of the
Shenandoah at Mount Jackson; Cedar Creek between Strasburg
and Middletown; and the Opequon at Bartonsville, four or five
miles from Winchester. There is also another road west of the
Valley Pike connecting these several villages called the "Back
Road," and in some places, another road between the Valley Pike
and the Back Road, which is called the "Middle Road."
From Winchester there is a macadamized road via
Martinsburg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Maryland,
and another via Berryville in Clarke County, and Charlestown
in Jefferson County, to Harper's Ferry. There is also a good
pike from Winchester to Front Royal, which crosses both forks
of the Shenandoah just above their junction; and from Front
Royal there are good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the way
of Conrad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg and
Staunton.
From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing through
Lexington, in Rockbridge County, and Buchanan, in Botetourt
County, to several points on the Virginia & Tennessee
Railroad; and others direct from Staunton and Lexington to
Lynchburg.
The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through the
Blue Ridge, with a tunnel at Rockfish Gap, and runs through
Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly, to Jackson's River, which
is one of the head streams of James River.
This description of the country is given in order to render
the following narrative intelligible, without too much
repetition. In the spring of 1864, before the opening of the
campaign, the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by the Federal
troops, under Major General Sigel, with his headquarters at
Winchester, while the upper Valley was held by Brigadier
General Imboden, of the Confederate Army, with one brigade of
cavalry, or mounted infantry, and a battery of artillery. When
the campaign opened, Sigel moved up the Valley and Major
Page 370
General Breckenridge moved from Southwestern Virginia, with
two brigades of infantry and a battalion of artillery, to meet
him. Breckenridge, having united his forces with Imboden's,
met and defeated Sigel at New Market on May 15th, driving him
back toward Winchester. Breckenridge then crossed the Blue
Ridge and joined General Lee at Hanover Junction, with his two
brigades of infantry and the battalion of artillery.
Subsequently, the Federal General Hunter organized another and
larger force than Sigel's, and moved up the Valley, and on the
5th day of June defeated Brigadier General William E. Jones,
at Piedmont, between Port Republic and Staunton--Jones' force
being composed of a very small body of infantry, and a cavalry
force which had been brought from Southwestern Virginia, after
Breckenridge's departure from the Valley. Jones was killed,
and the remnant of his force, under Brigadier General Vaughan,
fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's force then united with
another column which had moved from Lewisburg, in Western
Virginia, under the Federal General Crook. As soon as
information was received of Jones' defeat and death,
Breckenridge was sent back to the Valley, with the force he
had brought with him.
Page 371
CHAPTER XXXVII.
PURSUIT OF
HUNTER.
ON the 12th of June, while the 2nd corps (Ewell's) of the
Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Gaines' Mill, in rear
of Hill's line at Cold Harbor, I received verbal orders from
General Lee to hold the corps, with two of the battalions of
artillery attached to it, in readiness to move to the
Shenandoah Valley. Nelson's and Braxton's battalions were
selected, and Brigadier General Long was ordered to accompany
me as Chief of Artillery. After dark, on the same day, written
instructions were given me by General Lee, by which I was
directed to move, with the force designated, at 3 o'clock next
morning, for the Valley, by the way of Louisa Court-House and
Charlottesville, and through Brown's or Swift Run Gap in the
Blue Ridge, as I might find most advisable; to strike Hunter's
force in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it; then to move
down the Valley, cross the Potomac near Leesburg in Loudoun
County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as I might find most
practicable, and threaten Washington City. I was
further directed to communicate with General Breckenridge, who
would co-operate with me in the attack on Hunter and the
expedition into Maryland.
At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between
Charlottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry force
from Hunter's army; and those between Richmond and
Charlottesville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry, from
Grant's army; so that there was no communication with
Breckenridge. Hunter was supposed to be at Staunton with his
whole force, and Breckenridge was supposed to be at Waynesboro
or Rock-fish Gap. If such had been the case, the route
designated by General Lee would have carried me into the
Valley in Hunter's rear.
The 2nd corps now
numbered a little over 8,000
Page 372
muskets for duty. It had been on active and arduous service in
the field for forty days, and had been engaged in all the
great battles from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, sustaining
very heavy losses at Spottsylvania Court-House, where it lost
nearly an entire division, including its commander, Major
General Johnson, who was made prisoner. Of the brigadier
generals with it at the commencement of the campaign, only one
remained in command of his brigade. Two (Gordon and Ramseur)
had been made Major Generals; one (G. H. Stewart) had been
captured; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. Walker and R. D. Johnston)
had been severely wounded; and four (Stafford, J. M. Jones,
Daniel, and Doles) had been killed in action. Constant
exposure to the weather, a limited supply of provisions, and
two weeks' service in the swamps north of the Chickahominy had
told on the health of the men. Divisions were not stronger
than brigades ought to have been, nor brigades than regiments.
On the morning of the 13th, at two o'clock, we commenced
the march; and on the 16th, arrived at Rivanna River near
Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles in four
days.*
From Louisa Court-House I had sent a dispatch to
Gordonsville, to be forwarded, by telegraph, to Breckenridge;
and, on my arrival at Charlottesville, on the 16th,
* On the 15th we passed over the ground, near Trevillian's
depot, on which Hampton and Sheridan had fought on the 11th
and 12th. Hampton had defeated Sheridan and was then in
pursuit of him. Grant, in his report, says that
on the 11th Sheridan drove our cavalry "from the field, in
complete rout," and, when he advanced towards Gordonsville, on
the 12th," he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind
well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from
the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault."
There was not an infantry soldier in arms nearer the scene of
action than with General Lee's army, near Cold Harbor; and the
"well-constructed rifle-pits" were nothing more than
rails put up in the manner in which cavalry were accustomed to
arrange them to prevent a charge. Sheridan mistook some of
Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for
infantry.
Page 373
to which place I rode in advance of my troops, I received a
telegram from him, dated at Lynchburg, informing me that
Hunter was then in Bedford County, about twenty miles from
that place, and moving on it.
The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and
Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the
enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. The distance between
the two places was sixty miles, and there were no trains at
Charlottesville except one which belonged to the Central road,
and was about starting for Waynesboro. I ordered this to be
detained, and immediately directed, by telegram, all the
trains of the two roads to be sent to me with all dispatch,
for the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynchburg. The
trains were not in readiness to take the troops on board until
sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough were
furnished to transport about half of my infantry. Ramseur's
division, one brigade of Gordon's division and part of another
were put on the trains, as soon as they were ready, and
started for Lynchburg. Rodes' division, and the residue of
Gordon's, were ordered to move along the railroad, to meet the
trains on their return. The artillery and wagon-trains had
been started on the ordinary roads at daylight.
I accompanied Ramseur's division, going on the front train,
but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that
I did not reach Lynchburg until about one o'clock in the
afternoon, and the other trains were much later. I found
General Breckenridge in bed, suffering from an injury received
by the fall of a horse killed under him in action near Cold
Harbor. He had moved from Rock-fish Gap to Lynchburg by a
forced march, as soon as Hunter's movement towards that place
was discovered. When I showed him my instructions, he very
readily and cordially offered to co-operate with me, and serve
under my command.
Hunter's advance from Staunton had been impeded by a
brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier General McCausland,
Page 374
which had been managed with great skill, and kept in
his front all the way, and he was reported to be then
advancing on the old stone turnpike from Liberty in
Bedford County by New London, and watched by Imboden with a
small force of cavalry.
As General Breckenridge was unable to go out, at his request,
General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in town, had made
arrangements for the defence of the city, with such troops as
were at hand. Brigadier General Hays, who was an invalid from
a wound received at Spottsylvania Court-House, had tendered
his services and also aided in making arrangements for the
defence. I rode out with General Hill to examine the line
selected by him, and make a reconnaissance of the country in
front. Slight works had been hastily thrown up on College
Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest roads from Liberty,
which were manned by Breckenridge's infantry and the
dismounted cavalry of the command which had been with Jones at
Piedmont. The reserves, invalids from the hospitals, and the
cadets from the Military Institute at Lexington, occupied
other parts of the line. An inspection satisfied me that,
while this arrangement was the best which could be made under
the circumstances in which General Hill found himself, yet it
would leave the town exposed to the fire of the enemy's
artillery, should he advance to the attack, and I
therefore determined to meet the enemy with my troops in
front.
We found Imboden about four miles out on the turnpike, near
an old Quaker church, to which position he had been gradually
forced back by the enemy's infantry. My troops, as they
arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to bivouac,
and I immediately sent orders for them to move out on this
road, at a redoubt about two miles from the city, as Imboden's
command was driven back by vastly superior numbers. These
brigades, with two pieces of artillery in the redoubt,
arrested the progress of the enemy, and Ramseur's other
brigade, and the part of Gordon's division which had arrived,
took
Page 375
position on the same line. The enemy opened a heavy
fire of artillery on us, but, as night soon came on, he
went into camp in our front.*
Upon my arrival at Lynchburg, orders had been given for the
immediate return of the train for the rest of my infantry, and
I expected it to arrive by the morning of the 18th, but it did
not get to Lynchburg until late in the afternoon of that day.
Hunter's force was considerably larger than mine would have
been, had it all been up, and as it was of the utmost
consequence to the army at Richmond that he should not get
into Lynchburg, I did not feel justified in attacking him
until I could do so with a fair prospect of success. I
contented myself therefore with acting on the defensive on the
18th, throwing Breckenridge's infantry and a part
of his artillery on the front line, while that adopted by
General Hill was occupied by the dismounted cavalry and the
irregular troops. During the day, there was artillery firing
and skirmishing along the line, and, in the afternoon, an
attack was made on our line, to the right of the turnpike,
which was handsomely repulsed with considerable loss to the
enemy. A demonstration of the enemy's cavalry on the Forest
road was checked by part of Breckenridge's infantry under
Wharton and McCausland's cavalry.
On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day, Major
Generals Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the
* Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most
remarkable. He had defeated Jones' small force at Piedmont,
about ten miles from Staunton, on the 5th, and united with
Crook on the 8th, yet he did not arrive in front of
Lynchburg until near night on the 17th. The route from
Staunton to Lynchburg by which he moved, which was by
Lexington, Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter and Liberty, is about
one hundred miles in distance. It is true that McCausland had
delayed his progress by keeping constantly in his front, but
an energetic advance would have brushed away McCausland's
small force, and Lynchburg, with all its manufacturing
establishments and stores, would have fallen before assistance
arrived. A subsequent passage over the greater part of the
same route showed how Hunter had been employed.
Page 376
former to command the infantry and dismounted cavalry of
Breckenridge's command, and the latter to command the cavalry.
The mounted cavalry consisted of the remnants of several
brigades divided into two commands, one under Imboden, and the
other under McCausland. It was badly mounted and armed, and
its efficiency much impaired by the defeat at Piedmont, and
the arduous service it had recently gone through.
As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the
railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up,
arrangements were made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the
19th, but some time after midnight it was discovered that he
was moving, though it was not known whether he was retreating
or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the south where it was
vulnerable, or to attempt to join Grant on the south side of
James River. Pursuit could not, therefore, be made at once, as
a mistake, if either of the last two objects had been
contemplated, would have been fatal. At light, however, the
pursuit commenced, the 2nd corps moving along the turnpike,
over which it was discovered Hunter was retreating, and
Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest road, while
Ransom was ordered to move on the right of Elzey, with
McCausland's cavalry, and endeavor to strike the enemy at
Liberty or Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who was on the road from
Lynchburg to Campbell Court-House to watch a body of the
enemy's cavalry, which had moved in that direction the day
before, was to have moved on the left towards Liberty, but
orders did not reach him in time. The enemy's rear was
overtaken at Liberty, twenty-five miles from Lynchburg, just
before night, and driven through that place, after a brisk
skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The day's march on the old
turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible. McCausland
had taken the wrong road and did not reach Liberty until after
the enemy had been driven through, the town.
It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated
Page 377
on the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had
advanced, but had taken the road to Buford's depot, at the
foot of the Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go either by
Salem, Fincastle or Buchanan. Ransom was, therefore, ordered
to take the route, next day, by the Peaks of Otter, and
endeavor to intercept the enemy should he move by Buchanan or
Fincastle. The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of the
20th, and upon our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's
rear guard was seen going into the mountain on the road
towards Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my
aide, Lieutenant Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to that
place, with orders for Ransom to move for Salem.
Lieutenant Pitzer was also instructed to ride all night and
send instructions, by courier from Fincastle, and telegraph
from Salem, to have the road through the mountains to
Lewisburg and Southwestern Virginia blockaded. The enemy was
pursued into the mountains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken
possession of the crest of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries
in position commanding a gorge, through which the road passes,
where it was impossible for a regiment to move in line. I had
endeavored to ascertain if there was another way across the
mountain by which I could get around the enemy, but all men,
except the old ones, had gotten out of the way, and the
latter, as well as the women and children, were in
such a state of distress and alarm, that no reliable
information could be obtained from them. We tried to throw
forces up the sides of the mountains to get at the enemy, but
they were so rugged that night came on before anything could
be accomplished, and we had to desist, though not until a very
late hour in the night.
By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent with orders to
General Rodes, who was to be in the lead next morning, there
was some delay in his movement on the 21st, but the pursuit
was resumed very shortly after sunrise. At the Big Lick, it
was ascertained that the enemy had turned off from Salem
towards Lewisburg, on a road
Page 378
which passes through the mountains at a narrow pass called the
"Hanging Rock," and my column was immediately turned towards
that point, but on arriving there it was ascertained that the
enemy's rear guard had passed through the gorge. McCausland
had struck his column at this point and captured ten pieces of
artillery, some wagons and a number of prisoners; but, the
enemy having brought up a heavy force, McCausland was
compelled to fall back, carrying off, however, the prisoners
and a part of the artillery, and disabling the rest so that it
could not be removed. As the enemy had got into the mountains,
where nothing useful could be accomplished by pursuit, I did
not deem it proper to continue it farther.
A great part of my command had had nothing to eat for the
last few days, except a little bacon which was obtained at
Liberty.* The cooking utensils were in the trains, and the
effort to have bread baked at Lynchburg had failed. Neither
the wagon trains, nor the artillery of the 2nd corps, were up
and I knew that the country, through which Hunter's route led
for forty or fifty miles, was, for the most part, a desolate
mountain region; and that his troops were taking everything in
the way of provisions and forage which they could lay their
hands on. My field officers, except those of Breckenridge's
command, were on foot, as their horses could not be
transported on the trains from Charlottesville. I had seen our
soldiers endure a great deal, but there was a limit
to the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A stern chase
with infantry is a very difficult one, and Hunter's men were
marching for their lives, his disabled being carried in his
provision train, which was now empty. My cavalry was not
strong enough to accomplish anything of importance, and a
further pursuit could only have resulted in disaster to my
command from want of provisions and forage.
I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg,
* Now Bedford City.
Page 379
as I knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and he
was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to
Southwestern Virginia, he would have done us incalculable
mischief, as there were no troops of any consequence in that
quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should,
therefore, have been compelled to follow him.*
My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days'
pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the
Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest since leaving
Gaines' Mill. I determined therefore to rest on the 22nd, so
as to enable the wagons and artillery to get up, and to
prepare the men for the long march before them. Imboden had
come up, following on the road through Salem after the enemy,
and the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to watch the enemy
and to annoy him as he passed through the mountains towards
Lewisburg, and also ascertain whether he would endeavor to get
into the valley towards Lexington or Staunton.
* In his report Grant says: "General Hunter, owing to a want
of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place"
(Lynchburg). Now it appears that this expedition had been long
contemplated and was one of the prominent features of the
campaign of 1864. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was to
have united with Hunter at Lynchburg and the two together were
to have destroyed General Lee's communications and depots of
supplies and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that
Hunter set out on so important an expedition with an
insufficient supply of ammunition? He had only fought the
battle of Piedmont with a part of his force, and not a very
severe one, as Jones' force was a small one and composed
mostly of cavalry. Crook's column, not being there, was not
engaged. Had Sheridan defeated Hampton at Trevillian's, he
would have reached Lynchburg after destroying the railroad on
the way, and I could not have reached there in time to do any
good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan and the latter saw
"infantry too strong to successfully assault." Had
Hunter moved on Lynchburg with energy, that place would have
fallen before it was possible for me to get there. But he
tarried on the way, and when he reached there, there was
discovered "a want of ammunition to give battle."
Page 380
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND
MARYLAND.
AT Lynchburg I had received a telegram from General Lee
directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to return to
his army or to carry out the original plan, as I might deem
most expedient under the circumstances in which I found
myself. After the pursuit had ceased, I received another
dispatch from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the
condition of my troops would permit the expedition across the
Potomac to be carried out, and I determined to take the
responsibility of continuing it. On the 23rd, the march was
resumed and we reached Buchanan that night, where we struck
again the route over which Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's
cavalry moved by Clifton Forge, through
the western part of
* The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly
heart-rending. Houses had been burned, and women and children
left without shelter. The country had been stripped of
provisions and many families left without a morsel to eat.
Furniture and bedding had been cut to pieces, and old men and
women and children robbed of all clothing except what they
were wearing. Ladies' trunks had been rifled and their dresses
torn to pieces in mere wantonness. Even negro girls had lost
their little finery. We now had renewed evidences of outrages
committed by the commanding general's orders in burning
and plundering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number of
houses so destroyed. At Lexington Hunter had burned the
Military Institute, with all its contents, including its
library and scientific apparatus; and Washington College
had been plundered and the statue of Washington taken. The
residence of Ex-Governor Letcher, at that place, had been
burned, and but a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and her
family, to leave the house. In the same county a Christian
gentleman, Mr. Creigh, had been hung because he had killed a
straggling and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of
insulting and outraging the ladies of his family. The time
consumed in the perpetration of those deeds was the
salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries and
factories, which were so necessary to our army at Richmond.
Page 381
Rockbridge, to keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain if he
should attempt to get into the Valley again.
On the 26th I reached Staunton in advance of my troops, and
the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing
transportation and getting provisions from Waynesboro, to
which point they had been sent over the railroad. Some of the
guns and a number of the horses belonging to the artillery
were now unfit for service, and the best of each were
selected, and about a battalion taken from Breckenridge's
artillery, under Lieutenant Colonel King, to accompany us, in
addition to the two battalions brought with the 2nd corps. The
rest were left behind with a portion of the officers and men
in charge of them. The dismounted cavalry had been permitted
to send for their horses which had been recruiting, and Col.
Bradley T. Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a
battalion of Maryland cavalry, was assigned to the command of
Jones' brigade, with the temporary rank of brigadier general,
that brigade having been reorganized and the two Maryland
battalions attached to it. General Breckenridge had
accompanied us from Lynchburg, and, to give him a command
commensurate with his proper one, and at the same time enable
me to control the cavalry more readily, Gordon's division of
infantry was assigned to his command in addition to the one
under Elzey, and Ransom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered
to report to me directly. Major General Elzey was relieved
from duty, at his own request, and the division under him was
left under the temporary command of Brigadier
General Vaughan.
The official reports at this place showed about two thousand
mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which was composed of
four small brigades, to wit: Imboden's, McCausland's,
Jackson's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Vaughan's had not been
mounted, but the horses had been sent for from Southwestern
Virginia. The official reports of the infantry showed 10,000
muskets for duty, including Vaughan's dismounted cavalry.
Nearly, if not
Page 382
quite, half of the company's officers and men were bare-footed
or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent from
Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Richmond,
requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they
had not arrived.
Another telegram was received here from General Lee
stating that the circumstances under which my original orders
were given had changed, and again submitting it to my
judgment, in the altered state of things, whether the movement
down the Valley and across the Potomac should be made. The
accession to my command from Breckenridge's forces had not
been as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on account
of the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at
Piedmont, and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg from
Rock-fish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original
design at all hazards, and telegraphed General Lee my purpose
to continue the movement.
The march was resumed on the 28th with five days' rations in
the wagons and two days' in haversacks, empty wagons being
left to bring the shoes when they arrived. Imboden was sent
through Brock's Gap in the Great North Mountain to the Valley
of the south branch of the Potomac, with his brigade of
cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, to destroy the
railroad bridge over that stream and all the bridges on the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from that point to Martinsburg. The
telegraph line was repaired to New Market as we marched down
the Valley, and communications kept up with that point by
signal stations. On the 2nd of July we reached Winchester* and
I here received a dispatch from General
* On this day we passed through Newtown, where several houses,
including that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by
Hunter's orders, because a part of Mosby's command had
attacked a train of supplies for Sigel's force, at this place.
The original order was to burn the whole town, but the
officer sent to execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate
and another was sent who but partially executed it, after
forcing the people to take an oath of allegiance to the United
States to save their houses. Mosby's battalion, though called
"guerillas" by the enemy, was a regular organization in the
Confederate Army, and was merely serving on detached duty
under General Lee's orders. The attack on the train
was an act of legitimate warfare, and the order to burn
Newtown and the burning of houses mentioned were
unjustifiable.
Page 383
Lee, directing me to remain in the lower Valley until
everything was in readiness to cross the Potomac and to
destroy the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake &
Ohio Canal as far as possible. This was in accordance with my
previous determination, and its policy was obvious. My
provisions were nearly exhausted, and if I had moved through
Loudoun, it would have been necessary for me to halt and
thresh wheat and have it ground, as neither bread nor flour
could otherwise be obtained, which would have caused much
greater delay than was required on the other route, where we
could take provisions from the enemy. Moreover, unless the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was torn up, the enemy would have
been able to move troops from the West over that road to
Washington.
On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across North
Mountain, to move down Back Creek, and burn the railroad
bridge at its mouth, and then to move by North Mountain depot
to Haynesville on the road from Martinsburg to Williamsport;
and, early on the morning of the 3rd, Bradley Johnson was sent
by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the railroad at
Kearneysville east of Martinsburg, and unite with McCausland
at Haynesville, so as to cut off the retreat of Sigel, who was
at Martinsburg with a considerable force. Breckenridge moved,
on the same morning, direct from Martinsburg, with his command
preceded by Gilmor's battalion of cavalry, while I moved with
Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, over the route taken by
Johnson, to Leetown. On the approach of Breckenridge, Sigel,
after very slight skirmishing, evacuated Martinsburg, leaving
behind considerable stores, which fell into our hands.
McCausland burned the bridge
Page 384
over Back Creek, captured the guard at North Mountain depot,
and succeeded in reaching Haynesville; but Johnson encountered
a force at Leetown, under Mulligan, which, after hard
fighting, he drove across the railroad, when, Sigel having
united with Mulligan, Johnson's command was forced back, just
before night, on Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, which had
arrived at Leetown, after a march of twenty-four miles. It was
too late, and these divisions were too much exhausted, to go
after the enemy; and during the night, Sigel retreated across
the Potomac at Sheperdstown, to Maryland Heights.
On the 4th, Shepherdstown was occupied by a part of
Ransom's cavalry. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions moved to
Harper's Ferry and the enemy was driven from Bolivar Heights
and the village of Bolivar, to an inner line of works under
the cover of the guns from Maryland Heights. Breckenridge
after burning the railroad bridges at Martinsburg, and across
the Opequon, moved to Duffield's depot, five miles from Harper's
Ferry, destroying the road as he moved. During the night of
the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, burning the
railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac.
It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry,
except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by the
heavy guns on Maryland Heights; and the 5th was spent by
Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that place.
In the afternoon Breckenridge's command crossed the river at
Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was advanced over the
Antietam towards Maryland Heights. At night, considerable
stores, which had been abandoned at Harper's Ferry, were
secured; and before day, Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions moved
to Shepherdstown, and crossed the Potomac early on the 6th,
Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's division, being left to occupy
Harper's Ferry with skirmishers.
On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced towards
Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into
Page 385
his works. Working parties were employed in destroying the
aqueduct of the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and
canal-boats.
On the 7th Rodes moved through Rohrersville, on the road to
Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skirmished with a small
force of the enemy, while Breckenridge demonstrated against
Maryland Heights, with Gordon's division, supported by his
other division, now under Brigadier General Echols, who had
reported for duty.
While these operations were going on, McCausland had
occupied Hagerstown, and levied a contribution of $20,000, and
Boonsboro had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. On the 6th I
received a letter from General Lee, by special courier,
informing me that, on the 12th, an effort would be made to
release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing me to
take steps to unite them with my command, if the attempt was
successful; but I was not informed of the manner in which the
attempt would be made--General Lee stating that he was not,
himself, advised of the particulars.
My desire had been to manoeuvere the enemy out of
Maryland Heights, so as to enable me to move directly from
Harper's Ferry for Washington; but he had taken refuge in his
strongly fortified works, and as they could not be approached
without great difficulty, and an attempt to carry them by
assault would have resulted in greater loss than the advantage
to be gained would justify, I determined to move through the
gaps of South Mountain to the north of the Heights. On the
7th, the greater portion of the cavalry was sent across the
mountain, in the direction of Frederick; and that night, the
expected shoes having arrived and been distributed, orders
were given for a general move next morning; and an officer
(Lieutenant Colonel Goodwin of a Louisiana regiment) was
ordered back to Winchester, with a small guard, to collect the
stragglers at that place, and prevent them from following.
Page 386
Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South Branch of the
Potomac, and partially destroyed the bridge, but had not
succeeded in dislodging the guard from the block-house at that
place. He had been taken sick and very little had been
accomplished by the expedition; and his brigade, now under the
command of Col. George H. Smith, had returned.
Early on the morning of the 8th the whole force moved;
Rodes, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson; Breckenridge,
through Fox's Gap; and Ramseur, with the trains, through
Boonsboro Gap, followed by Lewis' brigade, which had started
from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the
trestle-work on the railroad, and the stores which had not
been brought off. Breckenridge and Ramseur encamped near
Middletown, and Rodes near Jefferson. Ransom had occupied
Catoctan Mountain, between Middletown and Frederick, with his
cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a body of the enemy
at the latter place. McCausland was ordered to move to the
right, in the afternoon, and the next day cut the telegraph
and railroad between Maryland Heights and Washington and
Baltimore--cross the Monocacy, and, if possible, occupy the
railroad bridge over that stream, at the junction near
Frederick.
Early on the 9th, Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry, and a
battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of Frederick,
with orders to strike the railroads from Baltimore to
Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the
Gunpowder, also to cut the railroad between Washington and
Baltimore and threaten the latter place; and then to move
towards Point Lookout, for the purpose of releasing the
prisoners, if we should succeed in getting into Washington.
The other troops also moved forward towards Monocacy Junction,
and Ramseur's division passed through Frederick, driving a
force of skirmishers before it.
Page 387
CHAPTER XXXIX.
BATTLE OF MONOCACY.
THE enemy, in considerable force under General Lew
Wallace, was found strongly posted on the eastern bank of the
Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork and two
block-houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge on
the Georgetown pike. Ramseur's division was deployed in front
of the enemy, after driving his skirmishers across the river,
and several batteries were put in position, when a sharp
artillery fire opened from both sides. Rodes' division had
come up from Jefferson and was placed on Ramseur's left,
covering the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the
Monocacy above the Junction. Breckenridge's command, with the
trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the Junction,
while the residue of the cavalry was watching a force of the
enemy's cavalry which had followed from Maryland Heights. The
enemy's position was too strong, and the difficulties of
crossing the Monocacy under fire too great, to attack in front
without greater loss than I was willing to incur. I therefore
made an examination in person to find a point at which the
river could be crossed, so as to take the enemy in flank.
While I was engaged in making this examination to my right, I
discovered McCausland in the act of crossing the river with
his brigade. As soon as he crossed, he dismounted his men, and
advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, which he
threw into confusion, and he came very near capturing a
battery of artillery, but the enemy concentrated on him, and
he was gradually forced back obstinately contesting the
ground. McCausland's movement, which was very brilliantly
executed, solved the problem for me, and, as soon as I
discovered it, orders were sent to Breckenridge to move up
rapidly with Gordon's division to McCausland's assistance, and
to follow up his attack. This division crossed at the same
Page 388
place, and Gordon was ordered to move forward and strike the
enemy on his left flank, and drive him from the position
commanding the crossings in Ramseur's front, so as to enable
the latter to cross. This movement was executed under the
personal superintendence of General Breckenridge, and, while
Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front, the attack was
made by Gordon in gallant style, and, with the aid of several
pieces of King's artillery which had been crossed over, and
Nelson's artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy
into great confusion and forced him from his position. Ramseur
immediately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued the
enemy's flying forces and Rodes crossed on the left and joined
in the pursuit.
Echols' division, which had been left to guard the trains, was
ordered up during the engagement, but was not needed. The
pursuit was soon discontinued, as Wallace's entire force had
taken the road towards Baltimore, and I did not desire
prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men,
and it was ascertained that one division of the 6th corps
(Rickett's), from Grant's army, was in the fight. Between 600
and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the
enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss in
killed and wounded was about 700, and among them were
Brigadier General Evans wounded, and Colonel Lamar of the 61st
Georgia Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Tavener of the 17th
Virginia Cavalry and Lieutenant Hobson of Nelson's artillery,
killed. The action closed about sunset, and we had marched
fourteen miles before it commenced. All the troops and trains
were crossed over the Monocacy that night, so as to resume the
march early next day. Such of our wounded as could not be
moved in ambulances or otherwise were sent to the hospitals at
Frederick under charge of competent medical officers, and our
dead were buried. During the operations at Monocacy, a
contribution of $200,000 in money was levied on the city of
Frederick, and some needed supplies were obtained.
Page 389
CHAPTER XL.
IN FRONT OF
WASHINGTON.
ON the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and we
bivouacked four miles from Rockville, on the Georgetown pike,
having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's division, which had
remained behind for a short time to protect a working party
engaged in destroying the railroad bridge, was detained for a
time in driving off a party of cavalry which had been
following from Maryland Heights, and did not get up until one
o'clock at night. McCausland, moving in front on this day,
drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before them and had quite
a brisk engagement at Rockville, where he encamped after
defeating and driving off the enemy.
We moved at daylight on the 11th; McCausland moving on the
Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded by Imboden's
cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at Rockville,
so as to reach the 7th Street pike which runs by Silver Spring
into Washington. Jackson's cavalry moved on the left flank.
The previous day had been very warm, and the roads were
exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain for several
weeks. The heat during the night had been very oppressive, and
but little rest had been obtained. This day was an exceedingly
hot one, and there was no air stirring. While marching, the
men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust, and many of
them fell by the way from exhaustion. Our progress was
therefore very much impeded, but I pushed on as rapidly as
possible, hoping to get into the fortifications around
Washington before they could be manned. Smith drove a small
body of cavalry before him into the woods on the 7th Street
pike, and dismounted his men and deployed them as skirmishers.
I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived in sight of Fort
Stevens on the road a short time after noon, when I discovered
that the works were but feebly manned.
Page 390
Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered
to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out
skirmishers, and move into the works if he could. My whole
column was then moving by flank, which was the only
practicable mode of marching upon the road we were on, and
before Rodes' division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of
dust in the rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a
column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left and
skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire
was opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our
hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it
became necessary to reconnoitre.
Rodes' skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of
the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to
examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was
practicable to carry them by assault. They were found to be
exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be
enclosed forts of heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works
in front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the
whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and
strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been
felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground,
making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was
raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek running
through a deep ravine which had been rendered impassable by
the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond were the
works on the Georgetown pike which had been reported to be the
strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye could reach,
the works appeared to be of the same impregnable character.
The position was naturally strong for defence, and the
examination showed, what might have been expected, that every
appliance of science and unlimited means had been used to
render the fortifications around Washington as strong as
possible. This reconnaissance consumed the balance of the day.
The rapid marching which had broken down a number
Page 391
of the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous
exposure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to be
collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded
at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights and Monocacy, had reduced
my infantry to about 8,000 muskets. Of those remaining, a very
large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days'
marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, and I was
satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifications,
that not more than one-third of my force could have been
carried into action. I had about forty pieces of field
artillery, of which the largest were 12 pounder Napoleons,
besides a few pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry.
McCausland reported the works on the Georgetown pike too
strongly manned for him to assault. We could not move to
the right or left without its being discovered from a signal
station on the top of the "Soldiers' Home," which overlooked
the country, and the enemy would have been enabled to move in
his works to meet us. Under the circumstances, to have rushed
my men blindly against the fortifications, without
understanding the state of things, would have been worse than
folly. If we had any friends in Washington, none of them came
out to give us information, and this satisfied me that the
place was not undefended. I knew that troops had arrived from
Grant's army, for prisoners had been captured from Rickett's
division of the 6th corps at Monocacy.
From Sharpsburg I had sent a message to Mosby, by one of
his men, requesting him to cross the Potomac below Harper's
Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph, and endeavor to find
out the condition of things in Washington, but he had not
crossed the river, and I had received no information from him.
A Northern paper, which was obtained, gave the information
that Hunter, after moving up the Ohio River in steamboats, was
passing over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and I knew that he
would be at Harper's Ferry soon, as Imboden had done very
little damage to the road west of Martinsburg. After dark on
Page 392
the 11th I held a consultation with Major Generals
Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon and Ramseur, in which
stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and the
necessity of doing something immediately, as the probability
was that the passes of the South Mountain and the fords of the
upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. After
interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to abandon
the project of capturing Washington I determined to make an
assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morning, unless
some information should be received before that time showing
its impracticability, and so informed those officers. During
the night a dispatch was received from Gen. Bradley Johnson
from near Baltimore informing me that he had received
information, from a reliable source, that two corps had
arrived from General Grant's army, and that his whole army was
probably in motion. This caused me to delay the attack until I
could examine the works again, and as soon as it was light
enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets
lined with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up
all hopes of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in
sight of the dome of the Capitol, and given the Federal
authorities a terrible fright.
In his report, Grant says, in regard to the condition of
things when I moved towards Washington, "The garrisons of
Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy
artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from
the invalid corps." And, in regard to the force of Wallace at
Monocacy, he says: "His force was not sufficient to ensure
success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it
resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy
and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach
Washington with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the
advance of the 19th corps before him." Stanton says in his
report: "Here (at Washington) they (we) were met by troops
from the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the
Page 393
6th corps under General Wright, a part of the 8th corps under
General Gilmore and a part of the 19th corps, just arrived
from New Orleans under General Emory."
Taking Grant's statement of the troops which had arrived from
his army, they were sufficient to hold the works against my
troops, at least until others could arrive. But in addition to
those which had already arrived, there were the detachments
from the invalid corps, called, I believe, the "Veteran
Reserves" (of which I was informed there were 5,000), the
heavy artillery regiments, the hundred days' men, and, I
suppose, the part of the 8th corps mentioned by Stanton. To
all of these may be added the local troops, or militia, and
the Government employees. Some of the Northern papers stated
that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the
city: but on Saturday I was fighting at Monocacy, 35 miles
from Washington, a force which I could not leave in my rear;
and after disposing of that force and moving as rapidly as it
was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in front
of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and then my
troops were exhausted and it required time to bring them up
into line. I had then made a march, over the circuitous route
by Charlottesville, Lynchburg and Salem, down the Valley and
through the passes of the South Mountain, which,
notwithstanding the delays in dealing with Hunter's, Sigel's,
and Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I
believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war--
the unopposed excursion of Sherman through
Georgia not excepted. My small force had been thrown up to the
very walls of the Federal Capital, north of a river which
could not be forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a
heavy force and the South Mountain in my rear,--the passes
through which mountain could be held by a small number of
troops. A glance at the map, when it is recollected that the
Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to Washington with the
largest vessels, will cause the intelligent reader to wonder,
not why I failed to take
Page 394
Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it as I did,
with the small force under my command.
It was supposed by some, who were not informed of the
facts, that I delayed in the lower Valley longer than was
necessary; but an examination of the foregoing narrative will
show that not one moment was spent in idleness, but that every
one was employed in making some arrangement, or removing
some difficulty in my way, which it was necessary to make or
remove; so as to enable me to advance with a prospect of
success. I could not move across the Potomac and through the
passes of the South Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was
driven from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland
Heights.
After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington, I
determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the
12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain
longer would cause the loss of my entire force.
Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on the
Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, and
started for Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to return.
The attempt to release the prisoners, of which I was informed by
General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had received notice of
it in some way. Major Harry Gilmor, who burned the bridge over
the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia road, captured Major General
Franklin on a train at that point, but he was permitted to
escape, either by the carelessness or exhaustion of the guard
placed over him, before I was informed of the capture.
On the afternoon of the
12th, a heavy reconnoitring force
was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was
driven back by Rodes' division with but slight loss to us. About
dark we commenced retiring and did so without molestation.
Passing through Rockville and Poolsville, we crossed the
Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg in Loudoun County, on
the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners
Page 395
captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety. There was some
skirmishing in the rear, between our cavalry and that of the
enemy which was following, and on the afternoon of the 14th,
there was some artillery firing by the enemy, across the river,
at our cavalry which was watching the fords. Besides the money
levied in Hagerstown and Frederick, which was subsequently
very useful in obtaining supplies, we brought off quite a large
number of beef cattle, and the cavalry obtained a number of
horses, some being also procured for the
artillery.*
*
On the night of the 13th the house of Postmaster General Blair
near Silver Spring was burned, and it was assumed by the enemy
that it was burned by my orders. I had nothing to do with it and
do not yet know how the burning occurred. Though I believed that
retaliation was justified by previous acts of the enemy, yet I
did not wish to incur the risk of any license on the part of my
troops and it was obviously impolitic to set the house on fire
when we were retiring, as it amounted to notice of our movement.
Page 396
CHAPTER XLI.
RETURN TO VIRGINIA.
WE rested on the 14th and 15th, near Leesburg; and on the
morning of the 16th, resumed the march to the Valley, through
Sincker's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Hunter had arrived at Harper's
Ferry, and united with Sigel, and the whole force had moved from
that place, under Crook, to Hillsboro, in Loudoun, and a body of
cavalry from it made a dash on our train, as we were moving
towards the Valley, and succeeded in setting fire to a few
wagons, but was soon driven off by troops from Rodes' and
Ramseur's divisions, and one piece of artillery was captured from
the enemy.
On the morning of the 17th, we crossed the Shenandoah, at
Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, and took possession near
Berryville--Breckenridge covering the ford at the ferry and
the river above and below, and Rodes' and Ramseur's division the
roads from Harper's Ferry.
On the 18th the enemy, having moved through Snicker's Gap,
appeared on the banks of the Shenandoah, and there was some
skirmishing. In the afternoon, a heavy column of his infantry
made a dash at Parker's Ford, one mile below the ferry, and
crossed over, after driving back the picket of 100 men at that
point. Breckenridge moved Gordon's and Echols' divisions to the
front, and held the enemy in check, while Rodes' division was
brought up from the left, and attacked and drove him across the
river, with heavy loss, and in great confusion.
The enemy's main body still occupied the eastern bank of the
Shenandoah on the 19th, and smaller columns moved up and down
the river, to effect a crossing. Imboden, with his own and
McCausland's cavalry, resisted and repulsed one of these
columns, which attempted to cross at Berry's Ferry, with
considerable loss to the enemy. The horses of Vaughan's cavalry
having been
Page 397
brought from Southwestern Virginia, his small force had been
now mounted. On this day I received information that a column
under Averill was moving from Martinsburg towards Winchester,
and as the position I held near Berryville left my trains exposed
to expeditions in the rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I
determined to concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to
enable me to put the trains in safety and then move out and
attack the enemy. This movement was commenced on the night
of the 19th; Ramseur's division, with a battery of artillery,
being sent to Winchester, to cover that place against Averill,
while the stores, and the sick and wounded were being removed,
and the other divisions moving through Millwood and White Post to
the Valley Pike at Newtown and Middletown.
Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching Averill,
and, on the afternoon of the 20th, it was reported to General
Ramseur, by General Vaughan, that Averill was at Stephenson's
depot, with an inferior force, which could be captured, and
Ramseur moved out from Winchester to attack him; but relying
on the accuracy of the information he had received, General
Ramseur did not take the proper precautions in advancing, and his
division, while moving by the flank, was suddenly met by a larger
force, under Averill, advancing in line of battle, and the result
was that Ramseur's force was thrown into confusion, and compelled
to retire, with the loss of four pieces of artillery, and a
number in killed and wounded--Brigadier Generals Lewis and
Lilly being among the wounded, and Colonel Board of the 58th
Virginia Regiment among the killed. Colonel Jackson made a
vigorous charge with his cavalry, which enabled Ramseur to rally
his men, restore order, and arrest the progress of Averill before
he reached Winchester. The error committed, on this occasion, by
this most gallant officer, was nobly retrieved in the subsequent
part of the campaign. I received at New Market the news of
Ramseur's misfortune, and immediately moved to his assistance with
Page 398
Rodes' division; but on arriving at Winchester, I found that
the enemy, after being checked, had fallen back a short distance;
and, as another and much larger column was moving through
Berryville, I did not go after Averill, but moved the whole
command to Newtown--the stores, and such of the wounded and
sick as could be transported, having been gotten off.
On the 21st my whole infantry force was concentrated near
Middletown; and, on the 22nd, it was moved across Cedar Creek,
towards Strasburg, and so posted as to cover all the roads from
the direction of Winchester.
A report having been sent to me, from Mount Jackson, that a
force of the enemy was moving from the Valley of the South
Branch of the Potomac to that place, Imboden was sent to
ascertain its truth, and it proved to be false. We rested on the
23rd, while waiting to ascertain the movements of the enemy,
and during the day a report was received from the cavalry in
front that a large portion of the force sent after us from
Washington was returning, and that Crook and Averill had united
and were at Kernstown, near Winchester.
Page 399
CHAPTER XLII.
BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.
ON the reception of the foregoing information, I determined to
attack the enemy at once; and, early on the morning of the 24th,
my whole force was put in motion for Winchester. The enemy,
under Crook, consisting of the "Army of West Virginia," and
including Hunter's and Sigel's forces, and Averill's cavalry, was
found in position at Kernstown, on the same ground occupied by
Shields, at the time of General Jackson's fight with him, on
March 22nd, 1862. Ramseur's division was sent to the left, at
Bartonsville, to get around the enemy's right flank, while the
other divisions moved along the Valley Pike, and formed on each
side of it. Ransom's cavalry was ordered to move in two columns:
one, on the right, along the road from Front Royal to Winchester,
and the other on the left, and west of Winchester, so as to unite
in rear of the latter place, and cut off the enemy's retreat.
After the enemy's skirmishers were driven in, it was discovered
that his left flank, extending through Kernstown, was exposed,
and General Breckenridge was ordered to move Echols' division,
now under Brigadier General Wharton, under cover of some ravines
on our right and attack that flank. This movement, which was made
under General Breckenridge's personal superintendence, was
handsomely executed, and the attacking division struck the
enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up and throwing
his whole line into great confusion. The other divisions then
advanced, and the rout of the enemy became complete. He was
pursued, by the infantry and artillery, through and beyond
Winchester; and the pursuit was continued by Rodes' division to
Stephenson's depot, six miles from Winchester--this division
then having marched twenty-seven miles from its position west of
Strasburg. The cavalry had not been moved according
Page 400
to my orders; and the enemy, having the advantage of an open country and a wide
macadamized road, was enabled to make his escape with his
artillery and most of his wagons. General Ransom had been in very
bad health since he reported to me in Lynchburg, and unable to
take the active command in the field; and all of my operations
had been impeded for the want of an efficient and energetic
cavalry commander. I think, if I had had one on this occasion,
the greater part of the enemy's force would have been captured or
destroyed, for the rout was thorough. Our loss, in this action,
was very light. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was
severe, and two or three hundred prisoners fell into
our hands; and among them, Colonel Mulligan, in command of a
division, mortally wounded. The infantry was too much exhausted
to continue the pursuit on the 25th, and only moved to Bunker
Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. The pursuit was continued by
our cavalry, and the enemy's rear guard of cavalry was
encountered at Martinsburg; but after slight skirmishing, it
evacuated the place. The whole defeated force crossed the
Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry.
The road from Winchester, via Martinsburg, to Williamsport was
strewed with débris of the rapid retreat--twelve caissons and
seventy-two wagons having been abandoned, and most of them
burned.
Page 401
CHAPTER XLIII.
THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.
ON the 26th we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to
the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroying the
railroad, it having been repaired since we passed over it at the
beginning of the month. While at Martinsburg, it was ascertained
that while we were near Washington, after Hunter's return to the
Valley, by his orders, a number of private residences had been
burned,--among them the homes of Mr. Alex. R. Boteler, an
ex-member of the Confederate Congress, of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a
member of the Virginia Senate, and of Mr. Edmund I. Lee, a
distant relative of General Lee,--all in Jefferson County,
with their contents, only time enough being given for the ladies
to get out of their houses. A number of towns in the South, as
well as private country houses, had been burned by the Federal
troops. I came to the conclusion it was time to open the eyes of
the people of the North to this enormity, by an example in the
way of retaliation. I did not select the cases mentioned, as
having more merit or greater claims for retaliation than others,
but because they had occurred within the limits of the country
covered by my command and were brought more immediately to my
attention.
The town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected as
the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland
was ordered to proceed, with his brigade and that of Johnson and
a battery of artillery, to that place, and demand of the
municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in
U. S. currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the
houses named and their contents; and in default of payment, to
lay the town in ashes. A written demand to that effect was sent
to the authorities, and they were informed what would be the
result of a failure or refusal to comply with
Page 402
it: for I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an
opportunity of saving their town, by making compensation for
part of the injury done, and hoped the payment of such a sum
would have the effect of causing the adoption of a different
policy. McCausland was also directed to proceed from
Chambersburg towards Cumberland, Maryland, and levy
contributions in money upon that and other towns able to bear
them, and if possible destroy the machinery of the coal pits near
Cumberland and the machine shops, depots and bridges on the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad as far as practicable.
On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac near
Clear Spring above Williamsport, and I moved with
Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions and Vaughan's cavalry
to the latter place, while Imboden demonstrated with his
and Jackson's cavalry towards Harper's Ferry, in order
to draw attention from McCausland. Breckenridge remained at
Martinsburg and continued the destruction of the railroad.
Vaughan drove a force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into
Hagerstown, where he captured and destroyed a train of cars
loaded with supplies. One of Rodes' brigades was crossed over at
Williamsport and subsequently withdrawn. On the 30th, McCausland
being well under way I moved back to Martinsburg, and
on the 31st, the whole infantry force was moved to
Bunker Hill, where we remained on the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd of August.
On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire from
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had been
reinforced by the 6th and 19th corps, and had been oscillating
between Harper's Ferry and Monocacy Junction, in a state of
uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac with the infantry and
Vaughan's and Jackson' cavalry, while Imboden demonstrated
towards Harper's Ferry. On the 5th, Rodes' and Ramseur's
divisions crossed at Williamsport and took position near St.
James' College and Vaughan's cavalry went into Hagerstown.
Breckenridge, with his command, and
Page 403
Jackson's cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took position at
Sharpsburg. This position is in full view from Maryland Heights,
and a cavalry force was sent out by the enemy to reconnoitre,
which, after skirmishing with Jackson's cavalry, was driven off
by the sharpshooters of Gordon's division. On the 6th, the whole
force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and moved towards
Martinsburg, and on the 7th we returned to Bunker Hill.*
* While at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground on
which the battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam, as it is called by
the enemy, was fought, and I was surprised to see how few traces
of that great battle remained. In the woods at the famous Dunkard
or Tunker Church, where, from personal observation at the battle,
I expected to find the trees terribly broken and battered, a
stranger would find difficulty in identifying the marks of the
bullets and shells.
I will take occasion here to say that the public, North or South,
has never known how small was the force with which General Lee
fought that battle. From personal observation and conversation
with other officers engaged, including General Lee himself, I am
satisfied that the latter was not able to carry 30,000
men into action. The exhaustion of our men, in the battles around
Richmond, the subsequent battles near Manassas, and on the march
to Maryland, when they were for days without anything to eat
except green corn, was so great, that the straggling was
frightful before we crossed the Potomac. As an instance of our
weakness, and a reminiscence worthy of being recorded, which was
brought forcibly to my mind while riding over the ground, I state
the following facts; in the early part of the day, all of General
Jackson's troops on the field except my brigade (A. P. Hill had
not then arrived from Harper's Ferry) were driven from
the field in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with
his division.
My brigade, which was on the extreme left, supporting some
artillery with which Stuart was operating, and had not been
engaged, was sent for by General Jackson and posted in the left
of the woods at the Dunkard Church. Hood was also forced back,
and then the enemy advanced to this woods--Sumner's corps,
which was fresh, advancing on our left flank. My brigade, then
numbering about 1000 men for duty, with two or three hundred men
of Jackson's own division, who had been rallied by Colonels
Grigsby and Stafford, and with an interval of at least one-half a
mile between us and any other part of our line, held Sumner's
corps in check for some time, until Green's division, of
Mansfield's corps, penetrated into the interval in the
woods between us and the rest of our line, and I was compelled to
move by the flank and attack it. That division was driven out of
the woods by my brigade, while Grigsby and Stafford skirmished
with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and with the
aid of three brigades--to wit: Anderson's, Semmes' and
Barksdale's--which had just arrived to our assistance, drove it
from the woods in great confusion and with heavy loss. So great
was the disparity in the forces at this point that the wounded
officers who were captured were greatly mortified, and commenced
making excuses by stating that the troops in their front were
raw troops who stampeded and produced confusion in their ranks.
McClellan, in his report, states that Sumner's corps and Green's
division encountered in this woods "overwhelming numbers behind
breastworks," and he assigns the heavy losses and consequent
demoralization in Sumner's corps as one of the reasons
for not renewing the fight on the 18th. We had no breastworks or
anything like them in that woods on the 17th, and, on our part,
it was a stand up fight there altogether. The slight breastworks
subsequently seen by McClellan were made on the 18th, when we
were expecting a renewal of the battle.
Page 404
On the 30th of July McCausland reached Chambersburg and
made the demand as directed, reading to such of the authorities
as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The demand was
not complied with, the people stating that they were not afraid
of having their town burned, and that a Federal force was
approaching. The policy pursued by our army on former
occasions had been so lenient that they did not suppose the
threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped for speedy
relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders,
and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.*
He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but on
approaching that town, he found it defended by a force under
Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he withdrew towards
Hampshire County in Virginia, and crossed the Potomac near the
mouth of the South Branch, capturing the garrison at that place
and partially destroying
* For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged
in it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left
them. Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has occurred and
the result of the war, I see no reason to regret my conduct on
this occasion.
Page 405
the railroad bridge. He then invested the post on the railroad at
New Creek, but finding it too strongly fortified to take by
assault, he moved to Moorefield in Hardy County, near which he
halted to rest and recruit his men and horses, as the command was
now considered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, had been
pursuing from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and Johnson's
brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the morning of the
7th of August, and routed by Averill's force. This resulted also
in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and the loss of the
artillery (4 pieces), and about 300 prisoners from the whole
command. The balance of the command made its way to Mount Jackson
in great disorder, and much weakened. This affair had a very
damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign.
Page 406
CHAPTER XLIV.
RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL.
ON the 9th, Imboden reported that a large force had been
concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6th, 19th, and
Crook's corps, under a new commander, and that it was moving
to our right. The new commander proved to be Major General
Sheridan, from Grant's army. On the 10th, we moved from
Bunker Hill to the east of Winchester, to cover the roads from
Charlestown and Berryville to that place; and Ramseur's division
was moved to Winchester, to cover that place against a force
reported to be advancing from the west; but, this report proving
untrue, it was subsequently moved to the junction of the Millwood
and Front Royal roads.
On the morning of the 11th, it was discovered that the enemy
was moving to our right on the east of the Opequon, and my
troops, which had been formed in line of battle covering
Winchester, were moved to the right, towards Newtown,
keeping between the enemy and the Valley Pike. Ramseur had a
brisk skirmish with a body of the enemy's cavalry on the
Millwood road, and drove it back. Imboden's and Vaughan's
brigades had a severe fight with another body of cavalry at the
double toll-gate, at the intersection of the Front Royal road
with the road from White Post to Newtown; and it was discovered
that there had been a considerable accession to that arm from
Grant's army.
Just before night, Gordon had very heavy skirmishing near
Newtown, with a large force of cavalry, which advanced on the
road from the double toll-gate, and drove it off. We encamped
near Newtown; and on the morning of the 12th, moved to Hupp's
Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek. Finding that the enemy
was advancing in much heavier force than I had yet encountered,
I determined to take position at Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg,
Page 407
and await his attack there. Imboden with his brigade was
sent to the Luray Valley, to watch that route; and, in the
afternoon, we moved to Fisher's Hill. I had received information,
a few days before, from General Lee, that General Anderson had
moved with Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitz. Lee's
division of cavalry to Culpeper Court-House; and I sent a
dispatch to Anderson informing him of the state of things, and
requesting him to move to Front Royal, so as to guard the Luray
Valley.
Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek,
on the 12th, and there was some skirmishing with it. My troops
were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on the North
Fork of the Shenandoah, and the left extending towards Little
North Mountain; and we awaited the advance of the enemy.
General Anderson moved to Front Royal, in compliance with my
request, and took position to prevent an advance of the enemy on
that route. Shortly after I took position at Fisher's Hill, Major
General Lomax reported to me to relieve Ransom in command of
the cavalry, and McCausland and Johnson joined us with the
remnants of their brigades. Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill,
within our view, for several days, and some severe skirmishing
ensued.
Upon taking position at Fisher's Hill, I had established a signal
station on the end of Three Top Mountain, a branch of
Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg, which overlooked both
camps and enabled me to communicate readily with General
Anderson in the Luray Valley. A small force from Sheridan's
army ascended the mountain and drove off our signal-men and
possession was taken of the station by the enemy, who was in
turn driven away; when several small but severe fights ensued
over the station, possession of it being finally gained and held
by a force of 100 men under Captain Keller of Gordon's division.
On the morning of the 17th, it was discovered that the enemy
was falling back, and I immediately moved
Page 408
forward in pursuit, requesting General Anderson, by signal, to
cross the river at Front Royal and move towards Winchester.
Just before night, the enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry,
reported to be a division, was encountered between Kernstown
and Winchester, and driven through the latter place, after a
sharp engagement, in which Wharton's division moved to the left
and attacked the enemy's infantry, and drove it from a strong
position on Bower's Hill, south of Winchester, while Ramseur
engaged it in the front and Gordon advanced against the cavalry
on the right.
On the 18th we took possession to cover Winchester, and
General Anderson came up with Kershaw's division of infantry,
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery and two brigades of cavalry
under Fitz. Lee. General Anderson ranked me, but he declined to
take command, and offered to co-operate in any movement I might
suggest. We had now discovered that Torbert's and Wilson's
divisions of cavalry from Grant's army had joined Sheridan's
force, and that the latter was very large.
On the 19th, my main force moved to Bunker Hill and
Lomax's cavalry made reconnaissances to Martinsburg and
Shepherdstown, while Anderson's whole force remained near
Winchester.
On the 20th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the
enemy's, on the Opequon and on the 21st, by concert, there was
a general movement towards Harper's Ferry--my command
moving through Smithfield towards Charlestown, and Anderson's
on the direct road by Summit Point. A body of the enemy's cavalry
was driven from the Opequon, and was pursued by part of our
cavalry towards Summit Point. I encountered Sheridan's main force
near Cameron's depot, about three miles from Charlestown, in a
position which he commenced fortifying at once. Rodes' and
Ramseur's divisions were advanced to the front, and very heavy
skirmishing ensued and was continued until night, but I waited
for General Anderson to arrive before making a general
Page 409
attack. He encountered Wilson's division of cavalry at Summit Point,
and, after driving it off, went into camp at that place. At light
next morning, it was discovered that the enemy had retired
during the night, and his rear guard of cavalry was driven
through Charlestown towards Halltown, where Sheridan had taken a
strong position under the protection of the heavy guns on
Maryland Heights.
I demonstrated on the enemy's front on the 22nd, 23rd and
24th, and there was some skirmishing. General Anderson then
consented to take my position in front of Charlestown and amuse
the enemy with Kershaw's division of infantry, supported by
McCausland's brigade of cavalry on the left and a regiment of
Fitz. Lee's cavalry on the right, while I moved with my infantry
and artillery to Shepherdstown and Fitz. Lee with the rest of the
cavalry to Williamsport, as if to cross into Maryland, in order
to keep up the fear of an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania.
On the 25th Fitz. Lee started by way of Leetown and
Martinsburg to Williamsport, and I moved through Leetown and
crossed the railroad at Kearneysville to Shepherdstown. After
Fitz. Lee had passed on, I encountered a very large force of the
enemy's cavalry between Leetown and Kearneysville, which was
moving out with several days' forage and rations for a raid in
our rear. After a sharp engagement with small arms and artillery,
this force was driven back through Shepherdstown, where we came
near surrounding and capturing a considerable portion of it, but
it succeeded in making its escape across the Potomac. Gordon's
division, which was moved around to intercept the enemy, became
heavily engaged, and cut off the retreat of part of his force by
one road, but it made its way down the river to the ford by
another and thus escaped. In this affair, a valuable officer,
Colonel Monaghan, of the 6th Louisiana Regiment, was killed.
Fitz. Lee reached Williamsport, and had some
Page 410
skirmishing across the river at that place, and then moved to
Shepherdstown.
On the 26th I moved to Leetown, on the 27th moved back to
Bunker Hill; while Anderson, who had confronted Sheridan,
during the two days of my absence, with but a division of
infantry, and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry, moved to
Stephenson's depot. On the 28th our cavalry, which had been left
holding a line from Charlestown to Shepherdstown, was compelled
to retire across the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement
with the enemy's cavalry at Smithfield. On the 29th, the enemy's
cavalry crossed the Opequon near Smithfield, driving in our
cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the front with a part of my
infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and after
a very sharp artillery duel, a portion of my command was crossed
over and pursued the enemy through Smithfield towards
Charlestown.
Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 31st there were some
demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the Opequon, which
were met by ours. On this day Anderson moved to Winchester,
and Rodes, with his division, went to Martinsburg on a
reconnaissance, drove a force of the enemy's cavalry from that
place, interrupted the preparations for repairing the railroad,
and then returned.
There was quiet on the 1st, but on the 2nd, I broke up my
camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three divisions of infantry
and part of McCausland's cavalry, under Colonel Ferguson,
across the country towards Summit Point, on a reconnaissance,
while the trains under the protection of Rodes' division were
moved to Stephenson's depot. After I had crossed the Opequon
and was moving towards Summit Point, Averill's cavalry attacked
and drove back in some confusion first Vaughan's and then
Johnson's cavalry, which were on the Martinsburg road and the
Opequon, but Rodes returned towards Bunker Hill and drove the
enemy back in turn. This affair arrested my march and I
recrossed the Opequon and
Page 411
moved to Stephenson's depot, where I established my camp.
On the 3rd, Rodes moved to Bunker Hill in support of
Lomax's cavalry, and drove the enemy's cavalry from and
beyond the place.
A letter had been received from General Lee requesting that
Kershaw's division should be returned to him, as he was very
much in need of troops, and, after consultation with me, General
Anderson determined to recross the Blue Ridge with that division
and Fitz. Lee's cavalry. On the 3rd, he moved towards Berryville
for the purpose of crossing the mountain at Ashby's Gap, and I
was to have moved towards Charlestown next day, to occupy the
enemy's attention during Anderson's movement. Sheridan,
however, had started two divisions of cavalry through Berryville
and White Post, on a raid to our rear, and his main force had
moved towards Berryville. Anderson encountered Crook's corps
at the latter place, and after a sharp engagement drove it back
on the main body. Receiving information of this affair, I moved
at daylight next morning, with three divisions, to Anderson's
assistance, Gordon's division being left to cover Winchester.
I found Kershaw's division extended out in a strong skirmish
line confronting Sheridan's main force, which had taken position
in rear of Berryville, across the road from Charlestown to that
place, and was busily fortifying, while the cavalry force which
had started on the raid was returning and passing between
Berryville and the river to Sheridan's rear. As may be supposed,
Anderson's position was one of great peril, if the enemy had
possessed enterprise, and it presented the appearance of the most
extreme audacity for him thus to confront a force so vastly
superior to his own, while, too, his trains were at the mercy of
the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it. Placing one of my
divisions in line on Kershaw's left, I moved with the other two
along the enemy's front towards his right, for the purpose of
reconnoitering and
Page 412
attacking that flank, if a suitable
opportunity offered. After moving in this way for two miles, I
reached an elevated position from which the enemy's line was
visible, and within artillery range of it. I at first thought
that I had reached his right flank and was about making
arrangements to attack it, when, casting my eye to my left, I
discovered, as far as the eye could reach, with the aid of field
glasses, a line extending toward Summit Point.
The position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he
was busily engaged fortifying it, having already made
considerable progress. It was not until I had had this view that
I realized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered
that his line was too long for me to get around his flank and the
position was too strong to attack in front, I returned and
informed General Anderson of the condition of things. After
consultation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack the
enemy in his entrenched lines, and we determined to move our
forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he would
not move out of his works.
The wagon trains were sent back early next morning (the 5th)
towards Winchester, and about an hour by sun, Kershaw's
division, whose place had been taken by one of my divisions,
moved toward the same point. About two o'clock in the afternoon
my troops were withdrawn, and moved back to Stephenson's
depot. This withdrawal was made while the skirmishers were in
close proximity and firing at each other; yet there was no effort
on the part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front division
(Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove back, and
pursued for some distance, Averill's cavalry, which was forcing,
towards Winchester, that part of our cavalry which had been
watching the Martinsburg road.
It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry
made demonstrations on the Martinsburg road and the Opequon
at several points and was repulsed.
Page 413
On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment of
the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below Brucetown,
burned some mills and retreated before a division of infantry
sent out to meet it.
On the 10th, my infantry moved by Bunker Hill to Darksville
and encountered a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry,
which was driven off, and then pursued by Lomax through
Martinsburg across the Opequon. We then returned to Bunker
Hill and the next day to Stephenson's depot, and there was quiet
on the 12th.
On the 13th, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, reported to
be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from Summit
Point, and drove in our pickets from the Opequon, when two
divisions of infantry were advanced to the front, driving the
enemy across the Opequon again. A very sharp artillery duel
across the creek then took place and some of my infantry crossed
over, when the enemy retired.
On the 14th, General Anderson again started, with Kershaw's
division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross the Blue
Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and was not molested. Fitz.
Lee's cavalry was left with me, and Ramseur's division was
moved to Winchester to occupy Kershaw's position.
There was an affair between one of Kershaw's brigades and
a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at Fisher's Hill
and Anderson at Front Royal, in which some prisoners were lost;
and two affairs in which the outposts from Kershaw's command were
attacked and captured by the enemy's cavalry, one in front of
Winchester and the other in front of Charlestown; which I have
not undertaken to detail, as they occurred when General
Anderson was controlling the operations of that division, but it
is proper to refer to them here as part of the operations in the
Valley. On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp
undisturbed.
The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows:
Ramseur's division and Nelson's battalion of
Page 414
artillery were on the road from Berryville to Winchester, one
mile from the latter place. Rodes', Gordon's and Wharton's
divisions (the last two being under Breckenridge), and Braxton's
and King's battalions of artillery were at Stephenson's depot on
the Winchester & Potomac Railroad, which is six miles from
Winchester. Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the
Opequon, and on my left from that stream to North Mountain,
while Fitz. Lee's cavalry watched the right, having small pickets
across to the Shenandoah. Four principal roads, from positions,
centred at Stephenson's depot, to wit: the Martinsburg road, the
road from Charlestown via Smithfield, the road from the same
place via Summit Point, and the road from Berryville via Jordan's
Springs. Sheridan's main force was near Berryville, at the
entrenched position which has been mentioned, while Averill was
at Martinsburg with a division of cavalry. Berryville is ten
miles from Winchester, nearly east, and Martinsburg twenty-two
miles nearly north. The crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville
road is four or five miles from Winchester. From Berryville there
are two good roads via White Post to the Valley Pike at Newtown
and Middletown, the last two roads running east of the Opequon.
The whole country is very open, being a limestone country which
is thickly settled and well cleared, and affords great facilities
for the movement of troops and the operations of cavalry. From
the enemy's fortifications on Maryland Heights, the country north
and east of Winchester, and the main roads through it are exposed
to view.
The relative positions which we occupied rendered my
communications to the rear very much exposed, but I could not
avoid it without giving up the lower Valley. The object of my
presence there was to keep up a threatening attitude towards
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as well as
to keep as large a force as possible from Grant's army to defend
the
Page 415
Federal Capital. Had Sheridan, by a prompt movement, thrown
his whole force on the line of my communications, I would have
been compelled to attempt to cut my way through, as there was
no escape for me to the right or left, and my force was too weak
to cross the Potomac while he was in my rear. I knew my
danger, but I could occupy no other position that would have
enabled me to accomplish the desired object.
If I had moved up the Valley at all, I could not have
stopped short of New Market, for between that place and
the country, in which I was, there was no forage for my
horses; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume
the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the
troops from Grant's army to him. Being compelled to
occupy the position where I was, and being aware of its
danger as well as apprised of the fact that very great
odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my
forces so as to display them at different points with great
rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they
were much larger than they really were. The events of
the last month had satisfied me that the commander
opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed an
excessive caution which amounted to timidity. If it was
his policy to produce the impression that his force was
too weak to fight me, he did not succeed, but if it was to
convince me that he was not an energetic commander, his
strategy was a complete success, and subsequent events
have not changed my opinion.
My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divisions
of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
Wharton's division of Breckenridge's command. The 2nd corps
numbered a little over 8,000 muskets when it was detached in
pursuit of Hunter, and it had now been reduced to about 7,000
muskets, by long and rapid marches, and the various
encampments and skirmishes in which it had participated.
Wharton's division had been reduced to about 1,700 muskets by
the same causes. Making a small allowance for details and
Page 416
those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty.
When I
returned from Maryland, my cavalry consisted of the remnants
of five small brigades, to wit: Imboden's, McCausland's,
Johnson's, Jackson's and Vaughan's. Vaughan's had now been
ordered to Southwestern Virginia, most of the men having left
without permission. The surprise and rout of McCausland's
and Johnson's brigades by Averill at Moorefield had resulted in
the loss of a considerable number of horses and men, and such
had been the loss in all the brigades, in the various fights and
skirmishes in which they had been engaged, that the whole of
this cavalry, now under Lomax, numbered only about 1,700
mounted men. Fitz. Lee had brought with him two brigades, to
wit: Wickham's and Lomax's old brigade (now under Colonel
Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men. I had three
battalions of artillery which had been with me near
Washington, and Fitz. Lee had brought a few pieces of horse
artillery. When I speak of divisions and brigades of my troops,
it must be understood that they were mere skeletons of those
organizations.
Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been
obtained principally from the lower Valley and the counties west
of it, and the money which was obtained by contributions in
Maryland was used for that purpose. Nearly the whole of our
bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and then having it
ground, by details from my command, and it sometimes happened
that while my troops were fighting, the very flour which was to
furnish them with bread for their next meal was being ground
under the protection of their guns. Latterly our flour had been
obtained from the upper Valley, but also by details sent for that
purpose. The horses and mules, including the cavalry horses,
were sustained almost entirely by grazing.
I have no means of stating with accuracy Sheridan's force,
and can only form an estimate from such data as I have been
able to procure. Citizens who had seen his
Page 417
force stated that it was the largest which they had ever seen in
the Valley on either side, and some estimated it as high as
60,000 or 70,000, but of course I made allowance for the usual
exaggeration of inexperienced men. My estimate is from the
following data: in Grant's letter to Hunter, dated at Monocacy,
August 5th, 1864, and contained in the report of the former, is
the following statement: "In detailing such a force, the brigade
of cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be
taken into account. There are now on their way to join you three
other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 5,000 men
and horses." Sheridan relieved Hunter on the 6th, and Grant says
in his report, "On the 7th of August, the Middle Department and
the Departments of West Virginia, Washington and the
Susquehanna were constituted into the Middle Military division,
and Major General Sheridan was assigned to the temporary
command of the same. Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by
Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the
Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry on
the 11th of August."
Before this cavalry was sent to the Valley, there was already
a division there commanded by Averill, besides some detachments
which belonged to the Department of West Virginia. A book
containing the official reports of the chief surgeon of the
cavalry corps of Sheridan's army which was subsequently captured
at Cedar Creek on the 19th of October, showed that there were
present for duty in that corps, during the first week in
September, 10,000 men. The extracts from Grant's report go to
confirm this statement, as, if three brigades numbered at least
5,000 men and horses, the two divisions, when the whole of them
arrived with Averill's cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000.
I think, therefore, that I can safely estimate Sheridan's cavalry
at the battle of Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000.
His infantry consisted of the 6th, 19th, and Crook's corps, the
latter being composed of the
Page 418
"Army of West Virginia," and one
division of the 8th corps. The report of Secretary Stanton shows
that there was in the department of which the "Middle Military
division" was composed the following "available force present for
duty May 1st, 1864," to wit:
- Department of Washington . . . . .42,124
- Department of West Virginia . . . . .30,782
- Department of the Susquehanna . . . . .2,970
- Middle Department . . . . .5,627
making an aggregate of 81,503; but, as the Federal Secretary of
War in the same report says, "In order to repair the losses of
the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force designed to
guard the Middle Department and the Department of Washington
was called forward to the front," we may assume that 40,000
men were used for that purpose, which would leave 41,503,
minus the losses in battle before Sheridan relieved Hunter in the
Middle Military division, exclusive of the 6th and 19th corps,
and the cavalry from Grant's army. The infantry of the Army of
the Potomac was composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps, on the
1st of May, 1864, and Stanton says the "available force present
for duty" in that army, on that day, was 120,386 men. Allowing
30,000 for the artillery and cavalry of that army, which would be
a very liberal allowance, and there would be still left 90,385
infantry; and it is fair to assume that the 6th corps numbered
one-third of the infantry, that is 30,000 men on the 1st of May,
1864.
If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been such as to
reduce the 6th corps to less than 10,000 men, notwithstanding the
reinforcements and recruits received, the carnage in Grant's army
must have been frightful indeed. The 19th corps was just from
the Department of the Gulf and had not gone through a bloody
campaign. A communication which was among the papers
captured at Cedar Creek, in noticing some statement of a
newspaper correspondent in regard to the conduct of that
Page 419
corps at Winchester, designated it as "a vile slander on 12,000 of the
best soldiers in the Union army."
In view of the foregoing data without counting the troops in
the Middle Department and the Departments of Washington and
the Susquehanna, and making liberal allowances for losses in
battle, and for troops detained on post and garrison duty in the
Department of West Virginia, I think that I may assume that
Sheridan had at least 35,000 infantry against me. The troops of
the 6th corps and of the Department of West Virginia, alone,
without counting the 19th corps, numbered on the 1st of May,
1864, 60,784. If with the 19th corps Sheridan did not have 35,000
infantry remaining from this force, what had become of the
balance? Sheridan's artillery very greatly outnumbered mine, both
in men and guns.
Having been informed that a force was at work on the
railroad at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of
September, with Rodes' and Gordon's divisions, and Braxton's
artillery, to Bunker Hill, and on the morning of the 18th with
Gordon's division and a part of the artillery to Martinsburg,
preceded by a part of Lomax's cavalry. Averill's division of
cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the
direction of Charlestown, and we then returned to Bunker Hill.
Gordon was left at Bunker Hill, with orders to move to
Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' division
moved to the latter place that night, to which I also returned.
At Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph office, I learned
that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I expected an early
move.
Page 420
CHAPTER XLV.
BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
AT light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets, at the
crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road, were driven in,
and information having been sent me of that fact, I immediately
ordered all the troops at Stephenson's depot to be in readiness
to move, directions being given for Gordon, who had arrived from
Bunker Hill, to move at once, but by some mistake on the part of
my staff officer, the latter order was not delivered to General
Breckenridge or Gordon. I rode at once to Ramseur's position,
and found his troops in line across the Berryville road
skirmishing with the enemy. Before reaching this point, I had
ascertained that Gordon was not moving and sent back for him, and
now discovering that the enemy's advance was a real one and in
heavy force, I sent orders for Breckenridge and Rodes to move up
as rapidly as possible. The position occupied by Ramseur was
about one mile and a half out from Winchester on an elevated
plateau between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run. Abraham's Creek
crosses the Valley Pike one mile south of Winchester, and then
crosses the Front Royal road about the same distance southeast
of the town, and running eastwardly, on the southern side of the
Berryville road, crosses that road a short distance before it
empties into the Opequon.
Red Bud Run crosses the Martinsburg road about a mile and
a half north of Winchester and runs eastwardly, on the northern
side of the Berryville road, to the Opequon. Ramseur was
therefore in the obtuse angle formed by the Martinsburg and
Front Royal roads. In front of and to the right of him, for some
distance, the country was open. Abraham's Creek runs through a
deep valley, and beyond it, on the right, is high open ground, at
the intersection of the Front Royal and Millwood roads. To
Page 421
Ramseur's left the country sloped off to the Red Bud, and there
were some patches of woods which afforded cover for troops.
To the north of the Red Bud, the country is very open, affording
facilities for any kind of troops. Towards the Opequon, on the
front, the Berryville road runs through a ravine with hills and
woods on each side, which enabled the enemy to move his troops
under cover, and mask them out of range of artillery.
Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line, covering the
approaches as far as practicable, and Lomax with Jackson's
cavalry and part of Johnson's was on the right, watching the
valley of Abraham's Creek, and the Front Royal road beyond,
while Fitz. Lee was on the left, across the Red Bud, with his
cavalry and a battery of horse artillery; and a detachment of
Johnson's cavalry watched the interval between Ramseur's left
and the Red Bud. These troops held the enemy's main force in
check until Gordon's and Rodes' divisions arrived from
Stephenson's depot.
Gordon's division arrived first, a little after ten o'clock A.M.,
and was placed under cover in a rear of a piece of woods behind
the interval between Ramseur's line and the Red Bud, the
detachment of Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the right.
Knowing that it would not do for us to await the shock of the
enemy's attack, Gordon was directed to examine the ground on the
left, with a view to attacking a force of the enemy which had
taken position in a piece of wood in front of him, and while he
was so engaged, Rodes arrived with three of his brigades, and was
directed to form on Gordon's right in rear of another piece of
woods. While this movement was executed, we discovered very
heavy columns of the enemy, which had been massed under
cover between the Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to
attack Ramseur on his left flank, while another force pressed him
in front. It was a moment of imminent and thrilling danger, as it
was impossible for Ramseur's division,
Page 422
which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to withstand the
immense force advancing against it.
The only chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon upon
the flank of the advancing columns, and they were ordered
forward at once to the attack. They advanced in most gallant
style through the woods into the open ground, and attacked with
great vigor, while Nelson's battery on the right, and Braxton's
on the left, opened a destructive fire. But Evans' brigade of
Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our infantry,
received a check from a column of the enemy, and was forced back
through the woods from behind which it had advanced, the enemy
following to the very rear of the woods, and to within musket
range of seven pieces of Braxton's artillery which were without
support.
This caused a pause in our advance and the position was most
critical, for it was apparent that unless this force was driven
back the day was lost. Braxton's guns, in which now was our only
hope, resolutely stood their ground, and under the personal
superintendence of Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H.
Carter, my then Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the
enemy. This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy
staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle
flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister
shot. Just then, Battle's brigade of Rodes' division, which had
arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to
the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans'
brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge.
Our advance, which had been suspended for a moment, was
resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into
great confusion and driven from the field. This attacking force
of the enemy proved to be the 6th and 19th corps, and it was a
grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter
disorder before my two divisions, numbering a very little over
5,000 muskets.
Page 423
Ramseur's division had received the shock of the enemy's
attack, and been forced back a little, but soon recovered itself.
Lomax, on the right, had held the enemy's cavalry in check, and,
with a part of his force, had made a gallant charge against a
body of infantry, when Ramseur's line was being forced back, thus
aiding the latter in recovering from the momentary disorder.
Fitz. Lee on the left, from across the Red Bud, had poured a
galling fire into the enemy's columns with his sharpshooters and
horse artillery, while Nelson's and Braxton's battalions had
performed wonders.
This affair occurred about 11 A.M., and a splendid victory had
been gained. The ground in front was strewn with the enemy's
dead and wounded, and some prisoners had been taken. But on
our side, Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very
moment of triumph, while conducting the attack of his division
with great gallantry and skill, and this was a heavy blow to me.
Brigadier General Godwin of Ramseur's division had been killed,
and Brigadier General York of Gordon's division had lost an arm.
Other brave men and officers had fallen, and we could illy bear
the loss of any of them.
Had I then had a fresh body of troops to push our victory, the
day would have been ours, but in this action, in the early part
of the day, I had present only about 7,000 muskets, about 2,000
cavalry and two battalions of artillery with about 30 guns; and
they had all been engaged. Wharton's division and King's
artillery had not arrived, and Imboden's cavalry under Colonel
Smith, and McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, were watching the
enemy's cavalry on the right, on the Martinsburg road and the
Opequon. The enemy had a fresh corps which had not been
engaged, and there remained his heavy force of cavalry. Our
lines were now formed across from Abraham's Creek to Red
Bud and were very attenuated. The enemy was still to be seen in
front in formidable force, and away to our right, across
Abraham's Creek, at the junction of the Front Royal and Millwood
roads,
Page 424
he had massed a division of cavalry with some artillery,
overlapping us at least a mile, while the country was open
between this force and the Valley Pike and Cedar Creek Pike
back of the latter; which roads furnished my only means of
retreat in the event of disaster. My line did not reach the Front
Royal road on the right or the Martinsburg road on the left.
When the order was sent for the troops to move from
Stephenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to the
front, with Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a
cavalry force, which had driven our pickets from the Opequon on
the Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily
engaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several
determined charges of his cavalry, while his own flanks were in
great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and a
column of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on the left.
After much difficulty, and some hard fighting, General
Breckenridge succeeded in extricating his force, and moving up
the Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field
until about two o'clock in the afternoon.
In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along the
line, and the reports from the front were that the enemy was
massing for another attack, but it was impossible to tell where
it would fall. As the danger from the enemy's cavalry on the
right was very great and Lomax's force very weak, Wickham's
brigade of Fitz. Lee's cavalry had been sent from the left to
Lomax's assistance. When Wharton's division arrived, Patton's
brigade of that division was left to aid Fitz. Lee in guarding
the Martinsburg road, against the force of cavalry, which was
advancing on that road watched by Lomax's two small brigades; and
the rest of the division in the centre, in order to be moved to
any point that might be attacked. Late in the afternoon two
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which
had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps,
Page 425
which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on that
flank, on the north side of Red Bud, and, before this
overwhelming force, Patton's brigade of infantry and Payne's
brigade of cavalry under Fitz. Lee were forced back.
A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along
the Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus
getting in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two other
brigades were moved in double quick time to the left and rear,
and making a gallant charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the aid
of King's artillery, and some of Braxton's guns which were turned
to the rear, succeeded in driving it back. The division was then
thrown into line by General Breckenridge, in rear of our left and
at right angles with the Martinsburg road, and another charge of
the enemy's cavalry was handsomely repulsed. But many of the men
on our front line, hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking
they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced falling
back, thus producing great confusion. At the same time Crook
advanced against our left, and Gordon threw Evans' brigade into
line to meet him, but the disorder in the front line became so
great that, after an obstinate resistance, that brigade was
compelled to retire also.
The whole front line had now given way, but a large portion
of the men were rallied and formed behind an indifferent line of
breastworks, which had been made just outside of Winchester
during the first year of the war, and, with the aid of the
artillery which was brought back to this position, the progress
of the enemy's infantry was arrested. Wharton's division
maintained its organization on the left, and Ramseur fell back in
good order on the right. Wickham's brigade of cavalry had been
brought from the right, and was in position on Fort Hill just
outside of Winchester on the west. Just after the advance of the
enemy's infantry was checked by our artillery, it was reported to
me that the enemy had got around our right flank, and as I knew
this was practicable
Page 426
and was expecting such a movement from the cavalry on the
Front Royal road, I gave the order to retire, but instantly
discovering that the supposed force of the enemy was Ramseur's
division, which had merely moved back to keep in line with the
other troops, I gave the order for the latter to return to the
works before they had moved twenty paces.
This order was obeyed by Wharton's division, but not so well
by the others. The enemy's cavalry force, however, was too large
for us, and having the advantage of open ground, it again
succeeded in getting around our left, producing great confusion,
for which there was no remedy. Nothing now was left for us but
to retire through Winchester, and Ramseur's division, which
maintained its organization, was moved on the east of the town to
the south side of it, and put in position, forming a basis for a
new line, while the other troops moved back through the town.
Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse artillery on Fort
Hill, covered this movement and checked the pursuit of the
enemy's cavalry. When the new line was formed, the enemy's
advance was checked until nightfall, and we then retired to
Newtown without serious molestation. Lomax had held the enemy's
cavalry on the Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at
pursuit was repulsed by Ramseur near Kernstown.
As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent for the
removal of the trains, stores and sick and wounded in the
hospitals to Fisher's Hill over the Cedar Creek Pike and the Back
Road. This was done with safety, and all the wounded, except
such as were not in a condition to be moved, and those which
had not been brought from the field, were carried to the rear.
This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's front,
had lasted from daylight till dark, and, at the close of it, we
had been forced back two miles, after having repulsed the enemy's
first attack with great slaughter to him and subsequently
contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed obstinacy. We
deserved
Page 427
the victory, and would have had it, but for the enemy's immense
superiority in cavalry, which alone gave it to him.
Three pieces of King's artillery, from which the horses were
shot, and which, therefore, could not be brought off, were lost,
but the enemy claimed five, and if he captured that number, two
were lost by the cavalry and not reported to me. My loss in
killed, wounded and prisoners was severe for the size of my
force, but it was only a fraction of that claimed by the enemy.
Owing to its obedience to orders in returning to the works, the
heaviest loss of prisoners was in Wharton's division. Colonel G.
W. Patton, commanding a brigade, was mortally wounded and fell
into the hands of the enemy; Major General Fitz. Lee was also
severely wounded. In the death of Major General Rodes, I had to
regret the loss, not only of a most accomplished, skilful and
gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, but also of a
personal friend, whose counsels had been of great service to me
in the trying circumstances with which I had found myself
surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's and patriot's
duty to his country, and his memory will long be cherished by his
comrades. General Godwin and Colonel Patton were both most
gallant and efficient officers, and their loss was deeply felt,
as was that of all the brave officers and men who fell in this
battle. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy,
and some prisoners fell into our hands.
A skilful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces
would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could have
reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole force;
and later in the day, when the battle had turned against us, with
the immense superiority in cavalry which Sheridan had, and the
advantage of the open country, would have destroyed my whole
force and captured everything I had. As it was, considering the
immense disparity in numbers and equipment, the enemy had very
little to boast of. I had lost a few pieces of
Page 428
artillery and some very valuable officers and men, but the main part of my force and
all my trains had been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and
wounded was far greater than mine. When I look back to this
battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to
the incapacity of my opponent.*
*
The enemy has called this battle "The Battle of the Opequon,"
but I know of no claim it has to that title, unless it be in the
fact that, after his repulse in the forepart of the day, some of
his troops ran back across that stream.
Page 429
CHAPTER XLVI.
AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL.
AT light on the morning of the 20th, my troops moved to
Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy, and again took
position at that point on the old line--Wharton's division being
on the right, then Gordon's, Ramseur's and Rodes', in the order
in which they are mentioned. Fitz. Lee's cavalry, now under
Brigadier General Wickham, was sent up the Luray Valley to a
narrow pass at Millwood, to try to hold that valley against the
enemy's cavalry. General Ramseur was transferred to the command
of Rodes' division, and Brigadier General Pegram, who had
reported for duty about the 1st of August, and been in command of
his brigade since that time, was left in command of the division
previously commanded by Ramseur. My infantry was not able to
occupy the whole line at Fisher's Hill, notwithstanding it was
extended out in an attenuated line, with considerable intervals.
The greater part of Lomax's cavalry was therefore dismounted,
and placed on Ramseur's left, near Little North Mountain, but the
line could not then be fully occupied.
This was the only position in the whole Valley where a
defensive line could be taken against an enemy moving up the
Valley, and it had several weak points. To have retired beyond
this point would have rendered it necessary for me to fall back
to some of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, at the upper part of the
Valley, and I determined therefore to make a show of a stand
here, with the hopes that the enemy would be deterred from
attacking me in this position, as had been the case in August.
On the second day after our arrival at this place, General
Breckenridge received orders from Richmond, by telegraph, to
return to Southwestern Virginia, and I lost the benefit of his
services. He had ably co-operated
Page 430
with me, and our personal relations had been of the most pleasant
character.
In the afternoon of the 20th, Sheridan's forces appeared on
the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill,
and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22nd, were consumed by
him in reconnoitring and gradually moving his forces to my front
under cover of breastworks. After some sharp skirmishing, he
attained a strong position immediately in my front and fortified
it, and I began to think he was satisfied with the advantage he
had gained and would not probably press it further; but on the
afternoon of the 22nd, I discovered that another attack was
contemplated, and orders were given for my troops to retire,
after dark, as I knew my force was not strong enough to resist a
determined assault. Just before sunset, however, Crook's corps,
which had moved to our left on the side of Little North Mountain,
and under cover of the woods, forced back Lomax's dismounted
cavalry and advanced against Ramseur's left.
Ramseur made an attempt to meet this movement by
throwing his brigades successively into line to the left, and
Wharton's division was sent for from the right, but it did not
arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line in the same
manner as Ramseur's, but the movement produced some disorder
in both divisions, and as soon as it was observed by the enemy,
he advanced along his whole line and the mischief could not be
remedied. After a very brief contest, my whole force retired in
considerable confusion, but the men and officers of the artillery
behaved with great coolness, fighting to the very last, and I had
to ride to some of the officers and order them to withdraw their
guns, before they would move. In some cases, they had held out
so long, and the roads leading from their positions into the Pike
were so rugged, that eleven guns fell into the hands of the
enemy. Vigorous pursuit was not made, and my force fell back
through Woodstock to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the
trains being carried off safely.
Page 431
Our loss in killed and wounded in this affair was slight, but
some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the most of whom
were captured while attempting to make their way across the
North Fork to Massanutten Mountain, under the impression that
the enemy had possession of the Valley Pike in our rear. I had
the misfortune to lose my Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel A.
S. Pendleton, a gallant and efficient young officer, who had
served on General Jackson's staff during his Valley campaign, and
subsequently to the time of the latter's death. Colonel Pendleton
fell mortally wounded about dark, while posting a force across
the Pike, a little in rear of Fisher's Hill, to check the enemy.
He was acting with his accustomed gallantry, and his loss was
deeply felt and regretted.
Page 432
CHAPTER XLVII.
THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY.
ON the morning of the 23rd, I moved back to Mount Jackson,
where I halted to enable the sick and wounded, and the hospital
stores at that place to be carried off. In the afternoon
Averill's division of cavalry came up in pursuit, and after some
heavy skirmishing was driven back. I then moved to Rude's Hill
between Mount Jackson and New Market.
On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's cavalry
crossed the North Fork below Mount Jackson, and attempted to
get around my right flank, but was held in check. The enemy's
infantry soon appeared at Mount Jackson, and commenced
moving around my left flank, on the opposite side of the river
from that on which my left rested. As the country was entirely
open, and Rude's Hill an elevated position, I could see the whole
movement of the enemy, and as soon as it was fully developed, I
commenced retiring in line of battle, and in that manner retired
through New Market to a point at which the road to Port
Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine miles from Rude's Hill.
This movement was made through an entirely open country,
and at every mile or two a halt was made, and artillery opened on
the enemy, who was pursuing, which compelled him to
commence deploying into line, when the retreat would be
resumed. In this retreat, under fire in line, which is so trying
to a retiring force, and tests the best qualities of the soldier,
the conduct of my troops was most admirable, and they preserved
perfect order and their line intact, notwithstanding their
diminished numbers, and the fact that the enemy was pursuing in
full force, and every now and then dashing up with horse
artillery under the support of cavalry, and opening on the
retiring lines. At the last halt, which was at a place
Page 433
called "Tenth Legion," near where the Port Republic road leaves
the Pike, and was a little before sunset, I determined to resist
any further advance so as to enable my trains to get on the Port
Republic road; and skirmishers were sent out and artillery opened
on the advancing enemy, but after some skirmishing, he went into
camp in our view, and beyond the reach of our guns. At this point
a gallant officer of artillery, Captain Massie, was killed by a
shell. As soon as it was dark, we retired five miles on the Port
Republic road and bivouacked.
In the morning Lomax's cavalry had been posted to our left,
on the Middle and Back Roads from Mount Jackson to
Harrisonburg, but it was forced back by a superior force of the
enemy's cavalry, and retired to the latter place in considerable
disorder. Wickham's brigade had been sent for from the Luray
Valley to join me through the New Market Gap, but it arrived at
that gap just as we were retiring through New Market, and orders
were sent for it to return to the Luray Valley, and join me at
Port Republic. In the meantime, Payne's small brigade had been
driven from Millford by two divisions of cavalry under Torbert,
which had moved up the Luray Valley, and subsequently joined
Sheridan through the New Market Gap. This cavalry had been
detained by Wickham with his and Payne's brigades, at Millford, a
sufficient time to enable us to pass New Market in safety. If,
however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by Conrad's store, we
would have been in a critical condition.
On the morning of the 25th, we moved towards Port Republic,--
which is in the fork of the South Fork and South River, and where
the road through Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge crosses those
rivers,--in order to unite with Kershaw's division which had
been ordered to join me from Culpeper Court-House. We crossed the
river below the junction, and took position between Port Republic
and Brown's Gap. Fitz. Lee's and Lomax's cavalry joined us here,
and on the 26th, Kershaw's division with Cutshaw's battalion of
artillery came up, after
Page 434
having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and
repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry.
There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 26th
with the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance
towards Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk
fighting in which artillery was used.
Having ascertained that the enemy's infantry had halted at
Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27th, I moved out and drove
a division of his cavalry from Port Republic, and then encamped
in the fork of the rivers. I here learned that two divisions of
cavalry under Torbert had been sent through Staunton to
Waynesboro, and were engaged in destroying the railroad bridge
in the latter place, and the tunnel through the Blue Ridge at
Rock-fish Gap, and on the 28th I moved for those points. In
making this movement I had the whole of the enemy's infantry on
my right, while one division of cavalry was in my rear and two in
my front, and on the left was the Blue Ridge. I had therefore to
move with great circumspection.
Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South River, near
the mountain, to get between the enemy and Rock-fish Gap,
while the infantry moved in two columns, one up South River,
with the trains guarded in front by Pegram's and Wharton's
divisions, and in rear by Ramseur's division, and the other,
composed of Kershaw's and Gordon's divisions with the artillery,
on the right through Mount Meridian, Piedmont and New Hope.
McCausland's cavalry, under Colonel Ferguson, was left to
blockade and hold Brown's Gap, while Lomax, with the rest of his
cavalry and Payne's brigade, watched the right flank and rear.
Wickham's brigade, having got between Rock-fish Gap and
Waynesboro, drove the enemy's working parties from the latter
place, and took position on a ridge in front of it, when a sharp
artillery fight ensued. Pegram's division, driving a small body
of cavalry before it, arrived just at night and advanced upon
Page 435
the enemy, when he retired in great haste, taking the roads
through Staunton and west of the Valley Pike, back to the main
body. A company of reserves, composed of boys under 18 years
of age, which had been employed on special duty at Staunton, had
gone to Rock-fish Gap, and another company of reserves from
Charlottesville, with two pieces of artillery, had moved to the
same point, and when the enemy advanced towards the tunnel
and before he got in range of the guns, they were opened and he
retired to Waynesboro.
On the 29th and 30th, we rested at Waynesboro, and an
engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge, which had
been but partially destroyed.
On the 1st of October, I moved my whole force across the
country to Mount Sidney on the Valley Pike, and took position
between that place and North River, the enemy's forces having
been concentrated around Harrisonburg, and on the north bank of
the river. In this position we remained until the 6th, awaiting
the arrival of Rosser's brigade of cavalry, which was on its way
from General Lee's army. In the meantime there was some
skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry on the North River, at the
bridge near Mount Crawford and at Bridgewater above.
On the 5th, Rosser's brigade arrived and was temporarily
attached to Fitz. Lee's division, of which Rosser was given the
command, as Brigadier General Wickham had resigned. The
horses of Rosser's brigade had been so much reduced by previous
hard service and the long march from Richmond, that the brigade
did not exceed six hundred mounted men for duty, when it joined
me. Kershaw's division numbered 2,700 muskets for duty and he
had brought with him Cutshaw's battalion of artillery. These
reinforcements about made up my losses at Winchester and
Fisher's Hill, and I determined to attack the enemy in his
position at Harrisonburg, and for that purpose made a
reconnaissance on the 5th, but on the morning of the 6th it was
discovered that he had retired during the night down the Valley.
Page 436
When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I moved
forward at once and arrived at New Market with my infantry on
the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the Back and Middle roads in
pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, which was engaged in burning
houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat and hay, and had several
skirmishes with it, while Lomax also moved down the Valley in
pursuit, and skirmished successfully with the enemy's cavalry on
the 8th; but on the 9th they encountered his whole cavalry force
at Tom's Brook, in rear of Fisher's Hill, and both of their
commands were driven back in considerable confusion, with a
loss of some pieces of artillery,--nine were reported to me as the
number lost, but Grant claims eleven. Rosser rallied his command
on the Back Road, at Columbia furnace opposite Edinburg, but a
part of the enemy's cavalry swept along the Pike to Mount
Jackson, and then retired on the approach of a part of my
infantry. On the 10th, Rosser established his line of pickets across
the Valley from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, and on the 11th
Lomax was sent to the Luray Valley to take position at
Millford.
Page 437
CHAPTER XLVIII.
BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE.
HAVING heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of
his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley again on the 12th.
On the morning of the 13th we reached Fisher's Hill, and I moved
with part of my command to Hupp's Hill, between Strasburg and
Cedar Creek, for the purpose of reconnoitring. The enemy was
found posted on the north bank of Cedar Creek in strong force,
and while we were observing him, without displaying any of my
force except a small body of cavalry, a division of his infantry
was moved out to his left and stacked arms in an open field, when
a battery of artillery was run out suddenly and opened on this
division, scattering it in great confusion.
The enemy then displayed a large force, and sent a division
across the creek to capture guns which had been opened on him,
but when it had advanced near enough, Conner's brigade of
Kershaw's division was sent forward to meet this division, and
after a sharp contest drove it back in considerable confusion and
with severe loss. Conner's brigade behaved very handsomely
indeed, but unfortunately, after the enemy had been entirely
repulsed, Brigadier General Conner, a most accomplished and
gallant officer, lost his leg by a shell from the opposite side of the
creek. Some prisoners were taken from the enemy in this affair,
and Colonel Wells, the division commander, fell into our hands
mortally wounded. The object of the reconnaissance having been
accomplished, I moved back to Fisher's Hill, and I subsequently
learned that the 6th corps had started for Grant's army but was
brought back after this affair.
I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th observing the enemy,
with the hope that he would move back from his very strong
position on the north of Cedar Creek, and
Page 438
that we would be able to get at him in a different position, but he
did not give any indications of an intention to move, nor did he
evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions were
in sight of each other. In the meantime there was some
skirmishing at Hupp's Hill, and some with the cavalry at Cedar
Creek on the Back Road. On the 16th Rosser's scouts reported a
brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the Back Road, and
detached from the rest of his force, and Rosser was permitted to
go that night, with a brigade of infantry mounted behind the same
number of cavalry, to attempt the surprise and capture of the
camp. He succeeded in surrounding and surprising the camp, but
it proved to be that of only a strong picket, the whole of which
was captured--the brigade having moved its location.
At light on the morning of the 7th, the whole of my troops
were moved out in front of our lines, for the purpose of covering
Rosser's return in case of difficulty, and, after he had returned,
General Gordon was sent with a brigade of his division to Hupp's
Hill, for the purpose of ascertaining, by close inspection, whether
the enemy's position was fortified, and he returned with the
information that it was. I was now compelled to move back for
want of provisions and forage, or attack the enemy in his position
with the hope of driving him from it, and I determined to attack.
As I was not strong enough to attack the fortified position in front,
I determined to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack
him by surprise if I could.
After General Gordon's return from Hupp's Hill, he and
Captain Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were sent to the
signal station on the end of Massanutten Mountain, which had
been re-established, for the purpose of examining the enemy's
position from that point, and General Pegram was ordered to go
as near as he could to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank,
and see whether it was practicable to surprise him on that flank.
CEDAR CREEK BATTLEFIELD
Page 439
Captain Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters after dark, and
reported the result of his and General Gordon's examination, and
he gave me a sketch of the enemy's position and camps. He
informed me that the enemy's left flank, which rested near Cedar
Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was lightly picketed, and
that there was but a small cavalry picket on the North Fork of the
Shenandoah, below the mouth of the creek, and he stated that,
from information he had received, he thought it was practicable to
move a column of infantry between the base of the mountain and
the river, to a ford below the mouth of the creek. He also
informed me that the main body of the enemy's cavalry was on
his right flank on the Back Road to Winchester.
The sketch made by Captain Hotchkiss, which proved to be
correct, designated the roads in the enemy's rear, and the house of
a Mr. Cooley at a favorable point for forming an attacking column,
after it crossed the river, in order to move against the enemy and
strike him on the Valley Pike in rear of his works. Upon this
information, I determined to attack the enemy by moving over the
ground designated by Captain Hotchkiss, if it should prove
practicable to move a column between the base of the mountain
and the river. Next morning, General Gordon confirmed the report
of Captain Hotchkiss, expressing confidence that the attack
could be sucessfully made on the enemy's left and rear, and
General Pegram reported that a movement on the enemy's right
flank would be attended with great difficulty, as the banks of
Cedar Creek on that flank were high and precipitous and were
well guarded. General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss were then
sent to examine and ascertain the practicability of the route at the
base of the mountain, and General Pegram, at his request, was
permitted to go to the signal station on the mountain to examine
the enemy's position himself from that point. Directions were
given, in the meantime, for everything to be in readiness to move
that night (the 18th) and the division commanders were
Page 440
requested to be at my quarters at two o'clock in the afternoon, to
receive their final instructions.
The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the right of the
position at Fisher's Hill and around by Strasburg, leaving a
considerable body of land between it and the mountain, on which
are several farms. Whenever Fisher's Hill had been occupied by
us, this bend of the river had been occupied by a portion of our
cavalry, to prevent the enemy from turning the right of the
position, and it was now occupied by Colonel Payne with his
cavalry, numbering about 300. In order to make the contemplated
movement, it was necessary to cross the river into this bend, and
then pass between the foot of the mountain and the river below
Strasburg, where the passage was very narrow, and across the
river again below the mouth of Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps
and position were visible from a signal station on Round Hill in
rear of Fisher's Hill, and had been examined by me from that
point, but the distance was too great to see with distinctness.
From the station on the mountain, which immediately overlooked
the enemy's left, the view was very distinct, but I could not go to
that point myself, as the ascent was very rugged, and it required
several hours to go and come, and I could not leave my command
for that time. I had, therefore, necessarily, to rely on the reports of
my officers.
General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on their return,
reported the route between the mountain and river, which was a
blind path, to be impracticable for infantry, but not for artillery,
and a temporary bridge was constructed under Captain
Hotchkiss' superintendence, at the first crossing of the river on
our right.
The plan of attack on which I determined was to send the
three divisions of the 2nd corps, to wit: Gordon's, Ramseur's and
Pegram's, under General Gordon, over the route which has been
specified to the enemy's rear, to make the attack at five o'clock in
the morning, which would be a little before daybreak--to move
myself, with
Page 441
Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, and all the artillery, along the
Pike through Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left
flank as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Rosser
to move with his own and Wickham's brigade, on the Back Road
across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy's cavalry
simultaneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax should move
by Front Royal, across the river, and come to the Valley Pike, so
as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was to
judge by the sound of the firing.
At two o'clock P.M. all the division commanders, except
Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain, came to my
headquarters, and I gave them their instructions. Gordon was
directed to cross over the bend of the river immediately after
dark; and move to the foot of the mountain, where he would rest
his troops, and move from there in time to cross the river again
and get in position at Cooley's house in the enemy's rear, so as to
make the attack at the designated hour, and he was instructed, in
advancing to the attack, to move for a house on the west side of
the Valley Pike called the "Belle Grove House," at which it was
known that Sheridan's headquarters were located.
A guide, who knew the country and the roads, was ordered to
be sent to General Gordon, and Colonel Payne was ordered to
accompany him with his force of cavalry, and endeavor to
capture Sheridan himself. Rosser was ordered to move before
day, in time to attack at five o'clock next morning, and to
endeavor to surprise the enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and
Wharton were ordered to move, at one o'clock in the morning,
towards Strasburg under my personal superintendence, and the
artillery was ordered to concentrate where the Pike passed
through the lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the
attack, to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill--the movement of the
artillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of
the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized
road
Page 442
Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, so as to
make as little noise as possible.
The division commanders were particularly admonished as to
the necessity for promptness and energy in all their movements,
and they were instructed to press the enemy with vigor after he
was encountered, and to allow him no time to form, but to
continue the pursuit until his forces should be completely routed.
They were also admonished of the danger to be apprehended
from a disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men,
and they were enjoined to take every possible precaution against
it.
Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had
started, General Pegram reported to me that he had discovered,
from the signal station on the mountain, what he supposed to be
an intrenchment thrown up since Gordon and Hotchkiss made
their examination; and he suggested the propriety of attacking the
enemy's left flank at the same time Gordon made his attack, as
he would probably have more difficulty than had been anticipated.
I adopted this suggestion and determined to cross Kershaw's
division over Cedar Creek, at Bowman's Mill, a little above its
mouth, and strike the enemy's left flank simultaneously with the
other attacks, of which purpose notice was sent to General
Gordon by General Pegram.
At one o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw and
Wharton moved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg
Kershaw moved to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and
Wharton moved along the Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions
not to display his forces but avoid the enemy's notice until the
attack began, when he was to move forward, support the
artillery when it came up, and send a force to get possession of
the bridge on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied Kershaw's
division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at halfpast three
o'clock. The moon was now shining and we could see the camps.
The division was halted under cover to await the arrival of the
proper time, and I pointed out
Page 443
to Kershaw, and the commander of his leading brigade, the
enemy's position and described the nature of the ground, and
directed them how the attack was to be made and followed up.
Kershaw was directed to cross his division over the creek as
quietly as possible, and to form it into column of brigades, as he
did so, and advance in that manner against the enemy's left
breastwork, extending to the right or left as might be necessary.
At half-past four he was ordered forward, and, a very short
time after he started, the firing from Rosser, on our left, and the
picket firing at the ford at which Gordon was crossing were
heard. Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and
formed his division as directed, and precisely at five o'clock his
leading brigade, with little opposition, swept over the enemy's left
work, capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the
enemy. As soon as this attack was made, I rode as rapidly as
possible to the position on Hupp's Hill to which Wharton and the
artillery had been ordered. I found the artillery just arriving, and a
very heavy fire of musketry was now heard in the enemy's rear
from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to
the creek, capturing some prisoners, but the enemy still held the
works on our left of the Pike, commanding that road and the
bridge, and opened with his artillery on us. Our artillery was
immediately brought into action and opened on the enemy, but he
soon evacuated his works, and our men from the other columns
rushed into them.
Just then the sun rose, and Wharton's division, and the artillery
were ordered immediately forward. I rode in advance of them
across the creek, and met General Gordon on the opposite hill.
Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's works on the
right of the Pike, which were occupied by Crook's corps, and he
and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their divisions had pushed
across it in pursuit of the enemy. The rear division of Gordon's
column (Pegram's) was crossing the river at the time Kershaw's
attack was made, and General Gordon
Page 444
moved rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops and advanced
against the enemy with his own division on the left, under
Brigadier General Evans, and Ramseur's on the right, with
Pegram in the right supporting them.
There had been a delay of an hour at the river before
crossing it, either from a miscalculation of time in the dark, or
because the cavalry which was to precede his column had not
gotten up, and the delay thus caused, for which no blame is to be
attached to General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form
his lines after the alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and
Gordon's attack, which was after light, was therefore met with
greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have
encountered, and the fighting had been severe.
Gordon, however, pushed his attack with great energy, and
the 19th and Crook's corps were in complete rout, and their
camps, with a number of pieces of artillery and a considerable
quantity of small arms, abandoned. The 6th corps, which was on
the enemy's right, and some distance from the point attacked, had
had time to get under arms and take position so as to arrest our
progress. General Gordon briefly informed me of the condition of
things and stated that Pegram's division, which had not been
previously engaged, had been ordered in. He then rode to take
command of his division, and I rode forward on the Pike to
ascertain the position of the enemy, in order to continue the
attack.
There was now a heavy fog, and that, with the smoke from
the artillery and small arms, so obscured objects that the enemy's
position could not be seen; but I soon came to Generals Ramseur
and Pegram, who informed me that Pegram's division had
encountered a division of the 6th corps on the left of the Valley
Pike, and, after a sharp engagement, had driven it back on the
main body of that corps, which was in their front in a strong
position. They further informed me that their divisions were in line
confronting the 6th corps, but that there was a vacancy in the line
on their right which ought to be filled.
Page 445
I ordered Wharton's division forward at once, and directed
Generals Ramseur and Pegram to put it where it was required. In
a very short time, and while I was endeavoring to discover the
enemy's line through the obscurity, Wharton's division came back
in some confusion, and General Wharton informed me that, in
advancing to the position pointed out to him by Generals Ramseur
and Pegram, his division had been driven back by the 6th corps,
which, he said, was advancing. He pointed out the direction from
which he said the enemy was advancing, and some pieces of
artillery, which had come up, were brought into action. The fog
soon rose sufficiently for us to see the enemy's position on a ridge
to the west of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong
one. After driving back Wharton's division he had not advanced,
but opened on us with artillery, and orders were given for
concentrating all our guns on him.
In the meantime, a force of cavalry was advancing along the
Pike, and through the fields to the right of Middletown, thus
placing our right and rear in great danger, and Wharton was
ordered to form his division at once, and take position to hold the
enemy's cavalry in check. Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's
division, which had become separated from the other brigades,
was ordered up for the same purpose. Discovering that the 6th
corps could not be attacked with advantage on its left flank,
because the approach in that direction was through an open flat
and across a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed Captain
Powell, serving on General Gordon's staff, who rode up to me
while the artillery was being placed in position, to tell the General
to advance against the enemy's right flank and attack it in
conjunction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery was
opened from our right; but as Captain Powell said he did not
know where General Gordon was and expressed some doubt
about finding him, immediately after he started, I sent Lieutenant
Page of my own staff, with
Page 446
orders for both Generals Gordon and Kershaw to make the
attack.
In a short time Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20 guns on
the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram
advanced at once to the position from which the enemy was
driven, and just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on
the right, and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north
of Middletown, and take position across the Pike against the
cavalry. Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he
delivered my order to General Kershaw, but the latter informed
him that his division was not in a condition to make the attack, as
it was very much scattered, and that he had not delivered the
order to General Gordon, because he saw that neither his division
nor Kershaw's was in a condition to execute it. As soon as
Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his
place.
I then rode to Middletown to make provision against the
enemy's cavalry, and discovered a large body of it seriously
threatening that flank, which was very much exposed. Wharton's
division and Wofford's brigade were put in position on Pegram's
right, and several charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed.
I had no cavalry on that flank except Payne's very small brigade,
which had accompanied Gordon, and made some captures of
prisoners and wagons. Lomax had not arrived, but I received a
message from him, informing me that he had crossed the river
after some delay from a cavalry force guarding it, and I sent a
message to him requiring him to move to Middletown as quickly
as possible, but, as I subsequently ascertained, he did not receive
that message. Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the
appointed time, but he had not been able to surprise him, as he
was found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to the
attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th.
There was now one division of cavalry threatening my right
flank and two were on the left, near the Back Road,
Page 447
held in check by Rosser. The force of the latter was too weak to
make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and all he could do
was to watch it. As I passed across Cedar Creek after the
enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in
the enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions
was ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their
commands.
It was reported to me, subsequently, that a great number
were at the same work, and I sent all my staff officers who could
be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the
division commanders to send for their men.
After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had
taken a new position about two miles north of Middletown, and,
as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to prevent
his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the left, for
the purpose of ordering an advance.
I found Ramseur and Kershaw in line with Pegram, but
Gordon had not come up. In a short time, however, I found him
coming up from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on
Kershaw's left, and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy
from his new position--Kershaw and Ramseur being ordered to
advance at the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left
was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the
rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been
disastrous, and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found
the enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make
the assault. The advance was made for some distance, when
Gordon's skirmishers came back, reporting a line of battle in front
behind breastworks, and Gordon did not make the attack.
It was now apparent that it would not do to press my troops
further. They had been up all night and were much jaded. In
passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early
morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, and the
men scattered, and it had
Page 448
required time to re-form them. Their ranks, moreover, were much
thinned by the advance of the men engaged in plundering the
enemy's camps. The delay which had unavoidably occurred had
enabled the enemy to rally a portion of his routed troops, and his
immense force of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening
both of our flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an
advance extremely hazardous.
I determined, therefore, to try and hold what had been gained,
and orders were given for carrying off the captured and
abandoned artillery, small arms and wagons. A number of bold
attempts were made during the subsequent part of the day, by the
enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right, but they were
invariably repulsed.
Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against
Ramseur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on
Ramseur's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my
view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of
the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans'
brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that
brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed.
General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men, and
lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The
information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly along
Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the
apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in
disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me
the first intimation of Gordon's condition.
At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder
in our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was repulsed.
Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw's and
Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals, and
continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to
retrieve the partial disorder. Ramseur, however, succeeded in
retaining with
Page 449
him two or three hundred men of his division, and Major Goggin
of Kershaw's staff, who was in command of Conner's brigade,
about the same number from that brigade; and these men, with six
pieces of artillery of Cutshaw's battalion, held the enemy's whole
force on our left in check for one hour and a half, until Ramseur
was shot down mortally wounded, and the ammunition of those
pieces of artillery was exhausted. While the latter were being
replaced by other guns, the force that had remained with
Ramseur and Goggin gave way also. Pegram's and Wharton's
divisions, and Wofford's brigade had remained steadfast on the
right and resisted all efforts of the enemy's cavalry, but no portion
of this force could be moved to the left without leaving the Pike
open to the cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope at once.
Every effort to rally the men in the rear having failed,
I now had nothing left for me but to order these troops
to retire also. When they commenced to move, the
disorder soon extended to them, but General Pegram
succeeded in bringing back a portion of his command across
Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding the enemy
in check, but this small force soon dissolved. A part of
Evans' brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a
ford above the bridge for a short time, but it followed
the example of the rest. I tried to rally the men immediately
after crossing Cedar Creek, and at Hupp's Hill, but
without success.
Could 500 men have been rallied, at either of these places,
who would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery
and wagons, and the greater part of the captured artillery could
have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble. As it
was, a bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the road
between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, just above Strasburg, where
there was no other passway, thereby blocking up all the artillery,
ordnance and medical wagons and ambulances which had not
passed that point; and, as there was no force to defend
Page 450
them, they were lost, a very small body of the enemy's cavalry
capturing them.
The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill,
and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the
Back Road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The
infantry moved back towards New Market at three o'clock next
morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover the retreat
of the troops, and hold that position until they were beyond
pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten o'clock on the
20th, and the enemy did not advance to that place while he was
there. He then fell back without molestation to his former position,
and established his line on Stony Creek, across from Columbia
Furnace to Edinburg, seven miles below Mount Jackson. My
other troops were halted at New Market, about seven miles from
Mount Jackson, and there was an entirely open country between
the two places, they being very nearly in sight of each other.
Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the Front
Royal road towards Winchester, under the impression that the
enemy was being forced back towards that place, and he did not
reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had taken
place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the Luray Valley
to his former place at Millford, without molestation.
My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three pieces
of artillery, some ordnance and medical wagons and ambulances,
which had been carried to the front for the use of the troops on
the field, about 1860 in killed and wounded, and something over
1,000 prisoners. Major General Ramseur fell into the hands of the
enemy mortally wounded, and in him not only my command, but
the country sustained a heavy loss. He was a most gallant and
energetic officer, whom no disaster appalled, but his courage and
energy seemed to gain new strength in the midst of confusion and
disorder. He fell at his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his
native State has reason to be proud of his memory. Brigadier
General Battle
Page 451
was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other valuable
officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured from
the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and wounded in
this action was very heavy.
This was a case of a glorious victory given up by my own
troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for on the
ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder of the
enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men undertook to
judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. Had they but
waited, the mischief on the left would have been remedied. I have
never been able to satisfy myself that the enemy's attack in the
afternoon was not a demonstration to cover his retreat during the
night. It certainly was not a vigorous one, as is shown by the fact
that the very small force with Ramseur and Goggin held him in
check so long; and the loss in killed and wounded in the division
which first gave way was not heavy, and was the least in
numbers of all but one, though it was the third in strength, and its
relative loss was the least of all the divisions.
I read a sharp lecture to my troops, in an address published to
them a few days after the battle, but I have never attributed the
result to a want of courage on their part, for I had seen them
perform too many prodigies of valor to doubt that. There was an
individuality about the Confederate soldier which caused him to
act often in battle according to his own opinions, and thereby
impair his own efficiency; and the tempting bait offered by the
rich plunder of the camps of the enemy's well-fed and well-clothed troops was frequently too great for our destitute soldiers,
and caused them to pause in the career of victory.
Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with that of the
enemy, the rout in the morning would have been complete; as it
was, I had only about 1,200 cavalry on the field under Rosser, and
Lomax's force, which numbered less than 1,700, did not get up.
My infantry and artillery was about the same strength as at
Winchester. The
Page 452
reports of the Ordnance officers showed in the hands of my troops
about 8,800 muskets in round numbers, as follows: in Kershaw's
division 2,700, Ramseur's 2,100, Gordon's 1,700, Pegram's 1,200
and Wharton's 1,100. Making a moderate allowance for the men
left to guard the camps and the signal station on the mountain, as
well as for a few sick and wounded, I went into this battle with
about 8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery.
The book containing the reports of the chief surgeon of
Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been mentioned as captured
at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry numbered about
8,700 men for duty a few days previous, and from information
which I had received of reinforcements sent him, in the way of
recruits and returned convalescents, I am satisfied that his
infantry force was fully as large as at Winchester. Sheridan was
absent in the morning at the beginning of the fight, and had
returned in the afternoon before the change in the fortunes of the
day.*
It may be asked why with so small a force I made the attack.
I can only say we had been fighting large odds during the whole
war, and I knew there was no chance of lessening them. It was
of the utmost consequence that Sheridan should be prevented
from sending troops to Grant, and General Lee, in a letter
received a day or two before, had expressed an earnest desire
that a victory should be gained in the Valley if possible, and it
could not be gained without fighting for it. I did hope to gain one
by surprising the enemy in his camp, and then thought and still
think I would have had it, if my directions had been complied with,
and my troops had awaited my orders to retire.
*
The retreat of the main body of his army had been arrested, and a new
line formed behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field; and
he still had immense odds against me when
he made the attack in the afternoon.
Page 453
CHAPTER XLIX.
CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.
AFTER the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my
troops remained in their camp for the rest of the month without
disturbance, but on the 26th of October the enemy's cavalry
attacked Lomax at Millford and after sharp fighting was repulsed.
Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send troops to
Grant, and that the Manassas Gap Railroad was being repaired, I
moved down the Valley again on the 10th of November. I had
received no reinforcements except about 250 cavalry under
General Cosby from Breckenridge's department in Southwestern
Virginia, some returned convalescents and several hundred
conscripts who had been on details which had been revoked.
On the 11th, on our approach to Cedar Creek, it was found
that the enemy had fallen back towards Winchester, after having
fortified and occupied a position on Hupp's Hill subsequently to
the battle of Cedar Creek. Colonel Payne drove a small body of
cavalry through Middletown to Newtown and I followed him and
took position south of the latter place and in view of it. Sheridan's
main force was found posted north of Newtown in a position
which he was engaged in fortifying.
I remained in front of him during the 11th and 12th, Rosser
being on my left flank on the Back Road, and Lomax on my right
between the Valley Pike and the Front Royal road, with one
brigade (McCausland's) at Cedarville on the latter road. Rosser
had some skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry on the 11th, and
on the 12th two divisions advanced against him, and after a heavy
fight the enemy was repulsed and some prisoners captured.
Colonel Payne, who was operating immediately in my front,
likewise had a sharp engagement with a portion of the enemy's
cavalry and defended it. When
Page 454
Rosser was heavily engaged, Lomax was ordered to his
assistance, with a part of his command, and during his absence,
late in the afternoon, Powell's division of the enemy's cavalry
attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and after a severe fight
drove him back across the river with the loss of two pieces of
artillery.
At the time of this affair, a blustering wind was blowing and
the firing could not be heard; and nothing was known of
McCausland's misfortune until after we commenced retiring that
night. In these cavalry fights, three valuable officers were killed,
namely: Lieutenant Colonel Marshall of Rosser's brigade, Colonel
Radford of McCausland's brigade, and Captain Harvie of
McCausland's staff.
Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his position,
and showed no disposition to come out of his lines with his
infantry, and not being willing to attack him in his entrenchments,
after the reverses I had met with, I determined to retire, as we
were beyond the reach of supplies. After dark on the 12th, we
moved to Fisher's Hill, and next day returned in the direction of
New Market, where we arrived on the 14th, no effort at pursuit
being made. I discovered by this movement that no troops had
been sent to Grant, and that the project of repairing the Manassas
Gap Railroad had been abandoned.
Shortly after our return to New Market, Kershaw's division
was returned to General Lee, and Cosby's cavalry to
Breckenridge. On the 22nd of November two divisions of the
enemy's cavalry advanced to Mount Jackson, after having driven
in our cavalry pickets. A part of it crossed over the river into
Meem's Bottom at the foot of Rude's Hill, but was driven back by
a portion of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being pursued
by Wickham's brigade, under Colonel Munford, to Woodstock.
On the 27th, Rosser crossed Great North Mountain into
Hardy County, with his own and Payne's brigade,
Page 455
and, about the 29th, surprised and captured the fortified post at
New Creek, on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. At this place, two
regiments of cavalry with their arms and colors were captured
and eight pieces of artillery and a very large amount of ordnance,
quartermaster and commissary stores fell into our hands. The
prisoners, numbering 800, four pieces of artillery, and some
wagons and horses, were brought off, the other guns, which were
heavy siege pieces, being spiked, and their carriages and a greater
part of the stores destroyed. Rosser also brought off several
hundred cattle and a large number of sheep from Hampshire and
Hardy counties.
This expedition closed the material operations of the campaign
of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley, and, at that time, the enemy
held precisely the same portion of that valley which he held before
the opening of the campaign in the spring, and no more, and the
headquarters of his troops were at the same place, to wit:
Winchester. There was this difference, however: at the beginning
of the campaign, he held it with comparatively a small force, and,
at the close, he was compelled to employ three corps of infantry,
and one of cavalry, for that purpose, and to guard the approaches
to Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania. When I was
detached from General Lee's army, Hunter was advancing on
Lynchburg, 170 miles south of Winchester, with a very
considerable force, and threatening all of General Lee's
communications with a very serious danger.
By a rapid movement, my force had been thrown to
Lynchburg, just in time to arrest Hunter's march into that place,
and he had been driven back and forced to escape into the
mountains of Western Virginia, with a loss of ten pieces of
artillery and subsequent terrible suffering to his troops. Maryland
and Pennsylvania had been invaded, Washington threatened and
thrown into a state of frantic alarm, and Grant had been
compelled to detach two corps of infantry and two divisions of
cavalry from his army. Five or six thousand prisoners had been
Page 456
captured from the enemy and sent to Richmond, and according to
a published statement by Sheridan, his army had lost 13,831, in
killed and wounded, after he took command of it. Heavy losses
had been inflicted on that army by my command, before Sheridan
went to the Valley, and the whole loss could not have been far
from double my entire force. The enemy moreover had been
deprived of the use of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, for three months.
It is true that I had lost many valuable officers and men, and
about 60 pieces of artillery, counting those lost by Ramseur and
McCausland, and not deducting the 19 pieces captured from the
enemy; but I think I may safely state that the fall of Lynchburg
with its foundries and factories, and the consequent destruction of
General Lee's communications, would have rendered necessary
the evacuation of Richmond, and that, therefore, the fall of the
latter place had been prevented; and by my subsequent
operations, Grant's operations against General Lee's army had
been materially impeded, and for some time substantially
suspended.
My loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, at Winchester and
Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and at Cedar Creek, about
3,000, but the enemy has claimed as prisoners several thousand
more than my entire loss. I know that a number of prisoners fell
into the enemy's hands who did not belong to my command: such
as cavalrymen on details to get fresh horses, soldiers on leave of
absence, conscripts on special details, citizens not in the service,
men employed in getting supplies for the departments, and
stragglers and deserters from other commands. My army during
the entire campaign had been self-sustaining so far as provisions
and forage were concerned, and a considerable number of beef
cattle had been sent to General Lee's army; and when the
difficulties under which I labored are considered, I think I may
confidently assert that I had done as well as it was possible for
me to do.
Page 457
Shortly after Rosser's return from the New Creek expedition,
Colonel Munford was sent with Wickham's brigade to the
counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to procure forage for his horses,
and, cold weather having now set in so as to prevent material
operations in the field, the three divisions of the 2nd corps were
sent, in succession, to General Lee,--Wharton's division, the
cavalry, and most of the artillery being retained with me.
On the 16th of December, I broke up the camp at New
Market, and moved back towards Staunton, for the purpose of
establishing my troops on or near Central Railroad--Lomax's
cavalry, except one brigade left to watch the Luray Valley, having
previously moved across the Blue Ridge so as to be able to
procure forage. Cavalry pickets were left in front of New
Market, and telegraphic communications kept up with that place,
from which there was communication with the lower Valley, by
means of signal stations on the northern end of Massanutten
Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, which
overlooked the enemy's camps and the surrounding country.
The troops had barely arrived at their new camps when
information was received that the enemy's cavalry was in motion.
On the 19th, Custer's division moved from Winchester towards
Staunton, and, at the same time, two other divisions of cavalry,
under Torbert or Merrit, moved across by Front Royal and
Chester Gap towards Gordonsville. This information having been
sent me by signal and telegraph, Wharton's division was moved on
the 20th, through a hailstorm, towards Harrisonburg, and Rosser
ordered to the front with all the cavalry he could collect. Custer's
division reached Lacy's Spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg,
on the evening of the 20th, and next morning before day, Rosser,
with about 600 men of his own and Payne's brigades, attacked it
in camp, and drove it back down the Valley in some confusion.
Lomax had been advised of the movement towards
Page 458
Gordonsville, and as soon as Custer was disposed of, Wharton's
division was moved back, and on the 23rd a portion of it was run
on the railroad to Charlottesville, Munford, who had now returned
from across the great North Mountain, being ordered to the same
place.
On my arrival at Charlottesville on the 23rd, I found that the
enemy's two divisions of cavalry, which had crossed the Blue
Ridge, had been held in check near Gordonsville by Lomax, until
the arrival of a brigade of infantry from Richmond, when they
retired precipitately. I returned to the Valley and established my
headquarters at Staunton--Wharton's division and the artillery
being encamped east of that place, and Rosser's cavalry west of
it; and thus closed the operations of 1864 with me.
Page 459
CHAPTER L.
OPERATIONS IN 1865.
ON the 2nd of January, 1865, I had a consultation with
General Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my position in
the Valley, and he told me that he had left me there with the
small command which still remained in order to produce the
impression that the force was much larger than it really was, and
he instructed me to do the best I could. Before I returned from
Richmond, Rosser started with between 300 and 400 picked
cavalry, for the post of Beverly in West Virginia, and, on the
11th, surprised and captured the place, securing over 500
prisoners and some stores. This expedition was made over a very
mountainous country, amid the snows of an unusually severe
winter. Rosser's loss was very light, but Lieutenant Colonel Cook,
of the 8th Virginia Cavalry, a most gallant and efficient officer,
lost his leg in the attack, and had to be left behind.
The great drought during the summer of 1864 had made the
corn crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as Sheridan had
destroyed a considerable quantity of small grain and hay, I found
it impossible to sustain the horses of my cavalry and artillery
where they were, and forage could not be obtained from
elsewhere. I was therefore compelled to send Fitz. Lee's two
brigades to General Lee, and Lomax's cavalry was brought from
across the Blue Ridge, where the country was exhausted of
forage, and sent west into the counties of Pendleton, Highland,
Bath, Alleghany and Greenbrier, where hay could be obtained.
Rosser's brigade had to be temporarily disbanded, and the men
allowed to go to their homes with their horses, to sustain them,
with orders to report when called on,--one or two companies,
whose homes were down the Valley, being required to picket and
scout in front of New Market.
Page 460
The men and horses of Lieutenant Colonel King's artillery
were sent to Southwestern Virginia to be wintered, and most of
the horses of the other battalions were sent off under care of
some of the men, who undertook to forage them until spring.
Nelson's battalion, with some pieces of artillery with their horses,
was retained with me and the remaining officers and men of the
other battalions were sent, under the charge of Colonel Carter, to
General Lee, to man stationary batteries on his lines. Brigadier
General Long, who had been absent on sick leave for some time
and had returned, remained with me, and most of the guns which
were without horses were sent to Lynchburg by railroad. This
was a deplorable state of things, but it could not be avoided, as
the horses of the cavalry and artillery would have perished had
they been kept in the Valley.
Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subsequently sent
to Southwestern Virginia to report to General Echols for special
duty, and McNeil's company of partisan rangers, and Woodson's
company of unattached Missouri cavalry, were sent to the county
of Hardy, Major Harry Gilmor being likewise ordered to that
county, with the remnant of his battalion, to take charge of the
whole, and operate against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; but he
was surprised and captured there, at a private house, soon after
his arrival. Two very small brigades of Wharton's division, and
Nelson's battalion with the few pieces of artillery which had been
retained, were left, as my whole available force, and these were
in winter quarters near Fishersville, on the Central railroad
between Staunton and Waynesboro. The telegraph to New
Market and the signal stations from there to the lower Valley
were kept up, and a few scouts sent to the rear of the enemy,
and in this way was my front principally picketed, and I kept
advised of the enemy's movements. Henceforth my efficient and
energetic signal officer, Captain Welbourn, was the commander
of my advance picket line.
Page 461
The winter was a severe one, and all material operations
were suspended until its close. Late in February, Lieutenant Jesse
McNeil, who was in command of his father's old company, with
forty or fifty men of that company and Woodson's, made a dash
into Cumberland, Maryland, at night and captured and brought off
Major Generals Crook and Kelly, with a staff officer of the latter,
though there were at the time several thousand troops in and
around Cumberland. The father of this gallant
young officer had performed many daring exploits during the war,
and had accompanied me into Maryland, doing good service.
When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg in October, 1864, Captain
McNeil had burned the bridge at Edinburg in his rear, and had
attacked and captured the guard at the bridge at Mount Jackson,
but in this affair he received a very severe wound from which he
subsequently died. Lieutenant Baylor of Rosser's brigade,
who was in Jefferson County with his company, made one or two
dashes on the enemy's outposts during the winter, and, on one
occasion, captured a train loaded with supplies, on the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad.
On the 20th of February, an order was issued by General
Lee, extending my command over the Department of
Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee, previously
commanded by General Breckenridge, the latter having been
made Secretary of War.
On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up the
Valley with a heavy force, consisting, according to the statement
of Grant, in his report, of "two divisions of cavalry, numbering
about 5,000 each." I had been informed of the preparations for a
movement of some kind, some days previous, and the information
had been telegraphed to General Lee. As soon as Sheridan
started, I was informed of the fact by signal and telegraph, and
orders were immediately sent by telegraph to Lomax, whose
headquarters were at Millboro, on the Central Railroad, forty
miles west of Staunton, to get together all of his cavalry as soon
as possible. Rosser was also
Page 462
directed to collect all of his men that he could, and an order was
sent by telegraph to General Echols, in Southwestern Virginia, to
send his brigade by rail to Lynchburg. My own headquarters
were at Staunton, but there were no troops at that place except a
local provost guard, and a company of reserves, composed of
boys under 18 years of age, which was acting under the orders of
the Conscript Bureau. Orders were therefore given for the
immediate removal of all stores from that place.
Rosser succeeded in collecting a little over 100 men, and with
these he attempted to check the enemy at North River, near
Mount Crawford, on the first of March, but was unable to do so.
On the afternoon of that day, the enemy approached to within
three or four miles of Staunton, and I then telegraphed to Lomax
to concentrate his cavalry at Pound Gap in Rockbridge County,
and to follow and annoy the enemy should he move towards
Lynchburg, and rode out of town towards Waynesboro, after all
the stores had been removed.
Wharton and Nelson were ordered to move to Waynesboro
by light next morning, and on that morning (the 2nd) their
commands were put in position on a ridge covering Waynesboro
on the west and just outside of the town. My object in taking this
position was to secure the removal of five pieces of artillery for
which there were no horses, and some stores still in Waynesboro,
as well as to present a bold front to the enemy, and ascertain the
object of his movement, which I could not do very well if I took
refuge at once in the mountain. The last report for Wharton's
command showed 1,200 men for duty; but as it was exceedingly
inclement, and raining and freezing, there were not more than
1,000 muskets on the line, and Nelson had six pieces of artillery. I
did not intend making my final stand on this ground, yet I was
satisfied that if my men would fight, which I had no reason to
doubt, I could hold the enemy in check until night, and then cross
the river and take position in Rock-fish Gap; for I had done more
difficult things than that during the war.
Page 463
About twelve o'clock in the day, it was reported to me that the
enemy was advancing, and I rode out at once on the line, and
soon discovered about a brigade of cavalry coming up on the road
from Staunton, on which the artillery opened, when it retired out
of range. The enemy manoeuvred for some time in our front,
keeping out of reach of our guns until late in the afternoon, when I
discovered a force moving to the left. I immediately sent a
messenger with notice of this fact to General Wharton, who was
on that flank, and with orders for him to look out and provide for
the enemy's advance; and another messenger, with notice to the
guns on the left, and directions for them to fire towards the
advancing force, which could not be seen from where they were.
The enemy soon made an attack on our left flank, and I
discovered the men on that flank giving back. Just then, General
Wharton, who had not received my message, rode up to me and I
pointed out to him the disorder in his line, and ordered him to ride
immediately to that point and rectify it. Before he got back, the
troops gave way on the left, after making very slight resistance,
and soon everything was in a state of confusion and the men
commenced crossing the river. I rode across it myself to try and
stop them at the bridge and check the enemy; but they could not
be rallied, and the enemy forded the river above and got in our
rear. I now saw that everything was lost, and after the enemy had
got between the mountain and the position where I was, and
retreat was thus cut off, I rode aside into the woods, and in that
way escaped capture. I went to the top of a hill to reconnoitre,
and had the mortification of seeing the greater part of my
command being carried off as prisoners, and a force of the enemy
moving rapidly towards Rock-fish Gap.
I then rode with the greater part of my staff and 15 or 20
others, including General Long, across the mountain, north of the
Gap, with the hope of arriving at Greenwood depot, to which the
stores had been removed, before the enemy reached that place;
but on getting near
Page 464
it, about dark, we discovered the enemy in possession. We then
rode to Jarman's Gap, about three miles from the depot, and
remained there all night, as the night was exceedingly dark, and
the ice rendered it impossible for us to travel over the rugged
roads.
The only solution of this affair which I can give is that my
men did not fight as I had expected them to do. Had they done so,
I am satisfied that the enemy could have been repulsed; and I
was and am still of opinion that the attack at Waynesboro was a
mere demonstration, to cover a movement to the south towards
Lynchburg. Yet some excuse is to be made for my men, as they
knew that they were weak and the enemy very strong.
The greater part of my command was captured, as was also
the artillery, which, with five guns on the cars at Greenwood,
made eleven pieces. Very few were killed or wounded on either
side. The only person killed on our side, as far as I have ever
heard, was Colonel Wm. H. Harman, who had formerly been in
the army but then held a civil appointment; and he was shot in the
streets of Waynesboro, either after he had been made prisoner, as
some said, or while he was attempting to make his escape, after
everything was over. My aide, Lieutenant Wm. G. Callaway, who
had been sent to the left with one of the messages, and my
medical director, Surgeon H. McGuire, had the misfortune to fall
into the hands of the enemy. All the wagons of Wharton's
command were absent getting supplies; but those we had with us,
including the ordnance and medical wagons and my own baggage
wagon, fell into their hands.
On the 3rd, I rode,
with the party that was with me, towards
Charlottesville; but on getting near to that place, we found the
enemy entering it. We had then to turn back and go by a
circuitous route under the mountains to Gordonsville, as the
Rivanna River and other streams were very much swollen. On
arriving at Gordonsville, I found General Wharton, who had made
his escape to Charlottesville on the night of the affair at
Waynesboro,
GENERAL EARLY, DISGUISED AS A FARMER, WHILE ESCAPING TO MEXICO, 1865
MAJOR THOMAS P. TURNER, COMMANDANT OF LIBBY PRISON, AND GENERAL EARLY IN HAVANA, 1865
Page 465
and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by the way of the Central and
Southside Railroads, to take command of Echols' brigade, and aid
in the defence of the city. General Long was ordered to report to
General Lee at Petersburg.
The affair at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from Lynchburg,
which he could have captured without difficulty, had he followed
Hunter's route and not jumped at the bait unwillingly offered him,
by the capture of my force at the former place. His deflection
from the direct route to the one by Charlottesville was without
adequate object, and resulted in the abandonment to capture
Lynchburg, or to cross the James River to the south side. He
halted at Charlottesville for two or three days, and then moved
towards James River below Lynchburg, when, being unable to
cross that river, he crossed over the Rivanna, at its mouth, and
then moved by the way of Frederick's Hall on the Central
Railroad, and Ashland on the R., F. & P. Railroad, across the
South and North Anna, and down the Pamunkey to the White
House.
At Gordonsville, about 200 cavalry were collected under
Colonel Morgan of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, and, with this force, I
watched the enemy for several days while he was at
Charlottesville, and when he was endeavoring to cross the James
River. When Sheridan had abandoned this effort, and on the day
he reached the vicinity of Ashland, while I was riding on the
Louisa Court-House and Richmond Road, towards the bridge
over the South Anna, with about 20 cavalry, I came very near
being captured, by a body of 300 cavalry sent after me, but I
succeeded in eluding the enemy with most of those who were
with me, and reached Richmond at two o'clock next morning,
after passing twice between the enemy's camps and his pickets.
My Adjutant General, Captain Moore, however, was captured,
but made his escape.
Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his cavalry
and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position
Page 466
on the north bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that place.
Rosser had collected a part of his brigade and made an attack,
near New Market, on the guard which was carrying back the
prisoners captured at Waynesboro, with the view of releasing
them, but he did not succeed in that object, though the guard was
compelled to retire in great haste. He then moved towards
Richmond on Sheridan's track.
After consultation with General Lee, at his headquarters near
Petersburg, Rosser's and McCausland's brigades were ordered to
report to him under the command of General Rosser, and I started
for the Valley, by the way of Lynchburg, to reorganize what was
left of my command. At Lynchburg, a despatch was received
from General Echols, stating that Thomas was moving in East
Tennessee, and threatening Southwestern Virginia with a heavy
force, and I immediately went, by train, to Wytheville. From that
place I went with General Echols to Bristol, on the state line
between Virginia and Tennessee, and it was ascertained, beyond
doubt, that some important movement by the enemy was on foot.
We then returned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in
endeavoring to organize the small force in that section, so as to
meet the enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 30th
of March, a telegraphic despatch from General Lee, directing me
to turn over the command in Southwestern Virginia to General
Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and informing me
that he would address a letter to me at my home. I complied at
once with this order and thus terminated my military career.
CONCLUSION.
In the afternoon of the 30th of March, after having turned
over the command to General Echols, I rode to Marion in Smythe
County and was taken that night with a cold and cough so
violent as to produce hemorrhage
Page 467
from the lungs, and prostrate me for several days in a very
dangerous condition. While I was in this situation, a heavy cavalry
force under Stoneman, from Thomas' army in Tennessee, moved
through North Carolina to the east, and a part of it came into
Virginia from the main column, and struck the Virginia &
Tennessee Railroad at New River east of Wytheville; whence,
after destroying the bridge, it moved east, cutting off all
communication with Richmond, and then crossed over into North
Carolina. As soon as I was in a condition to be moved, I was
carried on the railroad to Wytheville, and was proceeding thence
to my home, in an ambulance under charge of a surgeon, when I
received, most unexpectedly, the news of the surrender of General
Lee. Under the disheartening influence of the sad tidings I had
received, I proceeded to my journey's end, and I subsequently
received a letter from General Lee, dated on the 30th of March,
explaining the reasons for relieving me from command. This letter,
written on the very day of the commencement of the attack on
General Lee's lines, which resulted in the evacuation of Richmond,
and just ten days before the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia, has a historical interest; for it shows that Lee, even at
that late day, was anxiously and earnestly contemplating the
continuation of the struggle with unabated vigor, and a full
determination to make available every element of success.
Immediately after the battle of Cedar Creek, I had written a
letter to General Lee, stating my willingness to be relieved from
command, if he deemed it necessary for the public interests, and I
should have been content with the course pursued towards me,
had his letter not contained the expressions of personal confidence
in me that it does; for I knew that in everything he did as
commander of our armies, General Lee was actuated solely by an
earnest and ardent desire for the success of the cause of his
country. As to those among my countrymen who judged me
harshly, I have not a word of reproach.
Page 468
When there was so much at stake, it was not unnatural that
persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and forming their opinions
from the many false reports set afloat in a time of terrible war
and public suffering, should pass erroneous and severe judgments
on those commanders who met with reverses.
I was not embraced in the terms of General Lee's surrender
or that of General Johnston, and, as the order relieving me from
command had also relieved me from all embarrassment as to the
troops which had been under me, as soon as I was in a condition
to travel, I started on horseback for the Trans-Mississippi
Department to join the army of General Kirby Smith, should it
hold out; with the hope of at least meeting an honorable death
while fighting under the flag of my country. Before I reached that
Department, Smith's army had also been surrendered, and,
without giving a parole, after a long, weary and dangerous ride
from Virginia, through the states of North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, I
finally succeeded in leaving the country.
LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE.
"HD. QRS., C. S. ARMIES,
30th March, 1865.
"LT.-GENERAL J. A. EARLY, FRANKLIN CO., VA.
"General,--My telegram will have informed you that I deem a change of
commanders in your Department necessary; but it is due to your zealous and
patriotic services that I should explain the reasons that prompted my action.
The situation of affairs is such that we can neglect no means calculated to
develop the resources we possess to the greatest extent, and make them as
efficient as possible. To this end, it is essential that we should have the cheerful
and hearty support of the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers,
without which our efforts would be embarrassed and our means of resistance
weakened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you cannot command
the united and willing co-operation which is so essential to success. Your
reverses in the Valley, of which the public and the army judge chiefly by the
results, have, I fear, impaired your influence both with the people and the
soldiers, and would add greatly
Page 469
to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our military
operations in S. W. Virginia. While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and
devotion to the cause is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not
oppose what seems to be the current of opinion, without injustice to your
reputation and injury to the service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavor to
find a commander who would be more likely to develop the strength and
resources of the country, and inspire the soldiers with confidence; and to
accomplish this purpose, I thought it proper to yield my own opinion, and to
defer to that of these to whom alone we can look for support.
"I am sure that you will understand and appreciate my motives, and no one
will be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any measures which the
interests of the country may seem to require, regardless of all personal
considerations.
"Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have always
supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you have ever
manifested in the service of the country,
"I am, very respectfully and truly
"Your ob't servant,
R. E. LEE,
"Gen'l."
Page 470
APPENDIX.
THE TESTIMONY OF LETTERS.
I FEEL reluctant to add a word to what General Early has
written of himself and yet his letters, bearing (as many of them
do) upon his manuscript, show that there are some things he has
left untold which would interest the reader of his life.
My feeling in this matter proceeds from the remembrance of
his sentiments on the subject of biography, which he forcibly
expressed in a letter written in 1866 to a correspondent who
proposed writing an account of his life, saying:
I trust that you will not suspect me of rudeness or a desire to offend when
I respectfully request that you omit mine from the list of biographies you
propose writing. If I were to furnish you the materials desired, you would
become the biographer of my choice, and I would be bound by what you might
write. I hope you will understand what I mean, and will not interpret what I say
as intended in an offensive sense. I cannot, of course, prevent your writing on
any subject you may choose.
If my biography was of sufficient importance to require its being placed
before the world, and my wishes were consulted, I would not trust its
compilation to any but one who had known me personally and well: you and I
are, personally, entire strangers. During my life I have often associated with
men who thought they knew me, but who in fact had very little appreciation of
my true character. I would not therefore expect it to be understood by one who
is a stranger.
Naturally possessing a reserved disposition, and in his
bachelor life cut off from the softening influences of familiar
intercourse to be found in the home, it was not entirely the fault
of others that he was often misunderstood: but as he has said,
those who knew him best were the ones who best appreciated
him. The opportunity of intimate acquaintance enabled one to
fathom the depths of his kindly nature and to discover his real
feelings.
In his autobiographical sketch he writes of the mother whose
death was the source of grief to her family, but he does not tell of
the affection which caused him to
Page 471
choose her companionship preferably to that of any other, nor of
the sense of deprivation he felt upon the loss of her tender
counsels at the early age of sixteen. His father was a most
thoughtful and affectionate parent, but from him, too, he was
parted during the crucial period of his youth, though that parent's
watchful care followed closely in a correspondence, preserved by
the son, during a long life of many vicissitudes.
As the son's character developed, he inspired more and more
confidence and respect, until the relations of father and son
seemed to become reversed, and, as years wore on, the position
of head of the family was insensibly accorded the son. Possessing
a sense of right never swayed by impulse, his opinion and advice
were never questioned by members of his family. His
grandmother, observing the promise of his youth, had said of him
that he was born to make a name for himself.
In his nineteenth year, while a cadet at West Point Academy,
his sympathies were very much aroused for the Texans in their
revolt against the tyranny of Santa Anna, and he wrote urging his
father's consent to his joining in their cause. This letter portrays
the disposition of the future patriot, and is in part as follows:
The Texans are bound by every principle of self-preservation and are
justified by the natural law of rights, as well as by precedent, to declare their
independence and to resist the attempt which is being made to annihilate them.
And we of the United States are called upon by every principle of humanity, by
our love of liberty and our detestation of oppression, to go to the succor of our
countrymen and aid in overwhelming the tyrant. Shall we shed tears over the
fate of Greece and Poland, yet see our countrymen slaughtered with
indifference? The respect we entertain for our forefathers of the Revolution
forbids it. The gratitude we owe another country for espousing our cause
imperiously commands us to espouse that of the oppressed. The cause of the
Texans is more justifiable than was ours. We resisted the usurpation of our
lawful government. They are resisting the tyranny and cruelty of an usurped
government. Liberty has been driven from the old world and its only asylum is
in the new. It is the imperious duty of every one, who in this fair land has
received it and its principles unsullied from his ancestors, to extend
its dominion
and to perpetuate its glorious light to posterity. How can this be done
if
Page 472tyranny more despotic than that which exists
in Europe is allowed to exist in
our very confines? In succoring the Texans we should consider that we
extend
the sway of the goddess we worship, that we secure to their progeny the
benefits of which we are so tenacious, and secure to oppressed freemen of other
countries an asylum which our own country will, ere long, not be able to afford
them . . . .
The great end of all education is to expand the mind
and gain a knowledge
of human nature. What is more calculated to expand the mind than the
espousing and working in the cause of liberty? What better book in which to
study human nature than such a variety of characters as I would be constantly
thrown with? All things cry out to me to go. Oh, my dear father, will you not
give me permission? Do not think that my resolution has been taken
unadvisedly, and do not smile at my aspirations. I do not believe that I shall
become a Bonaparte or a Bolivar, but he who never aspires, never rises.
I have confined this letter to one subject because my whole soul is taken
up with that subject.
General Early returned from Canada to the States in 1869;
that winter was devoted to visits among his relatives and friends
from whom he had been so long parted. His father died in 1870.
In the autobiography he writes of his father as still living: it is
therefore presumable that his manuscript was, at least,
commenced while he was in Canada.
Previously he had published at Toronto (in 1866), "A Memoir
of the Last Year of the War for Independence," which was
written, he states, "under a solemn sense of duty to my
unhappy
country, and to the brave soldiers who fought under me, as well
as to myself."
His correspondence was very large and in many cases
continued during years. Through this runs the story of his
unflagging interest and industry in endeavoring to confirm every
minutest detail of the narrative he desired to complete. The letters
all show the esteem in which he was held. Many of them are
written to thank him for contributions, already written, in the
defence of the South. Others urge that he prepare a complete
history of the war giving the Southern side.
From among these letters the following are selected; not the
least of the interest in which proceeds from the fact that they are
voluntary offerings, generally from
JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT C. S. A., AND MRS. DAVIS
Page 473
warm personal friends and received in the course of private
correspondence.
The first is from the pen of the beloved leader and is followed
by tributes from Jefferson Davis, Generals D. H. Hill and W. H.
Payne, Colonels Marshall and Johnston, Senator John W. Daniel,
Professors Peters and Venable, Dr. McGuire, and others,--if less
known to fame,--none the less ardent in the expression of their
regard.
LEXINGTON, VA.,
Nov., 1865.
GENERAL J. A. EARLY:
I received last night
your letter, which gave me the first authentic
information of you I had received since the cessation of hostilities and
relieved
the anxiety I had felt on your account. I am very glad to hear of your
health and
safety, and I wish you every happiness and prosperity: you will always be
present to my recollections.
I desire, if not
prevented, to write a history of the campaigns in
Virginia; all of my records, books, orders, etc., were destroyed in the
conflagration and retreat from Richmond, only such reports as were
printed are preserved. Your reports of your operations in '64 were
among those destroyed. Can you not repeat them and send me copies
of such letters, orders, etc., of mine and particularly give me your
recollection of our effective strength at the principal battles? My only
object is to transmit, if possible, the truth and do justice to our brave
soldiers.
ROBERT E. LEE.
March, 1866.
I am much obliged for
the copies of my letters. Send me report
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